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2Abstract 
 
Through a study of geopolitical codes, this thesis examines the condition of the 
Westphalian sovereign state in the post-Cold War world.  Focusing primarily on the 
events of September 11th 2001 and their aftermath, the research questions the 
sustainability of the state as conceived by (neo)realists in the context of new regional 
and global actors and the processes underpinning these. 
 
From a critical realist perspective the study uses a comparison between Europe, 
where regionalization is particularly noticeable, and the hegemonic United States, in 
order to explore how the non-state global terrorist actor and the regional European actor 
impact upon responses, characterizations and therefore geopolitical codes relating to 
terrorism.  In so doing the plausibility of emerging common European geopolitical 
codes is considered. 
 
The thesis is structured around the discussion of the codes of the United States, 
Britain and France, in addition to a more limited examination of the European Union.  
This (neo)realist component is complemented by the use of discourse analysis, a 
technique more common in critical geopolitics.  The analysis is applied to government 
documents from each of the sample states (and the EU). 
 
From this analysis the research determines that each state retains unique 
geopolitical codes while sharing many components that contribute to their reproduction 
as sovereign states.  Furthermore, although common European codes appear to be 
unlikely in these circumstances, the European context and imaginations apparent in 
Britain and France points to a regional dimension.  The thesis concludes that the 
Westphalian sovereign state remains the dominant geopolitical actor, although other 
actors impinge upon it.  This is more apparent in Europe where the regional dimension 
constitutes an added layer of governance and may signify a move away from the 
‘modern’ character of the Westphalian state that continues to be more persistent in 
hegemonic America. 
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Chapter 1
. . . . . . .
The End of the Westphalian State?  A Critical 
Realist Analysis of Geopolitical Codes in 
Hegemonic America and Europe 
. . . . . . . .
The Treaty of Westphalia – State Sovereignty 
On October 24th 1648 combatants in the Thirty Years’ War met in Münster and 
Osnabrück, divided along religious lines, and signed a treaty ending the conflict (Darby, 
2001, p.82).  The Peace of Westphalia concluded five years of negotiations (p.78); it 
became a defining document and event for the concept of state sovereignty and the 
system of states that came to dominate in subsequent centuries.  While this did not 
become entrenched immediately, when the Westphalian treaty was signed the 
sentiments were already apparent: 
 
And to prevent for the future any Differences arising in the Politick 
State, all and every one of the electors, Princes and States of the Roman 
Empire, are so establish’d and confirm’d in their ancient Rights, 
Prerogatives, Libertys, Privileges, free exercise of Territorial Right, as 
well as Ecclesiastick, as Politick Lordships, Regales, by virtue of this 
present Transaction: that they never can or ought to be molested therein 
by any whomsoever upon any manner of pretence. (Treaty of 
Westphalia, 1648) 
 
Sovereignty, therefore, implies the absolute power of the state over a given territory; the 
state is the only actor to hold such power and, as the passage suggests, no actor, state or 
otherwise, has the right to intervene within the boundaries of another state.  Agnew 
(2005) reflects: 
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‘The importance of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, for example, lay in 
the mutual recognition among elites of the new European territorial 
states as a set of neutral centers of public power in the face of 
devastating religious wars.’ (p.440). 
 
By accepting each other’s sovereignty this new territoriality was established as the 
foundation for geopolitics in the modern era.   
 
However: 
 
‘Whereas sovereignty in the Westphalian sense centered on the authority 
granted to the monarch within a delineated territory, the rise of popular 
sovereignty through the revolutions of the eighteenth century in the 
United States and France signalled the rise of the sovereign nation-state.’ 
(Rudolph, 2005, p.5). 
 
Just as the exclusive authority over territory arising out of the Westphalian treaty 
reflected the modernist thought emerging from the Enlightenment, so too did this new 
concept of the nation-state.  Together they produced the territoriality and related state 
based governance that was to become ever more prevalent through the 19th and 20th 
centuries.  With this spacio-political resolution came the discourses that reproduced and 
privileged it as the natural, and inevitable, culmination of progress, giving sovereign 
territorial states, and the elites who govern them, a status and power underpinned by the 
realist geopolitics characteristic of this structure. 
 
The Aims and Scope of the Thesis 
Events and changes occurring in the late 20th century and the early 21st century 
have brought into question the Westphalian order.  This thesis examines this period 
from a critical realist perspective, with the aim of gaining an improved understanding of 
the changes and developments, and assessing whether it constitutes a defining moment 
ending the Westphalian state’s pre-eminent position in geopolitics, or if in fact it retains 
that status while evolving in response to the new conditions.  Central to the study will 
be the analysis of geopolitical codes, and specifically how these have been/are being 
reinvented since the end of the Cold War, and particularly following September 11th.
Given the way in which events the of that day have been used to promote policies of the 
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hegemonic1 United States, as well as many other states, geopolitical codes related to 
terrorism are the subject of the analysis.  By looking at these codes the thesis attempts to 
approach an understanding of how states are representing a non-state actor – the 
terrorist2 – through discourse, and therefore how they are responding to the globalizing 
forces apparent at this time that underpin the international terrorist actor itself. 
 
By researching three states – The United States, Britain and France – a 
comparison will be made between the construction of codes in Europe and in America.  
In so doing, the impact of regionalization on European codes, and the possibility of a 
common European code, can be considered.  This brings another non-state actor, 
regional governance, into focus.  Again, the presence of such non-state actors 
potentially challenges the dominance, and perhaps even the existence, of the sovereign 
state, thus the way in which they are represented in state codes, and the existence or 
otherwise of common codes, should offer some indication as to the persistence of the 
state and the Westphalian order in a world where regionalizing forces appear to be at 
work, if unevenly.  Two major non-state actors are, therefore, considered in this thesis 
in terms of their effects on the state and its codes; firstly international terrorism, an actor 
reflecting globalizing forces; and secondly regional (and layered) governance, an actor 
more closely associated with the state, but arguably with the potential to diminish or 
even replace it. 
 
This introductory chapter seeks to explain why geopolitical codes are an 
effective focus when studying the state and its reaction to other actors.  Secondly, the 
post-Cold War/post-September 11th period is identified as an appropriate and interesting 
 
1 The hegemonic state or the hegemon is used here to refer to the most powerful state in the world at 
present.  Taylor and Flint (2000) say: ‘In world systems theory, a state is hegemonic when it captures the 
majority of the world-economy’s economic capabilities.’ (p.34).  This is true of the United States, and 
allows it to assume a military dominance (or perhaps the other way round), economic and military power 
bring with them considerable political power.  Thus, the hegemon is dominant and more powerful than 
any rival in all three spheres, a situation that is likely to sustain for a period of time (possibly several 
decades, if not longer). 
2 The term terrorist is widely used, and is generally assumed to refer to one who engages in terrorism and 
in so doing causes terror.  As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2, these are problematic terms, 
the meaning of which tends to depend upon the view of the person using it.  Most often ‘terrorism’ and 
‘terrorist’ are used as derogatory terms to remove legitimacy from actors and actions opposed to the 
speaker/writer.  This ignores the potential for all actors to cause terror whether they are governments or 
not.  In this thesis the term terrorist is used in this most common understanding as the state elites use it.  
As such, it is used with a hint of irony as it is this discursive construction of the ‘Other’ that is being 
researched.  However, it is used here, for want of a better term, in order to make clear which constructed 
‘Other’ is being referred to, while recognizing that it is not only ‘terrorists’ who cause terror. 
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time in respect of the role of the state, given the globalizing and regionalizing forces at 
work, and the events that have punctuated it.  This is addressed by briefly reflecting on 
the Cold War geopolitics that preceded the period in question, before considering the 
changes that have occurred following the Cold War, and then the impact of September 
11th. Thirdly, the argument is made for the comparison of Europe and America and, in 
particular, the three states that have been selected.  Finally, the structure of the thesis 
will be outlined, discussing the purpose of the subsequent chapters. 
 
Geopolitical Codes 
Realist theory emerged from the same Enlightenment reasoning as the sovereign 
state.  As such, realists suggest that the state is the most important actor in geopolitics 
and answers to no higher unit of governance.  It is the culmination of political progress, 
and represents the natural order.  Neorealism adds to this the anarchical system of states, 
the structure through which behaviour and outcomes can be explained (Evans and 
Newnham, 1998, p.364).  Consequently, these theories lack an adequate explanation of 
change and how states have assumed the powerful positions that they have.  There is 
little consideration of the sub-state processes and no place for present or future non-state 
actors.  Conversely, for critical geopolitics practitioners, the Westphalian order must be 
understood as a product of discourse rather than being natural and inevitable.  However, 
although this is an effective tool in the analysis of the geopolitical practice3 of powerful 
state elites, the research in this thesis also acknowledges the continuing role of the state.  
It is the most important actor, given that it continues to be the main scale at which 
governance is practiced, power is held and discourse is (re)produced.  Thus, the research 
is based on a critical realist methodology. 
 
Hence, it is the state that is the subject of the research, and in particular 
geopolitical codes.  The concept of the geopolitical code was originally expressed by 
Gaddis (1982) in his analysis of post-war security policy in the United States.  He says:  
 
‘…I would suggest that there exist for presidential administrations 
certain “strategic” or “geopolitical” codes, assumptions about American 
 
3 Geopolitical practice refers to the actions or the performance of geopolitics.  This might include military 
engagements, signing treaties, passing resolutions or even speaking about geopolitics.  It is the practical 
playing out of geopolitical imaginings and representations, a process by which these representations are 
themselves normalized and established. 
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interests in the world, potential threats to them, and feasible responses, 
that tend to be formed either before or just after an administration takes 
office, and barring very unusual circumstances tend not to change much 
thereafter.’ (p.ix). 
 
These codes are therefore relatively stable frameworks for understanding the world, but 
as Gaddis suggests they are capable of change, spatially depending on assumptions 
about interests and threats to a given state, and temporally depending on the government 
and perceived circumstances impinging upon a state.   
 
Thus, applying the concept more widely, Dijkink (1998) notes: 
 
‘The Cold War was an extremely dominant geopolitical model (or world 
order) but it apparently permitted the emergence of slightly different 
geopolitical codes not only in the course of time in the US but also 
simultaneously between members of the Atlantic alliance.’ (p.293). 
 
The codes that are developed, and the policies that these contribute to, are therefore 
specific to the state, even if they sometimes converge.  It is the perception of a state’s 
interests (or those of the powerful elites in a state) that drives the process of code 
(re)formation: ‘The key element of such codes is the definition of state interest. (Taylor, 
1990, p.13).  Furthermore, ‘The differential valuation of places – regions and other 
states – means that practical geopolitical reasoning in the form of geopolitical codes 
provides the political geography assumptions informing foreign policy.’ (p.13).  
Through geopolitical codes, policy and responses to external actors can be generated 
that conform to the assumptions underlying and constituting those codes. 
 
For Taylor and Flint (2000) geopolitical codes are: 
 
‘…the set of strategic assumptions that a government makes about other 
states in forming its foreign policy… …Such operational codes involve 
evaluation of places beyond the state’s boundaries in terms of their 
strategic importance and as potential threats.  Geopolitical codes are not 
just state-centric; they also involve a particular single state’s view of the 
world.  They are by definition, therefore, highly biased pictures of the 
world.’ (p.91). 
 
Hence, they are irreducible from discourse relating both to the sovereign state generally 
and to the construction of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other(s)’ specifically.  The critical realism 
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adopted here implies that the state is the actor that is most worthy of analysis, and 
therefore geopolitical codes must be considered crucial in understanding the actions of 
states and the elites that generate the codes, but at the same time the states themselves, 
and the codes they produce, must be subjected to critical analysis, taking account of 
their discursive underpinnings. 
 
Taylor and Flint note that: ‘Geopolitical codes operate at three levels – local, 
regional and global.’ (p.91).  These scales are therefore relevant in the appreciation of 
post-Cold War geopolitical codes.  This research, however, is interested in how codes 
relate to international terrorism specifically, given the way in which this has come to 
dominate following September 11th. As a result, when examining codes, it is the strands 
relating to international terrorism that are under scrutiny; each state may construct codes 
that influence their relations with other states locally, regionally and globally, but these 
are not necessarily directly in accordance with the aims of this research.  Therefore, the 
codes discussed in this thesis are those linked to the representation and understanding of 
international terrorism, and how this intersects the three scales.  It is not an analysis of 
every geopolitical code emanating from the states in the study, rather the research seeks 
to use the codes as they apply to terrorism to gain an understanding of how states are 
imagining their roles regionally and globally, in addition to their reproduction of the 
‘Self’ nationally, in a world where neorealist assumptions of the state as the only 
important geopolitical actor are increasingly challenged. 
 
The Cold War 
The Cold War demonstrated how dominant neorealism and the sovereign state 
had become in geopolitics.  This was the defining geopolitical conflict that dominated 
the world in the period prior to that studied in this thesis, and therefore provides the 
background to the later discourses and geopolitical codes of the post-Cold War period.  
It was a bi-polar conflict understood through binary discourse, and contested by two 
powerful states and their assorted allies.  Dalby (1990) discusses the American 
representation of the Soviet ‘Other’: ‘The differences are the key to the danger; “they” 
are dangerous specifically because of how “they” are different.’ (p.54), and notes: 
‘…the construction of a menacing USSR facing a benign USA.’ (p.73).  Thus, 
negativity is assigned to the ‘Other’ state, reinforcing the ‘positive’ identity of the 
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‘Self’.  In a world where the state is understood to be the only relevant actor this 
reproduction of identity is relatively straightforward; the more complex politics of the 
inside is contrasted with the simplistic interpretations of state relations on the outside.  
By dividing the world into two blocks of states Cold War discourse made this even 
simpler, every event and action could be understood through the prism of the Cold War. 
 
The End of the Cold War, and the Post-Cold War World 
When the Soviet Union finally broke up in December 1991, following the 
collapse of Eastern Europe’s Communist governments in 1989, the Cold War was over.  
The ‘Other’ against which the United States and the West had been juxtaposed no 
longer existed.  Agnew and Corbridge (1995) reflect: 
 
‘The dissolution of the Cold War, the increased velocity and volatility of 
the world economy, the emergence of political movements outside the 
framework of territorial states (arms control, human rights, ecological, 
etc.), all call into question the established understanding of the spatio-
temporal framing of “international relations”.’ (p.80). 
 
Consequently, the end of the Cold War, and the globalizing forces that were 
increasingly impacting upon states, created a post-Cold War world that, to some, 
appeared more complex and difficult to understand compared to the apparently 
straightforward neorealist conflict that had ended.  By bringing into question the 
assumptions of the Westphalian state and the neorealist discourse surrounding it, post-
Cold War geopolitics is an appropriate and fascinating area for research. 
 
Where the Cold War world was characterized by conflicting sovereign states, the 
post-Cold War world has seen the increasing importance, or at least a greater 
acknowledgement, of other actors, with international terrorism and regional governance 
the most relevant to this study.  McGrew (2005) comments: 
 
‘The Westphalian conception of sovereignty as an indivisible, 
territorially exclusive form of public power is being displaced by a new 
sovereignty regime – in which sovereignty is understood as the shared 
exercise of public power and authority.  In this respect we are witnessing 
the emergence of a post-Westphalian world order.’ (p.33). 
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At the same time the state continues to be of vital importance, particularly due to the 
dominance that neorealist discourse has in interpretations.  It is through this discourse 
that inter-state relations are focused.  Nevertheless, the role of globalization cannot be 
ignored as it undermines the neorealist assumptions of state sovereignty, and boundaries 
between the inside and outside.  Goetschel (2000) says: ‘In the field of international 
security, globalisation has most often been associated with ecological degradation, 
refugee flows, international crime, uncontrolled proliferation, and religions 
fundamentalism.’ (p.264).  This is not to say that globalization and its effects were 
absent during the Cold War, but they do appear to have become more noticeable. 
 
Concurrent with globalization has been a process of regionalization.  This is 
most developed in Europe with the emergence of the European Union, and again has 
accelerated after the Cold War with expansion into Eastern Europe.  Acharya (2002a) 
argues that: ‘Regionalism is becoming, and facing the pressure to become, less 
sovereignty bound, in the sense of going against the norms of non-interference and non-
intervention that had underpinned the Westphalian international system.’ (p.20).  Hence, 
as with globalization, regionalization is a process that undermines neorealism through 
its challenge to the sovereign state; it is a development that serves to destabilise the 
territorial fixity and dominance of the state through multi-level rescaling of governance, 
adding complexity to the territoriality of the Westphalian order. 
 
Post-September 11th 
September 11th made the changing circumstances clearer than ever: 
 
‘The events and aftermath of September 11th ineluctably ended the 
already precarious distinction between domestic space, that within a 
sovereign state, and more global space where transnational networks, 
international relations, multinational institutions, and global corporations 
operate.  If it existed, any comfortable distinction between domestic and 
international, here and there, us and them, ceased to have meaning after 
that day.’ (Hyndman, 2003, p.1). 
 
All these actors overlap and reveal the reduced relevance of the sovereign state.  The 
confusion in the aftermath of the Cold War was simplified, for many, post-September 
11th, yet showed complexities of postmodern warfare.  Despite the fact that terrorism is 
not a state enemy corresponding to the neorealist concept of a system of states, it could 
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nonetheless be used as a new focus for the reproduction of the ‘Self’, it is a new ‘Other’ 
in a world of multiple actors.  When attempting to understand the post-Cold War world 
it, therefore, seems appropriate to examine the period following September 11th, as this, 
and terrorism generally, became projected as a, if not the, principal focus of geopolitics 
for the hegemon/core. 
 
Europe and America – A Comparison 
In the context of the globalizing and regionalizing forces that have been 
prevalent in the post-Cold War world, and indeed that have contributed to the greater 
importance of international terrorism in reality and in the representations of state elites, 
makes a comparison between Europe and the United States an effective vehicle for 
investigating how geopolitical codes have been reinvented in this period.  Europe is the 
site of the thickest regional layer of governance, and also has a history of global 
engagements.  The United States was one of the super-powers engaged in the Cold War, 
and remains the most powerful state in the world, it is also the state that has initiated a 
‘war on terrorism’.  In many ways, therefore, this state is a suitable example of a 
(neo)realist sovereign state and so can be compared to European states that have been 
drawn into, and reflect regionalization to varying degrees.  Two European states are 
selected here for study, the United Kingdom and France.  Both have a history of global 
engagement and a tendency to assume the status of major powers, however Britain has 
followed an Atlanticist course, tending to associate more closely with America, while 
France has adopted a more independent and distanced relationship with the hegemon, 
and has been a more enthusiastic advocate of European integration.  Comparing all three 
states, and introducing some European Union material, should facilitate a discussion on 
the possibilities for common European geopolitical codes undermining the traditional 
Westphalian model, or the influence the presence of a regional layer might have upon 
the construction of codes in states.   
 
The Research Questions 
Four main research questions will be addressed in the thesis, as shown in Box 
1.1 below.  These encompass both the individual state codes and the comparison 
between the states generally and Europe and America in particular.  The latter two 
questions concentrate on how the states have responded to the processes of 
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regionalization and globalization.  These principal questions will be expanded further in 
the following chapter. 
Box 1.1 
Principal Research Questions 
For the United States, the United Kingdom and France, what are the 
geopolitical codes in relation to international terrorism post-September 
11th?
When comparing the three states and the European Union, is there an 
identifiable European geopolitical code, and how do European codes differ 
from those of the United States? 
 
In the context of regionalization, and in their responses to the networked 
and non-state character of international terrorism, is the character of 
European states undergoing a process of change? 
 
Can it be said that Europe consists of ‘postmodern’ states while the United 
States remains a ‘modern’ state? 
The Structure of the Thesis 
This chapter has attempted to set out the foundations on which the subsequent 
chapters are built.  It has placed the present geopolitical situation in the context of the 
beginnings of the sovereign state and the more recent history of the Cold War, and in so 
doing has introduced the possibility that change may again be occurring as globalizing 
and regionalizing forces impinge on the state and allow other non-state actors, like 
international terrorists and regional governance, to acquire a greater role in geopolitics 
in contradiction of the neorealist discourse that has dominated thinking on the subject.  
The events of September 11th have brought these issues into sharper focus and provided 
a potential new ‘Other’ against which the state ‘Self’ can be reproduced, but in this case 
it is a non-state ‘Other’.  It has been noted that a critical realist methodology allows the 
state to be accepted as the dominant actor without assuming it to be permanent or 
inevitable, the critical element enables an understanding of the discourses underpinning 
the state, and representations of the terrorist ‘Other’, that contribute to the construction 
of geopolitical codes and hence policies of state elites. 
 
Chapter two develops the theoretical background that was introduced here.  
Expanding on the roots of the sovereign state in the Enlightenment and modernism, it 
explains how this is interrelated with (neo)realism as the hegemonic geopolitical theory.  
This is contrasted with critical geopolitics as an alternative.  Combining elements of the 
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two approaches, the argument is made for critical realism as the most effective way of 
understanding the state and its actions.  Following from this, the consistent reproduction 
of binary discourse is examined from the origins of the state itself, through colonialism 
and the Cold War.  From this, post-Cold War geopolitics are addressed, noting how the 
existing discourses continue to evolve in response to new realities.  September 11th is 
discussed in this context, and the discursive construction of a threatening terrorist 
‘Other’ is examined.  The chapter also expands on theories and effects of globalization.  
It then looks at governance, firstly at the global scale in relation to the globalizing 
forces, and then regionally, particularly in Europe, with the possibility of layered 
governance being identified.  A theoretical discussion on the consequences of all these 
processes for borders, territoriality and citizenship completes the chapter. 
 
The methodology used in the research is set out in chapter three.  This explains 
how the entire study and methods used are derived from the critical realism that 
underpins it.  It is shown that concentrating on state codes is a reflection of this, and 
furthermore the main method – discourse analysis – comes from the critical element of 
the philosophy.  The choice of states, selection of corpuses, and sampling are all 
discussed, as is the discourse analysis itself and interpretation of the results.  This 
chapter gives the background to the material presented in the empirical chapters that 
follow, communicating how they are a product of the methodology adopted by the 
researcher, and emphasizing that they must be understood in this context. 
 
Chapters four to six exhibit the empirical results of the analysis of material from 
the United States, Britain and France respectively.  In each case, the historical and 
political factors that influence the construction of geopolitical codes are outlined.  These 
are considered to apply at either the national, regional or global scales where the 
geopolitical codes operate.  The cores of these chapters discuss the results of the 
discourse analysis, looking at how binary discourse is used in the construction of the 
‘Self’ and the ‘Other’, and the threat thereof.  The particular narratives that each state 
draws upon in its responses to the terrorist threat that has been constructed are then 
identified, demonstrating the links between all these discourses and narratives.  The 
chapters also attempt to make connections between these post-Cold War/post-
September 11th representations and the historical/political contexts, and also the 
relationships with the theory of the state, geopolitics and globalization/regionalization 
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as discussed in chapter two.  This allows conclusions to be reached on the geopolitical 
codes of the three states and the scales at which these operate in relation to international 
terrorism. 
 
The final empirical chapter – chapter seven – deals with the comparison between 
the three states.  It examines how the states define themselves at the three scales, if at 
all, before looking at how they represent space and the ‘Other’.  Differences in the 
response to terrorism are then considered in light of these representations.  In addition, 
this chapter has a section covering the regional layer in Europe, with discourse analysis 
results for EU documents.  Again, all of this is placed in the context of the theory, most 
notably of globalization and regionalization, and the implications for states.  
Conclusions are then made on how the state codes are each affected or otherwise by the 
processes acting upon them and their particular contexts. 
 
The last chapter (chapter eight) reveals the conclusions.  This thesis uses theory 
and methods derived from critical geopolitics in a neorealist context, attempting to offer 
an insight into how sovereign states are constructing their geopolitical codes in this new 
post-Cold War/post-September 11th environment.  Accepting that the hegemony of 
neorealism in geopolitics has led to states as real and dominant actors, but approaching 
these from a critical standpoint, offers an alternative research methodology to the more 
common division between neorealist and critical research.  The role of the state and its 
geopolitical codes, as reproduced through discourse, can therefore be assessed in 
relation to global and regional forces.  As such, this final chapter puts the findings back 
into the context of the wider body of theory with the intention of enhancing, to some 
extent, understandings of the role of the Westphalian sovereign state in geopolitics, at a 
time when some might question its continuing relevance. 
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Chapter 2
. . . . . . .
Philosophical Foundations, Geopolitics and 
Forces of Change: A Review of the Literature 
. . . . . . . .
Introduction 
While the purpose of this thesis is to examine geopolitical codes in the post-Cold 
War world, and particularly post-September 11th, this cannot be detached from 
geopolitics over the longer duration.  Equally, comparing Europe and the United States 
brings into question particular ways of looking at geopolitics.  The point of this chapter 
is, therefore, firstly to set the research in the context of earlier geopolitics.  Secondly, 
and perhaps most importantly, through this I seek to identify and discuss the principal 
philosophical positions used to interpret geopolitics, and consequently establish my own 
standpoint in this respect.  In doing so, I intend to create a foundation on which later 
analysis and critiques can be made.  Finally, I aim to set my own research within a 
wider body of literature, and demonstrate the main subsets of literature and theory that 
impinge upon the research.  These three objectives are not mutually exclusive.  In other 
words they will not be addressed one by one.  Instead they should be accomplished in 
the chapter as a whole. 
 
Building on the background to the sovereign state discussed in the introductory 
chapter, this chapter begins by looking at understandings of the state, and of geopolitics, 
as related to the Enlightenment thought from which both emerged.  This first section – 
Realism and Critical Alternatives – therefore starts with a discussion of the modernist 
roots of the sovereign state.  This facilitates a progression to an examination of realism, 
as the dominant philosophical position for analysing and practicing geopolitics since the 
establishment of the sovereign state.  Contrasting this with critical geopolitics, 
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demonstrates how theorists adhering to such practices have deconstructed realism and 
the state system, revealing it to be discursively constructed rather than the ‘natural’ 
representation claimed by the realists. 
 
The second section takes the theory from the first, and discusses how discourses 
have been used in constructing worldviews and ultimately geopolitical codes in the past.  
The focus here is on Temporal Transitions – how discourses, and therefore codes, 
change over time while drawing upon established discursive structures.  This involves 
introducing the concept of Orientalism as a major colonial discourse.  The focus then 
moves to the Cold War, including how Orientalism could be drawn upon in 
representations of the ‘Other’ in this conflict.  From here I shall proceed to the post-
Cold War period.  The discussion will address the construction of representations 
through familiar discourses and the implications of this.  In addition, throughout this 
section, the ways in which the nation/state is reproduced, and the use of discourse in the 
normalization of particular state policies should also be drawn out.  This provides the 
background for an appreciation of the post-September 11th period. 
 
Post-September 11th Geopolitics examines the way in which terrorism has been 
constructed as a new threatening ‘Other’.  Beginning by exploring various definitions of 
terrorism, it proceeds to look at the links to the past that are used in such 
representations, in another example of the progression made apparent in the previous 
section.  The use, once again, of binary discourse and deployment of ‘common sense’ 
assumptions that were prevalent in the Cold War, are identified here.  These provide the 
basis for justifying particular responses by the state, and the dismissal of alternatives. 
 
A section introducing the process of Globalization begins to explain processes 
that impinge upon the state and the non-state actors that these may facilitate.  The term 
is defined and its implications pondered.  Fluidity and networks are of note given their 
relevance to international terrorism.  The apparent ability of terrorist networks to 
penetrate state borders raises questions for the sovereign territorial state; this is 
discussed here. 
 
The penultimate section covers Governance. This is crucial to the question of 
European geopolitical codes and of Europe as the location for ‘postmodern’ states.  It is 
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also important to consider the global scale when discussing globalization and actors 
operating outside the neorealist state system.  Thus, the potential for understanding 
governance to operate beyond the state is explored.  Regional layers are considered, 
with the European case being of particular relevance, both for its level of regionalization 
and due to its relevance to the subject of the thesis.  This precedes a discussion of the 
potential for governance to operate simultaneously at different scales, and also how this 
may lead to differences between regions and/or states. 
 
The final section focuses on major Implications of these changes or moves away 
from (neo)realism and its structures.  This is essentially divided into two main 
subsections: Borders and Territoriality. The first of these looks to define what borders 
are/mean, and then address how changes to borders could be taking effect as a result of 
processes such as globalization and regionalization; particularly prescient in the light of 
September 11th. This feeds into territoriality, which is closely related to borders.  Thus, 
the likelihood for changes in territoriality is assessed in the context of the realist forms 
that have dominated in the sovereign state.  Regional governance is also important in 
this respect, and so the European dimension is brought up again.  From here I shall 
attempt to draw out some conclusions from the chapter as a whole and then to frame the 
detailed research questions that the thesis will attempt to answer. 
 
Realism and Critical Alternatives 
Enlightenment and Modernity 
 Traditionally geopolitics, both in theory and practice, has been dominated by 
realist analysis.  This emerged as a function of modernism and the sovereign state (a 
new spatial form developed in line with this philosophy).  The Enlightenment brought a 
new mode of thought to Europe that emphasised progress, science and discovery.  In 
modernism, says Harvey (1989),  
 
‘The idea was to use the accumulation of knowledge generated by many 
individuals working freely and creatively for the pursuit of human 
emancipation and the enrichment of daily life.  The scientific domination 
of nature promised freedom from scarcity, want, and the arbitrariness of 
natural calamity.  The development of rational forms of social 
organization and rational modes of thought promised liberation from the 
irrationalities of myth, religion, superstition, release from the arbitrary 
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use of power as well as from the dark side of our own human natures.’ 
(p.12).   
 
This was the background to an understanding that space and politics could be 
appreciated scientifically and that rational explanations could be derived from this.  
Particular spacio-political formations must possess superiority over others and represent 
evidence of progress.   
 
The Sovereign State 
The treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is widely considered to have heralded the birth 
of the realist ‘nation-state’.  Non-interference by each state in another’s internal space 
was the principle drawn from this treaty, encapsulated in the concept of sovereignty.  
This involved a binary division between internal and external affairs that is an 
expression of the modernist resolution of space-time relations (Walker, 1993, p.16).  In 
theory sovereignty, when applied to the state, gives that state absolute authority over a 
clearly bounded territory (Agnew, 2005, p.439).  As such, no other state or actor has the 
right to interfere in that space.  This is usually expressed as a monopoly of violence 
within the state territory. In the words of McGrew (2005): ‘Sovereignty involved the 
rightful entitlement to exclusive, unqualified, and supreme rule within a delimited 
territory.’ (p.30). 
 
While the Treaty of Westphalia may have marked the beginning of the sovereign 
state it did not immediately, and arguably it never did, become established absolutely 
other than in core states.  It can, however, be argued that this treaty was the start of what 
became a new world order based upon (ostensibly) sovereign states.  Thus: 
‘…Westphalia refers to the state-centric character of world order premised on full 
participatory membership accorded exclusively to territorially based political actors that 
qualify as sovereign states.’ (Falk, 2004, p.4).  In other words, in the Westphalian world 
order, only states considered to be sovereign over a given territory are accepted as 
legitimate actors at the global scale. 
 
(Neo)Realism 
While idealists advocating the development of international law and world 
government have also founded their ideas in modernist discourse, it is realism that has 
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become hegemonic in geopolitical practice.  Traditional realism concentrated on the 
units (states) and, in particular, their relative power.  Thus for realists it was necessary 
to build/reinforce the power of the state, in order to protect it from other states in the 
anarchy they understand exists beyond/outside the state borders (Beeson and Bellamy, 
2003, p.349).  This position has been refined by neorealists.  Neorealism seeks to 
introduce an additional structural element.  Two separate systems can be identified, that 
can, indeed must, be studied separately.  The internal politics of the state are, they 
claim, irrelevant at the international scale.  Waltz (1986b) stresses that ‘One cannot 
infer the condition of international politics from the internal composition of states, nor 
can one arrive at an understanding of international politics by summing the foreign 
policies and the external behaviours of states.’ (p.51).  He advocates a systems 
approach, the essential elements of the system being the structure and the interacting 
units (p.94).  Therefore, it is the system, not individuals, that is the principal 
determinant of outcomes at the international level. 
 
The system, however, is said to be anarchical (Bull, 1995), in that it has no 
overarching authority to enforce rules.  Bull distinguishes between order and justice.  
Order in the state system is, for neorealists, the primary concern, and the consequences 
of achieving this are unimportant.  Bull states: ‘…to pursue the idea of world justice in 
the context of the system and society of states is to enter into conflict with the devices1
through which order is at present maintained.’ (p.85).  Furthermore, human justice, he 
contends, is ‘potentially subversive of international society’ (p.79), as this is built 
around states not individuals.  Hence, for the neorealist, analysis involves examining the 
structure and how the system works, providing explanations of external events and a 
foundation for policy decisions.  Non-state actors are thus irrelevant, as are individuals, 
who may be adversely affected by the process of maintaining order in the anarchical 
society. 
 
Diminishing the importance of justice in this way is a significant weakness of 
the neorealist philosophy, demonstrating the de-humanising nature of such realist 
analysis.  This stems from a focus on structure, relegating agency to a minor or even 
irrelevant role.  Ashley (1986, p.258) refers to this as ‘positivist structuralism’, where 
 
1 Bull points to five institutions that are used to maintain order in the state system: the balance of power, 
international law, war, great powers and diplomacy (Bull, 1977).   
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the state system is presented as the natural order of things.  This derives from the 
modernist foundations of realism and the state system it seeks to explain and reproduce.  
Removing significance from the actions of particular individuals therefore takes away 
responsibility for the effects of those actions, perpetuating a belief that the system 
makes them unavoidable.  Thus, a leader may claim to have no choice in a decision to 
go to war and so imply that they have no responsibility for those that die or suffer as a 
result. 
 
Furthermore, neorealism, by excluding internal factors, removes the possibility 
for explanations of change (Keohane, 1986, p.159), and thus for moving beyond the 
state system: ‘The problem with Waltz’s posture is that in any social system, structural 
change itself ultimately has no source other than unit level processes’ (Ruggie, 1986, 
p.152).  Consequently, ‘Waltz’s theory of “society” contains only a reproductive logic.’ 
(p.152).  As there is no place for internal state politics and social processes, the agents 
of structural change are ignored.  In doing so, neorealists like Waltz present a structure 
that is ever present.  Therefore, the neorealist state system appears fixed and inevitable. 
 
Critical Geopolitics – A Challenge to Neorealism 
As a radical alternative to the hegemony of neorealism, Critical Geopolitics is an 
attempt to disrupt the positivist discourses of rationality and progress that are central to 
the idea of the world as ‘naturally’ divided between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, such that 
‘scientific’ explanations can be derived.  Critical Geopolitics as presented by Ó Tuathail 
(1996) undermines these arguments by exposing the ‘natural’ and ‘objective’ science of 
geography and geopolitics.  ‘Although often assumed to be innocent, the geography of 
the world is not a product of nature but a product of histories of struggle between 
competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy, and administer space.’ (p.1).  
Therefore, power is introduced as a crucial element in geopolitics.  Drawing on the 
work of Michel Foucault, Ó Tuathail believes that ‘geography is not a natural given but 
a power-knowledge relationship.’ (p.10), consequently it can be used in the production 
and reinforcement of particular power relations. 
 
The neorealist geography of sovereign states gives certain states, and individuals 
in prominent positions within those states, a power that is drawn from the system of 
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knowledge that has produced that neorealist geography; at the same time their powerful 
status allows them to reproduce the knowledge and therefore the geographies 
perpetuating their power.  This established power structure is problematized by critical 
geopolitics.  Dodds (1993) argues that: ‘…by drawing attention to the fact that there is 
no “natural” or “prediscursive” geography of international; relations, we draw attention 
to how policy makers and academic experts through linguistic practices represent places 
and peoples in the practice of foreign policy.’ (p.71).  Through this critical 
understanding of geography and geopolitics, world politics no longer seems so ‘natural’ 
and easily explained as suggested by neorealists.   
 
Crucial to the ability to ‘geo-graph’ the world is the power of sight that has been 
privileged over the other senses (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p.24).  This was reflected in the 
approach of colonial geographers like Halford Mackinder who considered ‘seeing’ to be 
the only way to understand the world in an unsocialised ‘objective’ way.  Ó Tuathail 
states: ‘“Man,” for those who wrote Geography, was “seeing-man,” a transcendental 
European subject who was empowered with the sovereign power to see the world in the 
fullness of its positivity.’ (p.80).  The European ‘man’ had the power to bring what he 
saw into the structures of European knowledge and in so doing exerting power and 
control over the non-European spaces.  Thus, in saying that ‘sight sited geography by its 
power of citation.’ (p.80), Ó Tuathail describes the way in which explorer geographers 
like Mackinder could represent places they visited and ‘saw’, in particular ways.  
Authority and ‘truth’ are given to such representations due to the ‘authoritative’ source 
that ‘cited’ them.   
 
Ó Tuathail considers Foucault's concept of panopticism to be relevant here.  ‘A 
failure to problematize the panopticism that characterises so much geographical 
discourse is ultimately a failure to problematise the conceptual infrastructures that make 
geopolitics possible.’ (p.143).  The ‘all seeing eye’ of the geographer assumes a position 
of power in geopolitics.  Problematizing geopolitics is an action Ó Tuathail achieves in 
the ‘question’ of the hyphenated ‘Geo-politics’.  This: 
 
‘…does not mark a fixed presence but an unstable and indeterminate 
problematic; it is not an “is” but a question.  The hyphen ruptures the 
givenness of geopolitics and opens up the seal of the bonding of the 
“geo” and “politics” to critical thought.  In undoing the symbolic 
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functioning of the sign, its semantic instability, ambiguity, and 
indeterminacy are released.’ (p.67). 
 
He is therefore deconstructing the binary distinctions of geopolitics and the Cartesian 
Perspectivism2 on which it has traditionally been based, and which was particularly 
apparent in the approach of Mackinder with his ‘disembodied earth scanning minds eye’ 
(p.87). 
 
In order to represent, a person or a group must be seen to have/be in a position of 
power, and thus their representations are powerful.  Dodds reflects: 
 
‘When we discuss something as important as the foreign policy of a 
state, we clearly need to draw attention to the narrative functions of a 
state’s privileged story tellers.  In this case, we need to consider the role 
of academic experts, the media and foreign policy professionals 
themselves (e.g. Foreign Office officials).’ (p.71). 
 
These are the figures who have considerable power over geopolitical representations, 
those that Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992) call ‘intellectuals of statecraft’: ‘The notion of 
“intellectuals of statecraft” refers to a whole community of state bureaucrats, leaders, 
foreign-policy experts and advisors throughout the world who comment upon, influence 
and conduct the activities of statecraft.’ (p.193).  As such, these people are empowered 
by their positions and their status within government and within society to (re)produce 
the representations and discourses that underpin policy-making and the construction of 
geopolitical codes in their respective states. 
 
Hegemonic power is the ‘rule writer’ in geopolitics according to Ó Tuathail 
(p.61).  In other words it is from here that dominant geopolitical discourses emanate 
and, as he explains, they are entwined with economic, ideological, political and above 
all military sources of power (p.255).  These sources give particular people the 
opportunity to construct discourse and hence geo-graph the world in their own interests.  
Thus, powerful states can act at the expense of the less powerful.  Worldviews are 
heavily imbued with subjectivity and are established through discourse.   
 
2 This, according to Ó Tuathail, differentiates between the world “out there” and the consciousness of the intellectual.  The gaze is 
neutral and disembodied (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p23). 
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The geopolitical assumptions underlying these worldviews and which form the 
basis for policy decisions are referred to by critical geopolitics practitioners as ‘practical 
geopolitical reasoning’.  Dodds (1994) explains: ‘Practical geopolitical reasoning refers 
to the everyday or commonsense understandings of the political world that foreign-
policy elites employ to make sense of events and processes.’ (p.197).  These 
understandings make sense through the discourse that is (re)produced by the elites.  This 
discourse, and the practical geopolitical reasoning that draws upon it, legitimizes the 
policy responses and practices advocated and enacted by the foreign policy elites.  Ó 
Tuathail and Agnew (1992) determine that: 
 
‘…it is only through discourse that the building up of a navy or the 
decision to invade a foreign country is made meaningful and justified.  It 
is through discourse that leaders act, through the mobilization of certain 
simple geographical understandings that foreign-policy actions are 
explained and through ready-made geographically-infused reasoning that 
wars are rendered meaningful.’ (p.191). 
 
In so doing, the realist structures and practices such as wars can not only appear to make 
sense but also seem natural.  This is what critical geopolitics attempts to deconstruct 
revealing the discursive, constructed foundations on which such understandings and 
practices are based. 
 
In line with this, Dalby (1991) says that: 
 
‘It can be argued that the essential moment of geopolitical discourse is 
the division of space into “our” place and “their” place; its political 
function being to incorporate and regulate “us” or “the same” by 
distinguishing “us” from “them”, the same from “the other”.’ (p.274). 
 
It is this Self/Other binary discourse through which the state makes ‘sense’.  From this 
division, interpretations of threat from the ‘Other’, and responses in accordance with 
this, can be normalized as the natural and inevitable course of action. 
 
However, Dodds (1996) argues that: ‘Politics and political activity traverse the 
inside-outside dichotomy of the territorial state.’ (p.574).  Essentially, through an 
understanding of the discursive nature of geopolitics, the binaries and the boundaries 
between states and between international politics and domestic politics are revealed as 
Philosophical Foundations, Geopolitics and Forces of Change: A Review of the Literature 
37
the products of a particular set of discourses and power relations.  The realist system 
and its structures reinforce these power relations and protect the interests of the 
powerful elites.  Thus, Dodds and Sidaway (1994) believe that: ‘The value of 
geopolitical economy approaches as a complement to critical geopolitics is clear.  The 
former provide some theoretical and empirical opportunities for grounding elite 
geopolitical reasoning within the material circumstances that elites sought to 
reproduce.’ (p.519).  Critical geopolitics therefore attempts to look beyond the 
simplistic binaries of (neo)realism and seek explanations inclusive of internal as well as 
external processes, and particularly the interests of the elites who seek to reproduce the 
realist system. 
 
Routledge (1996) presents an argument for the analysis, within critical 
geopolitics, of social movements.  He says:  
 
‘Attention to the actions of social movements would contribute to a 
critical geopolitics in at least two ways.  First, it would (de)centre 
analytical focus away from an exclusive concern with the machinations 
of the state.  Second, it would enable critical geopolitics to investigate 
how different types of social movements challenge state-centred notions 
of hegemony, consent and power and contest the colonization of the 
“political” by the state.’ (p.509). 
 
By resisting a concern solely for the state, critical geopolitics not only 
problematizes the discourse and structures of (neo)realism, but also shifts the analysis 
onto other actors such as the social movements that Routledge describes.  In doing so 
the binaries that underpin the state are undermined and the systems of power that 
support state elites are opened to analysis and critique.  Hence, the inside-outside 
dichotomy, the very basis of the sovereign territorial state, is brought into question. 
 
There are indeed many actors and bodies that might be considered to be 
contributors to the (re)production of discourse and of geopolitical codes.  Some theorists 
argue that sub-state actors, and those that are unattached or even in conflict with the 
state, are worth examination in discussions on the formation of geopolitical codes.  
Routledge (2006) says: 
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‘…the histories of geopolitics have tended to focus upon the actions of 
states and their elites, overemphasising statesmanship and understating 
rebellion.  However, the geopolitical policies enacted by states and the 
discourses articulated by their policy makers have rarely gone without 
some form of contestation by those who have faced various forms of 
domination, exploitation and/or subjection which result from such 
practices.’ (p.233). 
 
This he argues is a form of ‘counter-hegemonic struggle’, such struggles are 
‘expressions of what we term “anti-geopolitics.”’ (p.233).  Anti-geopolitics: 
‘…challenges the material (economic and military) geopolitical power of states and 
global institutions, and second, it challenges the representations imposed by political 
elites upon the world and its different peoples, that are deployed to serve their 
geopolitical interests.’ (p.233).  These structures of power within states allow powerful 
elites to impose their representations and therefore protect their interests and maintain 
their positions of power.  In this way they are crucial to the ultimate formation of 
geopolitical codes, codes that draw upon such representations and are constructed in the 
interests of the elites.  The challenge posed by anti-geopolitics, of those opposed to the 
state, and the effects this can have on geopolitical codes cannot be dismissed even if it is 
the hegemonic structures of power, be they political, economic, ideological and military 
that are usually dominant in the reproduction of discourse and the generation of 
geopolitical codes. 
 
Within the state there are several powerful groups that can have influence on 
policy and who promote their interests, some of these are part of the official state 
apparatus and some are more removed from this but remain part of the elite.  These can 
include the media, political lobbies and the civil service.  In addition, there are many 
who consider ‘security intellectuals’ to have a powerful role in influencing and creating 
policy.  Politicians may solicit these people for advice, or they may provide it either 
privately or in public through specialist publications and also the mass media.  They 
may operate in dedicated organizations or as individuals.  Dalby’s (1990) work, 
Creating the Second Cold War: ‘…investigates in detail the writings of a number of 
intellectuals connected with the influential political lobby organization, the Committee 
on the Present Danger (CPD), many of whose members subsequently held important 
posts in the first Reagan administration.’ (p.X).  This is the sort of relationship that can 
exist for some such intellectuals, and the CPD is an example of an organization of 
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‘security intellectuals’ formed to lobby for particular policies.  The potential of these 
intellectuals to influence government policy is demonstrated by the CPD’s links to the 
Reagan government: ‘The geopolitical concerns of the CPD, and later their presence in 
the Reagan administration, have fed the state centric military domination of discourse 
about security.’ (p.172).  By impacting upon, or contributing to, discourse as reproduced 
by state elites these individuals alongside civil servants, media and wider societal 
influences, can have a great importance on the direction of policy. 
 
Although these individuals and groups can all have a contribution to the 
discourses and representations of a state the research in this thesis concentrates on the 
output of the political elites.  The assumption here is not that these are the only people 
who are involved in producing a state’s representations, and the geopolitical codes that 
these underpin, but rather that it is these elites who present the final versions.  They may 
be influenced by security intellectuals, advisors, media representations and opinions, 
and by the resistance of groups outside the state apparatus, but it is their policies, their 
performances, that are generally understood to be the position of the state.  The role of 
many others in the process must be acknowledged, as competing discourses and 
interests impinge upon the decision making of political elites, and these other actors are 
worth researching, nevertheless this study focuses on the elites for whom the structures 
of power give a privileged position as the persons widely viewed as the representatives 
of a given state, and who have considerable, though certainly not exclusive, power over 
the policies and geopolitical codes adopted. 
 
As noted above, the discourse of the sovereign state differentiates ‘Inside’ and 
‘Outside’, political thought rests with one and international relations with the other 
(Walker, 1993).  International relations do not exist outside discourse and the structure 
of the sovereign state that this underpins.  It is a phenomenon that can only be engaged 
if the sovereign state is accepted as the organising principle of geopolitics, as it is 
dependent on the binary division between inside and outside that this implies.  Thus, the 
neorealists can exclude or dismiss alternative interpretations due to their incompatibility 
with international relations as the established channel of explanation for world events. 
 
Consequently, a rethinking of democracy cannot be achieved, according to 
Walker, without also rethinking state sovereignty as a political practice.  He explains 
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that: ‘…the key resonance here is less the critique of the grand narrative as such, or the 
celebration of interdeterminacy, than a radical scepticism towards those resolutions of 
identities and difference which, as expressed by the principle of state sovereignty have 
become the primary context in which it has been possible to speak of democracy at all.’ 
(p.57).  Hence, it is not democracy itself that is the problem, but state sovereignty as a 
construction by which the inside can be universalist and a site of modernity and thus 
democracy, while the outside - the other (constructed as ‘Other’3) - is the negation of 
this, a space of anarchy and absence.  The Enlightenment concepts of modernity and 
progress behind this construction are, at the same time, undermined by it, as it denies 
the possibility of a universal democracy. 
 
Binaries are central to modernist thought and therefore to (neo)realism.  It is 
through these discourses that identity is constructed.  ‘To possess a true identity is to be 
false to difference, while to be true to difference is to sacrifice the promise of a true 
identity.’ (Connolly, 1991, p.67).  In this passage Connolly articulates the troublesome 
nature of identity.  If the ‘Self’ is to be ‘true’ or right this does not allow different 
‘Selves’ or ‘Others’ to be positive.  Without these ‘Others’ though, there can be no 
negative from which the ‘Self’ can be different, and so there could be no way to define 
identity (p.64).  Therefore, there is a necessity for ‘Others’, as an object against which 
identity can be defined.  Connolly explains: ‘Perhaps the demand to hold the other 
responsible for defects flows to some degree from the demand to treat oneself as 
responsible for every virtue attained.’ (p.98).  Nationality encapsulates this concept.  
The nation is defined against other nations.  In a logocentric act,4 these ‘Others’ must be 
constructed as being negative, in the process of (re)production of national identity.   
 
Hence, what frequently emerges from analysis of discourse in geopolitics is a 
binary division between positive and negative.  Dalby (1990) asserts that Western 
thought relies on such polarities whether occident and orient, developed and under-
developed or democracy and communism (p.23).  If an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ are to 
 
3 The capitalization of ‘Other’ signifies the establishment of a group of people as an object, or body of 
sameness, in this case with negative or lesser characteristics in comparison with the ‘Self’.  Therefore, 
while ‘other’ might simply refer to an additional unit of equal or greater value, ‘Other’ specifically 
defines difference of characteristics as well as of existence.  These characteristics are discursively 
constructed. 
4 Ashley (1989) describes the concept as follows: ‘Privileging the one term, a logocentric discourse 
effects a hierarchy in which the other is rendered as a complication, a negation, a manifestation, an effect, 
a disruption, a parasitic (mis)representation, or a fall from the graceful presence of the first.’ (p.261). 
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be maintained in the state system, as implied by neorealism, then state identity must be 
(re)constructed.  Without it, the state could not exist, but this must involve the formation 
of dangerous ‘Others’, such as other states or terrorists, against which to juxtapose the 
united ‘Self’.  Such binaries are typical of the logocentic practices of modernity.  The 
construction of such binary discourse is consequently a continual process that new 
‘Others’ can evolve from, and take the place of previous versions as circumstances 
change.  This change in discourse over time must be emphasised, as it makes room for 
more extensive structural changes than (neo)realism acknowledges. 
 
As discourse changes, so too can the geopolitical codes established through that 
discourse.  Events and changing realities have the potential to undermine existing 
geopolitical codes, as well as creating new opportunities to further the interests of elites 
within states politically and economically.  Indeed, for many theorists geopolitical codes 
are multiple and highly contested.  Ó Tuathail and Luke (1994) discuss the change in 
American codes following the end of the Cold war, with an apparently greater 
concentration on environmental issues coming to the fore: ‘…a deterritorialization of 
old alliances that were tied to American containment policies is unfolding even as fresh 
coalitions maneuver to reterritorialize new alliances around the agendas of an ecological 
political economy.’ (p.393).  This suggests a changing code in a world where the 
assumptions of the Cold War no longer make ‘sense’, and representations must change 
to accommodate new events and influences if the American state is to retain its political 
power and its economic status.  Essentially codes are not fixed.  The premise on which 
this research is based is that as discourse evolves in interaction with reality, so do the 
geopolitical codes.  They may at times be contested within a state or contain 
contradictions, and separate codes could be developed in relation to different issues 
states and actors.  It will be those codes relating to international terrorism, and being 
constructed in the post-Cold War period particularly post-September 11th, as expressed 
by political elites within the states in question, that will be the focus. 
 
The state, as a product of the Enlightenment, is therefore exposed as a 
constructed feature (re)produced by the geo-graphing practice of the (neo)realist.  The 
geopolitician should be recognized as an inextricable part of geopolitics or geo-politics, 
contributing to the (re)production of discourse while simultaneously understanding 
reality through that discourse.  I argue, however, that given its position as the dominant 
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philosophy in the practice of world politics, it would be wrong to ignore (neo)realism.  
At the same time it must not be approached uncritically.  Rather, the (neo)realist 
discourse must be deconstructed if geopolitics is to be understood.  This does not mean 
the role of the structures (e.g. states) is to be dismissed, but that they should be 
appreciated as products of discourse as opposed to ‘natural’ formations.  By adopting a 
‘critical realist’ approach, ‘reality’ can be accepted (Yeung, 1997, p.52) (i.e. that states 
do exist as important actors), while understanding and critiquing the way in which that 
reality has been made and is reproduced.  In other words, the human agency (of 
powerful actors) and the relevance of other non-state bodies can be included in analysis, 
as can an explanation of how discourse, and hence structures, can be changed over time, 
rather than the fixed state system of the (neo)realist vision. 
 
Temporal Transitions 
Dynamics for Change 
If we understand geopolitics from a critical realist perspective then it is 
necessary to understand discourse.  Explaining changes in structures over time, 
therefore, requires an appreciation of how discourse evolves temporally.  It is also 
imperative to comprehend the relationship that exists between discourse and reality.  
When approaching an analysis of geopolitical codes, such understandings are essential 
as these codes are (re)produced through discourse.  Codes are also constructed in the 
context of real structures (e.g. states), real events and agency (e.g. the decisions of 
politicians).   
 
These processes are addressed by Agnew and Corbridge (1995), who reflect 
upon the nature of discourse:  
 
‘Our usage implies a more tenuous practice: that modes of representation 
are implicit in practice but are subject to revision as practice changes.  
Spatial practices and representations of space are dialectically 
interwoven.  In other words, the spatial conditions of material life are 
shaped through their representations as certainly as representations are 
shaped by the spatial contours of material life.’ (p.47).   
 
Thus, they recognize a reality that is shaped through discourse, but equally accept that 
discourse is not independent of that reality.  Both are influenced by each other, as 
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practice changes over time it prompts change in discourse too.  To this extent Agnew 
and Corbridge tend towards practice as the dominant component without denying the 
role of discourse in shaping reality.  The discourse impacts upon and reinforces practical 
changes. 
 
From this perspective, Agnew and Corbridge assert that: ‘…the primacy of “the” 
territorial state is not a trans-historical given, but is specific to different historical 
epochs and different world regions.’ (p.5).  This challenges the realist position where 
the state is natural and the final stage of progress.  Instead, the state as a spatial practice 
only exists as a product of particular discursive representations.  Both are subject to 
change in space and time.  Consequently: ‘A geopolitical order, therefore, is always 
partial and precarious, achieved through social practice rather than imposed through a 
transhistorical logic.’ (p.180).  Hence, geopolitical codes are open to change as the 
practical realities change. 
 
This close relationship between discourse and practice, for Agnew and 
Corbridge, underpins the connection between political economy and geopolitical orders: 
‘Successive discourses of geopolitics take shape – sometimes uneasily and always 
unevenly – against the backdrop of an international political economy experiencing 
periodic crises and restructuring.’ (p.7).  Geopolitical orders are therefore not some pre-
determined reality, but a product of the realities of political economy and practices 
pertaining to this.  As such, geopolitical orders can change as a result of differences in 
political economy, whether over time, space or both.  Agnew and Corbridge point to the 
‘uneasy’ and ‘uneven’ relationship; it should not be assumed that there will be a perfect 
correlation between the two, variations in one may not be transferred perfectly, or 
immediately to the other. 
 
This is one definition of discourse and its relationship with reality.  A very 
different position is articulated in the work of Jean Baudrillard.  In his well-known work 
‘The Gulf War Did Not Take Place’, Baudrillard (2001) explores the war as a 
construction of media and ‘virtual’ models.5 In this poststructural approach, an 
 
5 Baudrillard (2001) argues that: ‘…war, when it has been turned into information, ceases to be a realistic 
war and becomes a virtual war’ (p.242).  This refers to the continual media coverage of the build up to the 
war, to the point of saturation.  His argument is thus not as simple as saying that the war didn’t happen 
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appreciation of reality is effectively unachievable, if indeed there is such a thing at all.  
Poststructural analysis is a useful tool when considering how discourse and narratives 
are built and used to establish and sustain structures, but it is also necessary to accept, as 
Agnew and Corbridge do, that there is a reality, that structures do exist and are 
important in studying geopolitics.  These two examples indicate the range of 
understandings relating to the interaction of discourse and reality, each being expedient 
in their own ways, but neither articulates precisely the position taken in this thesis, a 
position that lies somewhere in between. 
 
Critical realism allows both to be accommodated.  Reality can only be 
understood through discourse, and therefore responses to real events and structures are 
also formed and understood through discourse.  This does not imply that nothing is real 
or that reality can never be perceived.  Rather it means that reality can only be 
appreciated through the mediating discourse.  Such a perspective of reality and 
discourse is essential to the structure and direction of the research in this thesis; 
analysing discourse is essential to understand the geopolitical codes of states.  It is not 
the only contributing factor as the ‘realities’ of a state’s context, and the human agency 
of political figures, are also vital, but it is discourse through which geopolitical codes 
are constructed. 
 
The discourse that underpins these codes should be understood to have a 
relationship with reality and human agency – it is not permanent, it is changed by reality 
just as reality is constructed through discourse.  Agency is not controlled entirely by 
discourse any more than are structural realties, however a political actor does view the 
world, and their state’s place in it, through discourse, and so they are not detached from 
this, nor from the process of (re)constructing discourse.  They do, nevertheless, have 
choice, and their words and actions cannot be explained entirely by discourse, but also 
by their real experiences, political motivations and interactions with reality. 
 
and was entirely imagined.  He continues: ‘The closer we approach the real time of the event, the more 
we fall into the illusion of the virtual.’ (p247).  War is modelled and pre-presented in the media before it 
has happened such that he believes that: ‘…the victory of the model is more important than victory on the 
ground.’ (p.251).  It is therefore the manner in which war is presented and modelled, and thus is accepted 
as the reality, that he views as demonstrating the total construction of war – it is this war that did not take 
place.   
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To study geopolitics and analyse geopolitical codes, the relationship between 
reality and discourse, and the way changes occur over time, must be comprehended.  
Agnew and Corbridge provide an explanation that introduces the dynamics for change 
that (neo)realism lacks.  However, an overemphasis on practice and political economy 
ignores the extent to which discourse underpins representations of reality.  Without 
adopting the poststructural approach of theorists like Baudrillard, the essential part that 
discourse plays in the political practices of geopoliticians should not be dismissed.  The 
geopolitical codes of states are not only dependent on the realties that impinge upon 
them, but on how those states are constructed through discourse as actors in geopolitics.  
The worldviews of states, and the construction of a state’s identity, draw on the 
discourses and narratives that have historically established the state, in addition to the 
political and economic realties that they experience.  Discourse and geopolitical codes 
are therefore an essential area of study when seeking to understand a state and its 
geopolitical activities. 
 
Orientalism 
The roots of the discourses and geopolitical codes constructed and reproduced in 
the present therefore lie in their past as products of modernity.  As modernist concepts 
of progress and rationality took hold in the West6 they impacted upon the outlook and 
practices of Westerners.  Walker explained that realism requires the distinction to be 
made between ‘Inside’ and ‘Outside’.  In logocentric analysis those not conforming 
must be irrational and subjective, and are assigned negativity; the world beyond the 
‘West’ becomes the ‘Other’, a space of irrationality, where the ‘rational’ model of the 
European state, and modernity itself, is said to be absent.  The representation of the non-
Western ‘Other’, or ‘Orientalism’ (Said, 1978), is therefore a fundamental part of the 
construction of the discourse of the sovereign state; by the creation of a particular image 
of the non-West, the West itself, and in the process its geopolitical projects, can appear 
as superior and the culmination of progressive development. 
 
Said criticizes Orientalism because: ‘…as a system of thought it approaches a 
heterogeneous, dynamic, and complex human reality from an uncritically essentialist 
standpoint; this suggests both an enduring Oriental reality and an opposing but no less 
 
6 Note the capitalization of ‘West’.  Again, this is indicative of identity formation, where the ‘West’ is 
differentiated as a separate body superior to the non-west. 
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enduring Western essence, which observes the Orient from afar and, so to speak, from 
above.’ (p.333).  Thus a binary is at work in Orientalism, separating Orient and 
Occident as two distinctive objects, one negative and one positive.  This ‘system of 
thought’ allows a homogeneous view to be taken of all the people in the Orient 
assigning certain (negative) characteristics to them.  By understanding the Orient in this 
way it is possible to look at it from afar as Said describes.  Through the Orientalist lens, 
the ‘objective’ observer can analyse and explain the Orient.  As an underpinning 
foundation for all thought and practice related to the Orient, Orientalism, sustains power 
relations (the Occident dominating the Orient) while not actually defining these 
relationships.  It is a source of meaning from which every description, engagement, and 
idea connected with the Orient draws from and through. 
 
Said explains the development of subjugation as follows:  
 
‘What we must reckon with is a long and slow process of appropriation 
by which Europe, or the European awareness of the Orient, transformed 
itself from being textual and contemplative into being administrative, 
economic, and even military.  The fundamental change was a spatial and 
geographic one, or rather it was a change in the quality of geographical 
and spatial apprehension so far as the Orient was concerned.’ (1978, 
p.210). 
 
Orientalism therefore provided the discursive structure through which the Orient could 
be viewed as less progressive and dangerous, somewhere that needed to be controlled.  
Thus, the economic and military intervention that Said talks of increasingly took place 
in the imperial era.  The state was imposed on the Orient (Fromkin, 1990), by military 
and economic means.  This provides the background to continued domination even 
today, as seen in Iraq. 
 
Bhatia (2005) notes that: ‘Particularly in periods of conflict, one assigns virtue 
to one’s own identity and decisions, and draws on a series of negative traits to describe 
an opponent, relating to greed, irrationality, demonic nature or the absence of 
civilisation.’ (p.15).  Likewise, Orientalism provided the discursive framework in which 
colonisation of the East could be accepted as natural and unproblematic.  The Orient is 
the inferior ‘Other’ of the Western ‘Self’, the process of Orientalising being that of 
‘Othering’.  If the ‘Self’ is to be superior it must have progressed further than the 
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inferior ‘Other’ and must therefore be protected from it, and can intervene to assist it to 
improve.  Therefore, the binaries of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, and those of ‘Inside’ and 
‘Outside’, are not only linked but are interchangeable.  Outside is the ‘Other’, in 
contrast to the ‘Inside’ where the positive characteristics of the ‘Self’ are apparent.  The 
binary discourse of Orientalism, once established during colonialism, could then be 
drawn upon in subsequent geopolitical codes. 
 
The realist geopolitics, upon which the sovereign state and the geopolitical 
practice of the three states in this study are based, has been influenced by several figures 
and concepts.  Some of these have considerable relevance for all three states, while 
other traditions are more distinctive. 
 
The work of Halford Mackinder has proven to be particularly influential as a 
foundation for geopolitical reasoning.  Parker (1985) explains that: 
 
‘Mackinder’s central thesis in 1904 was that world history was basically 
a recurring conflict between the landmen and the seamen.  The most 
powerful centre of land power, he maintained, had always been the heart 
of Eurasia and it was from here that “the great Asiatic hammer” had 
steadily struck outwards into the maritime fringes.’ (p.17). 
 
This, Mackinder asserted was the ‘pivot area’ (later the ‘heartland’), control of which 
would offer domination of Eurasia and thereafter the world.  ‘Is not the pivot region of 
the world’s politics that vast area of Euro-Asia which is inaccessible to ships, but in 
antiquity lay open to the horse-riding nomads, and is today about to be covered with a 
network of railways?’ (Mackinder, 1904, p.434).  These railways he saw as being 
crucial, for whereas sea power had offered maritime powers such as Britain an 
advantage in the ‘Columbian epoch’ the advance of the railways would enable a land 
power to dominate the pivot area thereby providing an advantage over those states in the 
inner and outer crescents, which he describes thus: ‘Outside the pivot area, in a great 
inner crescent, are Germany, Austria, Turkey, India, and China, and in an outer 
crescent, Britain, South Africa, Australia, the United States, Canada and Japan.’ (p.436). 
 
This representation of the world was in line with realist thinking and influential 
for policy makers in western states.  Parker (1985) notes: 
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‘The dichotomy of land power and sea power was given a new 
ideological dimension by the Russian revolution of 1917 and the coming 
to power of the Bolsheviks.  From then on a major preoccupation of the 
ruling classes in the capitalist countries was preventing the spread of 
Communism, and Curzon’s [The British Foreign Secretary] foreign 
policy reflects this.’ (p.48). 
 
A containment policy in respect of Bolshevik Russia was therefore adopted in line with 
the potential threat it was perceived to pose to British interests given its occupying the 
‘pivot area’.  For Mackinder however the danger had always been wider than this with 
the risk that other states could follow a ‘pivot policy’, most notably Germany: 
 
‘The message, loud and clear, was that it was imperative for the 
maritime world, led by Britain, to gird its loins against the coming 
dangers.  It was also in the interest of the maritime states, with France in 
the role of continental bridgehead, to ally together and to attempt to 
wean Germany away from any temptation to engage in a pivot policy.’ 
(p.19). 
 
This certainly became a pertinent point for policy-makers in the light of the First World 
War in Britain, but even more so for France which had experienced an invasion by 
Germany. 
 
Although the eminent French geographer Paul Vidal de la Blache had identified 
the maritime world as being more dominant than the continental world, citing the 
British Empire as evidence of this, and facilitating world unity (p.34), French thinking 
was as recognizably realist as that of the British.  The concern, both for political 
geographers and for politicians, was for solutions to the threat they believed continued 
to be presented by Germany.   
 
‘Underlying the scholarly and analytic approach of the French there was 
an appreciation of the very real weakness of France, and in particular of 
her vulnerability in face of her powerful eastern neighbour.  Thus a 
united Europe, and one in which Britain, her principal ally, formed a part 
was very much in the international interests of France.  French language 
and culture still retained their pre-eminence from the Channel to the 
Baltic and the Black Sea, and it was this aspect of international 
influence, rather than the recourse to brute force, which had the greater 
appeal to French scholars.’ (Parker, 1985, p.95). 
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Thus, French geopolitics between the World Wars, while realist, was focused more on 
the threat of Germany than of Russia.  As such, efforts and thinking were concentrated 
on ways of restraining German expansionism, paralleling to an extent Mackinder’s fears 
of a German ‘pivot policy’.  Given ‘France’s economic and demographic weakness as 
compared with her powerful eastern neighbour’ (p.97), the French mechanism to 
achieve this restraint was based on alliances, particularly with Britain. 
 
Another influential figure in the geopolitics of the early 20th century was the 
American naval officer Alfred Mahan whose writings, similar to Vidal de la Blache, 
described the importance of sea power based on historical examples.  He considered this 
to be a capability that the United States must develop, both on its own and with allies, in 
order to protect its interests.  Sumida (1999) says: ‘Mahan was not an advocate of a 
conventional alliance, but rather an informal but nonetheless conscious coordination of 
efforts that produced a preponderance of force sufficient to achieve the benefits of naval 
supremacy realized by Britain alone a century before.’ (p.53).  Such an approach would 
involve a move away from America’s more traditional isolationist geopolitical codes 
towards a greater engagement with the outside world, and an enhancement of the 
country’s military capabilities to a level equivalent to the economic power that it 
increasingly held.  Mahan’s work resonated with other influential American figures and 
also with geopolitical thinkers in Britain and in Germany: 
 
‘In the United States, Theodore Roosevelt and other reformers were 
pushing for the construction of a Great Fleet as an instrument of 
territorial and commercial expansionism, a cause to which Mahan 
provided crucial impetus and legitimacy.  In Great Britain in 1894 
during his last naval command aboard the Chicago, Mahan was wined 
and dined by the elite of British society, including Queen Victoria and 
her grandson Kaiser William II.’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p.41). 
 
The concept of naval power was therefore significant at this time for the most powerful 
states, not least the United States which was beginning to assume the status of a great 
power.  This came to the fore in the First World War where the navel fleets of the 
United States and Britain on one side met that of Germany on the other, and when 
America participated in geopolitics at a global scale for the first time before temporarily 
retuning to isolationism. 
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 An alternative strand of American geopolitical thought sought to move away 
from this isolationism in the 1930s and 40s: 
 
‘…the unifying belief of the realist school of thought was that America 
should abandon the psychology of apartness and enter the lists as a full 
protagonist in the global power game.  It was only by so doing, they felt, 
that America could be strong and secure.’ (Parker, 1985, p.113). 
 
Nicholas Spykman was prominent among these thinkers.  In contrast to Mackinder, he 
took the view that the ‘Rimland’ was the most important space and should be protected 
from domination by a single power (p.124).  Parker explains: 
 
‘Since he considered that the central danger to America during World 
War II arose from the possibility of the Union of the Eurasian power 
centres against the United States, he believed that it was essential in the 
future that such a situation should never be allowed to recur.’ (p.113). 
 
Hence, it was Spykman’s view that a three-way alliance between the United States, 
Britain and the Soviet Union should be maintained after the war.  This philosophy was 
in line with that of the American government at the time: 
 
‘…the cultivation of good Russo-American relations became central to 
Roosevelt’s thinking right up to his untimely death in April 1945.  He 
had in this respect moved away from vintage Mahan and Mackinder and 
towards the views of Spykman and those who were of a similar 
geopolitical persuasion.’ (p.118). 
 
However, it was Mackinder’s theory that would soon come to dominate 
American and wider Western thinking, and policy-making in the Cold War.  With the 
Soviet Union occupying the ‘pivot area’ or ‘heartland’, following Mackinder implied 
that this was an advantage that made it particularly threatening to the world.  Ó Tuathail 
(1992) notes that: 
 
‘Certainly among some post-war Western security intellectuals the texts 
of Halford Mackinder were required reading.  Within this community, 
Mackinder was read as a Cold War geopolitician, an intellectual prophet 
who first saw the geopolitical realities of international politics and first 
recognized the great geopolitical significance of control of the 
heartland.’ (p.101). 
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The influence that this understanding had upon those defining Cold War policy 
consequently had considerable impact upon the conduct of the Western protagonists in 
the conflict: 
 
‘Exhortations about the heartland substituted for real human geography, 
in its messy complexity.  The result, most spectacularly in the case of the 
United States, was a foreign policy driven by simplistic visions of 
containment and domino reasoning rather than a comprehensive grasp of 
the complexity of regions and places.’ (p.116). 
 
Containment became the overriding policy in the West and especially in America; if the 
Soviet’s could be contained, it was thought, then they could be kept within the heartland 
and be restrained from invading the rimland (or the inner and outer crescents) as their 
‘natural’ expansionist character demanded. 
 
This view of the Soviet Union drew on the assessment of another influential 
figure – George Kennan.  Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’ and subsequent contributions to 
American policy development: ‘…expounded his conception of the Soviet Union as an 
historically and geographically determined power with an unfolding necessity to 
constantly expand.’ (Ó Tuathail, 2006, p.60).  Again this contributed to the apparent 
need to contain the Soviets with no room for negotiation.  As such, this ascribing of 
‘natural’ characteristics to the Soviet ‘Other’ was a defining strand of interpretation and 
policymaking in both American and Western conduct during the Cold War. 
 
Nevertheless, Western states did pursue their own policies within the Western 
bloc.  France is a notable example of a state that attempted to define a distinct approach.  
It was Charles de Gaulle who expressed this position most clearly and enshrined it in 
French policy when he came to power in 1958.  Parker (1985) describes how: 
 
‘He completely refused to accept the view of the maritime world which 
emanated from Britain and America.  His wartime experiences had led 
him to believe that les anglo-saxons wished only to entrench their own 
dominant positions, and was determined that France should in no way be 
part of this.’ (p.151). 
 
Furthermore: 
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‘Closer relations were cultivated with the Soviet Union and 
encouragement was given to the development of a more independent 
European stance in foreign policy.  This stratégie tous azimuths aimed at 
making France an independent world power between the two 
superpowers although in practice the country remained nearer to the 
West than to the Soviets.’ (p.151). 
 
Once more this was an approach that was firmly realist in character still understanding 
the Soviet Union to be the main threat to France while setting out a distinct policy 
according to what were considered to be France’s interests. 
 
Thus, in each of the three states considered in this study realism dominates their 
traditions of geopolitical thinking and consequently the policies that have been adopted.  
Some of these traditions overlap while others are more closely associated with a 
particular state, but it is the heritage of realist thought that is the foundation for all three.  
As has been shown, this realism was a crucial factor in the Cold War, and it is the 
geopolitics of this period that will now be examined in greater detail. 
 
Cold War Geopolitics 
Geopolitics after the Second World War was dominated by the Cold War.  This 
binary division of the world between two competing superpowers was constituted by 
neorealism.  In the United States, neorealist discourse underpinned the conflict through 
its emphasis upon states and its logocentrism, and consequently defined the geopolitical 
codes of the protagonists.  Everything had to be interpreted in the context of the Cold 
War with its division between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, ‘good’ and ‘evil’.  In his analysis of 
the writings of figures in the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), Dalby (1990) 
finds that: ‘…the construction of Self and Other in moral terms is coupled to the 
discursive practices of foreign policy-making’ (p.28).  Moral superiority is assumed for 
the positive ‘Self’, in this case the USA, over the negative Soviet ‘Other’.   
 
This was a replication of the longstanding Western binary of Occident and 
Orient, and therefore: ‘The Cold War narrative simply replaced native peoples with 
Soviets and Communists.’ (Sharp, 2000, p.90).  Cold War narratives could be made 
acceptable and obvious through the discourse that was already ingrained in the Western 
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psyche.  A simple discursive act replaces the Orient with the Soviet Union as the eastern 
‘Other’ that is dangerous and threatening. 
 
The American position is ‘obviously’ the most advanced and progressive, 
because as the ‘Self’ they define what is positive – therefore it makes ‘sense’.  Sharp 
(2000) explains: ‘Common sense appeals through the obviousness of its claims; it 
makes the world seem simple and manageable through a silencing of complexity, of 
problems that do not produce “right or wrong” or “true or false” conclusions.’ (p.41).  
Consequently, it is an ideal concept to invoke when attempting to write a ‘truth’.  If 
people are presented with a simple explanation, that can be easily located intertextually, 
this will appear to be an unproblematic position to adopt and believe.  When that 
explanation comes from an authoritative source, like an expert or the media, it is all the 
more convincing.  This is the mechanism through which discourses, and ultimately 
geopolitical codes, can be normalized and made acceptable. 
 
Sharp explains that: ‘…distinct from narratives that wrote Soviet action in 
deliberate power-political or ideological terms were those that made expansionary and 
repressive Soviet action seem unavoidable because of the laws of history and 
geopolitical location.’ (p.92).  This is a reference to the characterisation of the Soviet 
Union, and Russia before it, as being naturally inclined to expand from its heartland 
fortress, given the environmental and historical conditions acting upon it, which she 
identifies as: ‘…an environmental determinism that produces the Russian character 
based on a timeless quality of this part of the world.’ (p.x).  Pointing to this, Dalby 
(1990) claims that: ‘…the overall logic of the discourse of the Other as constructed 
through texts on nuclear strategy, international relations and Soviet history is structured 
on the classic geopolitical conceptions of Spykman and Mackinder’ (p.41).  Mackinder's 
(1904) concept of the heartland (or pivot area), of course, coincides with the space in 
which the Soviet Union was located, and thus necessitated its containment to stop it 
controlling the world island, and then the world. 
 
Orientalism had already established ‘truths’ about the inferiority of the people of 
the East and these could easily be assigned to the Soviets.  The Soviet Union was a 
sovereign state in the neorealist mould and thus was essentially modernist in form, 
Communism itself being a modern philosophy of temporal development.  Thus, it was 
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contradictory to claim that it was both a powerful state and an irrational non-modernist 
threat.  Nevertheless, these two narratives, that of state and irrational inferior, were 
combined through the threatening and expansionist discourses in the production of a 
dangerous ‘Other’ for the United States and the West.  It was through these discourses 
that the Cold War geopolitical codes of the United States and, to an extent, other 
‘Western’ states were constructed. 
 
Policy Implications 
Once the geopolitical codes were established, they provided a framework for all 
policy decisions.  For example, ‘nature’ was used to justify the argument of the 
irrational Soviet (Sharp, 2000, p.102).  Hence, the Soviet system is not the ‘correct’ one, 
as it is ‘clearly’ irrational compared to the capitalist democracy in America which is 
founded on rational thinking.  The ideology of powerful individuals can be reinforced in 
this way through the contrast with the ‘Other’, which is understood through discourse to 
be inferior to the ‘Self’ implying that the ideology of the ‘Other’ is also inferior to that 
of the ‘Self’.     
 
Deterrence, Dalby (1990) suggests, emerges as a result of this.  Those opposing 
any agreement with the USSR thought that because it was naturally expansionist and 
aggressive as Kennan had argued, the Soviet Union would simply make use of the 
process and ‘was not taking arms control and détente seriously’ (p.126).  Instead, it 
made ‘sense’ to accumulate weapons, so as not to be left behind by the Soviets.  
Discourses of nature underpinned a more aggressive approach by many in the USA, and 
were drawn upon in their writings of reality. 
 
The ‘discourses of realism, geopolitics, strategy and Sovietology’ (p.155) for 
Dalby, support militarism, due to the threat that is understood to exist.  He continues 
with the claim that: ‘The totalitarian conceptualisation denies politics and history by 
creating an Other as perpetual adversary.’ (p.158).  Furthermore, discourse established 
the position that: ‘…the other has a false science, technologically capable, but 
“possessed” of demonic intentions.’ (p.160).  By setting the confrontation up as 
‘natural’ due to historical and physical conditions, the ‘Other’ is always going to be a 
threat irrespective of the particular people involved or changes over time.  Emphasis on 
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the ever-present threat privileges militarism as not only natural, but also vital to the 
survival of the ‘Self’, and so maintains existing policies and power relations. 
 
Post-Cold War Geopolitics 
The end of the Cold War removed the clarity of the ‘Other’ represented by the 
Soviet Union, however, many of the assumptions and ‘realities’ were left untouched.  
Sharp (2000) describes the suggestion: ‘…that at the close of the Cold War, America’s 
new ‘Others’ would be terrorists, especially Islamic fundamentalists, drug traffickers, 
and with the increasing power of international trade, Japan.’ (p.143).  If neorealism was 
to continue to make sense and sustain the existing power relations, it would require 
another enemy.  This confusing situation drew suggestions of a more complicated and, 
of course, dangerous world. 
 
As it is impossible to achieve security, threat can be deployed constantly in the 
‘othering’ process. 
 
‘…the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from 
the most radical “other” of life, the terror of death, which once 
generalised and naturalised, triggers a fertile cycle of collective 
identities seeking security from alien others – who are seeking similarly 
impossible guarantees.’ (Der Derian, 1992, p.75). 
 
Thus, while the end of the Cold War meant the end of one threat, it did not follow that it 
was the end of all threats.  Sharp (1998) argues that the lack of a clear enemy has 
resulted in a ‘script of chaos’ where the clear division of good and bad has broken down 
and thus, in her example, film narratives ‘twist and turn, producing enemies and danger 
in the most unlikely of places.’ (p.162).  The stable, apparently fixed, character of Cold 
War geopolitics, that had seemed so natural and enduring, therefore posed a potential 
problem for neorealism as people tried to understand a world that suddenly did not 
appear so simple and straightforward. 
 
For some theorists like Fukuyama (1989), the ‘victory’ for America and the 
West in the Cold War represented the ‘end of history’, by finally establishing the 
modern ideology of liberal democracy and capitalism as the only credible form of 
governance, and as the final and most superior stage in human progress; other thinkers 
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believed that it merely marked the transition to a new geopolitical arrangement.  
Frequently the theme of threat as a result of a declining West, and an East growing in 
power and potentially challenging for hegemony, is apparent; for example, some cite 
China as a growing threat in the East (Weede, 1999).  Schulz (1999) predicts an alliance 
between the U.S. and Germany as the centre of a Western alliance, and: ‘Asia will be 
the “other” against whom this Western alliance is directed.’ (p.227).  She perceives the 
reason for such a development as being the need for a new enemy after the Cold War: 
‘…finding new enemies is seen by the military as well as by politicians whose entire 
careers have been devoted to an anti-communist agenda, as preferable to losing decades 
of power and privilege.’ (p.238).  The neorealist philosophy of the state requires 
enemies like the Soviet Union, without which power relations are threatened and the 
state is threatened.  Thus, internal unity begins to be weakened as identity cannot be so 
easily defined, a new threat must therefore be found, and as always, the most obvious 
way to look is east, as is ‘natural’ given the continually reproduced discourse of East 
and West, Occident and Orient. 
 
As such, Samuel Huntington (1996) asserts that whereas the Cold War was a 
battle between ideologies, it will be followed by a ‘clash of civilizations’.7 While 
realism is still an underlying principle for Huntington (p.34), at the same time he 
accepts that changes are occurring in terms of ‘sovereignty, functions, and power.’ 
(p.35).  Huntington’s thesis appears to be an attempt to reinterpret the post-Cold War 
world in a realist way (Aysha, 2003, p.118), still asserting the role of states but placing 
it in the context of practical changes.  Binaries remain central to his thinking. 
 
Huntington asserts that: ‘At the macro level, the dominant division is between 
“the West and the rest,” with the most intense conflicts occurring between Muslim and 
Asian societies on the one hand, and the west on the other.’ (p.183).  From a set of eight 
civilizations the argument comes down to a binary division of the West and the rest, 
with the East being the main place of threat.  Realist logocentrism and Orientalism are 
entangled in the ‘clash of civilizations’.  The previous discourse lets it appear to make a 
degree of sense, and thus makes it a powerful argument for policy-makers besides 
 
7 He depicts as many as eight civilizations, and believes that states will be clustered into these; the main 
conflicts will take place between states and groups of states of different civilizations (Huntington, 1996, 
p.29).   
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having popular appeal.  His thesis is constructed to support a defence of the West, not 
only spatially, but also culturally, from the threat of the ‘Other’. 
 
In an examination of the domestic implications of Huntington’s work in the 
United States, Aysha (2003) reflects on Huntington’s fears for America given ‘its lack 
of cultural and historical rootedness.’ (p.121).  Thus, from Huntington’s perspective, 
America is particularly vulnerable in a clash of civilisations, and more dependant on 
enemies for identity formation due to the lack of unity and ‘anti-federalism’ (p.122) that 
he believes has been apparent since the Cold War ended.  In short: ‘Fomenting a clash 
of civilizations abroad prevents a clash of civilizations at home.’ (p.124).  Aysha is 
pointing here to the way in which the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis acts as a realist 
narrative, drawing on the longstanding discourse of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ to continue the 
hegemony of the state in a changed post-Cold War world, and creating a new enemy, or 
threat, for America, to sustain it as a unified and powerful hegemonic state.   
 
Reactions to the Oklahoma bombing demonstrated how the ‘enemy’ can turn out 
to be different from that expected, given the discursive construction of the ‘Other’.  
Oklahoma City, where the bombing took place, can be described as: ‘a common popular 
geopolitical construction of a “heartland” space.’ (Sparke, 1998, p.199).  Thus it is 
understood in the popular imagination as representing America - the heart of America.  
Consequently it is not surprising that an attack here should trigger a considerable 
reaction.  In the context of the reality constructed, such an attack on the ‘inside’ must 
come from the dangerous ‘outside’.  However, the discovery that the bomb was planted 
by a white, American Gulf War veteran, did not fit with the way people understood the 
world.  The event was real and people did die, there was indeed a threat, but the 
discursive construct initially led people to misinterpret it.  This demonstrates the power 
and limits of discourse.  Discourse does not always lead to what powerful interests 
require, it is not an all powerful tool or a single clearly defined structure.  The same 
discourses were invoked after September 11th. On this occasion the events were of a 
larger scale and, with the terrorists apparently originating outside America, they could 
be more easily understood as representative of an external threatening ‘Other’.  The 
initial representations of the Oklahoma bombing were therefore a foretaste of what was 
to come post-September 11th, except this time the powerful actors would be more 
successful in harnessing the events to support the (re)production of the binary 
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discourses and narratives of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ and the responses that they 
wished to enact. 
 
Post-September 11th Geopolitics 
Defining Terrorism 
The period after the Cold War was therefore a time of change.  Neorealist 
interpretations were undermined by the sudden breakdown of the stable East/West 
binary prompting the search for new explanations that could restore the order, simplicity 
and, crucially, the power relations, which appeared to be threatened by the unknown.  
September 11th marked the point at which the confused and muddled world of the post-
Cold War period was suddenly made clear and simple again for neorealists.  While 
terrorism had been one of the threats identified previously, it was not, until then, a clear 
enemy like the Soviet Union. 
 
To the extent that terrorism can cause death and destruction, often with little 
clear warning of location or time, it seems perfect as a threat for galvanizing U.S. and 
Western identities in the way that the Soviet Union did.  Terrorism though is a 
phenomenon rather than a clearly identifiable state, and one that is not easy to define, 
changing depending on the perspective of the individual.  The ability of this practice to 
replace a state as the ‘Other’ and still leave neorealism intact consequently depends on 
how terrorism is constructed; it is after all not terrorism generally, but Islamic terrorism 
and al Qaeda that have been identified as the danger since September 11th. In general 
terms, as defined by Corlett (2003):  
 
‘Terrorism is the attempt to achieve (or prevent) political, social, 
economic, or religious change by the actual or threatened use of violence 
against other persons or other persons’ property; the violence (or threat 
thereof) employed therein is aimed partly at destabilizing (or 
maintaining) an existing political or social order, but mainly at 
publicizing the goals or causes espoused by the agents or by those on 
whose behalf their agents act; often, though not always, terrorism is 
aimed at provoking extreme counter-measures which will win public 
support for the terrorists and their goals or causes.’ (p.119).    
 
This definition is useful in as much as it sums up what might generally be 
assumed to be a terrorist act, that is, it is an act of violence perpetrated in support of 
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some sort of political aim.  Although prominent discourses support the view that 
terrorism is a practice of non-state actors, and is at odds with the state’s monopoly on 
the right to use violence within its borders, this definition leaves open the possibility 
that terrorism can also be used by states to achieve their objectives. 
 
In respect of terrorists who are separate actors from the state, Corlett believes 
that, on occasions, they may be morally justified in taking particular actions.   
 
‘For understanding that there are indeed circumstances in which political 
violence of various kinds are morally justified better enables a 
government to realise that it has a responsibility to everyone (not simply 
to its own citizens) to ensure against its creating such conditions, and it 
better enables its citizens to serve as guardians against their own 
governments perpetration of deeds that would deserve retributive 
political violence against their own government and its influential and 
controlling business interests.’ (p.161).   
 
This analysis is founded on a specific system of morality.  Terrorism (or at least 
acts of violence causing terror, given the discursive construction of the term terrorism) 
is acceptable in situations where there is an injustice, but this is judged on Western 
definitions of right and wrong.  Any terrorist is likely to be thoroughly convinced of the 
righteousness of the act being perpetrated; for example if, as is said, al Qaeda regard 
Westerners as infidels, any Westerner killed is not only acceptable but the fulfilment of 
a goal8. Who then is to specify what is and is not justified, is it the terrorist, the victim 
or some other ‘objective’ observer? 
 
Terror is an emotion that is the most extreme level of fear, caused by a sense of 
danger.  Therefore, there is no reason why it should only be ‘terrorists’ that cause terror; 
governments or individuals, such as ‘ordinary’ criminals could, and do, also cause 
terror.  Indeed, Smith (2006) contends that: ‘“Terrorism” was in fact first coined in the 
wake of the French revolution and it then referred to the process of governing through 
terror.  Terrorism was originally defined as a state practice, rather than a practice aimed 
at toppling states, and the reversal of the term’s meaning over more than two centuries 
 
8 It is important to be careful when using such examples that one does not follow uncritically the 
dominant representation of a terrorist group.  Although al Qaeda may see Westerners as infidels, through 
their own discourses and narratives of the evil ‘Other’, these representations should nevertheless be 
treated with caution.  This is after all the very issue that I am examining here. 
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speaks to the power of ruling classes to bend discourses for their own ideological 
purposes.’ (p.6).  As Price (2002) comments: ‘The idiom of power dictates that the 
violence of the state is legitimized as peace-keeping, while that of the dispossessed 
becomes terrorism.’ (p.4).  By issuing threats of violence and being in possession of the 
means for violence, any organization can potentially cause terror; this is enhanced by 
demonstrating the ability to carry out attacks.  However, governing elites construct the 
terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ through discourse, leading to their being differentiated 
and ‘othered’ from the states themselves. 
 
As such, terrorism is represented as only applying to acts against ‘us’ and not 
what ‘we’ do to ‘them’ (Chomsky, 2002, p.131).  These acts are instead identified as 
being counterterrorism (Townshend, 2002, p.114).  A binary division is created between 
terrorism and counterterrorism, between what ‘they’ do and what ‘we’ do.  Thus, while 
terror may be induced by the actions of the state, as much if not more than the actions of 
some other group, they are separated into two different categories. 
 
Perhaps then terrorism should be understood to encompass all who cause terror.  
As defined by Ettlinger and Bosco (2004), terrorism is: ‘…violence to invoke fear that 
can be performed by networks such as Al-Qaeda as much as by urban gangs, and by 
nation states such as Iraq as much as by the United States.’ (p.252).  Such a definition 
allows us to appreciate how responses to ‘threats’ can be legitimised through discourse.  
Terror that may be caused by powerful actors can be represented as necessary and 
justified.  The ‘terrorist’ is constructed as the threatening ‘Other’ and is the only actor 
understood to engage in terrorism.  In accordance with this, subsequent discussions in 
this thesis of the construction/representation of terrorism by states inevitably refer to 
terrorists and terrorism as a non-state activity.  The potential for state actors to cause 
terror is not removed by these representations. 
 
Historic Foundations 
As with Cold War geopolitical codes, those constructed post-September 11th 
cannot be separated from the discourses and discursive structures that preceded them.  
The pre-eminent role of states in responses to September 11th could be said to show that 
neorealism is as relevant as ever (Acharya, 2002b).  This, some argue, is proof that there 
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has been no great change in world politics (Gray, 2002, p.231), that states and thus 
realism are as central now to the production of events as they have been since 
Westphalia.  Fukuyama (2002) comments: ‘The September 11 attacks represent a 
desperate backlash against the modern world, which appears to be a speeding freight 
train to those unwilling to get on board.’ (p.28).  Representing terrorism as an evil 
‘Other’ is the continuation of the modernist doctrine of progress.  Modernity and 
development are bound up with realism and the sovereign state, in contrast with Islam 
and the East.  Many of the same discourses are therefore being drawn upon that have 
been apparent in Cold War geopolitics, earlier in colonialism, and in the Enlightenment 
thought that gave rise to the sovereign state. 
 
(Islamic) Terrorism was able to fill the gap left by the USSR, relatively easily 
being adopted and accepted given the discursive framework of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ that is 
already in place, both from the Cold War and in a wider sense (e.g. in Orientalism).  
Thornton (2003) describes how:  
 
‘…the Islamic resistance that gave us that stupendous event was 
interpreted as evil personified – a case of antiglobalist criminality, rather 
than geopolitical opposition.  Muslims who say “no” to globalisation are 
treated much as American Indians were when they refused to stay on the 
reservation: not as armies of resistance but as loathsome heathens who 
had the gall to obstruct manifest destiny.’ (p.207). 
 
The notion of the enemy being ‘evil’ and not really human concurs with Cold War 
discourse, and America’s ‘Manifest Destiny’ to which Thornton refers. 
 
For the United States, the ‘values’ upon which the state has been constructed, 
and the narrative of an ‘exceptional’ country, are once again deployed in understanding 
the new situation.  The contrast that is made between America, with these ‘positive’ 
attributes, and the terrorist ‘Other’ replicates the imperialist binaries in its close 
conformity with Orientalism.  Dalby (2003) argues that: ‘…the connections between 
such enlightenment, republican virtues, and the construction of geopolitical views of the 
United States as exceptional, reprise numerous imperial tropes even if these are widely 
ignored.’ (p.77).  Although these discourses of the United States were reproduced 
during the Cold War, the new ‘enemy’ is not another state that can simply slot into the 
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discursive structure.  Instead, the representations and actions of the geopolitical actors 
reconstruct the discourses more in line with colonial worldviews.   
 
Thus, in ‘The Colonial Present’ Gregory (2004) reflects: 
 
‘This is more than the rehabilitation of the Cold War and its paranoid 
silencing of difference and dissent, however, because the permanent 
state of emergency institutionalized through these imaginative 
geographies of the alien “other” also reactivates the dispositions of a 
colonial imaginary.  Its spacings are the mirror image of the “wild 
zones” of colonial imagination.’ (p.260). 
 
Just as colonials represented the ‘Other’ as inferior and lacking in the progress 
encapsulated by the sovereign state, so today representations of the terrorist conform to 
this Orientalist discourse.  Terrorists act outside the neorealist state system, as such they 
appear to make less ‘sense’ when interpreted through neorealist discourse, they are 
consequently more threatening.  Therefore, while discourses and geopolitical codes 
emerging after September 11th owe much to Cold War versions preceding them, 
geopolitical actors appear to be reverting more to earlier versions of the binary 
representations from colonialism, and in the case of the United States, from the frontier.  
Manifest destiny is reasserted yet again as America looks to tackle another ‘Other’ 
threatening its expansion and progress. 
 
Reproducing Binary Discourse 
In the state system, a network outside that framework, the complicated forces 
behind its formation and the reasons for the support it may have, are beyond the scope 
of comprehension.  Hence: ‘Binary narratives displaced any complex or critical analysis 
of what happened and why.’ (Der Derian, 2002, p.102).  Terrorism provides a 
convenient ‘Other’ for such a binary narrative, and so for the reassertion of American 
identity and of the neorealist sovereign state, not least because this particular attack was 
from a terrorist organization claiming to follow Islam. 
 
Religious overtones have been prevalent in narratives relating to September 11th 
and al Qaeda.  The West is presented as the forces of ‘good’ with God on their side 
fighting the ‘evil’ of terrorism.  The terrorists too present a similar argument in their 
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favour.  In the narratives of the U.S. government: ‘…this demonstration of an 
unequivocally evil act set a base mark for a permanent scale of moral values.’ (Maddox, 
2003, p.399).  Western morality is defined by the West as the pinnacle of progress and 
all that is good, the terrorists are evil because they are not modern.  They are from the 
East and Muslim, as opposed to the Christian West.  This strengthens the discourse of 
East and West as a basis on which to interpret the world and reduces an entire area, an 
entire religion, and many people with many diversities and complexities, into a 
homogenous body representing a straightforward threat like the Soviet Union. 
 
Reducing representations and interpretations to binaries leads to simple 
explanations and reinforces identities.  This process was used in the Cold War to vilify 
the Soviet Union and strengthen the ‘Self’ in a simple East/West conflict; it was present 
in colonial times when Orientalist discourses were constructed; once again it has been 
used since September 11th in the construction of the new terrorist ‘Other’.  Thus: ‘Such 
binary thinking has become part of the dominant geopolitical narrative, garnering 
support for both sides, and leaving little space in between for those who fail to identify 
with either side.’ (Hyndman, 2003, p.5).  In (neo)realist geopolitics this is an ‘obvious’ 
way to view the world, given that (neo)realism is itself founded on binary discourse.  
The same Enlightenment thought is applied to interpretations of events and provides a 
useful tool for policy-makers looking to legitimize their actions. 
 
Authority, Power and Common Sense 
Using normative arguments, terrorism can be established as an evil ‘Other’ 
which the states must fight.  Keohane (2002) refers to the ‘public delegitimation of 
terrorism’ (p.141), since September 11th. He describes how a ‘normative argument’ 
stressing ‘universality’ is used to create a divide between the world of states and 
civilization, and the dangerous terrorists.  Building on established discourse, such a 
binary is easy to accept, as it is terrorists, not states that cause terror.  As Keohane says: 
‘The delegitimation of terrorism and effective war against it will strengthen powerful 
states.’ (p.149).  According to neorealists, it is the states that have legitimacy to 
determine when violence can be used, to decide what is terrorism and wrong, and what 
is not and right.  In this way, powerful actors have reproduced discourses and narratives 
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to support their own worldviews and beliefs.  This is achieved by drawing upon the 
discourses of the nation-state. 
 
In forming a ‘public’ through a particular interpretation and representation of 
events, those with the power to construct representations generate an increased level of 
patriotism that reinforces notions of ‘common sense’ as in the Cold War, and thus 
marginalises alternative interpretations as not only wrong but also dangerous.  
‘Patriotism establishes that only external forces pose threats to the nation.  It excludes 
the possibility of internal actors interested in disrupting a seemingly unified 
community.’ (Waisbord, 2002, p.213).  Terms like ‘homeland’, which have come into 
common usage (Williams, 2002, p.338), reinforce this inside/outside distinction.  By 
creating an external threat and declaring war upon it, the U.S. government has been able 
to whip up patriotism, which allows arguments to be simplified to the extent that these 
are either for or against the national interest. 
 
Constructing Responses – Militarism 
Policy-makers can therefore formulate policies that are presented through, and 
reproduce, the discourses that construct terrorism as the new, threatening, ‘Other’.  For 
example, Goh (2003) reflects that: 
 
‘At the domestic level, the neo-isolationism that one might have 
expected as a consequence of the September 11 attacks has so far been 
kept in check by nationalist reactions, and by a discourse which has 
played down the relationship between terrorism and American foreign 
policy.’ (p.91). 
 
An alternative response, that of isolationism, that could make sense in line with aspects 
of historic American geopolitical codes, has therefore been dismissed in favour of the 
‘war’ approach, and a series of representations that isolate foreign policy from the 
causes of terrorism. 
 
American nationalism instead can be invoked, and the ‘public’ drawn on, to 
support a ‘war on terrorism’. 
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‘The resort to war as an “analog” is a common one in American history: 
war against depression, war against drugs, war against poverty, war 
against a whole range of ills, amounting to nothing less than a homespun 
sort of metaphorical bellicism.’ (Stephanson, 1998, p.77). 
 
War is consequently something that can be used to unite a country together and 
encourage patriotism.  Dalby (2003) notes that: ‘The script of a violent attack requiring 
a violent response was assumed even if there was no obvious assailant with a territorial 
base that could be attacked in response.’ (p.63).  If those in authoritative positions had 
presented a different interpretation, other responses could have been justified and made 
‘sense’: ‘…the events could have been specified as a disaster, an act of madness or 
perhaps most obviously as a crime, an act that required careful police work 
internationally and in the United States.’ (p.65).  The response to real events can be seen 
as subject to the agency of individuals.  Thus, the declaration of a ‘war on terrorism’ is 
not an inevitable response but it is one that can make sense in the context of the familiar 
binary discourses of the United States and other Western states. 
 
The development of new geopolitical representations in the aftermath of 
September 11th is thus a demonstration of how real events can be represented in 
particular ways by powerful actors, such that they can use this adapted discursive 
structure, and the rhetoric of common sense, to normalise a set of actions in response.  
Chomsky (2003) comments that: ‘…governments throughout the world seized upon 
9/11 as a “window of opportunity” to institute or escalate harsh and repressive 
programs.’ (p.126).  The process is not isolated to the United States, but is a feature in 
many sovereign states who reproduce these discourses, assisted by their use in the 
hegemonic state.  By creating such a threat these governments, especially the United 
States, have been able to institute a new period of militarization – ‘It is an unfolding 
scenario that is best understood as a deadly cycle of militarization and terrorism – twin 
expressions of the same New World Order…’ (Boggs, 2002, p.241) – their construction 
of the terrorist allows a military response to make sense, and an increase in 
militarization, just as during the Cold War, is the logical extension of this. 
 
Silencing Alternative Interpretations 
By creating this relationship between threat and militarism, terrorism becomes 
reduced to a set of simplistic binaries – self and other, good and evil, inside and outside 
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– a process that ignores complexity.  Smith (2002) points out that: ‘There has been little 
interest in trying to understand just why the U.S. is so unpopular in the world, and much 
more interest in reasserting the superiority of “the American way”.’ (p.57).  The 
problem with this approach is not only its unjust and even terrorizing implications, but 
that it does not actually address the real causes of terrorism, and therefore could 
undermine the very states who think they are fighting it: ‘If we are to tackle the roots of 
terrorism, we need to enter their world of thought, understand their grievances and 
explore why they think we bear responsibility for these.’ (Parekh, 2002, p.274).  
Without this, it is questionable how successful the United States and others will be in 
their aim of eliminating terrorism. 
 
Furthermore, by representing the threat through these discourses, and the 
responses as a ‘common sense’ reaction to that threat as it is then understood, debate 
can be silenced, eliminating the possibility of alternative responses being discussed.  
Dalby (2003) comments: 
 
‘…discussing the causes, and inevitably the complex geographies of 
these, was sometimes dismissed as nigh on unpatriotic in the United 
States.  War talk frequently silenced careful reflection, but did so on the 
basis of a complicit geography, a geography that specified matters as a 
simple spatial violation, an external attack on an innocent, supposedly 
safe interior.’ (p.64). 
 
The manner in which the terrorist attacks had been represented and understood 
promoted a sense of patriotism that vilified alternative interpretations.  If arguments did 
not conform to these discourses they could only be understood to be in support of the 
terrorists and were therefore, in themselves, threatening.   
 
Consequently, discussions and responses can only be accepted in this 
environment, if they draw on the modernist thought and the binary discourses that have 
emerged from it.  They can only make ‘sense’ if they are set in the context of the 
sovereign state.  Dalby adds: 
 
‘The suggestion is that the modern geopolitical reasoning of political 
elites in America in particular, but in other states as well, constrains the 
interpretation of the politics precisely because they operate in terms of a 
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political ontology of states whether understood as autonomous actors, or 
in a more sophisticated sociology, as a society of states. (p.64). 
 
In conditions where the powerful actors are reproducing the binary discourses of the 
state, and where they use these to construct the terrorist threat, it is difficult, or even 
impossible for alternative understandings to be accepted or even discussed.  However, a 
terrorist is a non-state actor, and furthermore is not the only one to have significance in 
the post-Cold War world, rather changes as a result of globalizing and regionalizing 
forces are threatening the simplicity implied in the discourses of the Westphalian 
sovereign state. 
 
Globalization 
Definitions and Perspectives 
Globalization, while itself not a new process, has deepened to become a more 
potent factor for change in the world during recent years, and particularly since the end 
of the Cold War.  Nevertheless, there is no consensus about globalization.  Opinions 
range from those who do not accept the process (Scruton, 2002) to those who regard it 
as an all consuming, rendering states irrelevant (Ohmae, 1995) and consequently 
confining realism to history.  For Goetschel (2000): ‘Globalisation is characterised by 
the weakening of existing mediating political institutions such as states, and the 
strengthening of the influence on international affairs of other political actors such as 
supranational organisations, transnational organisations, and individuals.’ (p.260).  This 
implies a move away from a purely realist model, towards a more complex system that 
involves other governmental as well as non-governmental organizations.  As Goetschel 
notes: ‘In an era of globalisation, realism especially cannot explain the role of non-state 
actors in the realm of international security.’ (p.266).  These non-state actors can, of 
course, encompass ‘terrorists’, who can take advantage of the globalizing forces, and act 
across states rather than being restricted within their borders.  Rostoványi (2002) points 
out that: ‘Terrorist targets – even if they may be connected to a particular country – can 
be found scattered practically all over the world in any country’ (p.74).  This prompts 
Mansbach (2003) to reflect that: ‘The essence of a globalising world consists of 
increasingly porous political boundaries and the declining relevance of physical distance 
and the growing autonomy capacity of non-state groups.’ (p.20).   
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However, there are many interpretations of globalization that accept its existence 
without necessarily concluding that it means the end of the state.  Held and McGrew 
(2002), identify several positions within the globalization/anti-globalization debate.  It is 
regarded favourably by Neoliberals9 and Liberal Internationalists10, while 
Statists/Protectionists11 and Radicals12 are more sceptical.  The first two offer a vision of 
a world that is increasingly borderless; the significance of the state is reduced in favour 
of a particular Western model of liberal economics and democracy.  The other two 
standpoints concentrate on the state (statists/protectionists), and on the local, seeing 
little role for regional and global actors.  To an extent statists/protectionists are 
compatible with critical realism due to their belief in the continuing power of the state, 
but by rejecting globalization they leave little room for change and for non-state actors 
globally or regionally. 
 
As an alternative, Institutional Reformers, who are classed by Held and McGrew 
as ‘globalisers’, argue for ‘radical institutional reform’ of organizations like the UN.  
They believe that these can provide some public goods that are more suited to delivery 
at a global level (Held and McGrew, 2002, p.104).  In order to provide public goods that 
meet global challenges, three gaps must be closed: the difference between the scale of 
the issues and the states, bringing into question what governmental body is responsible 
for global problems when states only have sovereignty over their individual territories; 
the lack of participation of important actors in the current system; and the lack of 
incentive for states to participate when they can obtain the same benefits from the 
efforts of others (p.105).  Institutional Reformers promote greater cooperation and 
responsibility for international organizations like the UN.  Thus, while accepting that 
 
9 Neoliberals seek the removal of barriers to trade and rely on market forces as the principal means of 
governance, with only limited intervention by other agents, aimed at supporting the free market (p.100). 
10 A more cooperative world order is sought by liberal internationalists.  This will come through the 
growing economic interdependence favoured by the neoliberals but also as a result of the spread of 
democracy and the peace that this allegedly brings, and of international law and institutions (p.102). 
11 Statists and Protectionists believe in strong state government and reject globalization as a 
misconception.  For these people, state governments still have considerable power, and it is desirable to 
strengthen the state so as to keep order and regulate the economy (p.110). 
12 This more localised concept: ‘…represents a normative theory of “humane governance” which is 
grounded in the existence of a multiplicity of communities and social movements, as opposed to the 
individualism and appeals to rational self-interest of neoliberalism and related political projects.’ (p.113).  
Radicals therefore reject the structured governance of states or larger regional and global organizations as 
well as the power of capital, though by concentrating on communities and movements they do not 
exclude possibilities for global networks. 
Philosophical Foundations, Geopolitics and Forces of Change: A Review of the Literature 
69
the sovereign state is still important, Institutional Reformers advocate the use of other 
organizations at different scales to cope with global problems. 
 
Global Transformers fall under the general heading of anti-globalization in Held 
and McGrew’s analysis.  This is slightly misleading, as the argument is not against 
globalization per se, but against it in its current manifestation.  They reject it as a 
neoliberal project (p.107), and also the arguments of the Institutional Reformers who 
see possibilities for change.  There is, however, still a commitment to global governance 
of a different kind: 
 
‘The core of this project involves reconceiving legitimate political 
activity in a manner which emancipates it from its traditional anchor in 
fixed borders and delimited territories and instead articulates it as an 
attribute of basic democratic arrangements or basic democratic law 
which can, in principle, be entrenched and drawn on in diverse self-
regulating associations – from cities and subnational regions to nation-
states, supranational regions and wider global networks.’ (p.108). 
 
Thus, global transformers are attempting to make fundamental changes to global politics 
by reducing the importance of borders and territory, and so of the state, allowing 
democracy to operate at a number of scales.  I take a position that lies between that of 
the Institutional Reformers and Global Transformers combined with some elements 
from the statists/protectionists argument.  This might be defined as ‘global reform’, in 
that I accept that no great transformation is likely, the state remains the most important 
actor, but reform as a consequence of globalization is in progress and primarily centred 
on existing institutions. 
 
Fluidity 
Globalization involves increase in speed (e.g. transport and communications) 
and consequent reduction of distance, or space-time compression (Urry, 2000).  Virilio 
(1977) contends that space itself is eliminated by speed: ‘The reduction of distances has 
become a strategic reality bearing incalculable economic and political consequences, 
since it corresponds to the negation of space.’ (p.133).  Without space, the territorial 
state is not possible as it is founded on the principle of designating a space by means of 
boundaries.  Thus, if Virilio is correct, then the speed, as implicit in globalization, can 
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only lead to the demise or transformation of the state and any other territorial 
formations. 
 
Technology and practice combine to create the globalization phenomenon, and 
hence it is part of, and a reinforcement of, power.  Those who have power are 
empowered even further by the technology and the ability to use it, and thus 
globalization is driven by ever increasing power.  ‘Very logically – and inexorably – the 
increase in the power of power heightens the will to destroy it.’ says Baudrillard (2002, 
p.6).  He goes on: ‘This is not then, a clash of civilisations or religions, and it reaches 
far beyond Islam and America.’ (p.11).  He is arguing that the particulars of Islam and 
America are not especially important in generating acts/events such as September 11th:
‘…if Islam dominated the world, terrorism would rise against Islam for it is the world, 
the globe itself, which resists globalization.’ (p.12).  It is the growth of power, in this 
case concentrated in America, but as a function of globalization, that leads to a desire to 
attack it.   
 
Technology and speed offer the potential for ‘absolute destruction’: 
 
‘The fact of having increasingly sophisticated weaponry deters the 
enemy more and more.  At that point war is no longer in its execution, 
but in its preparation.  The perpetuation of war is what I call pure war, 
war which isn’t acted out in repetition, but in infinite preparation.’ 
(Virilio, 1997, p.91). 
 
Accumulation of power allows the military to develop ever more sophisticated weapons 
to defend against a potential enemy.  In doing so they further enhance their power and 
the ability to deter.  Deterrence requires an enemy (like terrorism) and the assumption is 
that the enemy is deterred more as weaponry is accumulated.  Hence, the condition of 
pure war is established. 
 
Despite this more fluid world, terrorist acts still occur in space and in state 
territories, and it is states that are the primary actors in the military responses.  A more 
fluid world does not, therefore, mean a space-less world completely conquered by 
speed.  Der Derian (2002) suggests: 
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‘…9-11 is a combination of new and old forms of conflict, including: the 
rhetoric of holy war from both sides; a virtual network war in the media 
and on the internet; a high-tech surveillance war overseas but also in our 
airports, our cities, and even our homes; and a dirty war of counter-
terrorism and counter-insurgency, using an air campaign and limited 
special operations to kill the leadership and to intimidate the supporters 
of al Qaeda and the Taliban.’ (p.2). 
 
This ‘virtuous war’, ‘a war of networks’ is, as Der Derian says, a combination of the old 
and the new.  The realist concept of clearly bounded states engaging in conflict in an 
anarchical world is challenged by the terrorist networks, encouraging responses which 
do not necessarily stop at the boundaries of states. 
 
Networks 
Networks are a defining feature of a more globalized world.  They connect 
across borders and produce more complicated territorialities.  Castells (1996) explains 
how ‘spaces of flows’ (p.398) are the organizing structure as opposed to the ‘spaces of 
place’ that previously dominated, but argues that: ‘The space of flows is not placeless, 
although its structural logic is.  It is based on an electronic network, but this network 
links up specific places, with well-defined social, cultural, physical, and functional 
characteristics.’ (p.413),13 Therefore, networks can exist without eliminating place.  
Spaces of flows characterize the fluid world of networks where places are linked and 
moulded by their interaction with networks but retain their differences.  Hence, states 
can continue to exist as a territorial structure while being transformed in the spaces of 
flows, where networks impose a greater interconnectivity between places. 
 
States are not rendered obsolete by increased interdependence; on the contrary 
they remain an essential part of the global system while changing in response to the new 
circumstances.  Starr (1997) reflects that: ‘…an argument proposing the existence of 
other consequential actors is quite different from arguing that territorial states are no 
longer important, are becoming irrelevant or are in the process of disappearing.’ (p.77).  
Furthermore: ‘…the opportunities of international actors are constrained (or enabled) in 
various ways at various levels of analysis and that these constraints affect the 
willingness of decision makers to act.’ (p.16).  Interdependency acts as an important 
 
13 A place being: ‘a locale whose form, function and meaning are self-contained within the boundaries of 
physical capacity.’ (Castells, 1996, p.423). 
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influence upon states, in terms of the decisions that are made by the actors representing 
them.  It is more a contextual environment than a factor that must be weighed up along 
with others, but allows some actions to be taken while precluding other practices.  All 
actors must contend with the way in which their own decisions have wider 
consequences and, likewise, that the decisions of others will impact upon them. 
 
In this way networks have the effect of disrupting, though not destroying, the 
realist system of sovereign states.  While in response to the September 11th attacks, 
some argue that ‘networks could be the spatiality of the future’ (Flint, 2001, p. 
unknown), the state continues to be relevant.  Al Qaeda has used communications 
networks like the internet (Bull, D., 2002) and raised funds to sustain it around the 
world from businesses and investments (Biersteker, 2002, p.76).  Hence, the arrival of 
an actor – the terrorist – that does not conform to neorealist interpretations, but is 
instead part of a network, must impact, to an extent, upon how states respond and how 
geopolitics is understood.  Falk (2004) says: 
 
‘Modern geopolitics was framed to cope with conflict and relations 
among sovereign states; the capacity of a network with modest 
traditional financial and military resources to mount a major attack and 
wage a devastating type of war on a global scale against the largest state 
does require an acknowledgement of a different structure of security that 
will need to be constructed by a postmodern geopolitics, reinforced by 
responsive adjustments in legal doctrines pertaining to the use of force 
and self-defence.’ (p.193). 
 
This suggests a need for a revision of geopolitical interpretations and the discourses that 
underpin them. 
 
However, the response of the United States, in particular, has been to construct 
the terrorist ‘Other’ through these familiar discourses and act in a conventional realist 
way: ‘The difficulty of dealing with “shadowy networks” rendered traditional locational 
targeting of a (“rogue”) nation-state a logical solution.’ (Ettlinger and Bosco, 2004, 
p.253).  Debrix (2005) describes the ‘war on terror’ as: 
 
‘…a revulsion that cannot be identified as a traditional object of 
geopolitics (a network, fleeting enemies whose leaders may or may not 
be dead, insurgent groups with multiple affiliations, masters of terror, a 
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religion, a whole civilisation perhaps), and that is nonetheless necessary 
for America to ‘establish’ itself.’ (p.1159). 
 
Although the terrorist ‘threat’ has been represented through existing neorealist 
discourse, underpinning responses against other states, the character of the ‘threat’ as a 
network problematizes these kind of responses.  While this is necessary to reinforce the 
identity of the ‘Self’, it is simultaneously undermining to existing geopolitical 
interpretations.   
 
Nevertheless, there are links between the terrorist network and states (Freedman, 
2002), as the terrorists cannot avoid this.  Non-state networks and states are 
interconnected and, consequently, affect each other: ‘…a complex multilayer 
international structure is being established characterized not only by states but also by 
interactions between societies and also between state and social actors.’ (Kiss, 2002, 
p.40).  Hence, there can be no simple distinction between a new world of global 
networks and an old world of states.  The two exist together in a symbiotic relationship 
where states are changed by the networks, and the networks are constrained by state 
control14.
Governance 
Global Governance 
Globalizing forces inevitably have implications for governance.  A more fluid 
and networked world brings into question the extent to which states can continue to be 
seen as, or indeed should be, the dominant, if not the only, scales at which governance is 
practiced.  From a critical realist perspective it is important to recognize the continuing 
relevance and dominance of states in the realm of governance and thus in geopolitics, 
but at the same time to accept that other actors of various types, and operating at 
different scales, also have a role to play.  As such, consideration must be made of 
possible developments in global, and also regional, governance. 
 
14 While the state has been considered the main, or only, actor in global politics in the past, this is 
interpreted through neorealist discourse and therefore must not be taken to mean that no other actors were 
relevant, as neorealism maintains.  Nevertheless, the dominance of realism has constructed a reality that 
did put the state in a pre-eminent role and globalizing forces were not always as strong as they have 
become. 
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The Neorealist Perspective 
The neorealist interpretation requires the sovereign state to be at the centre of 
any new concepts of governance in a more interconnected world.  Cooper (2003) 
develops a reformed neorealism in response to the new conditions.  He defines three 
categories of state.  These are ‘pre-modern’, ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’.  The first, he 
says, are chaotic.  Most states are modern, in that they operate in the traditional realist 
way of competition between one another.  Finally, the postmodern states are epitomised 
by those in Europe where ‘Borders are increasingly irrelevant’ (p.30).  Cooper, while 
positive towards ‘postmodern’ Europe, focuses on states as the primary players in 
geopolitics. 
 
Responses to September 11th, especially in the United States, have followed the 
path of neorealism; they have been essentially state centred and unilateralist, though 
willing to make use of coalitions when they are useful, but ignoring them when they are 
not.  Thus: ‘…the Europeans had been sidelined almost completely in an American war 
fought for largely American ends by American military personnel.’ (Cox, 2002, p.156).  
Nevertheless, the conflict that is currently occurring between international terrorism and 
(neo)realist states is of a different nature to that between states, as the spatialities are 
juxtaposed and intertwined.  Hence, Ramphal (2003) argues that in tackling global 
problems that are currently presenting themselves: ‘…we can only achieve success by 
working together consensually, by acting multi-laterally using the tools of global 
governance.’ (p.215).  Global governance, an anathema to neorealists, is therefore a way 
to resolve the conflicting spatialities thrown up by global networks like al Qaeda and 
sovereign states.   
 
Alternative Interpretations 
World government, as a means to deliver peace, is not a new objective (Ewing, 
1947).  Although world government is rarely mentioned now, possibilities for multi-
layered governance are being discussed in the context of globalization and 
regionalization.  By deconstructing neorealist discourse, it is possible to recognise the 
potential for change in geopolitics in a way that neorealism cannot.  Mansbach (2003) 
reflects that a ‘postinternational’ perspective: 
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‘…breaks sharply and self-consciously with static models, which 
according to adherents, view global phenomena like states as timeless 
and universal.  Change, we see, is the product of simultaneous and 
related processes of fusion and fission of authority, and consequent 
political forms are contingent rather than universal.’ (p.19). 
 
Consequently, states should not be thought of as permanent, but rather they are subject 
to change, possibly breaking up (e.g. the former Yugoslavia), or coming together to 
create other layers of governance. 
 
McGrew’s (2000) Transformationalism15 accounts for the changes brought about 
by globalization.  Very much in line with the Institutional Reform and Global 
Transformation strands of globalization theory, and thus with my ‘global reform’ 
position, it allows networks to be included alongside territorial states in geopolitical 
analysis.  He explains that: ‘The transformationalist account seeks to acknowledge the 
significance of both the changing structure or context of politics and governance, 
brought about by globalization, and the importance of political agents in shaping the 
conduct and content of global governance.’ (p.154).  Borders and territory are still 
ascribed a degree of importance in this account, but only as regards administration 
(p.162). 
 
The world is now a heterarchy16 in which reflexive states17 are merely one part 
of a complex system of governance dominated by networks, experts18 and 
administration (p.163).  Governance can therefore be understood to operate at a number 
of scales, although unevenly across space.  McGrew identifies four layers or scales of 
governance: supra-state bodies, the national layer, the transnational layer and the sub-
 
15 McGrew defines three main arguments on the character of global governance: The Traditionalist 
argument, The Globalist argument, and the Transformationalist.   
Traditionalists believe in the prevalence of ‘hegemonic governance’ where a hegemon like the 
United States has influence via the structure of power and thus: ‘…their capacity to veto or bypass 
international bodies, such as the UN, gives them enormous influence over the management of global 
affairs.’ (p.152). 
The Globalist argument as set out by McGrew, dismisses the state focused nature of the 
traditionalist argument and instead looks to the ‘hegemony of global corporate capital’ (p.153).  Hence, 
this appears to be based on economic determinism rather than a concentration on structures of power 
between states. 
16 This is defined as: ‘A system in which political authority is shared and divided between different layers 
of governance and in which many agencies share in the task of governance.’ (McGrew, 2000, p.163). 
17 A reflexive state: ‘seeks to constitute its power at the intersection of global, regional, transnational and 
local systems of rule and governance.’ (McGrew, 2000, p.164). 
18 This leads to what he calls an ‘epistemic community’ which is a community of experts (McGrew, 2000, 
p.159).   
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state layer (p.143).  However, state representatives, such as politicians, still hold 
considerable power, hence states remain the most important actors.  
Transformationalism, with an enhanced position for the state, therefore forms a robust 
starting point for discussing global governance. 
 
Regional/Supra-State Governance 
 The region is a scale at which governance is increasingly operating.  
Regionalization is not an even process, with Europe being the most advanced example 
of the formation of a regional layer (Van der Wusten, 2000, p.87).  A regional actor like 
the European Union cannot be dismissed as irrelevant as in neorealist interpretations.  
Instead the role it might play vis-a-vis the member states must be considered.  This 
demands reflection on the nature of regional governance and layered governance more 
generally. 
 
Regional governance could take a number of forms.  For example, Ohmae 
(1995), as a hyper-globalist, claims ‘region states’ are the inevitable result of 
globalization.  These are economically based units that may cross sovereign state 
boundaries (p.5).  Trade blocs, another regional form, are based on a coalition of states 
working together on economic issues (Junne, 1999).19 Regionalizing forces that bring 
about economic cooperation can also, and perhaps must also, bring with them a level of 
political power. 
 
Adopting a political dimension, Gamble (2001) contends that a ‘new 
medievalism’ is a more useful theory for examining new layers of governance, a term 
that suggests territories that overlap and are contested with no clear ruler (p.29).  Hedley 
Bull (2002) describes it in the following terms: 
 
‘If modern states were to come to share their authority over their 
citizens, and their ability to command their loyalties, on the one hand 
with regional and world authorities, and on the other hand with sub-state 
or sub-national authorities, to such an extent that the concept of 
sovereignty ceased to be applicable, then a neo-mediaeval form of 
universal political order might be said to have emerged.’ (p.246). 
 
19 This could include a variety of formations with different competences over economic matters. 
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This approach recognizes the changes in state sovereignty that globalization has brought 
about and includes other actors, while dismissing (neo)realist conceptions of 
international relations that: ‘…for too long have obscured the fact that there have 
always been rival and overlapping sources of authority and order.’ (Gamble, 2001, 
p.36).  Despite this, new medievalism remains a project for a fragmented world similar 
to that of (neo)realism, and therefore leaves power in the hands of particular units or 
alliances, and stresses the anarchical nature of the system. 
 
Europe 
In the case of Europe, the extent to which regionalization has developed allows 
an argument to be made that there is a genuine regional layer of governance, and a 
regional actor with the potential to play a role in geopolitics.  TelT, (2001) describes a 
‘European regionalism’.  This: ‘…does not only refer to deepening integration policies 
but also to giving an active contribution – as a single entity and not only as a sum of 
member states – to filtering and sharing more autonomous international and political 
relations.’ (p.250).  Therefore, TelT’s ‘new regionalism’ provides a theory that can 
include both states and regional governance as closely linked layers of a complex 
system developing in Europe.  The layers of governance overlap and are entangled, and 
so influence and constrain without controlling each other. 
 
It is important to note, however, that the region has not replaced, or become 
more powerful/influential than, the state in terms of foreign policy, though perhaps less 
so in some other policy fields.  Although there must be an acknowledgement of the 
process of regionalization, particularly in Europe, the state remains the single most 
dominant geopolitical actor, even here.  As Van der Wusten (2000) points out: ‘We 
have not got European government, but a situation of governance.’ (p.88).  Hence, to 
understand geopolitics in Europe requires an appreciation of the impact of 
regionalization on the state, as much as to identify the role, if any, of the regional body 
itself.  Hettne and Söderbaum (2000) contend that: ‘Rising regionness does not mean 
that the so-called nation-states are becoming obsolete or disappearing, but rather that 
they are undergoing major restructuring in the context of regionalisation (and 
globalisation) and the complex interplay of state-market-society relations.’ (p.465).  The 
state is, therefore, going through a process of change as it meets the challenge of 
globalization and regionalization, but perhaps also of localization: 
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‘Rather than replacing – or “hollowing out” – nation-states, sub-national 
empowerment and supra-nationalisation are in fact seen as part of a 
broader dynamic of “power dispersion” in the European Union, in which 
national states have lost political control to European and sub-national 
institutions, while retaining significant control over resources and 
building upon this in introducing measures of institutional restructuring.’ 
(Gualini, 2004, p.552). 
 
Thus, the state could be understood to be one layer in multi-layered governance, which 
increasingly includes both sub-state and supra-national levels.   
 
However, the very complexity of the system of layered governance that appears 
to be evolving in Europe is such that it cannot be assumed that all competencies have 
undergone the same degree of dispersion to regional and/or sub-state layers.  As Smith 
(2003) says: ‘The growth of the European Community as an economic power has not 
been accompanied by as profound a development of its internal or external political 
dimension.’ (p.29).  The economic policy sphere is perhaps the most notable to have 
been regionalized to a considerable extent, though certainly not in its entirety.  In 
contrast, foreign and defence policy has been treated by the states as primarily their 
responsibility.  These policy areas are often considered to represent the fundamental 
features of state sovereignty and therefore of the Westphalian state.  The extent to which 
they may be regionalized is consequently of greater relevance to this thesis than, for 
example, economic policy, as foreign and defence policy is most closely linked to the 
construction of geopolitical codes, and so the question of possible common European 
geopolitical codes.  Hence, the existence of regional or layered governance for one (or 
more) competencies does not necessarily imply that the same is true for all 
competencies; following from this, integration in some areas does not automatically 
lead to equal integration in all areas and to a regional body that can be a geopolitical 
actor of equal weight to, or even replacing, its component states and with clearly 
defined geopolitical codes of its own.  
 
Layered Governance 
 The precise balance between layers is the subject of debate, but in terms of 
critical realism, must be considered to remain in favour of the states.  Hooghe and 
Marks (2001) differentiate the ‘State-Centric Model’, which privileges the state in the 
EU (p.3), and ‘Multi-Level governance’, where decision making is shared by different 
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levels allowing EU institutions some independent control (p.3), and through collective 
decision making, diminishing the power of the states (p.4).  Both of these views appear 
to have some validity.  It is difficult to define exactly where the balance of power lies, 
as it is a complex and variable system.   
 
Given that the processes are on going and the role of agency must be 
acknowledged, an exact model of European governance may be impossible to produce.  
Hooghe and Marks reflect this: ‘Multi-level governance may not be a stable 
equilibrium.  There is no explicit constitutional framework.  There is little consensus on 
the goals of integration.  As a result, the allocation of competences between national and 
supranational actors is contested.’ (p.28).  What is clear is that regionalization in Europe 
(and possibly to a lesser extent elsewhere) has had an impact on the power and the 
sovereignty of the state.  While the state may continue to be the most powerful actor in 
geopolitics, the effect of multi-layered governance cannot be ignored. 
 
Multi-layered governance is expressed in Held’s (1995) ‘cosmopolitan 
democracy’: ‘…a cosmopolitan community, it needs to be emphasized, does not require 
political and cultural integration in the form of a consensus about a wide range of 
beliefs, values and norms.’ (p.115), but he adds: ‘Nevertheless, what clearly is required 
is a “precommitment” to democracy, for without this there can be no sustained dialogue, 
and democracy cannot function as a decision making process.’ (p.116).  This removes 
the problem of a common identity, but as democracy is a precondition for participation 
and the successful working of the system, this privileges what is sometimes considered 
a Western concept.  It does though, move beyond the neorealist state system. 
 
The state must still be appreciated, as the most important actor in geopolitics.  
The need is for a model that can also accommodate the other actors that neorealism 
excludes.  Held’s is a vision of the world that allows for change, and can encompass 
layers of governance, but lacks non-governmental actors.  Writing in 1996, he describes 
how: 
 
‘A cosmopolitan democracy would not call for a diminution per se of 
state capacity across the globe.  Rather it would seek to entrench and 
develop democratic institutions at regional and global levels as a 
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necessary compliment to those at the level of the nation-state.’ (Held, 
1996, p.354). 
 
Regional parliaments would, he says, be the first component to be introduced, with the 
European parliament being enhanced (p.354).  Eventually the objective would be: 
‘…the formation of an authoritative assembly of all democratic states and societies – a 
re-formed UN, or a compliment to it’ (p.355).  Essentially, cosmopolitan democracy 
would not be a unitary global system built from the top down, but instead would be built 
up gradually, involving existing institutions like the EU and the UN, and adding other 
regional and global bodies over time.  States would not be abolished, although Held 
clearly sees them as having a declining relevance. 
 
Diverging Regions/States? 
If regions are to form a site of governance, and a coherent political power 
structure in addition too, rather than purely as an agent of states, then there will be 
aspects of policy where they will define positions in opposition to other regions or 
states, and thus create a new source of potential conflict (Boswell, 1999, p.280).  
Writing towards the end of the Cold War, John Palmer (1987) contends that Europe and 
America had been diverging for a number of years, with growing economic conflict, 
and resentment in the US that Europe did not contribute enough to its own defence.  
Kagan (2003) adds: ‘On the all-important question of power – the efficacy of power, the 
morality of power, the durability of power – American and European perspectives are 
diverging.’ (p.3).  Kagan attributes this divergence to relative power.  Without any clear 
rival, America has been able to exercise its power without contest.  Europe, being 
militarily weak, he says, has an interest in moving out of an anarchic world into one 
governed by law (p.37) – ‘Europeans have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of 
anarchy into the Kantian World of perpetual peace.’ (p.57).  As a result, he suggests, 
Europeans have built up institutions like the European Union and press for more 
powerful international institutions while Americans are inclined to use military power 
and act unilaterally. 
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Consequences 
Borders 
Definitions 
The delineation of borders is an essential component of the sovereign state, 
identifying what is inside and what is outside.  Anderson and O’Dowd (1999) describe 
borders as follows: ‘They are at once gateways and barriers to the “outside world”, 
protective and imprisoning, areas of opportunity and/or insecurity, zones of contact 
and/or conflict, of co-operation and/or competition, of ambivalent identities and/or the 
aggressive assertion of difference.’(p.595).  In realist terms, all state borders act in the 
same way, as the territoriality of the state is indivisible; a state has complete control 
over its delimited territory.  O’Dowd (2002) explains this: ‘Borders are integral to 
human behaviour – they are a product of the need for order, control and protection in 
human life and they reflect our contending desires for sameness and difference, for a 
marker between “us” and “them”.’(p.14).  However, borders do not operate in this 
simplistic way that the realists represent, they are not always so clear, uncontested, or 
equally applied.  Increasingly globalization, regionalization, and the geopolitical actors 
facilitated by these processes, problematize the state boundary. 
 
Changing Meanings of Borders 
That is not to say that borders have disappeared or become irrelevant, on the 
contrary they continue to be extremely important, not least in neorealist constructions.  
In fact some would argue that their importance has even increased in the light of 
globalization (Rudolph, 2005, p.14).  Borders are, though, more complex than the 
neorealist would suggest.  They still play a major role in global politics, not least in the 
construction of Self/Other identities (Wright, 2004).  Despite this, changes have been 
taking place that, for some people and purposes, have altered the meaning of borders, 
leading to a more complex system.   
 
Some borders now apply differently to several groups, e.g. national citizens, 
European citizens and non-Europeans.  Anderson and O’Dowd comment: 
 
‘In a contradictory world where increasing transnationalization co-exists 
with increasing stress on ethnic, regional and national identities, there is 
a long term shift away from the relatively simple, monopolistic and 
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absolute sovereignty claims of national states towards a reality of 
multiple or overlapping jurisdictions and partial or qualified 
sovereignties.’ (1999, p.602). 
 
State borders are still there, and their porosity is variable not only across space but also 
from person to person.  Rich westerners are likely to have access to the benefits of 
globalization that, combined with their Western identity, allow them to traverse 
boundaries more easily then poor and non-Western people. 
 
Europe is perhaps the most obvious example of this: ‘A putative Europe Without 
Frontiers – the European version of the “borderless” ideology – coexists with tendencies 
towards a Fortress Europe;’ (Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999, p.602).  This paradox, of de-
bordering within Europe lies at the heart of the debate over what form of governance is 
developing in the region.  ‘The lines demarcating the territory of the state may still 
retain political significance, but this, at least as far as Western Europeans are concerned, 
is diminishing in the face of new political, economic and information trends.’ (Newman, 
2003, p.133).  Interpretations that stress a greater porosity of borders argue, to various 
extents, that state power is being weakened, whether by capital crossing borders, higher 
levels of migration, transfer of powers to organisations like the WTO or the EU, or even 
international terrorism. 
 
It is wrong to suggest that borders are disappearing in Europe: ‘European 
borders are in the process of being re-scripted as key nodes and gate-way points within 
an expanded Europe of cross-border regions…’ (Kramsch, Mamadouh and Van Der 
Velde, 2004, p.535).  Hence, they are being transformed internally while being 
reinforced externally.  Thus: 
 
‘…for some observers, the EU evokes a post-Westphalian and 
postmodern polity which is moving away from a strong emphasis on 
bounded territory.  Instead, it is characterised by multiple, fluid spaces 
of regions, markets and cities connected by networks of communication, 
transportation and traversed by flows of goods, people, information and 
capital. (Walters, 2004, p.676). 
 
This does not spell the end for borders, even within Europe.  Globalization and 
Regionalization are reconstructing borders in such a way as to increase their porosity for 
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some people in some places while they may remain, or become more rigid, in other 
cases. 
 
September 11th 
September 11th, as the act of a global terrorist network, was a dramatic 
demonstration of the porosity of borders and thus a challenge to the neorealist state that 
is based upon them.  Smith (2001) points out that: ‘The intense connections between 
local and global events expressed in this tragedy also suggest the limits to national 
geographies.  The 19 hijackers lived multinational lives between Florida and Riyadh, 
Boston and Beirut.’ (p.3).  Consequently, Anderson (2002) admits that ‘My instant 
response was that 11 September would in fact spell the final demise of the “borderless 
world”’ (p.227).  ‘However, the more fundamental border transformations, intrinsic to 
contemporary globalization, have been the very substantial but selective increases in the 
porosity of existing borders and in cross-border traffic of all sorts’ (p.231).  He notes the 
trend towards greater cross border activities while still emphasising that this is selective.
Places are linked in networks in ways that it is difficult for state authorities to cope with 
as they contend with actors outside the scope of neorealism.   
 
In such a world Beeson and Bellamy (2003) argue for security based not on 
states, but on humans – ‘human security’.  This encompasses issues of poverty, 
malnutrition and states themselves (p.346).  They emphasise the need to look beyond 
state boundaries:  
 
‘Neo-realist security practices are predicated upon a conceptualisation of 
international order that remains centred on sovereign boundaries and 
clear distinctions between “self” and “other”.  What 11 September 
demonstrated is that not only are those boundaries theoretically and 
practically insecure, so too is the security politics that is based on them.’ 
(p.353). 
 
This assessment allows for analysis that accepts the porosity of boundaries. The 
constraints of neorealist discourse, through which borders are singular and simplistic, 
are reduced in favour of a complicated system of actors and geographies.  Borders are 
now revealed to be multiple and complex, and undergoing a process of change.  
Traditional neorealist discourses of security are consequently disrupted by this evolution 
in singular state borders and the territoriality that they define. 
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Territoriality 
Territoriality and Realism 
 A territory is a space that is under the control of those in power (Paasi, 2003, 
p.116), no particular functions must be specified as within its jurisdiction.  In 
neorealism, the discourse of territoriality makes it obvious that a government controls 
all that is inside its territory.  Territoriality is therefore a power strategy using space to 
assert authority and naturalise a particular structure of governance.  Sack (1986) defines 
territoriality thus: ‘Territoriality in humans is best understood as a spatial strategy to 
affect, influence, or control resources and people, by controlling area; and, as a strategy, 
territoriality can be turned on and off.’ (p.1).  He describes how modernity brought three 
territorial effects: ‘emptiable space’, ‘impersonal/bureaucratic relationships’ and ‘the 
possibility of obfuscation’ (p.172).  Mapping based on cartesian perspectivism was the 
foundation for these representations of space.  Once space could be ‘emptied’, new 
divisions and territories could be defined.  Spatial differentiation could be practiced at 
any scale in the interests of capitalism and of those in power.  By drawing boundaries, 
authority and power over a space could be assumed. 
 
Territoriality is therefore constructed in the context of particular discourses.  The 
incarnation described by Sack, in respect of modernity, was the foundation for the 
sovereign state, and its accompanying realist philosophy.  Sovereignty came to be 
associated, in realist discourse, with a particular delimited territory: 
 
‘The conception of sovereignty that has predominated in modern 
political theory relies on the idea of exclusive political authority 
exercised by a state over a given territory.  This idea reflects the concept 
of sovereignty that emerged from Westphalia and then developed along 
with Enlightenment and Romantic ideals of popular rule and patriotism.’ 
(Agnew, 2005, p.456). 
 
Hence, the territoriality of the sovereign state should be understood to be a function of 
Enlightenment thought.  The binary discourse that this produced underpins the 
construction of territorialities that draw borders around exclusive spaces, and ascribe 
power or sovereignty to a single authority in that territory. 
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The impact of global change, particularly post-September 11th, is consequently 
troubling for neorealists who continue to see this territorial architecture, in modernist 
terms, as the culmination of human progress.  For example Scruton (2002) argues that 
territoriality, as the principal source of identity, is confined to the ‘West’, but is under 
threat: ‘Whatever hope there might have been that people would come to define their 
loyalties in terms of territory rather than faith has been obliterated by the impact of 
Western technology, which seems to believe in neither.’ (p.131).  Technology is linked 
to globalization and the diminishing of borders and sovereignty.  This challenges the 
simple (neo)realist territoriality.  In an Orientalist binary, the ‘West’ is represented as 
superior in its territorial arrangements, but these are threatened.  For Scruton, September 
11th demonstrates the effect of an absence of Westphalian territoriality:  
 
‘And with the emergence of territorial jurisdictions and genuinely 
accountable governments, the terrorist threat would almost certainly 
dwindle, as people learn to attach their loyalties to real fragments of 
earth rather than imagining vistas of heaven and thereby to see human 
life for what it is – namely, a process of accommodation with one’s 
neighbours.’ (p.145). 
 
This represents the neorealist perception of the pre-eminence and necessity of the 
territorial state – states create order through unity, without them there can only be 
disorder. 
 
Potential for Change 
What the neorealist position does, is deny any possibility for alternative 
territorialities.  This excludes the potential for change and for other forms of 
governance, such as the layered governance discussed above.  Agnew (2005) states that: 
‘What is clear, however, if not widely recognized within contemporary debates about 
state sovereignty, is that political authority is not necessarily predicated on and defined 
by strict and fixed territorial boundaries.’ (p.441).  In addition, Ruggie (1998) points out 
that mutual exclusion is not a precondition.  He describes the medieval system where 
there were large zones of transition rather than clearly defined borders (p.179).  The 
reasons for the transformation into what we know as a state lie, according to Ruggie, in 
changes in domains of social life.  These are material environments,20 the matrix of 
 
20 Ecodemographics, relations of production, and relations of force (p.193). 
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constraints and opportunities within which social actors interacted,21 and social 
epistemes22 (p.193).  If changes to these conditions led to a transformation in 
territoriality then this spatial form is neither fixed nor inevitable.  Just as territoriality 
changed from the medieval system, to the Westphalian state, it could transform with the 
current developments in geopolitics. 
 
Ruggie argues that global change is producing the ‘unbundling of territoriality’ 
(p.190), that is, the international organizations, common markets and multi-national 
political communities that have become more prevalent with globalization are 
producing overlapping territorialities.  While it should not be assumed that this 
encourages a process of ‘deterritorialization’ (Luke, 1998, p.279), ‘unbundling’ is a 
useful concept to take forward.  Contrary to (neo)realism, it provides a basis on which 
to develop understandings of the implications of globalization and regionalization.  
Some contend that layers of society cannot easily be held together under a single 
identity where more than one layer of territoriality exists (Taylor, 1994, p.160) and so 
unbundling is a dangerous development in the eyes of the neorealist.  If these processes 
have an effect on governance and borders, as appears to be possible, then they must by 
implication change the nature of territoriality.  That is not to say that state territory is 
defunct as a spatial form, but rather that it must be understood to operate alongside other 
territorialities of greater or lesser importance. 
 
European Territoriality 
The European example is especially relevant when discussing evolving 
territorialities, given the extent of regionalization.  Berezin (2003) reflects that: ‘Forms 
of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, from globalization to Europeanization, are 
producing the postmodern era.’ (p.28).  However, Mamadouh (2001) calls the EU’s 
territory ‘secondary territory’ due to its being formed from a combination of the 
territories of the member states rather than being defined as an entity in itself (p.425), it 
has no predetermined claims as sovereign states do (p.426).  Furthermore: ‘The size of 
the territory controlled by the EU varies from one policy domain to the other.’ (p.427).  
This refers to the policy areas for which only some member states have, so far, agreed to 
 
21 The structure of property rights, divergences between private and social rates of return, and coalitional 
possibilities among major social actors (p.193). 
22 Political doctrines, political metaphysics, and spatial constructs (p.193). 
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pass control to the EU.  Consequently, the organization’s policy competence varies 
across its ‘territory’.  In this interpretation, the EU would appear to be a body which 
does not have territory beyond that of its member states, it is ever dependant on the 
states which retain their traditional territoriality.     
 
Where Europe differs, however, is that it has an identifiable regional layer of 
governance, for all that the states may still be dominant.  The question remains whether 
the regional dimension in Europe is one that can be manipulated to engender a European 
identity alongside those of the states?  Agnew (2003) argues that: ‘National identities 
never just happen.  Their intellectual and popular strength has been particularly reliant 
on the privileged status accorded to the modern territorial state as a moral equivalent of 
the individual person with its own identity and interests.’ (p.223).  A European 
territoriality would have to encapsulate a similar set of characteristics before it could 
form the basis of a European identity to compete with, or at least sit alongside, those of 
the states. 
 
The difference between states and the EU is described by Wallace (1999): ‘The 
post-sovereign European order is characterized by disintegrated policy networks and 
disjointed and opaque policy-making processes, without any of the symbols, myths or 
rituals through which modernizing national governments built up a sense of national 
solidarity and virtual representation.’ (p.520).  The use of territoriality in identity 
formation is therefore absent according to Wallace.  Instead, the regional layer is one of 
bureaucratic administration.  He stresses that: ‘…no coherent European narrative is 
emerging, sufficient to generate a legitimizing community of shared identity at this new, 
diffuse, level of governance.’ (p.521).  This has implications for geopolitical codes.  
While policy-making in some areas can be achieved at the regional level without a clear 
European identity, drawn from a European territoriality, foreign policy and geopolitical 
codes demand a coherent common outlook separate from the states.  If a region is to 
hold together at all as a separate entity, there must be some form of common identity, 
even if this is in the shadow of, and closely connected to, that of the states.  New 
territorialities underpinning a regional geopolitical actor, in addition to state actors, 
would require a regional dimension going beyond the singular state territoriality 
apparent in the Westphalian system. 
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Conclusions and Research Questions 
 The foundations of the sovereign state have been shown to lie in the 
Westphalian treaty.  This spatial resolution is representative of the Enlightenment 
thought that characterized modernity.  From these same origins comes (neo)realism, a 
geopolitical philosophy that privileges the sovereign state as the only actor of 
consequence in world politics.  Central to this philosophy is the application of binary 
discourse through which representations are made.  Thus, the differentiation of the 
inside and the outside can be normalized in respect of the state, where the inside is 
ordered while the outside is anarchic. 
 
It is by adopting a critical geopolitics that (neo)realism can be deconstructed in 
this way.  An appreciation can be gained of the importance of power, powerful actors 
and their use of discourse in constructing representations of the world.  The critical 
approach allows an understanding to be acquired of the discursive mechanisms for the 
(re)production of identity.  Through binary discourse the ‘Self’ is separated from the 
‘Other’, which is shown to be inferior, privileging the ‘Self’.  It is this binary discourse 
that has played a central role in the construction of the (neo)realist state system and in 
the reinforcement of state/national identities. 
 
However, I have also emphasised that although the critical approach is vital to 
gaining an understanding of geopolitics as it is practiced through (neo)realism, and how 
it might be re-made, this does not diminish the importance that (neo)realism and the 
sovereign state have had and continue to have.  While discourse is essential in the 
creation of states, these states are then real and important actors in world politics.  The 
position I have adopted in this chapter, and will do in this thesis, is one that can be 
termed ‘critical realism’; in that I accept the influence that (neo)realism has, and the 
structures that it has underpinned, but unlike the neorealists, I do not see these as being 
the fixed and inevitable result of post-Enlightenment progress.  I recognize that they are 
constructed through discourse, and are subject to change and challenge by other actors. 
 
Discourse has been shown to have a close relationship with reality, driving its 
potential for change.  Though not a simple or direct connection, changes in reality do 
have an impact on discourse, even if this is delayed or limited at times.  Equally, as in 
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the construction of the state, reality is constructed through discourse, and real decisions 
are made in the context of understandings made through discourse.  Hence, despite what 
the neorealists may argue, change is possible.  It has been demonstrated how discourses 
and discursive structures are drawn upon repeatedly over time in changing 
circumstances of reality.  Orientalism, formulated in a colonial context could be 
reproduced in the Cold War environment in the process of ‘othering’ the Soviet Union.  
Likewise the Cold War discourse remained in the post-Cold War period, underpinning a 
confused situation and a search for new enemies.  In each situation, earlier discourses 
remain, but the real events lead to their adaptation to suit the changed reality.  In turn, 
responses to that reality are formed through discourses, and so reality itself is, in part, 
constructed through discourse. 
 
It has also become clear that geopolitics, post-September 11th, have continued 
this pattern.  The discursive structure of the Cold War has been remade to understand 
the new ‘threat’ from terrorism.  Thus, terrorism is represented in a particular way when 
understood through the inherited discursive reasoning.  An imagining of terrorism is 
made by historical references and established discourse.  Once again binaries 
differentiate a ‘good’ ‘Self’ and an ‘evil’ ‘Other’.  The same practices used by the 
powerful in the Cold War are repeated in respect of terrorism; applying ‘common 
sense’, and the assurance of authority and power, established a set of representations 
that are ‘obvious’ when interpreted through discourse.  This makes the responses of the 
state ‘obvious’ too, and is the foundation for militarism, again as in the Cold War.  This 
process silences other possible interpretations, as they do not make ‘sense’ and are 
characterized as threatening to the state and consequently beneficial to the terrorist. 
 
Potentially undermining to these neorealist interpretations, not least due to the 
terrorist networks themselves, is the process of globalization.  In my position of ‘global 
reform’, I accept that non-state or multi-state organizations are changing the role of the 
state, but that this is relatively limited in that the states remain predominant, and will do 
so for some time to come at least.  Nevertheless, the greater fluidity that globalization 
brings makes it more difficult for states to control their sovereign territory as they might 
have done in the past (though not always completely).  It is this fluidity that allows 
networks to form across borders and creates actors that are less easily controlled by 
states, but are nonetheless not absolutely independent of them either. 
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 This brings me to global governance.  Here again I look to move beyond the 
neorealist perspective that sees this as only associations or coalitions of states, and 
instead to envisage that a more independent layer or layers of governance may be 
possible.  The transformationalist view, that I take, retains the state as the most powerful 
actor, but leaves room for governance to take place at more than one scale given the 
impacts of globalization and also of regionalization.  Regional governance is a feature 
particularly noticeable in Europe.  Again the degree to which this can operate 
independently of states is debatable and in critical realism must be approached from the 
assumption that states are likely to be more powerful.  This does not, though, preclude a 
relatively powerful regional layer, which may even be part of a developing complex 
multi-layered governance.  The depth of this development is greater in Europe, 
prompting questions of what this means for the practice of geopolitics here as opposed 
to for example, the United States. 
 
All of these processes have, as I have said above, significant implications for 
borders.  Borders, as constructed in (neo)realist discourse, are simple lines delineating a 
sovereign state’s territory; when global networks, multi-layered governance and 
regionalization are introduced, this changes the very nature of borders, problematizing 
them and increasing their complexity.  In turn this impacts upon the territoriality that is 
closely related to the borders that define it in the state system.  Suddenly possibilities 
emerge for multiple territorialities overlapping and meaning different things in different 
places.  If this is so, then the state is no longer the same, even if it remains the most 
important actor in geopolitics.  Furthermore, if these processes are more intense in 
Europe, for example, this could mean a different territoriality in Europe from other parts 
of the world. 
 
This chapter has shown how geopolitics has been dominated by (neo)realism 
both in theory and in practice.  This is the philosophy that has underpinned the making 
of, and reactions to, realities in changing world circumstances.  Yet by approaching 
geopolitics critically it has been revealed how these understandings are constructed 
through discourse.  Accepting that states have been established in this way does not 
mean they must be dismissed, it does though allow other actors to be given their 
appropriate places in world politics, and offers a better way of understanding how new 
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realities and processes at work post-Cold War, and especially post-September 11th, are 
influencing events and also the construction of worldviews in different states. 
 
The position of each state in space and time is relevant to the worldviews that 
the powerful actors construct and the geopolitical codes that emerge from these.  Each 
state has a historical and political context in which discourses have been reproduced and 
are now available again for representations of terrorism.  The extent, and way in which, 
global and regional processes are at work also varies from place to place, and is 
therefore also relevant in the formation of geopolitical codes.  This makes a comparison 
between states such as Britain and France in Europe, and the United States where such 
deep regionalization is absent, particularly pertinent at this time. 
 
Research Questions 
From these conclusions a number of research questions emerge: 
 
For the United States, the United Kingdom and France, what are the geopolitical codes 
in relation to international terrorism post-September 11th?
a) What historical discourses and narratives are drawn on? 
 b) How is international terrorism imagined? 
c) To what extent does terrorism represent a new ‘Other’ in the discursive 
structure? 
d) Is there evidence of competing or alternative representations? 
e) How are the representations given authority? 
f) To what extent is international terrorism imagined in a postmodern way but 
reacted to in a modern way? 
 
When comparing the three states and the European Union, is there an identifiable 
European geopolitical code, and how do European codes differ from those of the United 
States? 
 
a) Comparing the three state representations of international terrorism, what 
similarities and differences can be found between them? 
b) When comparing the state European representations to those of the European 
Union, is there evidence of a common imaging of international terrorism? 
c) Are there any clear divisions in the way international terrorism is imagined 
and reacted to in Europe? 
a) What differences are there between the American and European imaginings 
of international terrorism? 
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In the context of regionalization and in their responses to the networked and non-state 
character of international terrorism, is the character of European states undergoing a 
process of change? 
 
a) Is terrorism represented and responded to as a problem of regional 
significance? 
b) Are borders (both internal and external of the EU) represented as important 
barriers in defending against international terrorism? 
c) Are the responses to international terrorist networks based on state territory 
as in a ‘modern’ state, or do they suggest a more complex territoriality in 
Europe where responses are regional and global? 
 
Can it be said that Europe consists of ‘postmodern’ states while the United States 
remains a ‘modern’ state? 
 
a) Do American responses to terrorism emphasise the defence of state borders 
to a greater extent than those of Europe? 
b) Are territorialities implicit in European responses more complex than those 
of the United States’ responses? 
c) How is citizenship addressed in the United States in comparison with 
Europe? 
d) Does the American code represent a more unilateralist (‘modernist’) 
approach than the European codes? 
e) Are neorealism and the sovereign state reinforced by the hegemonic 
American representations to a greater extent than by those of Europe? 
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Chapter 3
. . . . . . .
A Critical Realist Methodology: The 
Foundations for State Centred Discourse 
Analysis 
. . . . . . . .
Introduction 
 In the last chapter the dominance of neorealism in geopolitics was discussed.  In 
addition, the critical challenge to this philosophy was also examined, and elements of 
this were identified as effective for use in this study.  This does not mean that 
neorealism is dismissed altogether; its very importance in the (re)production of the state, 
and in the geopolitical practices of powerful actors, suggests that it cannot be ignored 
when researching the geopolitics of these same actors.  Consequently, critical realism 
was presented as an approach that can encompass the structures and practices 
underpinned by neorealism, and a critical analysis and recognition of how these are 
constructed through discourse, and are not natural or necessarily constant. 
 
It is therefore a critical realist perspective that runs through this methodology.  
The research is fundamentally conceptualized in a neorealist way; it looks at 
geopolitical codes, codes that are generated by states, and is for that reason directed 
towards an analysis of states.  Despite this, the attractions of critical geopolitics were 
noted in the previous chapter, and this is also influential in the methodology through the 
critical realism underpinning it.  This chapter will demonstrate how these two, in many 
ways contradictory, approaches are brought together, discussing the theory itself and 
then how this affects the choices made, in terms of methods used and the interpretation 
of results.  Finally, it will argue that critical realism, and the methodology that this 
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produces, is the most effective way to look at geopolitics in the post-Cold War and post-
September 11th world, given the existence and relative influence of the actors involved. 
 
Critical Realism: The Foundation for a Methodology 
 Yeung (1997) argues that: ‘…critical realism makes its strongest claims at the 
ontological level: the independent existence of reality and causal powers ascribed to 
human reasons strengthen the possibility of reclaiming reality and an emancipatory 
social science.’ (p.55).  Critical realism is thus a philosophy that accepts reality.  In 
terms of geopolitics the state, as a realist structure, can therefore be understood to be 
real.  Furthermore, it can be considered to be the primary context in which geopolitics is 
practiced.  In researching geopolitics, and geopolitical codes, it is difficult to avoid the 
state as the main focus for that research, given the influence of this formation on 
geopolitics.  Indeed: ‘One of the appeals of realist thinking is its applicability to 
practical problems of international relations…’ (Keohane, 1986, p.7).  Hence, to 
approach an understanding of geopolitical codes in the post-Cold War world the 
acceptance of a neorealist perspective of that world is a useful starting point.  The 
research can focus upon the state as the main unit in world politics, and the structure 
through which most of the relevant actors operate. 
 
Despite this attraction of neorealism the criticisms discussed in the previous 
chapter are still relevant.  It is a philosophy that does not provide space for actors 
outside the state system.  In a study that aims to evaluate geopolitical codes in relation 
to terrorism, and to investigate common European codes, this is a particularly weak 
point, but even in general terms, it is a limited appreciation of geopolitics and the 
influences upon this.  If geopolitics is: ‘…the analysis of the interaction between 
geographical settings and perspectives, and international politics.’ (Cohen, 2003, p.3), 
then it is essential to include all actors, both state and non-state, this may incorporate 
international terrorists and regional layers of governance as much as states. 
 
This is where a critical approach has clear advantages over neorealism.  
Following this thinking, the relevance of a whole range of actors can be noted.  
Fundamentally, it provides the tools to deconstruct established neorealist worldviews, 
revealing these to be constructions created through discourse.  The significance of 
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power in this process also becomes conspicuous when undertaking such an analysis.  Ó 
Tuathail (1994) says: ‘“Critical geopolitics”, as I understand it, is a question not an 
answer, an approach not a theory, which opens up the messy problematic of 
geography/global politics to rigorous problematization and investigation.’ (p.527).  
Critical geopolitics helps to reveal the hidden meanings behind the dominant 
geopolitics.  Where neorealism presents a simplistic vision, critical geopolitics 
contributes to a methodology that seeks to uncover the way that states are ‘made’ and 
how they, and those who represent them, ‘geo-graph’ the world by virtue of their 
powerful positions and the discourses that this allows them to (re)produce. 
 
Despite these attributes, it is difficult, or even impossible, to adopt a purely 
critical geopolitics; and, given the pre-eminence of neorealism, it is arguably misguided 
to assume that the state is only a construction.  Ó Tuathail (2000) reflects that: ‘In 
seeking to engage certain discourses in order to displace them, one invariably is 
dependent to a certain degree upon the organizing terms of these discourses, a 
dependence that can re-invent that which one seeks to problematize.’ (p.387).  This is 
certainly an issue when looking at geopolitics centered on the state.  To determine the 
discourses and narratives of a given state, and of the representations of that state (e.g. of 
terrorism), requires a methodology that takes the state as the principal unit of analysis.  
As such, the neorealist discourse is reinforced. 
 
However, to reduce geopolitics, and the constructions that contribute to it, to a 
formation where only discourse is relevant is to deny the existence of reality outside the 
‘text’.  Critical realism allows elements of both approaches to be brought together.  In 
critiquing Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism Ruggie (1986) remarks: ‘The problem with 
Waltz’s posture is that in any social system, structural change itself ultimately has no 
source other than unit level processes…’ (p.152).  By carrying out a critical analysis of 
the state and its geopolitics it becomes possible to understand how discourse affects 
policy production and geopolitical codes as well as the very existence of the state itself.  
The critical approach removes the notion that the state system is fixed and so introduces 
an understanding of the potential for change, both temporal and spatial. 
 
While methods of analysis derived from critical geopolitics are effective in 
deconstructing neorealist geopolitics, it must also be recognized that the very supremacy 
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of neorealism in geopolitics produces structures, such as the state, that then influence 
the way in which geopolitics is practiced and understood.  Waltz (1986a) notes that: 
‘Structures cause actions to have consequences they were not intended to have.’ (p.104).  
This hints at the role of structures as real constraints or influences.  Waltz would not 
recognize these as having been constructed through discourse in the way that a critical 
or critical realist theorist might, nevertheless he makes an important point; once the 
construction is complete and the structures are accepted, they are real and are therefore 
a component that should not be dismissed. 
 
The state is one such structure.  It has extensive consequences for geopolitics by 
providing the main organizing structure, and acting as an influence and constraint on 
actors in global politics.  The state and its representatives remain the most important, 
though not the only, actors in geopolitics.  Recognition of this, combined with a critical 
form of analysis, allows an understanding of the construction of the state to be 
approached, and hence a deeper appreciation of how geopolitical codes are constructed 
in a neorealist context can be achieved. 
 
Critical realism therefore underpins a methodology that places the state at the 
centre of the analysis.  However, this analysis is carried out by utilizing methods that 
are more common in critical geopolitics than in the neorealism that has dominated the 
discipline.  While the state is accepted as a structure that is not only real but also the 
most important unit or actor, the permanence and naturalness of this is disputed.  
Instead, the critical realism adopted here recognizes the role of discourse in 
representations, and thus in the construction of the sovereign state.  Consequently, 
discourse is also considered relevant in the formation of geopolitical codes; actors such 
as terrorists are represented through discourse in a process that constructs them as 
‘Others’ and reproduces the ‘Self’, that is the state.  By challenging the, supposedly, 
fixed character of the state system, this critical realism allows for change in the 
structures and so can leave room for other actors to play a part in geopolitics (e.g. 
terrorists or regional layers of governance).  Furthermore, individual agency becomes 
relevant as the structures are not considered to be completely dominant; although these 
actors operate through discourse they are not controlled by it, rather they have their own 
influence on geopolitical outcomes in the same way as discourse and structures do.  The 
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methodology is therefore one which brings neorealism and critical geopolitics together, 
using critical methods and approaches in a neorealist context. 
 
Nonetheless, while this particular methodology has been selected for the 
research, it should be noted that there are many ways in which the study could be 
approached and many methodologies that could be applied.  The critical geographer 
Gearóid Ó Tuathail presents just such an alternative for geopolitical discourse analysis 
in his (2002) work on American responses to the war in Bosnia.  Ó Tuathail sets out 
what he describes as ‘a framework for analyzing practical geopolitical reasoning’ 
(p.607).  This framework consists of four principal parts: categorization and 
particularization, storyline construction, performative geopolitical script and foreign 
policy process. 
 
As a means of categorization and particularization, Ó Tuathail defines five 
questions that must be answered as to how statespersons ‘reason about daily dramas 
(p.609).  Firstly he asks where? ‘The activity of specifying location is central to 
geopolitical reasoning yet often appears unexceptional and obvious.’ (p.610).  Secondly, 
the question is what? This refers to what the statesperson is claiming is actually 
happening in a particular situation.  Thirdly, who? This involves ‘actor typification’, 
representing the role or character of the actors involved in the event(s)/situation.  The 
fourth question is why? This is what Ó Tuathail describes as ‘attributions and 
imputations of causality’, he reflects: ‘Attribution refers to ways in which actors 
construct causal relations and explanations of events and imputation is a form of 
attribution referring to how certain intentions, psychological states and motivations are 
imputed to the protagonists.’ (p.614).  The last question is so what? This is a ‘strategic 
calculation’: ‘In considering new foreign policy crises, politicians and officials 
inevitably engage in rough and ready calculations of the geostrategic significance of the 
crisis to their state.’ (p.616). 
 
The answers to these questions provide the basis for the next part of the 
framework, the assemblage of storylines.  Ó Tuathail says: 
 
‘The social process of categorization and particularization produces a 
knowledge specific to the policy challenge under consideration.  From 
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these building blocks higher-level storylines are constructed and refined.  
Storylines are sense-making organizational devices tying the different 
elements of a policy challenge together into a reasonably coherent and 
convincing narrative.’ (p.617). 
 
These storylines may not be shared by all parts or members of the policy making 
process, on occasions there may be contested and alternative versions.  However, they 
can be considered to be a means of bringing together different parts of the 
representations of a situation and its protagonists into a narrative based upon which 
policy decisions can be made and justified. 
 
The third part of the framework is the ‘performative geopolitical script’.  On this 
Ó Tuathail states: 
 
‘A geopolitical script refers to the directions and manner in which 
foreign policy leaders perform geopolitics in public, to the political 
strategies of coping that leaders develop in order to navigate through 
certain foreign policy challenges and crises.  It is a way of performing 
whereas a storyline is a set of arguments.’ (p.619). 
 
The arguments made in the storylines are set within the geopolitical scripts that are then 
performed by the foreign policy leaders; these storylines are the narratives that underpin 
the geopolitical scripts.  A script may draw upon more than one storyline allowing 
alternatives to be acknowledged according to the circumstances and the audience: ‘It is 
a tacit set of rules for how foreign policy actors are to perform in certain speech 
situations, and how they are to articulate responses to policy challenges and problems.’ 
(p.619). 
 
As regards the final part of the framework, Ó Tuathail comments: 
‘…geopolitical discourse is also a problem-solving discourse with regulatory 
aspirations.’ (p.621).  This problem solving can be subdivided into a further four 
components.  The first of these is ‘problem definition’, a process that involves inclusion 
and exclusion when defining a policy challenge or: ‘…the translation of complex 
foreign policy challenges into extant geopolitical categories, conceptions, and recipes.’ 
(p.622).  ‘The second concept, emanating from the act of “problem definition” and 
distinct to geopolitics is the conscious development of geopolitical strategy and policy 
line by an administration.’ (p.622).  This strategy, according to Ó Tuathail, may be 
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based on previous strategies for similar situations and is developed in meetings between 
‘authoritative and influential parties’.  Following this is the process of ‘geopolitical 
accommodation’, this is: ‘…how policy-making tries to accommodate the interests, 
concerns and political needs of the various parties to a conflict.’ (p.622).  At the end of 
all that is ‘problem closure’: ‘…the identification, development and promotion of a 
perceived solution to the defined problem.’ (p.622).  This completes the foreign policy 
process as problem solving, and therefore Ó Tuathail’s framework for analyzing 
practical geopolitical reasoning. 
 
This is a critical geopolitics methodology and represents one possible way of 
approaching and enacting discourse analysis in this area.  Discourse analysis is a 
method that is used in a wide variety of ways, in fact Ó Tuathail comments that: 
‘“discourse analysis” is a misnomer for there is no agreed and paradigmatic “discourse 
analysis” but a heterogeneous mix of approaches, perspectives and strategies.’ (p.605).  
In terms of the critical realist methodology adopted here, the geopolitical codes of 
sovereign states and their discursive foundations are the principal focus of the study.  It 
therefore necessitates the application of a form of discourse analysis of selected 
documents set within the (neo)realist framework of sample states.  The (neo)realist and 
critical elements are consequently combined in the methodology as explained below. 
 
Country Selection 
 The neorealist element of the methodology demands that the research should be 
focused upon the state and more specifically the construction of geopolitical codes of 
the state, but one of the first decisions was to determine which states would be the 
subject of the analysis.  The research sought to make use of a comparative analysis, 
principally between Europe and America, and more specifically between three states – 
the United States, the United Kingdom and France.  Hettne and Söderbaum (2000) 
comment: ‘…we believe that comparative analysis helps to guard against the 
ethnocentric bias and culture-bound interpretations that can arise in too contextualised a 
specialisation.’ (p.461).  Its application here allows the European states, where regional 
processes have been noticeably more prevalent, to be understood in relation to the 
United States, where the neorealist concept of the sovereign state arguably remains 
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unchallenged.  By comparing all three states the impact of context on discourse, and 
ultimately on codes and policy, is also better understood. 
 
The selection of the United States is a consequence of the critical realist 
philosophy; America dominates the post-Cold War period as the only remaining 
‘superpower’ and the hegemonic state.  Furthermore, it is central to issues of terrorism, 
particularly after September 11th, and has attempted to lead a ‘war on terrorism’.  This 
state is, consequently, very important regarding the issues being examined, and is 
central to neorealist representations, and the reinforcing of this theory.  An American 
and European comparison is one that has been deployed by many theorists, de 
Tocqueville being one of the best known (Walters, 2004, p.687).  However, in this case 
it is reversed, rather than looking for difference in America when juxtaposed with 
Europe, the research places greater emphasis on finding how the European states differ 
from America, and what conclusions can be drawn from what they may share with each 
other but not with the United States.  The extent to which processes of regionalization in 
Europe are driving changes in the state can be assessed through this comparison with 
America as the hegemonic state where regionalization is less of a factor. 
 
Determining which European states would form the focus of the comparison 
required consideration of their likely utility in demonstrating potential common 
European codes, or alternatively distinct codes within Europe.  Britain and France were 
chosen as the most effective examples for these purposes.  Both states are among the 
largest and most powerful in Europe.  Larger states can have greater influence in 
international politics, and in the structures of the EU.  A further factor, which 
recommends Britain and France over other European states, is their historical 
backgrounds as global and imperial powers.  The legacy of this is a tendency to seek a 
prominent role in the world for the given state as a geopolitical actor, although this may 
be achieved in different ways.  Furthermore, the colonial history has created 
connections between these states and other parts of the world, whether it is immigrant 
communities, close relationships with former colonies, or commercial interests in these 
now independent states.  This gives them a particular perspective on world politics, with 
perceived interests and relationships in many parts of the world that not all European 
states have, or not to the same extent.  In addition, France was a founding member of 
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the EC and has always considered itself to be at the centre of the European project, 
while Britain has tended to be more sceptical.   
 
These positions are apparent in levels of public support for the European Union.  
Figure 3.1 shows the support for membership of the Union in France, Britain and the 
EU as a whole, as found by the European Commission’s Eurobarometer survey in the 
autumn of 2004, approximately the end of the period under study in this thesis.  The 
difference between Britain and France is clear from the graph; whereas France is almost 
identical to the EU average with 56% saying that membership of the EU is a good thing, 
in Britain only 38% hold this opinion.  The same is true for those that consider it to be a 
bad thing, fewer than 15% agreeing in France and the EU compared to more than 20% 
in Britain. 
Figure 3.1 
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Figure 3.2 also depicts this relative scepticism in the United Kingdom towards 
European integration; this time it shows support for a common defence and security 
policy in the same period.  Security and defence is of course particularly relevant to 
possible common geopolitical codes.  In this case France shows an even more positive 
view than the EU average with 81% thinking developments in these policy 
competencies would be a good thing and only 12% a bad thing.  For Britain the support 
is again much lower, though perhaps higher than might be expected, 60% believe it to 
A Critical Realist Methodology: The Foundations for State Centred Discourse Analysis 
102 
be a good thing with 27% saying it is a bad thing.  The populations of the two states 
therefore show a marked difference in enthusiasm for the European project.   
Figure 3.2 
Support to a Common Defence and Security Policy in 
Autumn 2004
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While British governments have tended to follow these sceptical views of their 
population they have also taken a more Atlanticist position than their French 
counterparts.  These two approaches are perhaps not unrelated; by associating more 
closely with the United States Britain is less inclined to be integrated in Europe, and 
France attempts to deepen integration in Europe and is consequently less Atlanticist in 
outlook.  This is indicative of clear contextual variations between the two states, a 
feature that is valuable when assessing the extent to which convergence of codes may be 
occurring, if two states that are so distinctive in terms of public perceptions of Europe 
were to share codes it would indicate a significant impact of regionalization processes. 
 
An additional site for the research was the European Union.  This is, of course, 
not a state and thus reflects the critical realist position that sees a role for other actors, in 
this case a regional organization of member states.  As such, its inclusion in the study 
makes it possible to challenge neorealist assumptions about the predominance of the 
state in geopolitics, enhancing the critical element of the research.  The European Union 
is the most important organization in terms of regionalization in Europe, and therefore 
cannot be ignored when looking for common geopolitical codes.  Specifically, in this 
research, the focus is on those parts, and individuals, in the Union that are most closely 
A Critical Realist Methodology: The Foundations for State Centred Discourse Analysis 
103 
associated with developing foreign and defence policy competencies.  This includes the 
Commission, as represented by the President and the Commissioner for External 
Relations, and the separate High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, who acts on behalf of the Council of the European Union. 
 
Two main constraints influenced the selection of states for the study.  The first 
of these was the issue of language.  It was necessary for the documents chosen for 
analysis to be produced in English (either originally or in translations), in order that I 
could understand these as an English speaker.  Therefore, the states chosen must 
provide such documents; the United States, Britain and France fulfilled this criterion.  
Secondly, time was a constraint, thus while initially five states appeared to be a 
manageable number, this changed through engagement with the research process. 
 
Corpus Selection 
For each of the chosen states, and the European Union, it was necessary to 
compile a corpus1 of documents from which a sample could be analysed (Ryan and 
Bernard, 2000, p.780).  This method of analysis derives from the critical realist 
methodology.  Taking a critical approach to researching the neorealist geopolitics of 
sovereign states involves discourse analysis; for this to be carried out, material must be 
sought for the analysis that is the product of the governing elites of these states.  The 
compilation of a corpus of such material is, therefore, the first step towards critically 
deconstructing the representations and geopolitical codes of a state. 
 
1 Discussing the corpus, Bauer and Aarts (2000) say: ‘…while older meanings of “text corpus” imply the 
complete collection of texts according to some common theme, more recent meanings stress the 
purposive nature of selection, and not only of texts but also of any material with symbolic functions.  This 
selection is inevitably arbitrary to some degree: comprehensive analysis has priority over scrutiny of 
selection.’ (p.23).  The corpus contained many types and subjects of documents from state sources.  Later, 
sampling provided suitable examples for detailed analysis. 
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Table 3.1 
Corpus and Sample Sizes 
 Corpus No.2 Sample No. Percentage of Corpus
US UK France EU US UK France EU US UK France EU 
1993 94 N/A N/A 5 6 N/A N/A 0 6.4 N/A N/A 0 
1994 29 N/A N/A 5 3 N/A N/A 1 10.3 N/A N/A 20.0 
1995 217 N/A N/A 12 16 N/A N/A 2 7.4 N/A N/A 16.7 
1996 243 N/A N/A 23 16 N/A N/A 1 6.6 N/A N/A 4.3 
1997 90 23 9 8 2 5 1 0 2.2 21.7 11.1 0 
1998 115 25 93 6 12 15 4 0 10.4 60.0 4.3 0 
1999 134 31 90 24 16 6 6 5 11.9 19.4 6.7 20.8 
2000 178 25 87 92 8 2 7 12 4.5 8.0 8.0 13.0 
2001 
(Pre Sep.11) 
368 41 179 41 10 2 10 2 2.7 4.9 5.6 4.9 
2001 
(Post Sep.11) 
471 236 223 88 65 34 34 11 13.8 14.4 15.2 12.5 
2002 938 398 543 197 52 24 43 21 5.5 6.0 7.9 10.7 
2003 827 329 502 143 42 42 82 17 5.1 12.8 16.3 11.9 
2004 580 380 162 147 39 48 24 16 6.7 12.6 14.8 10.9 
Total 4284 1488 1888 791 287 178 211 88 6.7 12.0 11.2 11.1 
Sourcing the documents varies from country to country.  Table 3.1 gives a 
breakdown of the number of documents in each corpus for every year in the study, and 
how many of these were included in the samples.  In all cases they were collected from 
government websites,3 the method of searching depending on how the websites were 
organised.  In the United States it was possible to choose a list of documents covering a 
particular subject.4 It was therefore relatively easy to produce comprehensive lists of 
documents that were likely to include the subject of terrorism.  The lists produced for 
the British corpus came from a combination of pre-prepared collections on the websites, 
 
2 These numbers may not be exact as they are based on the number of documents in the lists provided on 
websites and produced from searches; it is possible that a document may appear on more than one of 
these lists or even more than once on the same list. 
3 Except those of President Clinton’s speeches (see Footnote 8 below). 
4 The details varied from site to site.  On the White House website it was possible to look at a list of 
speeches on the subject of National Security, Homeland Security, Defense etc.  For the Department of 
State they tended to be organized by genre and time, e.g. Statements in 2001 or Press Releases in 2003.  
The Department of Defense used a similar format. 
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and use of the site’s search facility.5 The lists tended to be of ‘speeches’ in general or 
‘press releases’; the searches were usually for terrorism, which rendered a considerable 
number of documents.  The French documents came from two sources: The Ministére 
Des Affaires Étrangéres (Foreign Ministry) and the Permanent Mission of France to the 
UN.  Like Britain, the result was a combination of lists and searches, but in this case 
with an even greater emphasis on the searches.6
The final corpus was for the European Union.  Here again it was constructed 
from the outcome of searches in addition to lists available on the EU websites.7 The EU 
is not a state, and is still developing its Foreign and Security Policy dimension, and 
therefore the range of documents on these matters is more limited than for the states.  
Thus, the EU corpus is smaller than those of the states. 
 
It is evident from Table 3.1 that the number of documents in each of the 
samples, and the proportion of the corpuses selected, varies from country to country.  
Although this creates the possibility that comparing arguments and discourses over 
time, and between countries, might be difficult due to the unequal samples, there are 
several reasons why this issue does not seriously diminish the analysis.   The discourse 
analysis carried out on the documents is a qualitative technique that involves in-depth 
reading of the material, and so some documents may provide more evidence than others, 
and a small number could provide a considerable amount of evidence; the overall 
number is not as important as it may be in a quantitative study.  The quantitative 
analysis that is used is limited, and does not seek precise results but general trends.  
While more limited numbers were available from before September 11th, this is 
 
5 Two websites were used here, Downing Street and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.  Downing 
Street provided a list of the Prime Minister’s speeches categorized by month and year, as well as a search 
facility used to find any other useful documents.  The Foreign Office also provided an extensive 
collection of speeches and releases categorized by time in a similar way, but again the search facility gave 
greater coverage. 
6 Most of the documents came from the French Foreign Ministry; the lists from this source were 
generated exclusively by searching, as this was the only possible method when dealing with the English 
language version of the site.  It still produced a considerable number of documents in English post-
September 11th, and these constitute the majority of the corpus.  The Mission site was presented as lists 
archived along subject lines and by time.  It was this source that gave most of the documents pre-
September 11th.
7 The main searches were of the External Relations section of the EU website, and this produced a large 
number of documents.  Limited lists of speeches (sorted by time) of figures such as External Relations 
Commissioner, Chris Patten were also available here.  A separate, and extensive, speech and article 
archive was available on the website of The High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, this 
was again arranged by date. 
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reflected in the emphasis of the research primarily on the three years following this 
event; documents from the earlier period are treated as a single subset rather than 
individual years, and also contribute to the overall analysis. 
 
For all four corpuses a timescale for which documents would be collected had to 
be decided upon.  The research is focused on the post-Cold War period; this implied a 
stating point no earlier then the end of the Cold War.  An end to the research period 
required a more arbitrary limit.  The most significant instance of international terrorism, 
in terms of its impact on geopolitics, has arguably been September 11th and therefore 
this, and its aftermath, had to be included in, and indeed be the main focus of, the 
research.  Based upon this, the limit was determined as the 11th September 2004, three 
years after the attacks. 
 
Access is a constraint addressed by some authors (Phillips and Hardy, 2002; 
Silverman, 2000).  Silverman notes that: ‘In independent, unfunded research, you are 
likely to choose any setting which, while demonstrating the phenomenon in which you 
are interested, is accessible and will provide appropriate data reasonably readily and 
quickly.’ (p.106).  For an individual researcher without funding for travel, the most 
useful source of documents is the Internet.  Here government websites make available a 
wide range of documents, from publications to press releases and speech transcripts.  
While this is a valuable source of material, it is also a recently created, and still 
developing, source, and one that differs from country to country.   
 
The United States was probably the most exhaustive in its provision of material, 
as was reflected in the greater number of documents in the American corpus (Table 
3.1).8 For all the corpuses it is unlikely to be clear if any documents are missing.9
8 For the current President, the White House website appeared to give a full archive of material, but the 
State Department was the source for other material related to terrorism, as well as for the Secretary of 
State of course.  The Department of Defense site was the source for speeches etc. by the Secretary for 
Defense.  Finally, a complication was that past President’s material is unavailable from the White House 
and therefore it was necessary to find the site of President Clinton’s library for material generated during 
his presidency. 
9 A good example of this is Tony Blair’s speeches.  The Downing Street website directs users to the 
Labour party for political speeches (e.g. those made at party conferences), but the Labour party website 
includes only a small selection of recent speeches.  Therefore, the ‘political’ speeches of the past are 
apparently unavailable.  In this example I am aware that these speeches are not included in the collection 
even if I do not know exactly how many of them there are or what they contain, however there could be 
other gaps that there is no obvious indication of. 
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While documents going back to the early 1990s were acquired for the United States, 
these were not always as plentiful as for more recent years (see Table 3.1).10 The 
European sources were more limited going back in time, as the table reveals.  While a 
few documents were available prior to the late 1990s, particularly in the EU website, the 
greatest concentration came from the late 1990s onwards.  In the British case the turning 
point appeared to be the arrival of the Labour government in 1997 when documents 
began to be archived; for France some were available earlier but here a language issue 
arose.  English translations only began on a large-scale post-September 11th. That is not 
to say that some documents in English could not be sourced from earlier, but these are 
largely limited to documents from the UN. 
 
Sampling 
The treatment of the corpuses relates directly to the philosophical starting point 
of the research.  Given that neorealism underpins the study, to the extent that it is 
focused on states and their geopolitical codes, this impacts upon the sort of documents 
that were selected for analysis.  Likewise, the critical element that drives the application 
of discourse analysis also affects the way in which these are chosen.  These factors are 
encapsulated in the process of sampling. 
 
As Phillips and Hardy (2002) argue ‘...we inevitably have to select a subset of 
texts for the purpose of manageability.’ (p.10).  According to Mason (2002): ‘The aim is 
to produce, through sampling, a relevant range of contexts or phenomena, which will 
enable you to make strategic and possibly cross-contextual comparisons, and hence 
build a well founded argument.’ (p.123).  As this research aims to determine the 
geopolitical codes of certain states in relation to international terrorism, and to do so 
critically through a process of discourse analysis, sampling demanded a method that 
would find documents most likely to show evidence of the discourses and 
representations underpinning these codes. 
 
This implied the use of purposive sampling (Richie and Lewis, 2003; Silverman, 
2000).  For this it was necessary to identify a set of criteria that would determine the 
 
10 A particular problem arose in accessing Madeline Albright’s speeches for example; although they 
appeared to be available they could never be accessed. 
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best documents to go forward into discourse analysis.  Four criteria were applied to a 
state’s corpus: relevance to the focus of the research; authorship (that is a favouring of 
documents produced by or on behalf of elite figures); apparent significance, in terms of 
events surrounding terrorism, or political occasions; and genre or type.   
 
To some extent relevance had already been considered when constructing the 
corpus; searches had been for key terms such as terrorism, and lists of documents had 
been chosen, where possible, for their subject matter or for their authors post.  Despite 
this, there were many that had little or no relevance to terrorism or geopolitics.11 When 
sampling, this criterion was applied to filter out these irrelevant documents leaving 
those dealing with the subject under examination, and that would provide the best 
material for the discourse analysis.  This required a judgement to be made rather than 
following a clear formula. 
 
Secondly, in relation to authorship, the speeches and articles of key political 
figures were sought.12 Mason (2002) argues that: 
 
‘Underlying all of this must be a concern to identify who it is that has, 
does or is the experiences, perspectives, behaviours, practices, identities, 
personalities, and so on, that your research questions will require you to 
 
11 Although documents that had this as their principal subject were sought, this was not necessarily borne 
out on every occasion.  If a document appeared to cover a more vaguely related issue then it would be 
considered for inclusion, as important connections may be made with terrorism and geopolitics that 
reinforce the relevant discourses.  However, to include all such documents would essentially mean 
including all documents, with most having no such connections, therefore these choices were limited and 
only a selection of those most likely to make these linkages were included. 
12 The particular figures and their positions varied slightly from state to state.  In the United States the 
President was an obvious choice, as was the Secretary of State.  Some speeches were also included from 
the Vice President, given the particular influence that the current incumbent has on policy and particularly 
foreign policy.  Finally, substantial numbers of documents from the Defense Secretary were used, another 
influential figure in the administration, and also some from the deputy to Donald Rumsfelt, Paul 
Wolfavitz, given his influence on policy.  
 For Britain, the selection was more limited: The Prime Minister, again the most obvious choice, 
and the Foreign Secretary, occasionally another senior politician was included when a relevant speech 
appeared.  However, the lack of an archive of documents from the Ministry of Defence meant that the 
Defence Secretary was not included.  No other figure appeared influential enough in the British system to 
warrant particular attention.   
France was limited somewhat by documents available in English, but by including the President, 
the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister as the main figures, the most important individuals in 
relation to foreign policy were covered.   
Finally, for the EU the selection was restricted to the officials directly involved in the new 
foreign policy: The President of the Commission, The External Affairs Commissioner and the High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
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investigate.  The question is therefore not only what is the best data 
source from which to sample, but who or which?’ (p.129). 
 
A country’s political elite is considered by most people to represent that state, and its 
views and positions in international politics.  Consequently, it is the representations 
made by these individuals, and the discourses through which these are constructed that 
contribute to the defining of geopolitical codes.  Van der Wusten and Dijkink (2002) 
say: ‘There may be rivalry over the terms of each discourse in each polity, but in fact 
these geopolitics are, in our view, as a rule remarkably broadly supported in most 
countries most of the time.’ (p.21).  Thus, while it is possible for a more junior member 
of a state apparatus or a media source to represent an alternative vision, when a leader 
or other senior figure speaks their representations are widely understood to be those of 
that state, as they are the key representatives of that state (Ensink, 1997, p.9). 
 
The use of events in sampling is discussed by Mason (2002): 
 
‘Just as with settings, you will need to decide what are the dimensions, 
and boundaries, which constitute the event, and how you should select 
them for study (strategically, representationally, illustratively).  This will 
involve decisions about what constitutes the event – where does it begin 
and end, in time and space?’ (p.131). 
 
Documents relating to a particularly important event in terms of terrorism are therefore 
worthy of inclusion in the sample.  The most obvious example is September 11th itself, 
but other particular bombings, or the Iraq war would also qualify through this criterion.  
The aim here was to capture documents that most clearly and specifically encapsulated 
the way in which a government was viewing and constructing the events and their 
participants as they unfolded. 
 
However, the importance of a document cannot be judged by its relationship to 
an event alone, some documents have significance due to the issues they discuss, or the 
influence they have.  Phillips and Hardy (2002) explain that: ‘…researchers can try to 
capture “important” texts, for example, those that are widely distributed, that are 
associated with changes in practices, or that were produced in reaction to a particular 
event.’ (p.73).  An excellent example would be the annual state of the union address by 
the President of the United States.  These are set piece speeches that take place every 
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year and will always be likely to include some discussion of foreign policy and, since 
2001, terrorism. 
Table 3.2 
Genre of Documents Within Samples 
 Number of Documents Percentage of Sample
US UK France EU US UK France EU 
Speeches 237 146 140 48 82.6 82.0 66.4 54.5 
Articles 7 6 5 12 2.4 3.4 2.4 13.6 
Letters 2 1 17 0 0.7 0.6 8.1 0 
Testimony 11 0 1 0 3.8 0 0.5 0 
Interview 2 21 34 0 0.7 11.8 16.1 0 
Publication 18 2 1 1 6.3 1.1 0.5 1.1 
Press Release 10 1 13 26 3.5 0.6 6.2 29.5 
Unknown13 0 1 0 1 0 0.6 0 1.1 
The genre of the documents differentiates speeches, articles,14 letters,15 
testimonies,16 interviews,17 publications18 and press releases.19 Table 3.2 shows the 
number of documents of each genre in the four samples.  Mason (2002) argues that: 
 
‘Questions about what the sources might be able to tell you will lead you 
to engage with the question of method, that is, how you can generate 
data from your sources, and what limitations might be imposed by the 
nature of the data source or the method.’ (p.54). 
 
Since the research was attempting to identify the geopolitical discourses reproduced by 
elites, the source most amenable for this purpose was the speech, consequently this was 
by far the most common genre in all four samples (Table 3.2).  Ensink (1997) 
 
13 These are documents where the genre is not clearly identifiable. 
14 Articles are documents that have been written by (or at least appear to have been written by) a 
politician for publication in the press.  As such, for the purposes of this research they are similar to 
speeches in the sense that they are the words of the elites that represent the state.  They are not, however, 
as frequently produced. 
15 Letters are communications written by the elite figures under study. 
16 A testimony is a written or transcribed document submitted to an official body. 
17 These are transcripts of interviews given to the media. 
18 ‘Publications’ include a range of government documents such as reports or policy documents.  They 
often do not specify an author as they are allegedly produced on behalf of the government as a whole.  
Sometimes they may be more technical and be aimed at a more limited audience than a speech.  
Consequently, the representations made are not always as obvious. 
19 Press releases are (usually short) statements issued by a government, or a government department, 
giving a response to a particular event.  As they supposedly represent the view/position of the state or 
department as a whole there is no author specified. 
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comments: ‘The words of the incumbent of the function are not perceived as those of a 
private person, but in relation to the function and what this function represents.’ (p.9).  
To approach an understanding of a state’s geopolitical codes through discourse analysis 
consequently requires the study of the words of the elites.  A ‘speech’ encapsulates 
these words.   
 
As with all documents and other discursive practices, when speeches are enacted 
performativity emerges.  Bialasiewicz et al comment: 
 
‘Performativity is a discursive mode through which ontological effects 
(the idea of the autonomous subject or the notion of the pre-existing 
state) are established.  Performativity thereby challenges the notion of 
the naturally existing subject.  But it does not eradicate the appearance of 
the subject or the idea of agency.  Performance presumes a subject and 
occurs within the conditions of possibility brought into being by the 
infrastructure of performativity.’ (p.408). 
 
Also, when a speech, for example, is performed the ‘nature’ of the ‘Other’ becomes 
fixed and ‘known’.  It is therefore possible to comprehend the importance of 
performance in the (re)production of discourse and in the manifestation of subjects, 
these being constituted within the ‘infrastructure of performativity’.  Consequently, 
speeches must be understood to be a form of performance, a discursive practice 
combining ‘the ideal and the material’ (p.406).  In so doing they refer to real events, 
structures and people in addition to imagined characteristics, motivations, relationships 
and geographies.  Essential elements of the performance are where it takes place, who 
enacts it and to whom it is made.  These features affect the outcome of the performance, 
for example a speech by a President to a global audience can have a greater effect than 
the same speech by an anonymous official to a small group. 
 
The political speech displays specific characteristics differentiating it from the 
other sources drawn on here.  Due to its being delivered by a politician and its nature as 
an oral communication, possibly to an audience in the same location and/or through the 
broadcast media, the speech tends to be more prone to the use of rhetoric.  The 
politician uses the speech to attempt to convince the audience of particular arguments or 
to gain support personally and for policies.  Paine (1981) says: ‘A politician wishes to 
put a claim on his audience through his speeches by making what he says appear 
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relevant and useful, just and necessary.’ (p.10).  The subject matter, the material used 
and the presentation of the speech are therefore important in achieving these objectives; 
the speaker must engage the audience in order to be convincing.  In the case of 
politicians, they will generally be speaking to a wide public audience, even if those in 
the same room are from a more specialised constituency; the result is that their speeches 
are usually aimed at that wider audience giving rise to their rhetorical nature, as they 
must attempt to capture the interest and agreement of a range of people.  The political 
speech is consequently inclined towards a limited technical content and has a greater 
focus upon dramatic impact. 
 
It is these characteristics that make the speech an effective subject for discourse 
analysis in this research, but also give it the potential to exaggerate the presence of 
discourses and narratives given the rhetorical element.  The politician constructs an 
argument through discourse in an attempt to normalise the assumptions behind it and 
make policies acceptable and ‘obvious’ to the audience.  Thus, when analysing political 
speeches it is relatively straightforward to uncover discourses through which the state or 
threatening ‘others’ are reproduced, but these are found in a genre that is also dominated 
by rhetoric; the analysis and interpretation must recognize this characteristic as a factor 
in the production of speeches that is not as important for other genres such as 
publications or press releases, which are not performed in the same way and are 
therefore not so widely consumed by a lay audience. 
 
The proportion of speeches in each sample is therefore potentially influential for 
the analysis and the subsequent comparison.  Table 3.2 shows that while the samples for 
the United States and Britain have almost identical percentages of speeches (about 
82%), France has 66.4% and the EU only 54%.  However, the last two still have 
substantial proportions of speeches in their samples, far more than any other genre, 
speeches still dominate the analysis.  Furthermore, although discourse may be more 
obvious in political speeches it is certainly not absent in other documents.  Since the 
method of analysis used here does not involve counting the occurrence of a discourse or 
narrative within a document, but rather finding how each one is constructed across the 
sample as a whole, and noting how many documents they are present in, the fact they 
may be repeated more often or be less subtle in the speeches is not crucial.  Where it 
does affect the thesis is that the quotes selected to demonstrate the use of a discourse or 
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narrative are more likely to come from speeches because of their being a larger 
proportion of the samples and also as a result of the nature of the speech presenting 
them in a more obvious and quotable way. 
 
Although a particular person makes the speech and is attributed the authorship, 
political speeches are frequently partly or wholly written by one or more speechwriters.  
As these people are never identified as being the authors it was impossible to separate 
their contributions from those of the speaker.  However, although the speaker may not 
have written the speech, when they say the words and allow their name to be attached to 
them, they are effectively adopting and endorsing it, making it unlikely that they would 
willingly give a speech with which they did not largely agree.  As figures representative 
of the state, the words that they endorse become the representations of that state. 
 
Sauer (1997) argues that: ‘The singular speech is a small part in a large mosaic.  
It can be characterized as a strategic move in an overarching communicative plan, and it 
can be assessed properly only if the larger context is taken into account.’ (p.36).  Each 
speech can only be analysed in the wider context of the other speeches in the sample, 
but also the other documents that were included.  These other genres are not always so 
directly attributable to the relevant elites; they do, though, usually have their explicit or 
implicit endorsement, and so can be taken as part of that ‘large mosaic’.  When few if 
any relevant speeches were available for an event, or where a document appeared to 
have ‘importance’ to the subject matter, other genres were included in the sample. 
 
Transcription and Translation 
Since all the material was from archival sources on the Internet there was no 
need to carry out transcription.  However, this is not to say that other unknown 
individuals have not transcribed many of the documents.  In the case of articles and 
other publications, the assumption must be that the authors have written these 
themselves, although there may have been some editing by others.  Someone, though, 
has obviously transcribed the speeches.  A few speeches were texts issued in advance of 
the speech actually being made, and therefore the transcription issues do not necessarily 
apply as these will have come directly from the author or speechwriter.  This does raise 
another issue; that is the question of whether the planned speech is the same as the 
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speech that was actually made.  Again this is an issue that affects speeches due to the 
characteristics of the genre.  Since the speech is performed rather than simply published 
it is possible for it to change in the process of that performance, perhaps in response to 
the audience.  Nevertheless, the assumption was made that while slight changes are 
possible, the general thrust, and especially the discourses and narratives drawn on and 
reproduced, are unlikely to change much. 
 
Whether the transcription is carried out by the researcher or, as in this case, by 
someone else, the process always has the potential to change in some way, most likely 
accidentally, but possibly deliberately, the material originally presented.  As such, 
Hoggart, Lees and Davies (2002) reflect that: ‘Reliance on published accounts of 
whatever form, implies that the researcher accepts a limited and biased data set – a data 
set that has often been “tarted up” for public consumption, so precise wording cannot be 
relied upon.’ (p.132).  Lapadat (2000) emphasises the fact that transcriptions are not 
neutral representations’ (p.208).  She points out that: ‘The person transcribing, whether 
a researcher or hired assistant, will be making interpretative decisions while 
transcribing, which can range from deliberately “tidying up” sentence structures to 
omitting or mishearing (or at least hearing differently from the researcher).’ (p.216).  
When it is the researcher that is transcribing, it is possible at least to consider the likely 
effects of the way in which the task has been carried out, and the perspective from 
which it was approached.  In contrast, when the transcriber is not known, it is unclear 
whether the transcript may have been deliberately written to vary from the original for 
some unknown reason, and the procedures for doing the task are also a mystery and may 
vary from text to text. 
 
The issues related to translation bear a similarity to those of transcription; the 
translation is carried out by unspecified individuals, to procedures that are equally 
uncertain, any deliberate changes are not identified.  In addition, translating a document 
from one language into another will always result in some changes from the original 
(Steiner, 2001, p.181).  Hoggart, Lees and Davies (2002) say: 
 
‘…there is little doubt that translation often does not convey original 
meaning… …because manner of expression can be as important as 
words themselves, literal translations can “distort” intended meanings, 
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with the translator imposing a lens between the expressions in original 
and translated texts.’ (p.133). 
 
There may not be identical words or sentence structures in both languages, and so the 
translator will be attempting to achieve a close approximation to the original meaning.  
The result is that the translations might not be exactly the same as the intended 
document produced in the original language (Smith, 1996, p.161).  Nevertheless, all the 
documents came from government websites, and therefore it is reasonable to assume 
that they are the work of official government translators.  Consequently, these 
documents are taken to be endorsed by the state.  Smith concludes that: ‘…the 
problematisation of language and meaning applies to research in “home” and “foreign” 
languages since both involve interpretation and appropriation.’ (p.163).  Thus, the 
interpretation of any material is always going to be influenced by the person 
interpreting, the difference here is that a number of other unknown individuals are also 
involved in interpreting in addition to the researcher. 
 
Language also had some relevance in the choice of countries and of documents.  
Phillips and Hardy (2002) reflect that: ‘Very simple considerations such as geographic 
proximity and language makes certain sites that might be theoretically interesting 
impractical.’ (p.68).  It was necessary that any documents should be available in 
English, either in their original form or as translations.  Obviously, this was not an issue 
for the United States or the United Kingdom; for France, however, only translated 
documents were included in the analysis, although these were plentiful, particularly 
post-September 11th. Likewise the EU, being a multi-state organisation, translates most 
documents into many languages. 
 
Discourse Analysis 
Various definitions are available for discourse and discourse analysis (Hoggart, 
Lees and Davies, 2002, p.163; Gill, 2000, p.178; Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p.3; 
Fairclough, 2003, p.206).  The assumption underlying this research is that states, and 
their geopolitical codes, are constructed through discourses, the method of discourse 
analysis applied must therefore accord with this understanding.  Gee (1999) says: 
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‘A discourse analysis is based on the details of speech (and gaze and 
gesture and action) or writing that are arguably deemed relevant in the 
situation and that are relevant to the arguments the analyst is attempting 
to make.  A discourse analysis is not based on all the physical features 
present, not even all those that might, in some conceivable context, be 
meaningful, or might be meaningful in analyses with different purposes.’ 
(p.88). 
 
As such, critical discourse analysis was practiced, which: ‘...focuses on the role of 
discourse activity in constituting and sustaining unequal power relations.’ (Phillips and 
Hardy, 2002, p.25).  This conforms to the critical geopolitics approach discussed in the 
previous chapter and therefore to critical realism. 
 
In addition, the positionality of the researcher must be recognized as influencing 
the analysis.  Fairclough (2003) comments: ‘…there is no such thing as an “objective” 
analysis of a text, if by that we mean an analysis which simply describes what is “there” 
in the text without being “biased” by the “subjectivity” of the analyst.’ (p.14).  The way 
in which the representations of others are identified, represented and explained is 
consequently a subjective and reflexive (Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p.10) process that 
may differ from how another researcher would analyse and understand the discourses.  
In this thesis, for example, the position of the researcher existing within the United 
Kingdom, and therefore exposed to the very discourses being studied in that state, in 
addition to those of the other states filtered through the British discourse, may lead to a 
different analysis from that performed by a researcher in another country.  An additional 
factor is the disciplinary perspective; in this case the research is carried out from a 
geographical starting point, a different researcher from another discipline may look at 
the material in an alternative way.  The purpose or aim of the research could also affect 
the way a researcher looks at the material, so in this case the concentration on 
geopolitical codes and terrorism might lead to interpreting data as relating primarily to 
these phenomena rather than anything else.  Hence, all aspects of the researchers 
experience and that of their research can impinge upon the analysis. 
 
The analysis began with a pilot study of the country in question.  This involved 
critically reading several documents, looking for discourses and narratives that were 
drawn on and reproduced within them.  Determination of discourses and narratives 
occurred at this stage.  The choice was made through an iterative process in the pilot 
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study.  An appreciation of the geopolitics and context of each state was a component in 
the understanding of what discourses and narratives might exist, and for identifying the 
presence and significance of those that occurred.  This was enhanced by background 
reading on each state and geopolitics more generally.  Once again, the fundamentals of 
the research are important here.  Agnew and Corbridge (1995) define a discourse as: 
‘…equivalent to a theory about how the world works assumed implicitly in practice by a 
politician, writer, academic or “ordinary person”.’ (p.47).  Based on the idea that the 
state is a reality constructed through discourse, discourses inherent in this process were 
central to the analysis.  To find such discourses, therefore, required a reading of the 
texts that looked for the assumptions behind what was said, crucially those that were 
repeated not only in one document but several.   
 
A similar process was adopted for narratives.  Ashley (1989) explains that: ‘A 
narrative is a representation that arrests ambiguity and controls the proliferation of 
meaning by imposing a standard and standpoint of interpretation that is taken to be fixed 
and independent of the time it represents.’ (p.263).  The narratives taken to be important 
in this research were those that established a status or role for a state and the wider state 
system, and those that contributed to the characterization of the ‘Other’, particularly 
terrorists.  Identifying a narrative is consequently an action that cannot be removed from 
the wider methodology; the underlying thinking on the existence and construction of the 
state, and on its role in geopolitics affects the type of narratives sought.  Within a study 
that is based on the principle that the state is the main actor in geopolitics, and that 
codes are developed through discourse, attention must be focused on narratives, and 
discourses, that are drawn from that state’s context, and represent its role or place in the 
world, as well as those that represent the terrorist ‘Other’. 
 
In both cases the choice could vary as the selection process progressed, and the 
significance of each discourse and narrative became clearer.  This applied within the 
pilot study and continued in the extended analysis.  While some selections could prove 
of little importance to the sample, others may become apparent when more documents 
are studied.  Furthermore, in some cases those that initially appear separate can, after 
more consideration, be reassigned as the same discourse or narrative.  Once the 
discourses and narratives of interest for the research were established they were 
assigned relevant names and codes for use in the analysis of the sample as a whole. 
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All the discourses and narratives discussed in the following chapters are 
presented in Table 3.3. In each case the code used to identify them, the corpus of 
documents in which they were found and a short description/definition of the 
discourse/narrative is given.  As all of these discourses and narratives were drawn from 
the documents that were analysed, it is important to note that where one was present in 
more than one corpus this does not necessarily mean that it was identical in each.  For 
example, the use of a discourse in one country may be slightly different from its use in 
another country.  Such variations are the result of the different contexts and the different 
narratives that exist within these; each state has a self-image constructed over a long 
period of time, and drawing on particular historical experiences; all the discourses and 
narratives interact with one another in a discursive structure producing place specific 
versions that are ostensibly the same as in another state.  Hence, the descriptions are 
generalised, the nuances are identified and more expansive explanations are provided in 
the subsequent chapters, chapter 7 giving a comparison between those that are shared by 
more than one state. 
 
The discourses and narratives were selected due to their relevance to the subject 
of the research, and are not necessarily the only ones present in the documents.  Many 
of the binary discourses are similar to those that were discussed in the previous chapter, 
a reflection of the history of binary discourses in colonialism and in Cold War 
geopolitics.  Of course, just as they may not be reproduced identically in each state they 
may also change over time.  It should be noted, however, that as the discourses and 
narratives in the table are taken from the analysis of the documents, their identification, 
definition and naming are the product of this process.20 Historical resonances and 
foundations are discussed in the empirical chapters and the relationships between the 
different discourses and narratives in each country are explored. 
 
20 The naming of discourses and narratives was motivated as much by convenience and easy identification 
as it was an expression of what the discourse/narrative is/does.  Thus, a binary discourse like 
Order/Disorder underpins the division of space into ordered and disordered spaces but the language used 
does not always involve these words.  Indeed, in some cases a name may rarely reflect the actual words 
used, such as the Crusade narrative; the word ‘crusade’ was only occasionally said by American elites 
who often talked more about war, but it appears to sum up the understandings and assumptions 
underlying and driving America’s ‘war on terrorism’. 
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Table 3.3 
Discourses and Narratives Identified in the Documents 
 Name Code Corpus in 
Which it 
Appears 
Description 
Discourses Identity/Difference ID U.S.  U.K.  
France  
E.U. 
A binary underpinning the other binary discourses, 
constructing difference and thereby allowing 
identity to be established. 
Self/Other SO U.S.  U.K.  
France  
E.U. 
Building on Identity/Difference, this differentiates 
the identity and character of the ‘Self’ relative to 
the ‘Other’. 
Positive/Negative PN U.S.  U.K.  
France  
E.U. 
This binary attributes positive characteristics to the 
‘Self’ and negative characteristics to the ‘Other’. 
Good/Evil GE U.S.  U.K.  
France  
E.U. 
Generally a more extreme version of 
Positive/Negative with certain religious 
connotations, especially in America. 
Inside/Outside IO U.S.  U.K.  
France  
E.U. 
An essential discourse of the sovereign state, it 
underpins the territorialization characteristic of the 
state system in which borders differentiate the 
inside from the outside. 
Order/Disorder OD U.S.  U.K.  
France  
E.U. 
Another spatial binary, marking the difference 
between ordered space (on the inside) and 
disordered space (on the outside) where the 
‘Other’ comes from. 
East/West EW U.S.  U.K.  
France  
E.U. 
Closely related to Orientalism, this binary is 
familiar from colonial and Cold War 
representations.  It characterizes an inferior East 
and a superior West. 
Threat TH U.S.  U.K.  
France  
E.U. 
This is a discourse through which the ‘Other’ is 
represented as posing a danger to the ‘Self’.  It is 
invoked using the word ‘threat’, or other words 
and phrases indicating the potential to cause such a 
danger in the character, capability or actions of the 
‘Other’. 
Narratives Exceptionalism EX U.S. A narrative suggesting a unique and positive, even 
divinely inspired character of the ‘Self’. 
Freedom FR U.S.  U.K.  
E.U. 
This is a value or attribute that is represented as 
belonging to the countries and people of the ‘Self’ 
and needing to be given to ‘Others’. 
History H U.K. A narrative of an idealist historical experience 
giving the state and its people certain advantages 
and positive characteristics. 
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Narratives 
(Continued) 
Global Player GP U.K.  
France  
E.U. 
This narrative suggests the existence, the need or 
inevitability of an important role for the state (or 
E.U.) at the global scale. 
Humanist Values HV France These are values that are positive, embodied by the 
state but universal, and as such require to be 
spread regionally and globally. 
Values VU E.U. These are values common to all European states 
and peoples; they are supposedly a positive shared 
feature around which Europeans can unite. 
Organic OG U.S.  U.K.  
France  
E.U. 
The Organic narrative underpins representations of 
the ‘Other’ as some sort of dangerous organism.  
The Threat is said to ‘grow’ in ‘swamps’, which 
are of course generally thought of as dangerous or 
distasteful places.  It is therefore a narrative that 
encapsulates a range of descriptions and 
representations similar to this where the ‘Other’ is 
characterized as a single threatening, negative 
organism such as a weed. 
Weapons of Mass 
Destruction 
(WMD) 
WD U.S.  U.K.  
France  
E.U. 
Weapons of Mass Destruction is a narrative used 
in conjunction and in support of the Threat 
discourse.  As such, it suggests danger and menace 
from the possession of, or potential acquisition of, 
these weapons.  At different times the term is used 
in reference to different types of weapons, often 
without specifying what they are, but most often 
the state elites use it collectively in relation to 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.  The 
generality and lack of precision gives the term 
discursive power to (re)produce the Threat 
discourse; WMD are weapons that ‘they’ have 
threatening ‘us’ whereas the same types of 
weapons in the hands of Western states are a 
deterrent. 
Rogue State RS U.S.  U.K. The implication of this narrative is that a state is in 
some way deviant from the normal practices of a 
sovereign state making it threatening to the ‘good’ 
states.  Assigning such a label could encompass all 
manner of alleged wrongs, but is often associated 
with WMD, and indeed states that practice these 
same wrongs might not be described as ‘Rogue’ if 
they are friendly to the western powers.  It is 
therefore a narrative that differentiates and 
reinforces the othering of a particular state, lacking 
any specific meaning but giving negativity to the 
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state in question. 
Narratives 
(Continued) 
Coalition CL U.S.  U.K.  
E.U. 
A Coalition suggests some form of unstructured 
alliance, varying from a well-established and close 
association to a looser and task specific 
arrangement. 
American Alliance AA U.K.  E.U. A narrative that established the idea of a long term 
Coalition with America based on common 
interests/values and/or historical foundations. 
European Unity EU U.K.  
France  
E.U. 
Versions of this narrative tend to construct an 
image of a structured and united Europe, one 
which may share certain values or interests and be 
governed by some degree of collective or 
cooperative decision making.  This Europe may be 
a ‘Self’ with its own identity, up to a point. 
Collective 
Responsibility 
CR France A narrative that envisages and demands a strong 
level of cooperation between states whether at 
regional or even global scales.  Decisions and 
strategies internationally should be discussed and 
agreed collectively. 
Collectivity CY E.U. Similar to the French Collective Responsibility 
narrative, this implies the need and values of 
collective decision making in the E.U. 
Multipolarity MP France A narrative that invokes ideas of a world organized 
around a series of powerful ‘poles’ of which 
Europe would be one. 
World Democracy WD France Expresses the perceived need for democratic 
decision making at the global scale where states 
such as France have a greater say. 
Global Community GC U.K.  
France  
E.U. 
A narrative underpinning representations of a more 
structured system of states where there is greater 
cooperation and potentially some from of 
collective decision making and rules governing the 
activities of states. 
Law LW U.S. Supports legalistic interpretations of geopolitical 
situations including Threats and responses to these. 
Crusade Against 
Terrorism 
CT U.S. An American narrative of response to the Threat of 
terrorism, it gives a certain divine motivation and 
moral certainty to the actions taken. 
Inevitability of 
Victory 
IV U.S. Linked to the Crusade, this narrative presents the 
idea that any actions taken against the ‘evil’ 
‘Other’ will inevitability be successful due to their 
being taken on  the side of God and by the 
Exceptional United States. 
War Against - WT U.K. Equivalent to the American Crusade but without 
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Terrorism the same divine connotations giving scope for 
some non-military solutions alongside the 
generally more dominant militarism. 
Narratives 
(Continued) 
Battle Against 
Terrorism 
BT France The French version of the response narrative, 
Battle Against Terrorism can encompass 
militarism but underpins arguments against war in 
many cases pointing instead to social and political 
measures. 
Fight Against 
Terrorism 
FT E.U. The European response narrative is restricted by 
the differences between member states, and is thus 
a compromise reflecting this and the limited ability 
of the EU to act itself.  It is therefore a narrative 
underpinning mostly non-military policies and a 
collective approach. 
Gee (1999) notes that: ‘…any discourse analysis needs, at least to give some 
consideration, if only as background, to the whole picture.’ (p.92).  Hodder (2000) adds: 
‘…different types of texts have to be understood in the contexts of their conditions of 
production and reading.’ (p.704).  The context of a document is important for 
understanding why particular themes, discourses and narratives might be emphasised 
over others.  Thus, it was necessary to note contextual information for each document.21 
The full sample could then be analysed. 
 
Coding was not a purely mechanical process.22 As Dey (1993) describes: 
‘Analysis often proceeds in tandem with data collection, rather than commencing on its 
completion.’ (p.37).  Indeed, on reading a document it is impossible not to develop a 
sense of how the discourses and narratives are related and how they are used in the 
representations.  It is also possible to get a feeling for developments over time when 
working through the documents.  This sense of connections and themes running through 
the sample is effective for building towards later analyses of the material as a whole.   
 
21 This included the date it was published or that the speech was made, the type or genre of the document, 
the author, the location (of a speech) or place of publication (of an article), the title, and the intended 
audience.  Not every document has all of this information.  For example, some press releases or 
publications give no author; some even have no exact date.  In addition the intended audience may be 
vague, however it is assumed that a speech made in a politician’s country is intended for a domestic 
audience, while one made elsewhere is for an international audience, unless there is an obvious reason 
why this should not be the case. 
22 An explanation of the coding process and four sample documents are shown in Appendix A.  Appendix 
B shows a sample cover sheet for contextual and coding information, including an explanation of the 
sheet. 
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The completion of discourse analysis is not necessarily accomplished at an 
absolute point given the iterative nature of the process.  Phillips and Hardy (2002) say: 
‘The end point comes not because the researcher stops finding anything new, but 
because the researcher judges that the data are sufficient to make and justify an 
interesting argument.’ (p.74).  Thus, when the documents had yielded enough material 
to explain the construction of the state and the terrorist, providing convincing evidence 
of the presence and importance of the relevant discourses, the process could be brought 
to an end. 
 
Quantitative Analysis 
The use of quantitative techniques can be effective when working with some 
qualitative data (Kitchin and Tate, 2000, p.253; Silverman, 2000, p.185).  Silverman 
identifies counting techniques as being an appropriate use of quantitative methods in 
qualitative research: 
 
‘Simple counting techniques, theoretically derived and ideally based on 
members’ own categories, can offer a means to survey the whole corpus 
of data ordinarily lost in intensive, qualitative research.  Instead of 
taking a researcher’s word for it, the reader has a chance to gain a sense 
of the flavour of the data as a whole.’ (p.185). 
 
Quantitative data can be derived which highlights the relative frequency of different 
discourses and narratives in terms of their usage in the documents, and identifies 
changes in that frequency over time.  It was used to augment the conclusions being 
drawn from the qualitative analysis and provide a framework in which these could be 
discussed.  No quantitative analysis was carried out as part of the textual analysis; it was 
all applied to the documents as a whole, counting how many contained a given 
discourse or narrative.23 
In order to produce data for given time periods it was first of all necessary to 
decide what these should be. 24 September 11th is a key point in terms of terrorism.  As 
fewer documents from before the event existed in the sample (Table 3.1), this was taken 
as one period.  It had the advantage of accounting for the differences in starting point 
 
23 Data for the given country were entered on an Excel spreadsheet, creating a table of the data for all the 
documents. 
24 The EU sample, being smaller, was treated as a single period for the purposes of quantitative analysis. 
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between the countries if any comparisons were to be made.  Following this, terrorism 
became a more prominent issue, making it useful to break this period down further.  To 
gauge the initial impact of September 11th on the discourses and narratives, a second 
period was delineated from September 11th, 2001 to the end of that year.  Three further 
time periods: 2002, 2003 and 2004 up to September 11th were then adopted.  2002 was 
the year in which arguments were emerging about Iraq and weapons of mass 
destruction, a development from the focus on September 11th and Afghanistan in late 
2001.  By 2003 the Iraq war was coming closer and eventually began in March.  Finally 
2004, at the end of the study period, saw the continuation of conflict in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and the ‘war on terror’ more generally.  Although these divisions loosely 
relate to unfolding events post-September 11th, they were divided according to the three 
years (or up to September 11th in 2004) following 2001.  No other single event or day 
had the same impact to the issues relevant to the research as September 11th 2001, so 
this reduces the subjective choice of which events are suitable to mark the divisions and 
which are not, while still producing three periods that relate to the general evolution of 
events. 
 
The percentages calculated from each period were those of the proportion of 
documents out of the total in which a discourse/narrative appeared.  It was then possible 
to generate graphs.  This allowed for a comparison of each discourse and narrative over 
time, and secondly of different discourses and narratives in a given time period.  From 
the graphs it was possible to assess whether any of the discourses or narratives were so 
infrequent over the entire sample that they were not influential enough for inclusion in 
the discussion.25 
There is a certain problematic element in using quantitative analysis on data that 
has originally been derived from qualitative analysis, but in this case the subject of the 
counting is definable enough to be counted and the quantitative analysis is basic enough 
to avoid interpretations that exaggerate the robustness of the data.  It is important 
though to be aware of the way in which the data was generated and the limitations of the 
results when interpreting it.  It is always necessary to be careful in the interpretation of 
 
25 In practice this only applied to a small number of narratives.  This does not mean that any narrative that 
was relatively infrequently used was eliminated, the assessment involved more than just looking at the 
numbers as represented in the graphs, it also included drawing on interpretations from the discourse 
analysis. 
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quantitative results, but in this case they are to be treated as a guide to assist in 
understanding the qualitative data rather than an end in themselves. 
 
Relationships, Patterns and Themes 
When analysing documents it is possible to see particular patterns developing.  
Ideas are often repeated; at times they are built on over time, or are adapted in response 
to events.  Some discourses and narratives are barely noticeable, and then come to the 
fore at another time.  The interpretation and coding of the data can be thought of as an 
iterative process.  Links and patterns in the discourses, narratives, and the 
representations and constructions that these underpin, emerge subconsciously at first 
then become clearer as more documents are subjected to the analytical process, and 
others are re-assessed.  Placing this in the context of the graphs generated from 
quantitative data offers further clarity to the patterns by revealing how often each 
discourse/narrative occurs relative to each other in a given period. 
 
The next component of the process was to identify the key themes in the data.  
Beginning by sorting the documents according to the discourses and narratives that they 
contained, the aim was to find quotes demonstrating how they were used in the given 
state.26 Fairclough (2001) reflects: ‘…if one’s concern is with the social values 
associated with texts and their elements, and more generally with the social significance 
of texts, description needs to be complimented with interpretation and explanation.’ 
(p.118).  This stage of interpretation involved reading each quote, often several times, 
and considering what the common themes and linkages were, bearing in mind the 
contextual information about the document.27 Some quotes gave a particular insight 
into how a discourse was drawn upon, or how it contributed to the main themes; others 
contributed to the construction of the themes (for example, over time). 
 
26 The first step in finding the quotes was to select a discourse or a narrative, or sometimes more than one 
where they were closely tied up with each other and therefore could be connected as part of a single 
theme.  Where a document showed the existence of the discourse/narrative in question it was put aside.  
Then these documents were searched for any quotes identified at the discourse analysis stage.  Those with 
such quotes were retained, and those without were discarded.  This process was repeated for each 
discourse/narrative, starting again with the full sample each time. 
27 Of particular significance was the date of the documents, as this could allow the quote to be set in the 
context of the trends identified in the graph.   
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To be able to focus on the central points, and produce an explanation, it was 
essential to select quotes.  Those that reflected the same themes were grouped together, 
and a decision taken on which one did so most succinctly and clearly.  Where one could 
encapsulate a number of points, this was also an advantage.  By gradually reducing the 
selection of quotes, a small number covering all the important points related to the 
discourse/narrative were identified.28 
The representativeness of these quotes was triangulated in two principal ways.  
Firstly, they were selected as the best examples from a larger number of quotes that 
showed similar features, and these in turn had been identified as examples of the way 
the given discourse/narrative was drawn upon.  Secondly, they were triangulated with 
the quantitative analysis.  Using the graphs it is clear how frequently the 
discourse/narrative being discussed occurs, and how it changes over time, it is 
consequently apparent how important each one is to the representations. 
 
The final task was to organise the quotes to support the arguments and 
explanations.  The quotes were re-read and considered in terms of the themes.  For 
Fairclough (2001): 
 
‘The objective of the stage of explanation is to portray a discourse as 
part of a social process, as a social practice, showing how it is 
determined by social structures, and what reproductive effects discourses 
can cumulatively have on those structures, sustaining them or changing 
them.’ (p.135). 
 
Hence, in the explanation, the discourses and narratives, and how they are related, are 
discussed, as are the ways in which they are used to construct representations, and 
ultimately to underpin geopolitical codes. 
 
In doing so, it was necessary to make connections with the relevant political and 
historical context of the given state.  This context provides an important background for 
 
28 It is worth noting that many quotes show evidence of a number of discourses and narratives, some of 
which may not be directly relevant to the particular point being discussed in relation to the quote.  They 
may however have relevance in terms of how they are connected to the discourses/narratives in focus.  A 
potential effect of this is that a quote may be identified in two or more of the searches, and obviously if 
used once cannot be used again.  It was, therefore, necessary when deciding which quotes to use, to assess 
whether such a quote should be included at that stage, or kept for later where it might be more 
representative or offer greater insight on another point. 
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understanding and interpreting the (re)construction of discourses and narratives.  They 
are not produced in a vacuum, instead evolving from earlier versions and related to the 
historical representation of the relevant state, its supposed characteristics, and its place 
in the world.  These historical and political imperatives impinge on the (re)production of 
discourses and on the actions of powerful actors in the state, and so must be appreciated 
as part of any explanation.  The process of writing gives a further insight into the 
importance of themes and how everything is connected.  Thus, further reflection led in 
many cases to an additional narrowing of the quote selection where some appeared to 
stray too far from the important points, or to be overly repetitive in their representations. 
 
Caveats 
Certain caveats inevitably exist for any methodology, and that is true for this 
thesis.  The critical realist starting point and the concentration on the state, and in 
particular state elites, as the focus for the analysis and the source of evidence of 
geopolitical codes, offers useful boundaries for the research and allows for a discussion 
of the neorealist discourses underlying state codes.  At the same time it must be 
recognised that there are other scales and actors with relevance that such a methodology 
does not encompass.   In essence the subject could be approached in a variety of ways 
depending on the perspective taken. 
 
As was noted above, there is a risk, perhaps even a necessity, that the mythology 
applied and the understandings upon which this is based contribute to the reproduction 
of the very discourses and narratives that are being critiqued in the research.  In this 
case, the application of a critical realist methodology seeks to uncover the realist 
discourses that underpin the state and the geopolitical codes of individual states, and yet 
by taking the state as the unit of analysis, and furthermore elite figures as representative 
of the state, the study does not entirely move beyond the confines of neorealism.  
Consequently, the binary discourses that are subjected to analysis can themselves 
become the structures through which reality is interpreted and explained, and in so 
doing these binaries are reinforced.  An analysis of this type, while providing some 
understanding of how discourses are reproduced by elites, and how these contribute to 
geopolitical codes, does involve a degree of simplification even accounting for its more 
critical elements when compared to straightforward neorealist analysis. 
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Alternative approaches might provide different interpretations by shifting the 
focus away from the state elites and their binary discourses, and instead looking at sub-
state processes and actors.  Examining the power relations, the economic and social 
processes at work within states and between states, and how this impinges upon 
geopolitics is an area that could potentially generate understandings less constrained by 
binary discourse and the state structures.  However, the choice was made to concentrate 
in this case upon the state and its elites. 
 
A second caveat of the methodology is the rhetorical nature of the speeches that 
formed the majority of the material analysed, and the extent to which the methods used 
can fully account for it.  This rhetoric was referred to above and should be appreciated 
when interpreting the results of discourse analysis on such material.  Ó Tuathail (2002) 
discusses political leaders and foreign policy officials as: ‘…professionally skilled 
rhetoricians whose job it is to construct arguments that resonate with popular common 
sense and to create social consensus through persuasion, enabling policy decision-
making and action.’ (p.607).  In other words rhetoric is deployed with the intention of 
making an argument acceptable to the intended audience and, through the application of 
‘common sense’, to make their conclusions ‘obvious’ and ‘natural’.  In so doing, the 
chosen policies of the speaker can be enacted with the general support of the audience; 
at least that is the intention.  Ó Tuathail continues: ‘Statespersons are on a very public 
stage and act out certain roles and perform in expected ways before mass audiences.’ 
(p.608).  The performance and the relationship with the audience are therefore crucial in 
a speech to a greater degree than for other sources.  A politician is performing a speech 
to an audience lacing it with rhetoric to engage and convince. 
 
The consideration of audience, and the potential of this to impact upon a speech 
is articulated by Ó Tuathail (2003) in relation to the American government’s efforts to 
make the case for the Iraq war: 
 
‘A central challenge for the White House was that every time the 
president or a senior official made the pitch for the war, they were 
addressing multiple audiences: the US political class, the US public, the 
international community’s political class, and international public 
opinion, not to mention Saddam Hussein’s regime itself.  The Bush 
administration concentrated on its core audience – the US electorate…’ 
(p.866). 
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This choice of audience therefore affects the way in which arguments are expressed, the 
sort of rhetoric used and how the speech is performed.  Although discourse analysis as 
practiced in this research has advantages, as has been discussed here, the methodology 
is arguably less suited to determining the effect that the performance of geopolitical 
texts has on the representations and geopolitical codes that are being (re)constructed.  
Again, this is acknowledged and forms part of the context in which the study should be 
interpreted. 
 
Conclusion 
When researching geopolitical codes there is, from the beginning, a realist 
assumption underlying the discussion; geopolitical codes are generally associated with 
states, and therefore the state is the focus of the research.  This is true for this research.  
However, while the state was the main unit of study, the methodology followed a 
critical realist path.  Such an approach impacts upon the choices made throughout the 
research and how each element is understood. 
 
A critical realist methodology offers the advantage of accepting that the state 
and the state system have been, and continue to be, the dominant organising theory and 
structure in geopolitics, without agreeing with the neorealist doctrine that privileges 
these as natural and unchanging.  The state, and its powerful elites, can consequently be 
critiqued deploying critical methods, most notably discourse analysis.  Furthermore, 
critical realism allows the neorealist structures to be understood as real, and yet to be so 
through their discursive construction.  Likewise, and following from this, the 
geopolitical codes that the states adopt are also constructed through discourse as are the 
representations of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ made by elites as they (re)produce their 
policies. 
 
Neorealist research would be constrained by the implicit assumption that the 
state system is an ever present structure and the superior product of modernity.  Hence, 
the possibility of other actors gaining importance, and potentially disrupting the 
simplistic territorialities of the state is absent.  As such, to approach an understanding of 
how regional governance might influence geopolitical codes, or even the full 
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implications, for these codes, of terrorists crossing state borders is impossible.  Change 
is not something that neorealism is comfortable with. 
 
Thus, critical geopolitics appears to provide a mode of thought that can 
overcome the strictures of neorealism and achieve an appreciation of how the state 
actually comes into being, and how it is then continually reinforced.  However, a purely 
critical methodology is also deficient through its underestimation of the importance of 
the state.  Assuming that because discourse is vital to the construction of the state and 
its geopolitical codes, at the expense of other actors, that it is not entirely real, ignores 
the importance that the state has in international politics.  The state remains a powerful 
organizing principal, if a contested one.  By virtue of the fact that it has been 
constructed through neorealist discourse to hold this status and influence, it is worth 
studying as the central unit in geopolitics. 
 
The introduction of this critical aspect to a study that can be thought of as 
(neo)realist in focus therefore offers significant advantages.  It takes attributes from 
both the neorealist and the critical geopolitics philosophies, combining them into a 
methodology that can deconstruct that state and its codes, while still accepting that it is 
an essential and real part of geopolitics in the post-Cold War world.  It is not, though, a 
methodology that is normally applied in a critical study, and so it is worth considering 
the potential disadvantages of doing so.  Given that, by definition, a critical approach 
aims to move beyond an unquestioning acceptance of neorealism, there is arguably a 
danger that by taking a neorealist starting point that very critical function is undermined.  
The methods that have been prompted by the (neo)realist element might lend validity to 
this argument.  For example, by choosing states, and indeed three powerful states, the 
neorealist discourse in question is reproduced.  Nevertheless, it is impossible to truly 
understand how such states and their elites achieve this power without studying them, 
and the critical realist methodology creates an opportunity to do this in a critical way.  
Hence, discourse analysis is the chosen method as the main tool in the research.  
Although there may be a reproduction of the discourse, the de-construction that is 
achieved through this methodology is arguably of greater worth.  Essentially, the 
principle on which the methodology and the research is built is that there cannot be an 
effective analysis of geopolitics that does not acknowledge the impact of neorealism and 
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the state; if this is to be critically examined it is unavoidable that the state will have to 
be the focus. 
 
This critical realist methodology is, therefore, one that holds advantages over 
either neorealism or critical geopolitics.  The changes that have been occurring in the 
world since the end of the Cold War, and even more so after September 11th, make it 
essential that a methodology in geopolitical research such as this should be capable of 
accomplishing an investigation that will provide answers to questions on more than just 
the actions of states in relation to each other.  The influence of other non-state or multi-
state actors must also be considered, and yet it is still the states that dominate.  Critical 
realism accepts that dominance, but does not give it a permanent or unchallenged status.  
The methodology outlined here points to a concentration on the state, but one that is 
critical of the way this is formed, and the dominance it has achieved; it promotes 
discourse analysis while accepting that this has limitations; the role of individual actors 
and context is also acknowledged.  This methodology lies behind the results and 
discussion presented in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 4
. . . . . . .
Isolationism and Interventionism: the 
Geopolitical Codes of America’s Crusade for 
Freedom 
. . . . . . . .
Introduction 
 Underpinning this study is the assumption, implicit in the critical realist 
approach, that each state has its own codes.  Fundamental to this is the acceptance that 
codes change over time and space.  Consequently, it is the attributes of the place, in this 
case the United States, that lead to the development of its codes.  The historical and 
political factors that impinge upon the state combine with discourse and narratives, 
producing geopolitical codes that are contextually sensitive. 
 
Geopolitical codes, like the narratives and discourses that contribute to them, are 
not stable, but are instead continually evolving in response to events and the agency of 
influential actors.  This process cannot be removed from the scales at which it occurs; in 
the American case they develop where national and global scales meet, being the 
product of factors active at these scales.  As I have indicated, these factors are 
irreducible from temporal change, and therefore the codes are located in the context of 
long-term representations and policies of the state. 
 
The place of the United States as the hegemon, both at present and as one of two 
superpowers in the Cold War, means that much of the geopolitics literature is about, or 
written from the perspective of, that state.  As a consequence, many of the factors 
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impinging on America’s foreign policy, and hence contributing to its codes, have 
already been discussed in chapter two.  Therefore, although I will begin by identifying 
what the principal factors are, my discussion will be relatively brief, concentrating more 
on the beginnings of the country, and the ideologies that emerged from these 
foundations.   
 
Having shown what differentiates America from other states, the discussion 
proceeds to the discourses and narratives as revealed by discourse analysis.  There were 
eight discourses identified in the American documents.  These were Identity/Difference, 
Order/Disorder, Inside/Outside, East/West, Self/Other, Positive/Negative, Good/Evil 
and Threat.  The dominance of binary discourses gives interpretations of the American 
political elites a strong binary character.  Each of the discourses interacts with and 
reinforces the others; Identity/Difference is the discourse that underpins the rest 
supporting the division between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’, the ‘Self’ being ‘positive’ 
and ‘good’, the ‘Other’ being ‘negative’ and ‘evil’.  The ‘Self’, the American state, is on 
the ‘inside’ where there is ‘order’, while the ‘Other’ is ‘outside’ the state’s borders 
where ‘disorder’ exists.  Furthermore, the Orientalist and Cold War binary of East/West 
relates to these binaries making the East the domain of the ‘Other’ and the ‘West that of 
the ‘Self’.  Given these divisions, Threat is associated with the negative ‘Other’, which 
poses a danger to the ‘Self’.  Binary discourse underpins the very idea of the sovereign 
state and has therefore also been central to geopolitical understandings in the United 
States, it is consequently unsurprising that similar binaries should be reproduced in 
post-Cold War and post-September 11th representations driving the formation of 
geopolitical codes at this time. 
 
In addition, nine narratives found in the American documents will be discussed: 
Organic, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Rogue State, Law, Crusade, Inevitability of 
Victory, Coalition, Exceptionalism and Freedom.  As with the discourses, these relate to 
one another and to the discourses; no single discourse or narrative can be considered 
entirely in isolation as they all influence each other making them place specific, not 
withstanding close similarities that some might have with those of other states.  Due to 
this relationship, some narratives reinforce the positive image of the ‘Self’ and others 
the negative and threatening image of the ‘Other’, conforming to the structures 
established through the binary discourses, at the same time these narratives are 
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themselves crucial in the reproduction of the discourses as a result of the ideas that they 
make real.  Again, the narratives are rooted historically, underpinned by state discourse 
as well as that specific to the United States.  The relationships between the narratives, 
the discourses and their historical resonances are explored in the analysis. 
 
Firstly, I will discuss how binary discourse has been used to divide the world 
into a disordered outside, from where Threats can emerge, and an ordered inside.  
Following this assessment of spatial discourses, the construction of the terrorist ‘Other’ 
as a negative for the reproduction of the ‘Self’ is addressed, before revealing how this 
Threat was widened to include Rogue States and Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD).  I move on to look at the American response, focusing mainly on the 
establishment of a Crusade Against Terrorism, and how other states are accommodated 
within this.  An attempt is then made to reconnect this Crusade with long-term 
American geopolitical influences by revealing the role of narratives of Exceptionalism 
and Freedom in this new, and yet familiar, worldview.  Combining this with the 
historical and political context should allow a definition of the geopolitical code(s).  In 
conclusion I will relate these to the context from which they emerged, emphasizing how 
it is these foundations that precipitate unique codes. 
 
Construction of Geopolitical Codes: The American Context 
 The values and historical experiences that contributed to the formation of the 
United States as a state-nation have also come to define a national ‘Self’.  This ‘Self’, 
and the values that it embodies, are represented as a model when America is engaging 
globally, and are defended from contamination during periods of disengagement.  Two 
scales, the national and the global, are therefore those at which the factors influencing 
American geopolitical codes can be grouped (Table 4.1).  This is only an approximation 
as they are in fact closely interrelated, overlapping and influencing each other. 
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Table 4.1 
Factors Influencing American Geopolitical Codes 
National Global 
Manifest Destiny  
Individualism 
Republicanism 
Liberty 
Exceptionalism 
Expansionism/Interventionism 
Isolationism 
German/Japanese Threat 
Soviet Threat 
 
The construction of the American ‘Self’ has its roots in the history and ideology 
of the colonizers.  This was drawn from the Puritans.  Bercovitch (1978) explains: 
 
‘The American Puritan jeremiad was the ritual of a culture on an errand 
– which is to say, a culture based on a faith in process.  Substituting 
teleology for hierarchy, it discarded the Old World ideal of stasis for a 
New World vision of the future.’ (p.23). 
 
From these early foundations arose the notion that Americans were chosen by God and 
had a mission, America itself being a ‘holy land’.  Bercovitch notes: ‘The significance 
of “holy land” depends on other lands not being holy… …Moreover sacred history 
means the gradual conquest of the profane by the sacred.’ (p.178).  This gave the 
colonization of North America, and the advance of the frontier, a meaning, the 
colonizers working towards their destiny as designed by the creator.  The North 
American continent was being ‘geo-graphed’ as a wilderness, a space to be tamed by 
God’s ‘chosen’ people. 
 
It is from this historical legacy that the concept of Manifest Destiny emerged.  
Manifest Destiny encompasses a belief in America’s God-given position as a people, 
and a country, whose role it is to spread the virtues that it (supposedly) embodies, firstly 
by the expansion of the country itself, and then to the wider world.  Hook and Spanier 
(2004) reflect: ‘From the beginning, Americans professed a strong belief in what they 
considered to be their destiny – to spread, by example, freedom and social justice and to 
lead humankind away from its wicked ways to the New Jerusalem on earth.’ (p.12).  
Manifest Destiny is, therefore, not only a representation of Americans as a superior 
people, but involves the construction of America as a place that is itself superior (the 
New Jerusalem), and created by God for his chosen people to live in.  Agnew (1983) 
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comments: ‘Up to and beyond continental boundaries, then, the political definition of 
the United States has been viewed in exceptionalist terms as the outcome of a unique 
often providential place “under the sun”.’ (p.154).  This powerful concept brings 
together a people and the space they inhabit; its reproduction is itself a powerful tool to 
support, first the colonization and expansion across the North American continent, and 
thereafter to underpin American foreign policy. 
 
Closely related to Manifest Destiny is individualism.  Again, this is a factor 
predominantly operating at the national scale (Table 4.1) given its importance in 
constructions of American identity.  The experience of the frontier, where individual 
colonialists progressively ‘tamed’ the wilderness, allowed this attribute to be written 
into the idea, or myth, of America, and reinforced it as a practical expression of how 
Americans were expected to behave and how governance should operate (with 
individual rights emphasized over collective rights).  This is discussed by Perkins 
(1993): 
 
‘Unlike French Republicans after 1789, the Americans seldom talked of 
a “national will” transcending the views of individuals.  Although 
government intervened in economic matters much more than is 
suggested by polemicists expressing reverence for the policies of the 
Founding Fathers, and although, too, cooperative economic efforts 
became increasingly important, individual free enterprise was the model 
form, as befitted the nation of farms and farmers that America was at its 
birth.’ (p.11). 
 
This reveals the way in which individualism became even more significant as an idea 
than it was in reality. 
 
These factors in the construction of America cannot be separated from 
Enlightenment thought, also crucial in the emergence of the sovereign state.  Hence, it 
was essential for the formation of the United States as an independent state, and in the 
construction of the identity that allowed that state to be differentiated from the ‘Other’, 
particularly the European ‘Other’, from which many colonists had escaped (e.g. the 
Puritans), and which they looked upon as inferior to the ‘new world’ they were creating.  
Thus: ‘Only America achieved a true synthesis of the philosophy of the Enlightenment.  
The belief in the perfectibility of man and the progressive nature of voluntary social 
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cooperation reconciled nature and history, individual rights and social justice.’ (Arieli, 
1964, p.124).  Manifest Destiny and American individualism sit within Enlightenment 
thought; the construction of America can appear to support a view of this country as the 
only true Enlightenment society.  The foundations of Manifest Destiny in the Puritan 
vision of progress, corresponds with Enlightenment philosophy.  Hence, it is America 
that is represented as a societal and governance model at its most advanced, an 
achievement allegedly unequalled in Europe. 
 
From individualism and the model of society developed by the colonizers, 
comes the commitment to republicanism.  Again this is discursively rooted in 
Enlightenment philosophy, while drawing on the Puritan tradition.  Republicanism also 
lies in the first column of the table (4.1).  It is another component of the American 
‘Self’, the model of government, and of society, which is supposedly unique to the 
(chosen) American people, and to an imagined America ‘sited’ in the ‘empty’ space that 
the colonizers found on the North American continent.  Perkins (1993) points to 
republicanism as a strand of an American ideology arising in the embryonic stages of 
the American state and identity: ‘The most important belief was a commitment to 
republicanism, a striking departure from an otherwise nearly universal commitment to 
monarchy.’ (p.10).  This, once more, reflects an understanding by Americans that they 
were different from Europeans; only they could sustain a republican government true to 
Enlightenment ideals.  In this narrative, the ‘chosen people’ were free of the constraints 
of the Old World and could therefore build the most progressive form of state, drawing 
on their individualism, and supporting the liberty that they had supposedly gained by 
settling in the New World. 
 
Liberty is the next national factor (Table 4.1), and is closely connected with 
those already discussed.  Indeed, Arieli (1964) argues: ‘Self-government and civil 
liberty, constitutionalism and republicanism, were derived not from the philosophy of 
natural rights but from the civil and religious traditions of the colonists.  The polity of 
New England was the offspring of the Puritan way of life.’ (p.247).  Liberty, as a 
component of the American idea, combines and is entangled with these other features 
all of which go back to the original Puritan beginnings of colonial America.  The 
representation of America as an ‘empty space’ in which the colonizers were free to 
settle and live as individuals, unconstrained by hierarchical societies and oppression, 
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underpins the notion of America as ‘the land of the free’, the one place where liberty is 
possible. 
 
This view was reinforced by the failure of the French Revolution, initially 
supported by Americans, to deliver the same degree of liberty that Americans saw as 
being available in their own country.  Thus: ‘America was left as the bulwark of the 
rights of humanity, the sanctuary, the asylum and stronghold, of human liberty and 
human decency.’ (p.130).  Human liberty is consequently a crucial feature in the 
construction of the American ‘Self’ and the ‘siteing’ of America as a space in which 
humanity could be truly free.  The French example could be used as evidence 
reinforcing this.  By, apparently, proving that the values enshrined in the American state 
could only be realized absolutely in America, the sense of uniqueness given by Manifest 
Destiny was reinforced. 
 
This leads to the final factor in the national column of the table – 
Exceptionalism.  Perkins says: ‘The exceptionalist interpretation stresses the view that 
the United States is unique, that its history is to a large degree not compatible with that 
of other nations.’ (p.232).  Exceptionalism draws on the other factors in its assertion of 
the difference of America from the rest of the world – the ‘Others’.  It is not merely 
different however, but unique, exceptional, in its qualities and in its nature.  It is the 
American mission to spread human values around the world, just as they advanced 
across the North American continent with the colonists.  This mission is unique to the 
Americans, as they are the only nation ‘chosen’ to accomplish it. 
 
Two opposing trajectories operating at the global scale emerge directly from the 
national factors – expansionism and isolationism.  These define the main approaches in 
American foreign policy and are essentially opposites.  Hook and Spanier (2004) 
comment: ‘American foreign policy remains a story of pendulum-like swings between 
two contradictory impulses, both products of the nation’s self-image as an exceptional 
world power: morally inspired activism to save the world, and detachment from a sinful 
world.’ (p.353).  Exceptionalism allows Americans to perceive their country to be the 
only power capable of saving the world, furthermore following Manifest Destiny, this is 
a role that they must fill.  As God’s chosen people, it is the ‘right’ thing to do, and is 
therefore a moral duty.  Simultaneously, given the inferiority that they attribute to the 
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outside world, there is a tendency to hold back from engagement with the ‘sinful world’ 
in order to protect the values and liberty that they believe the country allows. 
 
There is, therefore, a strong basis for expansionism or interventionism within the 
founding principles of America: ‘America’s core values of political liberty, spiritual 
tolerance, and economic opportunity were meant for export.  Their adoption overseas 
represented the fulfillment of America’s historic mission,’ (p.348).  Manifest Destiny 
was not accomplished at the borders of the American state, but instead requires the 
spread of what are considered to be universal values to all parts of the world.  This is the 
mission that America has been given by God.  The world is therefore spatialised in a 
binary fashion by the discourse constructing the American ‘Self’; America is the space 
that is free, where human values have been adopted; the rest of the world is a space that 
requires America to act to spread those values, saving humanity.  This, though, applies 
more to some spaces than to others. 
 
The isolationist tendency stems from this binary depiction of the world.  For the 
United States to become involved with other states would, through this discourse, leave 
it open to being dragged into the immoral practices that the colonizers left behind in 
Europe.  This view pervaded American foreign policy from the beginning.  As Perkins 
(1993) notes: ‘…involvement in the sordid politics of Europe could be and was 
regarded by the Americans as contaminating, a descent to the level of court intrigues 
and amoral national selfishness contrary to the principles of republicanism.’ (p.16).  
Therefore, for much of the 19th century, American involvement outside the Western 
hemisphere was limited. 
 
Isolationism was also notable at the start of the two World Wars.  Nevertheless, 
this factor has never entirely stopped the United States acting on a global scale, the 
expansionist tendency rarely being completely dormant.  While the narrative underlying 
this suggests a righteous motive, differing from the ‘sordid’ practices of the Europeans, 
this is a reflection of the evolving American discursive structure through which it is 
represented as different and unique.  The United States has, in fact, not always been 
restrained in its global engagements as became increasingly apparent in the 20th century, 
when it had become more powerful, ultimately achieving hegemonic status after the 
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Second World War.  Figures such as Alfred Mahan were influential in promoting 
greater external engagement and expansion of military power. 
 
The country’s involvement in the World Wars was, however, a response to a 
perceived threat to America itself, if not necessarily an immediate or direct threat.  As 
such, the country was forced to take a decision on whether to get involved, by the 
activities of Germany, and in the Second World War Japan, though thereafter the 
expansionist zeal underpinned the responses in terms of a representation, and belief, that 
America could fight evil and reform the world.  Hook and Spanier (2004) reflect: 
 
‘The German threat during World War I was not one of immediate 
invasion, nor was an invasion the main threat even after the defeat of 
France early in World War II.  But the United States twice forsook its 
“splendid isolation” from foreign entanglements because American 
security was threatened.  Just as in World War I, any state – especially 
an antidemocratic state – that controlled all the resources of Eurasia, the 
Middle East, and Africa, and then converted those resources into 
military power, might someday be able to attack North America.’ (p.10). 
 
Thus, from the American perspective, the prospect of an evil ‘Other’ taking control of 
the rest of the (less pure) world posed a threat to America itself.  This has a certain 
resonance with Mackinder’s ‘Pivot’ and ‘Heartland’ theories, and demonstrates the 
extent to which these ideas have continued to inform geopolitical thinking throughout 
the 20th century and beyond, despite so many changes in world politics (Ó Tuathail, 
1992, p.101).  Therefore, in order to protect America and its values, Americans felt it 
necessary to fight this ‘Other’ as part of their ongoing mission as assigned by God.  
Following this interpretation, it is they who represent good while the ‘Other’, in this 
case German or Japanese, represents evil. 
 
Binary representations went on to underpin America’s Cold War discourse, as 
was discussed in chapter two.  Orientalism could be extended to characterize the Soviet 
Union in the east as the negative ‘Other’ threatening the West and the United States in 
particular (Sharp, 2000).  This newly constructed threat, together with the hegemonic 
role that the United States had acquired, gave the country a new reason for executing its 
expansionism in the wider world, at least when understood through the discourse of 
American identity, and in the context of Mackinder’s ‘pivot area’.  The perceived threat 
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of the Soviet Union became absolutely central to American geopolitics; this threat 
therefore lies in the column of global factors (Table 4.1).  Its implications were 
obviously considerable during the Cold War but have continued, as has also been 
discussed, in the post-Cold War period.  Hence, it is of more consistent relevance to 
foreign policy than the relatively short lived German and Japanese threats; for all that 
they fitted into the evolving discourse and had an impact upon this. 
 
After the Cold War: New Threats in a Disordered World 
The end of the Cold War, and of the Soviet Union, did not mean that the 
discursive structure, developed in relation to this, suddenly disappeared.  Instead, 
following Agnew and Corbridge (1995), the Cold War discursive structure remained, 
but was now exposed to a changed reality and would need to adapt to this.  Running 
through the whole discursive structure, and underpinning the rest of the discourses and 
narratives, is the binary discourse of Identity/Difference.  This is the discourse that 
Connolly (1991) identified as central to the establishment of an identity; in this case the 
identity being established is that of the state – the United States – made real through the 
binary discourse and continual (re)emphasis of the difference from inferior ‘Others’.  
Identity/Difference is the basic binary through which the other binary discourses are 
constructed, therefore its presence is not specifically identified in the documents, but it 
is necessarily drawn upon when these other discourses and the related narratives are 
reproduced. 
 
A binary characterization of an ordered inside and a disordered outside is 
apparent.  This corresponds with the longstanding American understanding of the 
outside world as being less enlightened than America itself: ‘…America’s version of 
enlightenment, exceptionalism, was premised on being able to escape and abolish the 
ambiguity of European freedom.’ (Burke, 2005, p.322).  Given that the, apparently 
stable, Cold War order had evaporated; there was a need to understand the new 
situation.  Threats such as the Soviets and the Germans came from the outside, and 
therefore any new enemy could also be assumed to be external, such as in the case of 
the Oklahoma bombing (Sparke, 1998). 
 
Isolationism and Interventionism: the Geopolitical Codes of America’s Crusade for Freedom 
142
Although not one of the most common discourses, Order/Disorder does appear 
in almost 30% of documents analysed, similar in number to the East/West discourse, but 
Inside/Outside is more frequent, occurring in over 40% of documents (Figure 4.1).  
Prior to September 11th Order/Disorder was relatively infrequent compared to the other 
discourses (Figure 4.2), a relationship becoming more distinct after the attacks (Figure 
4.3).  The focus was on the character of the terrorists rather than where they had come 
from, and why.  Consequently, the trend is apparent for East/West and Inside/Outside, 
the latter changing from the third most common discourse before September 11th to the 
fifth afterwards (Figures 4.2 and 4.3). 
 
In 2002 these three discourses remained the most infrequent but were closer to 
the rest (Figure 4.4) as the terrorist’s location, a disordered, eastern outside, became 
more important in representations and responses.  The trend continued in 2003 when 
East/West became the most frequently occurring of the three (Figure 4.5), and in 2004 
when it was the third most common, while Order/Disorder was more limited again 
(Figure 4.6).  These changes accompanied the build up to, and then the execution of, the 
invasion of Iraq, a country in the ‘east’.  In addition, once the Threat had been located in 
the disordered outside, there was, perhaps, less need to draw so heavily on these 
discourses. 
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Figure 4.2 
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Figure 4.4 
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Figure 4.5 
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Figure 4.6 
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Figure 4.7 
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Figure 4.7 provides a comparison of these discourses over time.  Inside/Outside 
and Order/Disorder are fairly consistent with dips after September 11th, particularly in 
the case of Order/Disorder.  East/West also has a low point following the attacks, where 
character is more important than spatial origin, but apart from that, there is a steady 
increase in frequency.  This reflects the change in focus of the Threat from the outside 
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in general after the Cold War, to the Middle East, and countries like Afghanistan and 
Iraq, as responses to September 11th were formulated. 
 
Through the Cold War discursive structure it was ‘obvious’ for Americans to see 
the outside world as chaotic and potentially threatening.  Debrix (2005) identifies this 
tendency: ‘The USA, with its embracing of terror, must always measure itself against 
new opponents, new enemies, new warrior classes, new insurgencies, and new forms of 
tyranny.’ (p.1170).  The Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the Department of State 
reflects this in the following description in 1996 when speaking to the Denver Council 
on Foreign Relations:1
The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War did not, alas, 
bring forth the “End of History” or a new dawn of world peace and 
harmony.  Instead, this change brought into sharper focus serious global 
problems and threats.  You’ve heard the list before: as ethnic conflict, 
weapons proliferation, environmental degradation, untenable population 
growth, international crime, and terrorism. (Wilcox, 1996) 
 
This is a description of a disordered world, and a world that is dangerous for that 
disorder.  There is a list of problems or Threats all of which compound a sense of 
turmoil, terrorism is among them, but no more prominent than others such as weapons 
proliferation.  The passage demonstrates an increasing unease by the mid-1990s, but one 
that has not yet formulated into a single Threat or enemy.  Wilcox refers to the ‘end of 
history’ argument made by Fukayama (1989), who suggested that America’s Cold War 
victory represented a victory of the American ideology and system of government.  For 
Wilcox this is clearly not the case, which follows the historical American view of the 
world, in which they stand alone as the most enlightened people and country.  If this is 
so, a continuing struggle makes ‘sense’, diminishing Fukayama’s argument. 
 
Order/Disorder works with Inside/Outside, which is often drawn on with words 
like ‘home’ and ‘abroad’.  As Walker (1993) notes, this discourse is central to realism, 
where there is a clear distinction between the domestic and the international, and where 
it is ‘natural’ for boundaries to be drawn around states, and for the world to be divided 
 
1 ‘Founded in 1938 as a committee of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, the Denver 
Council; on Foreign Relations (DCFR) is incorporated as an independent, non-partisan, non-profit 
organization.  Since 1993 it has been located at the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS), 
University of Denver.’ (DCFR, 2007). 
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up into distinct territorial units.  As Walker argues, this binary separates political 
thought and international relations.  It therefore allows the values of the American state 
to be distinguished from the disorder and lack of values that are said to exist outside, 
and in turn for terrorism to be distinguished between its international and domestic 
varieties. 
 
Hence, in 1996, the year after the Oklahoma bombing, Defense Secretary, 
William Perry notes in a speech to the American Bar Association that: 
 
Domestic Terrorism is a crime against the order and tranquility of our 
nation.  International terrorism is an assault on the peace and stability of 
the world. (Perry, 1996) 
 
The inside and outside are clearly differentiated and order and disorder are highlighted, 
terrorism being associated with the later.  At this point there is recognition that terrorism 
can originate on the inside as well as the outside, but it is not the same. 
 
However, this hint at greater complexity does not last.  In 2000 The National 
Commission on Terrorism2 again draws on the Inside/Outside discourse: 
 
International terrorism once threatened Americans only when they were 
outside the country.  Today international terrorists attack us on our own 
soil. (National Commission on Terrorism, 2000) 
 
This, from an apparently authoritative source, helps to embellish the Threat provided by 
terrorism by showing how it no longer exists only on the outside where there is 
disorder.  Consequently, it is all the more dangerous.  Within this, there is a sense in 
which the fluidity of borders may have increased allowing the Threat from outside to 
come in to the homeland.  According to O’Dowd (2002), borders help to define ‘us’ and 
‘them’, they are a component in the reproduction of the Self/Other discourse that is also 
apparent in the passage.  Anderson and O’Dowd (1999) accept that the role of state 
borders is changing and becoming more complex, but still maintain that they are 
relevant.  The American example appears to demonstrate this, as there is still a repeated 
 
2 The Commission on Terrorism was created in 1999 to ‘…review the laws, regulations, directives, 
policies and practices for preventing and punishing international terrorism directed against the United 
States…’ (The National Commission on Terrorism, 2000).  The Commissioners were chosen by the 
leaders of the parties in the Senate and House of Representatives. 
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differentiation of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ drawing on binary discourse that also helps in 
the reproduction of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’.  New threats are constructed through this binary, 
ignoring the implications of globalization. 
 
During the Cold War, an East/West binary owed much to Orientalist 
representations.  Given that the discursive structure evolved from that of the Cold War, 
it would therefore be unsurprising if this were to continue.  Often the discourse is drawn 
on in reference to ‘The West’, which by implication distinguishes it from ‘the East’.  
Thus, we might see references to ‘western military superiority’ (Hughs, 1999), where, 
as expected, the West is ‘better’ than the East.   
 
President Clinton, speaking at the OSCE summit in 1999, suggests that the 
Middle East is a region that marks a division between the ordered West and the 
disordered East. 
 
So much of the future of the 21st century will turn on developments in 
the vast region that lies between traditional notions of Asia and Europe, 
between the Muslim world and the West, between the parts of our 
community that are stable and prosperous and democratic, and those still 
struggling to build basic human security and freedom. (Clinton, 1999) 
 
In line with Said’s (1978) Orientalism, and with Cold War discourses of East and West, 
he is representing the East as disordered and inferior to the West, which is ‘stable’, 
‘prosperous’ and ‘democratic’.  The East is, in comparison, ‘struggling’ and lacking 
‘freedom’.  It is noticeable that the East is described as the ‘Muslim world’, a 
connection that is relevant to the association between terrorism, Islam, and the East, that 
is increasingly developed.  The binary of Occident and Orient that Said identifies, 
comfortably correlates with the American identity and could easily be written into 
discourses of the Cold War where East and West was an important binary (Sharp, 
2000), and now influences the post-Cold War world.  Clinton can therefore represent 
the Middle East as lacking in the virtues of America, such as Freedom (liberty), and 
therefore it is disordered and threatening.  To do so also reinforces the argument for 
American intervention in the region in furtherance of American economic and political 
interests.  Therefore, the significance of the rhetoric cannot be ignored. 
 
Isolationism and Interventionism: the Geopolitical Codes of America’s Crusade for Freedom 
149
Figure 4.8 
The Organic Narrative over Time (U.S.)
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A narrative worth noting is the Organic character of terrorism.  This is at its peak 
before September 11th, occurring in more than a quarter of documents, but is never 
particularly frequent (Figure 4.8).  The attacks led to a reduction and thereafter it 
fluctuated.  When a range of Threats was being represented, this was a useful narrative 
to support the vague sense of disorder, but September 11th focused the Threat on 
terrorism, reducing the need for such emphasis.  Where there is no Freedom, the 
Organic narrative appears to suggest conditions are right for terrorism to ‘breed’ like 
some sort of weed or cancer.  Philip Wilcox says (to the DCFR): ‘Terrorism often 
emerges from the breeding grounds of political, economic and ideologic conflict.’ 
(1996).  Here again is a link between the production of terrorism and disordered spaces.  
The places where terrorism comes from are represented using the Organic narrative: 
 
We have often seen terrorists take advantage of countries where they 
can do their training, do their planning, do their equipping in safety.  
Now, a lot of those swamps as we call them, have been drained over 
time. (Hull, 2001)3
These ‘disordered’ places are described as ‘swamps’ suggesting a murky and distasteful 
place where one might find dangerous creatures.  By ‘draining’ these metaphorical 
‘swamps’, the conditions for the development of terrorism are, supposedly, removed 
 
3 This quotation comes from a press briefing by the acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism, following 
the release of the annual ‘Patterns of Global Terrorism’ report. 
Isolationism and Interventionism: the Geopolitical Codes of America’s Crusade for Freedom 
150
and so the world becomes safer.  The phrase ‘breeding grounds’ draws on the imagery 
of terrorism as some sort of disease or monster.  Such conditions are found, it is said, in 
the East, an ‘obvious’ assertion given the historical context. 
 
September 11th and the Characterization of the ‘Other’ 
 September 11th had a dramatic effect on American (geo)politics: 
 
‘It might be argued that the Cold War finally ended on 11 September 
2001.  The US has entered into a new realm of geopolitics, still 
dedicated to the expansion of the New World Order but with drastic 
alterations in the role of military power.’ (Boggs, 2002, p.247). 
 
However, representations and responses made in the aftermath cannot be separated from 
earlier post-Cold War understandings, and of course longer-term worldviews.  What the 
attacks did do was to focus the sense of Threat upon terrorism.  It also prompted a 
clearer characterization of terrorism as a negative ‘Other’, reinforcing the positive 
representation of the ‘Self’, and of the American values, and vision for the world. 
 
In line with the self-image of America as superior and detached from the 
‘sordid’ activities of less enlightened parts of the world, the United States is repeatedly 
represented as essentially peaceful and working for the good of the world: ‘While other 
countries have interests, the United States has sustained the pretension that it 
additionally embodies, unlike other great powers of the past, values of benefit to all…’ 
(Falk, 2004, p.248).  This correlates with its supposed exceptional role assigned by God.  
In accordance, Bill Clinton told the UN General Assembly in 1998: 
 
…we are no threat to any peaceful nation and we believe the best way to 
disprove these claims is to continue our work for peace and prosperity 
around the world.  For us to pull back from the world’s trouble spots, to 
turn our backs on those taking risks for peace, to weaken our own 
opposition to terrorism, would hand the enemies of peace a victory they 
must never have.  (Clinton, 1998b) 
 
Noticeable in this extract is the use of words like ‘we’, ‘our’ and ‘us’, against ‘they’ and 
‘enemies’.  In terms of Connolly’s (1991) ‘identity/difference’, for the American ‘Self’ 
to be positive ‘others’ cannot be the same, a negative ‘Other’ is essential to create the 
difference that defines the positive ‘Self’.  This logocentrism has been a feature of 
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American identity from the beginning; the ‘Other’ may have varied from Europe and 
Native Americans in the early days, to Germany and then the Soviet Union.  The United 
States view understands peace as a virtue ascribed to America that is absent elsewhere 
in the disordered world, only by engaging with that world can ‘they’ be challenged and 
peace delivered. 
 
The terrorist ‘Other’ is, therefore, attributed a whole range of negative 
characteristics to produce a clear division from the ‘Self’ and, in so doing, construct that 
‘Self’ in a more positive light.  As such: ‘Terrorists also use violence in a less focused 
way to express protest and rage, to advance messianic and fanatic religious agendas, and 
for even more obscure pathological reasons.’ (Wilcox, 1996).  They: ‘…share a hatred 
for democracy, a fanatical glorification of violence, and a horrible distortion of their 
religion to justify the murder of innocents.’ (Clinton, 1998a).  Furthermore, they are 
‘barbaric’ and ‘indiscriminate’ (Holbrooke, 1999), and ‘cowardly merchants of terror’ 
(Cohen, 1998).  The terrorist is apparently unstable, shown by their lack of focus, their 
‘rage’, ‘fanaticism’, ‘hatred’, not to mention ‘pathological reasons’, ‘barbarism’ and 
‘indiscriminate’ actions. 
 
Each of these terms acts to reinforce the idea of a crazed lunatic who cannot be 
predicted or reasoned with.  They appear completely at odds with ‘normal’, ‘civilized’ 
people and are therefore all the more dangerous and threatening.  In addition, there is a 
religious dimension to the terrorists’ character, but one that does not conform to that of 
America.  It is ‘their religion’ – Islam – which comes from the outside, from the east, 
but to make matters worse, it is ‘horribly distorted’ by these ‘cowards’.  This conforms 
to Corlett’s (2003) definition of terrorism, which places it outside the realm of the state, 
as an act carried out by non-state actors.  As such it is anathema in a neorealist 
worldview and can therefore always be wrong, mad, and consequently dangerous.  
Thus, the binary discourses of Self/Other and Positive/Negative are reproduced and 
fused together, along with that of Threat, as terrorism is built up piece by piece as a 
worthy replacement for the Soviet Union in the discursive structure. 
 
Being contrary to the rules of neorealism makes terrorism a particularly 
‘threatening’ enemy.  Dalby (2003) reflects: 
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‘The suggestion is that the modern geopolitical reasoning of political 
elites in America in particular, but in other states as well, constrains the 
interpretation of the politics precisely because they operate in terms of a 
political ontology of states whether understood as autonomous actors, or 
in a more sophisticated sociology, as a society of states.’ (p.64). 
 
Terrorists can act in ways that states cannot, as they do not follow the same territoriality 
and have a different spatial logic.  These characteristics can be used in the imagery of 
terrorism generated by policy-makers to reinforce the sense of menace, and therefore 
provide a discursive logic for their policy decisions.  This is apparent in discussions by 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in 2004, firstly at the Greater Miami Chamber of 
Commerce and then at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Singapore, 
when the impact of September 11th is firmly established in the (re)construction of 
terrorism.  In an election year, the re-emphasis on the ‘Other’ and the Threat posed by it 
should be expected.  The unpredictability of this modern enemy, and the resulting 
danger, remains at the centre of the discussion: 
 
The central fact of terrorism is this.  It is that a terrorist can attack at any 
time at any place using any technique and it is absolutely impossible to 
defend that every time of the day or night in every place against every 
conceivable technique. (Rumsfeld, 2004a) 
 
And furthermore: 
 
Future dangers will less likely be from battles between great powers, and 
more likely from enemies that work in small cells, that are fluid and 
strike without warning anywhere, anytime – enemies that have access to 
increasingly formidable technology and weapons. (Rumsfeld, 2004b) 
 
Increasing fluidity, a component of globalization, appears to underpin Rumsfeld’s 
thinking.  Virilio’s (1997) concept of ‘pure war’ suggests that power is related to speed.  
Rumsfeld is constructing a terrorist Threat that is dangerous because it has power 
derived from fluidity, hence it can ‘strike’ ‘anywhere, anytime’.  For Virilio, technology 
and speed create a situation where war is in the preparation, this is ‘pure war’.  The 
military must continue to develop and accumulate sophisticated weapons in response to 
an alleged Threat.  However, Luke and Ó Tuathail (2000) point out that: ‘The 
significance of geopolitics may appear to be fading for some; yet, as Bosnia, Rwanda, 
Taiwan, Kashmir and numerous other places remind us, its heavy hand still shapes life 
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and death across the planet.’ (p.378).  While Virilio’s contention that space is eliminated 
by speed may not be completely true, representation of the terrorist Threat as being 
more fluid than those in the past, allows Rumsfeld to justify a greater militarism in 
response, similar to Virilio’s argument. 
 
The Threat discourse was the most frequent before September 11th, and the need 
to characterize a negative ‘Other’ meant that Positive/Negative was the second most 
common, in terms of numbers of documents in which it appeared (Figure 4.2).  
Immediately after September 11th Threat is overtaken by Positive/Negative (and 
Good/Evil) (Figure 4.3).  This reflects the fact that the focus is on characterizing the 
terrorists in a negative way to emphasize the difference from the ‘Self’, the Threat now 
being more singular than before.  In Figure 4.9 this change is noticeable as Threat, 
which was previously in almost 90% of documents, falls back to around 60%, while 
Positive/Negative is more consistent, rising only slightly.   
Figure 4.9 
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Threat recovers from 2002 onwards, while Positive/Negative is a little more 
variable but remains fairly consistent.  The importance of these two discourses is more 
apparent when comparing them to others in 2002 (Figure 4.4), 2003 (Figure 4.5) and 
2004 (Figure 4.6).  Threat returns to being the dominant discourse with 
Positive/Negative not far behind.  Having established the idea of the negative nature of 
terrorists, and the risk they ‘must’ pose to the ‘Self’, by drawing on real events, this 
could be continually reproduced as responses are formulated and enacted.  The addition 
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of further Threats (e.g. Iraq) allowed this process to continue, and the negativity and 
consequent Threat could continue to be reproduced.  The result is that these two 
discourses appear in more documents than any other over the study period (Figure 4.1). 
 
Good/Evil is a closely related discourse.  It is familiar from Cold War 
representations where, for example, Ronald Reagan described the Soviet Union as ‘the 
Evil Empire’.  The discourse helps to reinforce the separation of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ by 
removing any possibility of nuance.  Bhatia (2005) describes how the background to a 
terrorist attack becomes irrelevant when approached through this discourse: ‘Once a 
terror attack occurs, it is held that all such historiography should be consigned to the 
proverbial scrap heap.  It now becomes a matter of pure “evil”, with no history or 
reason.’ (p.17).  If something is evil then it cannot be accepted or tolerated in any way, 
it is totally wrong and extremely dangerous and threatening.  Hence, there can only be 
one response to it, and that response is ‘good’.  This allows America, and the American 
government’s actions, to be portrayed as ‘right’ and ‘unavoidable’, and prevents any 
questioning of those actions. 
Figure 4.10 
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Good/Evil is the third most common discourse overall (Figure 4.1), but before 
September 11th it had occurred in approximately the same number of documents as 
Inside/Outside and Self/Other, and fewer than Threat and Positive/Negative (Figure 
4.2).  With no single ‘Other’, such a strong characterization was difficult.  September 
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11th led to this discourse combining with Positive/Negative in the negative 
representations of terrorism, and so they were the most frequent discourses (Figure 4.3).  
This was the peak of the Good/Evil discourse (Figure 4.10).  Thereafter it declined, 
relatively (Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6), and absolutely (Figure 4.10) as the image had 
been established, it was now ‘obvious’ that the terrorist was ‘evil’. 
 
Consequently, following September 11th, it made ‘sense’ that such an act could 
be carried out, and in turn the evidence of the attack could be used to prove that the 
terrorists were ‘evil’ and reinforced the discourse.  This discourse become dominant 
immediately, as is apparent from Bush’s address on the evening of September 11th:
‘Today our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature.’ And then: ‘…we go 
forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world.’ (Bush, 2001a).  
He not only uses the term ‘evil’ itself, but also constructs a binary division between 
Americans and the terrorists.  While ‘they’ are the ’worst of human nature’ and 
therefore beyond salvation, ‘we’ are ‘good’ and ‘just’ and will ’defend freedom’. 
 
Repetition of the term ‘evil’ reinforces the discourse, and its effect is to remove 
the terrorists and their behavior from normal humanity and debate.  They are not 
‘civilized’, they are ‘evil’, and there is therefore no justification or argument that can be 
made for them.  Boggs (2002) comments: ‘Terrorism in the official wisdom winds up 
reduced to an evil act, pure and simple, although virtually any form of US military 
intervention – no matter how ill conceived or destructive – becomes a regrettably 
necessary instrument of progress.’ (p.243).  Bush reiterates the distinction between the 
‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ in this statement at the FBI Headquarters: 
 
The people who did this act on America, and who may be planning 
further acts, are evil people.  They don’t represent an ideology, they 
don’t represent a legitimate political group of people.  They’re flat evil.  
That’s all they think about, is evil.  And as a nation of good folks, we’re 
going to hunt them down, and were going to find them, and we will bring 
them to justice. (Bush, 2001e) 
 
There is a strong rhetorical tone to statements such as this, as Bush tries to encourage 
Americans, his principal intended audience, to support himself, his government and his 
policies in response to September 11th. In addition, we can see what Keohane (2002) 
describes as the ‘public delegitimation of terrorism’ (p.141).  This involves ‘normative 
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arguments’ that divide civilized states and dangerous terrorists.  It is this difference that 
definitions of terrorism, such as that of Corlett, often represent, and Keohane argues that 
by delegitimizing terrorism, strengthens states through the war that is waged against it.  
Therefore, Bush and others laid the ground for the ‘war against terrorism’ by reinforcing 
the division between terrorist and state, and the comparative legitimacy of the two 
actors. 
 
This distinct contrast between terrorist and American is starkly drawn in the 
following passage, where Bush is addressing the American nation: 
 
We value life; the terrorists ruthlessly destroy it.  We value education; 
the terrorists do not believe women should be educated or should have 
health care; or should leave their homes.  We value the right to speak our 
minds; for the terrorists, free expression can be grounds for execution.  
We respect people of all faiths and welcome the free practice of religion; 
our enemy wants to dictate how to think and how to worship even to 
their fellow Muslims. (Bush, 2001f) 
 
Chomsky (2002) identifies that, as constructed by powerful actors, terrorism includes 
only acts against ‘us’ and excludes what we do to ‘them’, which is counterterrorism and 
is therefore justified.  The real events of September 11th are drawn on in the 
construction of a terrorist ‘Other’ that is dangerous and threatening due to negative 
characteristics assigned to it.  This reproduces earlier discourse and the sense of Threat 
developed after the Cold War; the dramatic events are invoked, allowing the 
construction of the terrorist to be reinforced.  If the terrorist is ‘evil’ then something 
must be done; this conforms to the logic of Manifest Destiny. 
 
Developing the Threat: ‘An Axis of Evil’ 
 A general threat from ‘evil’ terrorists was therefore an accepted ‘reality’ 
following September 11th, but in 2002 it was developed further with the introduction of 
new elements – Rogue States and Weapons of Mass Destruction.  This stems from the 
incompatibility of the (neo)realist discourse underpinning the state, and the non-state 
terrorist networks that now had to be comprehended: ‘The difficulty of dealing with 
“shadowy networks” rendered traditional locational targeting of a (“rogue”) nation-state 
a logical solution.’ (Ettlinger and Bosco, 2004, p.253).  If there is one point when this 
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change occurs it is the State of the Union Address on the 29th of January.  Firstly Bush 
argues that: 
 
We must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, 
biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the 
world. 
 
Then he continues by coining a famous phrase that embodies this new combined Threat: 
 
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, 
arming to threaten the peace of the world.  By seeking weapons of mass 
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.  They could 
provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their 
hatred. (Bush, 2002b) 
 
In these passages Threat still underpins references to terrorism, but is now joined by the 
narratives of Rogue States and WMD.  These have been seen before as part of the 
selection of Threats after the Cold War, but not directly linked to terrorism in most 
cases.  Now a rhetorical link is made – they are, he says, ‘allies’ and ‘could provide 
these arms to terrorists’.  By using the term ‘axis’ he draws parallels with the Second 
World War, when America’s enemies (e.g. Germany, Italy, Japan) were known as the 
‘axis powers’.  This historical reference adds to the negative and threatening image that 
is being constructed.  Bush claims that the danger is ‘growing’ and the Threat is 
becoming greater.  Since the terrorists are now firmly established, through discourse, as 
‘evil’ and unrestrained, they would ‘obviously’ use these weapons if provided with 
them by the Rogue States.  Given his position of power, the President speaks with 
authority on these matters in this widely observed annual speech, and the connections 
made appear to make ‘sense’ in the context of the discourses and narratives that have 
been developed both before and after September 11th.
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Rogue State are the fourth and sixth most 
widely occurring narratives overall (Figure 4.11), but this masks some important 
variations over time.  Before September 11th, they were two of the most frequent 
(Figure 4.12), part of the selection of vague dangers.  The attacks on America briefly 
changed this as the attention moved to terrorism.  Hence, they are comparatively minor 
at this time (Figure 4.13).  The graph in Figure 4.17 demonstrates this dramatic fall in 
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both narratives, but also that they recover again in 2002.  Figure 4.14 shows how they 
now compare favorably with most other narratives.  This is a time when the ‘axis of 
evil’4 is being identified and the case for a war with Iraq is being constructed.  Thus, in 
2003 both narratives reach their peak, WMD at over 70% and Rogue State at over 50% 
(Figure 4.17).  Consequently, WMD is the second most frequent narrative and Rogue 
State is the fourth (Figure 4.15).  This corresponds with the war in Iraq where such 
representations are at their peak in order to justify this action.  By 2004 the attention on 
Iraq has, unsurprisingly, declined somewhat and so these narratives are no longer so 
widely used relative to the others (Figure 4.16) or in absolute terms, falling 
considerably from the previous year (Figure 4.17). 
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4 This was a phrase and a concept made famous by George Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address, from 
which the passage above is drawn.  It was an attempt to discursively connect a number of states that the 
American government considered to be enemies, together with terrorists as one ‘evil’ ‘Other’.  In the 
Address, the states referred to were North Korea, Iran and Iraq, but subsequently this ‘axis’ varied with 
other states such as Syria or Cuba potentially being part of it, depending on who was using it and when.  
The key feature of this phrase is its flexibility as a convenient means of bundling any state or group 
together as one enemy, this also makes it ill-defined and unclear as to what it actually means in practice. 
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Figure 4.14 
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Occurrence of Narratives in 2003 (U.S.)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
CT EX Cl IV OG LW WD RS FR
Narratives
CT – Crusade Against Terrorism OG – Organic  FR – Freedom 
EX – Exceptionalism  LW – Law   
CL – Coalition  WD – Weapons of Mass Destruction   
IV – Inevitability of Victory  RS – Rogue State 
CT – Crusade Against Terrorism OG – Organic  FR – Freedom 
EX – Exceptionalism  LW – Law   
CL – Coalition  WD – Weapons of Mass Destruction   
IV – Inevitability of Victory  RS – Rogue State 
Isolationism and Interventionism: the Geopolitical Codes of America’s Crusade for Freedom 
161
Figure 4.16 
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While initially the new Threat was presented as a general one, a number of 
Rogue States that might now provide WMD to terrorists – an axis of evil – once this 
was established in public consciousness, policy-makers focused the Threat on a single 
state – Iraq.  This conformed to their strategic and policy interests in the Middle East 
generally and the specific antagonistic relationship that had existed between America 
CT – Crusade Against Terrorism OG – Organic  FR – Freedom 
EX – Exceptionalism  LW – Law   
CL – Coalition  WD – Weapons of Mass Destruction   
IV – Inevitability of Victory  RS – Rogue State 
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and Iraq since 1991.  The ideas of  Rogue States and an axis of evil have a strong spatial 
character.  By assigning some states as ‘Rogue’ this contributes to a spatialization of the 
ordered and disordered parts of the world.  The state involves the territorialization of a 
specific bounded space where that state’s authorities have a theoretical sovereignty, if a 
state is said to be rogue then by extension this applies to the space, the territory that it 
controls.  By grouping such states, no matter how unlikely the connections, together 
with the description of an axis of evil, the presence of evil is itself spatialized through 
the territories of these states and the suggestion that there is a linkage between them.  
The spaces are no longer just ‘rogue’, however, they have moved a stage further and 
become the territories of ‘evil’; they are ‘evil’ spaces. 
 
Despite the fact that the September 11th attacks were not connected to Iraq, and 
that they did not involve WMD, Bush could use the ‘evil’ character of terrorists that had 
been reinforced after the attacks, and the Threat that that implied, to associate them with 
the other Threats that were already believed to exist.  Iraq was an enemy, a Rogue State, 
and so if Rogue States were part of an ‘axis of evil’, Iraq was ‘obviously’ one of them.  
Thus, Iraq was now implicitly connected to September 11th.
Such an alleged connection became increasingly specific, and use of examples 
appeared to give added authority to the claims.  In October 2002, Bush made a speech 
on the subject in Cincinnati Museum Center, asserting that: 
 
We know that Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common 
enemy – the United States of America.  We know that Iraq and al 
Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade.  Some al 
Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq.  These include one 
very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in 
Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for 
chemical and biological attacks.  We’ve learned that Iraq has trained al 
Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases.  And 
we know that after September the 11th, Saddam Hussein’s regime 
gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America. (Bush, 2002f) 
 
The two enemies are said to share common negative characteristics, and are therefore 
supposed to be on the same side, that of evil.  In a binary relationship there can only be 
friends or enemies.  This is indicative of a process of bundling Threats into one more 
threatening Threat; or, as Putzel (2006) puts it: ‘…establishing an unbroken thread 
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between terrorist attacks and states the US deems to be “rogues”.’ (p.73).  By doing so 
policy-makers build more solid foundations on which to base the justifications for their 
actions. 
 
This discursive construction continues as the argument is made for a war in Iraq.  
Ettlinger and Bosco (2004) reflect: ‘Al-Qaeda was a catalyst in the war against Iraq, 
used, as it were, to focus US attention on a more familiar foe, as well as on a more 
spatially concise set of targets.’ (p.250).  By linking Iraq directly to al-Qaeda it becomes 
easier to make a convincing case to the American public, as the effect of September 11th 
is harnessed, placing Iraq on the opposite side of the binary from America, and 
assigning it a level of responsibility for the attacks: 
 
Or worse, if we find a post-9/11 nexus between Iraq and terrorist 
organizations that are looking for just such weapons – and I would 
submit and will provide more evidence that such connections are now 
emerging and we can establish that they exist – we cannot wait for one of 
these terrible weapons to show up in one of our cities and wonder where 
it came from after its been detonated by al-Qaida or somebody else. 
(Powell, 2003)5
The placing of a hypothetical attack in an American city draws on the real events of 
September 11th by evoking the idea of future more lethal attacks.  This allows the 
‘nexus’ to be made more real and dangerous, and thus makes the need for it to be 
challenged appear more urgent and ‘obvious’.  As Falah, Flint and Mamadouh (2006) 
note: ‘The United States of America, acting as hegemonic power, constructed its 2003 
war on Iraq as just with rhetorical tools unavailable to nonhegemonic states.’ (p.142).  It 
was now ‘common sense’ that Rogue States, and in particular Iraq, were part of the 
same threatening ‘Other’, if one had WMD then the logic followed that they would all 
have WMD. 
 
Common sense is an important part of writing a ‘truth’.  As Sharp (2000) 
identified, it was drawn on in the Cold War to simplify the world and make particular 
points seem ‘obvious’.  Thus, if terrorists and Rogue States can be constructed as 
negative ‘Others’, then it is ‘common sense’ that they are working together in a nexus.  
Furthermore, if this is so, then it is also ‘common sense’ that America must fight them 
 
5 This is a passage from a speech to the UN Security Council. 
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given the Threat they apparently pose.  With the new, more deadly, Threat constructed, 
it is possible to argue for a war that would remove the Threat, and form part of a wider 
Crusade Against Terror and against ‘evil’.   
 
Responding to the Threat 
 In Cold War America, as has been shown, the discourses constructed in relation 
to the ‘Other’, and the representations that these underpinned, supported a tendency for 
militarism and established ‘an Other as perpetual adversary’ (Dalby, 1990, p.158).  
Militarism and deterrence was ‘common sense’ given the Threat that was believed to 
exist and consequently this response was easily justifiable by those in power.  Likewise, 
in the post-Cold War world, the construction of a terrorist ‘Other’ makes some sort of 
response ‘obvious’.  For the United States that response is a ‘war on terrorism’: 
 
‘The declaration of a “war on terror” – on an act rather than one specific 
group – left the enterprise tantalizingly open to any number of 
interpretations or appropriations, with the terminology used by the Bush 
administration so polarizing that contradictory information was 
discarded as irrelevant.’ (Bhatia, 2005, p.16). 
 
As with the existence of a threatening ‘Other’ itself, this sort of response is not new to 
the American experience; a resort to war is a frequent solution to any Threat in 
American history (Stephenson, 1998, p.77).  The founding ideals of the American ‘Self’ 
are, of course, irreducible from the concept of fighting evil, and so this approach makes 
‘sense’ through discourse, when presented with an ‘evil’ ‘Other’. 
 
Legal Measures 
However, war is not the only response that has been proposed for terrorism by 
American policy-makers.  Another narrative that is used on occasions is that of Law.  
For example in 2000 The National Commission on Terrorism claimed in their report 
that: 
 
Diplomacy is an important instrument, both in gaining the assistance of 
other nations in particular cases and convincing the international 
community to condemn and outlaw egregious terrorist practices.  Law 
enforcement is often invaluable in the investigation and apprehension of 
terrorists. (The National Commission on Terrorism, 2000) 
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While Law is not the only means discussed in this document, and in others, the repeated 
mention of legal methods suggests that terrorism is still considered in terms of the 
(neo)realist state system, where military force is reserved primarily for inter-state 
conflict, while non-state actors are generally controlled through legal means. 
 
Nevertheless, while the Law narrative appeared in more documents than any 
other before September 11th (Figure 4.12), once the attacks had taken place it is 
relegated to insignificance at around 10% or less (Figures 4.13, 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16).  
As we have seen, September 11th allowed the negativity and Threat of the terrorist to be 
clarified and reinforced.  Once it had been constructed in this way the ‘obvious’ 
response, in line with the historical context, was one focused on militarism. 
 
A Crusade Against Terrorism 
 Accordingly a narrative that might be described as Crusade Against Terrorism is 
identifiable.  The foundations are laid before September 11th for its later application.  It 
appears in the following passage by Bill Clinton: 
 
In this day, no campaign for peace can succeed without a determination 
to fight terrorism.  Let our actions today send this message loud and 
clear: There are no expendable American targets.  There will be no 
sanctuary for terrorists.  We will defend our people, our interests and our 
values.  We will help all faiths, in all parts of the world, who want to live 
free of fear and violence.  We will persist and we will prevail.  (Clinton, 
1998a) 
 
This is his address to the nation following the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan in 
response to the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.  It is a time where terrorism is 
emerging in representations as a more prominent Threat, and where al Qaeda is being 
more widely discussed.  The Crusade narrative, in combination with the various 
discourses, allowed the military action to be given added credibility.   
 
Another important narrative also comes through here - Inevitability of Victory.  
This appears in the final sentence where the phrase ‘we will prevail’, which becomes 
common post-September 11th, demonstrates a confidence in the ultimate success of this 
war, or Crusade Against Terrorism.  This is closely related to Exceptionalism.  In this 
interpretation, the God given superiority of America, and all that it represents, must 
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surely be destined to succeed, just as in the Second World War and in the Cold War.  
All these links become relevant in supporting this narrative, which in turn reinforces 
them. 
 
The Crusade narrative is extremely important, occurring in more documents than 
any other (60%) (Figure 4.11).  Although it starts off relatively moderately in relation to 
the others before September 11th (Figure 4.12), this event leads to it being the most 
common narrative thereafter (apart from 2002 when it is slightly behind Freedom) 
(Figures 4.13, 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16).   
 
Inevitability of Victory also follows this pattern, unsurprising given the close 
connection between the two.  It starts off being the least common narrative (Figure 
4.12), and then after September 11th becomes the third most common (Figure 4.13), 
after that, it is generally the fifth (Figures 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16).  These changes in 
relative position reflect a dramatic increase in both narratives after September 11th.
Figure 4.18 
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This is shown in the comparative graph in Figure 4.18. From little over 30% 
Crusade increases to over 60%; at the same time Inevitability of Victory changes from 
around 10% to over 50%.  This demonstrates how the negativity and Threat constructed 
after the attacks leads to a great concentration on a crusading response, one that will 
‘naturally’ be successful given America’s God given role on the side of ‘good’.   Once 
established this need for a Crusade continues to be reinforced as the Iraq war 
Isolationism and Interventionism: the Geopolitical Codes of America’s Crusade for Freedom 
167
approaches and thereafter, the narrative showing a steady increase (Figure 4.18).  
Inevitability of Victory stabilizes over the same period (Figure 4.18), given that it is 
more implicit being derived from the American identity. 
 
When the supposed Threat is realized so dramatically it requires a response, not 
now to challenge and reduce the Threat, but as an act of justice or revenge for the 
attack.  Thus: 
 
Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there.  It will 
not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, 
stopped and defeated. (Bush, 2001d)6
As the narrative of Crusade7 appears to make ‘sense’, it supports a military response.  
Hence, the Afghanistan conflict could be easily justified and understood as part of the 
‘necessary’ and ‘legitimate’ Crusade against terrorism and against ‘evil’.  Gregory 
(2004) encapsulates the process as follows: ‘The first move was to identify al-Qaeda 
with Afghanistan – to fold the one into the other – so that it could become the object of 
a conventional military campaign.’ (p.49).  This corresponds with the spatial 
characterization of the outside and the East: ‘Afghanistan is clearly a wild zone, a 
source of terror and danger beyond the fringes of civilization where wanted terrorists 
seek refuge and friends among warriors lurking beyond the reach of law and order.’ 
(Dalby, 2003, p.73).  The military action would constitute revenge for the attacks and, it 
was argued, at the same time reduce the remaining Threat. 
 
The narrative of Crusade was also applied when talking about Iraq, once it had 
been bundled into the general Threat alongside terrorism.  The Crusade in Iraq is, 
though, only part of the wider Crusade Against Terrorism, focused on the whole of the 
Middle East.  Bush again makes the argument through the East/West discourse when 
talking to a military audience in California: 
 
A free and peaceful Iraq is an important part of winning the war on 
terror.  A free Iraq will no longer be a training ground for terrorists, will 
 
6 Bush is addressing a joint session of Congress. 
7 This was a controversial term when used after September 11th, given its connections with the Christian 
crusades.  Its use was therefore abandoned, but the implications of the narrative still apply even if the 
word itself is not often used. 
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no longer supply them with money or weapons.  A free Iraq will help to 
rid the Middle East of resentment and violence, and radicalism.  A free 
Iraq will show all nations of the region that human freedom brings 
progress and prosperity.  By working for peace and stability in the 
Middle East we’re making America, and future generations of 
Americans, more secure. (Bush, 2003) 
 
There are elements, in this representation, of Huntington’s (1996) ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’.  Huntington asserts that Muslim countries are becoming destabilized, and 
identifies the East as the principal Threat to the West, in an Orientalist manner.  This 
Threat from the East – the Muslim East – that Huntington points to is replicated in the 
representations of American policy-makers.   
 
Aysha (2003) has argued that Huntington’s concept reflects his realist concern 
for the coherence of the United States.  By constructing an Eastern enemy, through a 
clash of civilizations, an internal clash is avoided as the ‘Self’ becomes united against 
the threatening ‘Other’.  Boggs (2002) argues that: 
 
‘In order to justify wartime mobilization for a period of many years or 
even decades, moreover, the system demands ongoing patriotic and 
militaristic legitimation – a dynamic that, for the US, was already well 
under way in the aftermath of 11 September.’ (p.250). 
 
In the logic disseminated by the American leadership, a Crusade on the outside must be 
waged to protect the inside from suffering the same disorder and absence of Freedom 
that they claim is characteristic beyond their borders, and in the East in particular.  
These ideas connect with earlier geopolitical concepts like ‘rimlands’ and ‘shatterbelts’, 
the Middle East being widely represented in the West as an unstable and violent region 
(Sidaway, 1994, p.358).  This conforms to the American propensity for 
expansionism/interventionism, their Manifest Destiny, and drives a trend towards 
militarism. 
 
A Coalition? 
 The Coalition Against Terrorism narrative is important in that it reveals the 
nature of the relationship between the United States and other states in the American 
worldview.  This relationship is essentially a neorealist one.  While cooperation may be 
useful, or necessary, to achieve some aims of American policy, it is only carried out 
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through alliances of states, and may be restricted to single operations.  Such alliances 
only occur when the aims of the United States converge with those of another state, as 
each is attempting to further its own interests in an anarchical society (Bull, 1977).  
Given that America sees itself as holding a unique role as a leader for the world, guiding 
it to a better future, replicating America itself, it is inclined to work with other states, 
but only when these states are ‘following’ America. 
 
Since before September 11th, the Coalition narrative has been apparent in a 
substantial number of documents.  Indeed, it is the second most widely used narrative 
overall (Figure 4.11).  This reflects its persistent presence in the background where it is 
written into discussions of responses to Threats.  The graph in Figure 4.19 shows how 
the trend is actually for an increase in the proportion of documents in which the 
narrative occurs.  Beginning at over 40%, by 2004 it is in well of 60% of documents.  
The only exception is 2003, when it returns almost to pre-September 11th levels.  This is 
a time when the Iraq war has detached America from most of its main allies, and 
feelings of isolationism and unilateralism may be increased.  Nevertheless even at that 
time nearly half of the documents showed evidence of the Coalition narrative. 
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It is clear though that, according to this narrative, the United States must be the 
leader of the Coalition.  This is not an arrangement in which a consensus is reached, as 
the people ‘chosen’ by God to lead the world and fight on behalf of ‘good’, there is only 
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one way of doing things, and that is the American way.  On the 13th of September 2001, 
a national day of prayer and remembrance, Bush says: 
 
We will use all the resources of the United States and our cooperating 
friends and allies to pursue those responsible for this evil, until justice is 
done. (Bush, 2001b) 
 
This is an American Crusade, continuing its long-term mission.  Consequently, while 
the Coalition may be mentioned frequently, and form an important component in 
constructing the ‘good’ opposition to the terrorists, it is the American role, and 
American virtues, that are always emphasized.  Adopting such a position also allows the 
powerful position that America has in geopolitics to be utilized in the pursuit of 
American interests globally, reinforcing that power. 
 
American Exceptionalism and the Crusade for Freedom 
 Exceptionalism has underpinned the whole American response to September 
11th. America has a self-image that ascribes to it a unique historical role in the world.  It 
is this role, coupled with the strategic concerns of the state, that drives it to 
expansionism in the post-Cold War world and particularly post-September 11th. This is 
presented once again by Wolfowitz in a speech to the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, Asia Security Conference in Singapore, about the Threat of terrorism: 
 
At the beginning of our nation, our founding fathers understood that a 
new nation purchased with toil and blood would have lasting meaning 
only if the character of the nation matched the sacrifice of those who 
fought for its independence.  Only if the independence of that new nation 
were secured on the pillars of justice and freedom.  America is a place 
where people can live free from persecution and fear, where religion is a 
matter of personal conscience, where people may enjoy peace and 
prosperity, safety and security, where they may find God and worship 
him in their own way.  That is what the United States stands for. 
(Wolfowitz, 2002) 
 
Exceptionalism and Freedom narratives are combined here as he sets the United States 
up as the example to the world of what is ‘good’.  Historical references make a 
discursive link to America’s past, and to its founding values.  Wolfowitz alludes to it 
being a country chosen by God to be different from others, to be better.  This gives it an 
historic mission, a Manifest Destiny to follow.  The Crusade Against Terrorism offers 
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another opportunity to advance this cause by bringing Freedom to the world (e.g. in Iraq 
the following year). 
 
Exceptionalism was never a narrative that dominated in the documents, being 
one of the less frequent before September 11th (Figure 4.12), at a rather low level of 
under 30% (Figure 4.20).  The attacks did have the effect of increasing its use, which 
peaked in 2002 at nearly 50%.  This does not mean it lacks importance, as it is crucial to 
the rationale behind the Crusade Against Terrorism, hence the increase after September 
11th. At that time it was one of the top five narratives (Figure 4.13), whereas by 2003 
(Figure 4.15) and 2004 (Figure 4.16), it was the third least frequent.  By that time the 
Crusade appeared to make ‘sense’, and no longer needed to be regularly built into the 
American mission, and the narrative returns to earlier levels again (Figure 4.20). 
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Freedom on the other hand, rises dramatically after September 11th, peaking in 
2002, and subsequently stabilizing at a high level (Figure 4.20).  This is closely related 
to the American value of liberty.  It is the main feature that is said to separate America 
from less enlightened and threatening countries.  Therefore, as the ‘Other’ is 
reproduced, and the argument for a Crusade built, Freedom is emphasized as the 
solution that will bring order and security.  It is ‘good’ as it is part of the American 
state’s character.  Consequently, it becomes the second most common narrative 
following September 11th, then the most common in 2002 (Figure 4.14), when it is used 
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to underpin the argument for war in Iraq, before being third and second in 2003 (Figure 
4.15) and 2004 (Figure 4.16) respectively. 
 
The Freedom narrative is the main component in constructing a fundamentally 
spatial mission.  According to this mission, Freedom must be introduced to the ‘Muslim 
world’ if change is to be achieved, and it is to become ‘better’ like America.  Burke 
(2005) argues that, from the American perspective: ‘Freedom is something America 
brings to the world, for itself and from within itself.  It is not a space in the world to 
which it submits, which binds it or presents any limits, moral, political or ethical.’ 
(p.328).  Freedom, then, is the prerequisite for order, which in turn removes the 
‘breeding ground’ for terrorism.  America represents ‘civilization’ whereas the terrorists 
represent ‘chaos’.  Thus:  
 
‘The strategy of the Bush administration was, once again, to present 
the United States as the world – the “universal nation” articulating 
universal values – and the war on Iraq became another front in its 
continuing fight against “enemies of civilization”: terrorists, tyrants, 
barbarians.’ (Gregory, 2004, p.195). 
 
Such representations provided the lens through which Iraq and the war were seen by 
American policy-makers.  President Bush reflects: 
 
We’ll defeat people there so we don’t have to face them here, but a free 
Iraq in the midst of the Middle East is going to be a transforming 
event.  This is a part of the world where people – the people are 
desperate for freedom.  This is a part of the world where people – 
they’re frustrated, the deep resentments because they’re not free.  We, 
in America, believe everybody deserves to be free.  We believe it’s the 
Almighty God’s gift to every man and woman on Earth – freedom. 
(Bush, 2004)8
In an Orientalist fashion, the narrative of Freedom runs through every discussion of the 
East, and the need for change there.  From this passage we can also see elements of the 
Exceptionalism narrative, in that Freedom is defined as a gift from God.  It is a gift that 
America has been given that is inextricably linked with its unique position.  The 
implication is that by making the East free, America is doing God’s work, which is 
reinforced by the idea that America is ‘good’ and the terrorists are ‘evil’. 
 
8 This speech was given to the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America in Las Vegas. 
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The roots of this concept in Enlightenment thought, and Orientalism, are 
explained by Burke (2005) who notes a: 
 
‘…crucial feature of freedom in the American enlightenment: its 
Eurocentric and Orientalist nature.  Freedom is something the East lacks, 
and it will be achieved not by the agency of its own people, or by the 
upwelling of some genuinely universal; human aspiration, but by the 
particular application of American pressure and force.’ (p.333). 
 
Therefore, through the American worldview, the Middle East is lacking in Freedom.  By 
helping the people of the East to achieve Freedom like America, the United States can 
fulfill its destiny (and strengthen its power in the region).  The development of these 
narratives consequently supports the Crusade narrative.  Not only is it necessary for the 
reduction of Threat, but also to continue the longstanding mission of America to deliver 
Freedom to the world. 
 
Conclusion 
The geopolitical codes of the United States are engaged in a process of continual 
change responding to, and influencing reality and powerful actors.  They are not 
independent from factors that have influenced American worldviews in the past.  
Although in the early stages of the formation of the United States, policy-makers 
perceived that their country would not operate as European states did, the United States 
is nevertheless a (neo)realist state.  The values on which it was built, and the self-image 
that was forged from these, grew out of Enlightenment thinking just as the (neo)realist 
state did. 
 
During the Cold War the United States was locked in a neorealist conflict with 
the Soviet Union.  The geopolitical codes formed in response to the realities of this 
situation and through which interpretations of events were made, did not immediately 
disappear at the end of the Cold War.  They were instead part of a continuing evolution 
built upon earlier experiences such as the foundation of the nation and two World Wars.  
Consequently, the post-Cold War world was understood not through a completely new 
discursive structure, but through discourses already constructed during the Cold War 
and earlier.  The outside was represented as disordered, reinforcing the idea of the 
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ordered inside.  This gave credence to the construction of a range of new Threats that 
would ‘obviously’ ‘grow’ amidst the disorder. 
 
The terrorist attacks of September 11th allowed the Threat to be clarified and 
enhanced.  Drawing on familiar discourses of Positive/Negative and Good/Evil, the 
terrorists were separated from the good ‘Self’ in a process of othering that made them 
completely repugnant and dehumanized.  Again this was a familiar process that had 
been applied to previous enemies, and indeed involved discursive links to these enemies 
to reinforce the idea.  In so doing the new terrorist Threat became part of a long-term 
series of Threats to the American ‘Self’ that had to be challenged as part of America’s 
God-given mission.  All the Threats came from the same source and had the same 
negative characteristics; they were in effect all part of the same evil ‘Other’. 
 
In this context, the introduction of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Rogue 
State narratives back into the discussion of Threats, alongside terrorism, allowed these 
to be linked discursively into the single Threat.  Adding these new elements to terrorism 
made the Threat even more threatening and gave policy-makers an opportunity to draw 
states into the discussion in an ‘axis of evil’.  In particular, Iraq became prominent in 
discussions of the Threat, and an implied link to terrorism became an ‘obvious’, and 
established, connection between al-Qaeda, Iraq and WMD. 
 
The response to the ‘Threat’ made ‘sense’ when understood through this 
discourse, and also when taken in the context of the factors influencing American 
foreign policy.  That response was a Crusade Against Terrorism.  Although, particularly 
before September 11th, legal measures were often discussed as a solution, after the 
attacks the Threat was constructed in such a way as military responses and militarism 
could be justified, including the Iraq war.  Throughout, the implication, through a 
narrative of Inevitability of Victory, was that America would ultimately defeat the ‘evil’ 
‘Other’ just as it had its previous incarnations.  This made ‘sense’, as the United States 
was on the side of God; it could not fail to succeed. 
 
While it was possible to work with others on occasions to achieve their aims, 
Coalitions must be led by America and follow American values as it represents ‘good’ 
and its purity must not be threatened.  The isolationist element of the ‘Self’ advocates 
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America acting unilaterally so as not to be swayed from the ‘right’ course and from 
fulfilling its destiny.  Thus, the coalition is a loose, and fundamentally neorealist, one 
based on state self-interest. 
 
At the root of all of this is the belief that America is Exceptional and unique.  It 
is different from any other state in the role it has, and the mission God has given it.  
This has impacted on foreign policy since the beginning of the state, and an 
Exceptionalism narrative continued to be written into representations of terrorism and 
the responses to it.  This supported the Crusade as part of America’s effort to spread its 
superior values around the world.   What the United States supposedly represents, both 
as a state, and as a space within its boundaries, is liberty.  By expanding this through the 
introduction of Freedom to more of the world, it is argued that, the conditions for Threat 
to develop are removed.  Order is brought to the disorder and the breeding grounds are 
eliminated. 
 
From this we can identify an American discursive structure in relation to 
terrorism.  At the bottom of the structure are the narratives.  These have a two-way 
relationship with discourse and with each other (Figure 4.21).  Thus, Exceptionalism 
and Freedom are closely associated as has been shown, but in turn these make sense 
through binary discourse as the positive side reinforces the idea that these are virtues.  
Likewise the emphasis on such virtues in the narratives reproduces the binary discourse.  
Narratives relating to the negativity of terrorists (Organic, WMD, and Rogue State) 
achieve the same effect for the other side of binary discourse and support the positive 
narratives in this way.  Similarly narratives of responses (Law, Coalition, Crusade and 
Inevitability of Victory) make sense only in the context of Threat, but their repetition 
reinforces this discourse. 
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Figure 4.21 
Diagram of the American Discursive Structure 
 
The discourses themselves can be thought of as nested, in that they operate on 
different layers.  Immediately above the narratives lie the discourses most closely 
associated with terrorism.  The next layer is slightly more distant though no less 
important.  Here the binary discourses are very closely related.  Each reinforces the 
other while also linking with the layers below.  They are more widely applied but no 
less relevant, and can connect to other historic structures and events, and so make 
‘sense’ of new events in the context of earlier occurrences.   
 
The top layer is the most general.  Identity/Difference is the binary that runs 
through the whole structure.  Each of the binaries below is ultimately understood 
through this.  The identity of the ‘Self’ is established in comparison to, the construction 
of, a negative ‘Other’.  All other binaries make the same comparison and reproduce the 
difference between a positive side and a negative side, which goes on to underpin the 
narratives that are directly discussing people and events.  This diagram may 
oversimplify the relationships between different discourses and narratives, but it is 
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worth considering if only to emphasize that they are all related and cannot be considered 
in isolation. 
 
Through this structure, the American geopolitical codes are constructed and 
‘make sense’, understandings of terrorism are produced, and responses generated.  The 
geopolitical code operates at the national and global scale in the same way as the factors 
influencing it.  At the national scale it requires that America be protected from 
dangerous ‘Others’ originating on the outside.  This is not a purely physical protection 
but one that defends the space as well as the people from contamination.  The values of 
liberty, republicanism and individualism that were spread across North America by the 
colonizers must not be threatened.  There is, therefore, an isolationist tendency that is 
focused on the national scale; America’s Exceptionalism demands that it keep apart 
from those on the inferior outside in order to protect the national ‘Self’.   
 
The logic of the geopolitical code at the global scale is that there should be 
another wave of expansionism.  While this combines with isolationism in terms of 
rejecting deep, restricting alliances, it nevertheless demands an engagement in the 
disordered world to deliver Freedom and the values of America, and in turn remove the 
grounds for new Threats like terrorism.  Doing so is part of America’s mission and of its 
Manifest Destiny as it continues to fight ‘evil’ and eliminate the Threats to the ‘Self’.  
Hence, this geopolitical code simultaneously achieves both the aim of protecting the 
chosen homeland of America, and allows the American people to fulfill their historic 
mission of leading the world to a ‘better’ future. 
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Chapter 5
. . . . . . .
Atlanticism and Europeanism?  Competing 
Codes in Post-Cold War Britain 
. . . . . . . .
Introduction 
 Britain is often considered to be the European country closest to the United 
States, and yet at the same time it is a member of the European Union and therefore a 
part, if reluctantly at times, of the integration and regionalization processes that have 
been occurring in Europe.  The unique place that Britain has, attempting to be both 
European and to have a ‘special relationship’ with the United States, makes it an 
interesting example, and one that will be crucial in exploring the connections between 
regionalization and the construction of codes in the post-Cold War world.  This state-
centred focus is again a function of the critical realist approach.  As I discussed in 
relation to the United States, this allows spatial and temporal changes in codes to be 
included in the analysis.  Thus, the historical and political factors that make the British 
state unique cannot be separated from the discourses and narratives. 
 
The evolution of geopolitical codes that was identified in the previous chapter is 
also apparent in the British case.  However, whereas in America this is a process that 
can be said to occur at two scales – the national and the global – in the British case a 
third scale must be considered – the regional.  The possibility must be researched of 
geopolitical codes developing at the intersection of these three scales as a result of the 
factors present at each of them.  Geopolitical codes are the subject of change over time 
in response to changes in the factors at each scale at which they are applied. 
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Consequently, I shall begin the chapter by discussing the historical and political 
factors that define the British context, and contribute to its evolving codes.  This will 
start with the factors present at the national scale, those that have historically 
contributed to the idea of what Britain represents.  The next set of factors is at the global 
scale and has, and continues to, influence British representations of its place/role in the 
world.  Finally, I address the intermediate regional scale, identifying the main factors 
providing a context for code formation at this level, potentially setting it apart from the 
American example. 
 
This historical and political context will provide the starting point for discussing 
the discourses that emerge from an analysis of contemporary material as produced by 
important political actors.  As with the United States, these discourses were 
Identity/Difference, Self/Other, Order/Disorder, Inside/Outside, East/West, 
Positive/Negative, Good/Evil and Threat.  While they have been given the same names 
and are very similar to those of the United States, they are not identical, demonstrating 
nuances produced by the British context in which they are reproduced, and the related 
British narratives with which they are interconnected.  These will be examined in this 
chapter.  As with America, the defining of binary discourse is an essential part of the 
construction of the sovereign state and specifically of the British state as different from, 
and superior to, other states and especially its enemies.  As a territorial sovereign state 
the differentiation of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ is essential to the territoriality that defines it.  
Thus, these discourses are not new so much as (re)formed in the context of new events 
and new ‘Others’, they are nevertheless repeatedly invoked in the continual 
establishment of Britain as a sovereign state.  The geopolitical codes constructed 
through these discourses are therefore made in the context of such binary 
understandings. 
 
Eleven narratives have been identified in the British documents and are 
discussed in this chapter.  These are as follows: Freedom, Organic, Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Rogue State, War Against Terrorism, History, Global Player, Coalition, 
European Unity, American Alliance and Global Community.  As with the discourses, 
some demonstrate similarities with American narratives but are subtly different in line 
with the British context, others that were found in British documents are new reflecting 
the particular construction of the British ‘Self’, including its regional experience in the 
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European Union and its historic experiences as a major power.  The weaving together of 
these narratives impacts upon the reproduction of discourse and underpins particular 
British representations and ultimately the construction of geopolitical codes.  Again, this 
helps to ground the positive image of the (British) ‘Self’ and the negative and 
threatening image of the ‘Other’ in the present situation, and in so doing reproduces the 
binary divisions that define the very idea of the state. 
 
Beginning in a similar way to the American chapter, the first discourse analysis 
section looks at the use of binary discourse to (re)produce the idea of a threatening 
‘Other’ in the post-Cold War period.  This involves a clear spatial construct, 
reemphasising the distinction between the inside and the outside, order and disorder, 
East and West, separating the ‘Self’ from the dangerous ‘Other’.  I then discuss the 
focus on terrorism after September 11th, and how this was constructed as a specific and 
dangerous Threat, particularly through a British Good/Evil binary.  Following from this 
is the same bundling of Threats from terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction and 
Rogue States that was seen in America, but in a British context.   
 
Moving on to the British response, I define a narrative of ‘War against 
Terrorism’.  The remaining sections deal with how British policy-makers envision this 
‘war’ being carried out, and the British place in this.  The British self-image of its 
historical and global status is examined, before a discussion of the British perspective of 
a Coalition.  This leads on to an analysis of the place of Europe in British 
representations, and then a section on the attempts to reconcile this with the state-to-
state Atlantic Alliance.  Finally, the narrative of a ‘Global Community’ is identified as a 
central component of British attempts to meet the challenges posed by new non-state 
actors, and to retain a role for the country in the post-Cold War world.   
 
The combination of the factors that separate Britain from its American allies, 
and from its fellow European Union members, and the results of the discourse analysis, 
should facilitate the definition of its geopolitical codes.  Concluding the chapter, I will 
make connections from these codes back to the British historical and political context in 
which they are formed, demonstrating how this leads to codes that are separate from 
those of other states, even those that have much in common. 
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Construction of Geopolitical Codes: The British Context 
 The construction of Britain as a state-nation has been a difficult and often 
contested process, due to its creation from the fusion of four component parts.  The state 
lacks a single constitutional document or founding revolution around which an idea of 
the ‘self’ can be constructed.1 It is, as Colley (1992) puts it, ‘an invented nation’ (p.5). 
However, certain values and historical events can, nevertheless, be identified that 
contribute to the concept of a unique British ‘Self’.  In terms of the national mythology, 
these have been applied through colonialism in the British Empire at a global scale, and 
continue to be championed by Britain as a global actor, while at a regional scale they 
are put forward as an ideal model for the operation of the European Union.  Hence, it is 
possible to loosely divide the factors that influence the construction of geopolitical 
codes into three scales at which they act upon/with the representations (Table 5.1).  It 
should be noted that these are not exclusive; the factors combine and connect with each 
other across, and within scales. 
Table 5.1 
Factors Influencing British Geopolitical Codes 
National Regional Global 
Liberalism 
Freedom and Liberty 
Commercialism 
Island Nation 
Continental Threat – 
(Germany/France) 
Soviet Threat 
European Integration 
Colonial Legacy  
Globalism  
Great Power  
Bridging Role 
Atlantic Alliance 
The fundamental strands of ‘Britishness’ emerge from Enlightenment thinking.  
It was this form of thought, of course, that gave rise to the realist state itself, as was 
explained in chapter two.  This was considered, in modernist terms, to be the result of 
progress, an improved form of social organization.  As Harvey (1989) said, modernism 
promised to free people from irrationality and ‘arbitrary use of power’ (p.12).  The 
modern British state came into being during the period that Enlightenment reasoning 
was taking hold in Europe.  These modernist ideas, therefore, became central to the 
evolving British state, and construction of the national ‘Self’. 
 
1 The act of union between Scotland and England in 1707 might be considered to be an appropriate 
event/document in these terms; however it had already been preceded by the union of the crowns and was 
not a constitution as such.  Furthermore, Wales had already been conquered by England, and Ireland 
would not join the Union for nearly another hundred years.  It was therefore a rather convoluted process 
that formed the new British state. 
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As such, Murdoch (1998) argues that: 
 
‘…there was a British Enlightenment, because it was a movement about 
the expansion of culture and realisation of human achievement, founded 
on an admiration of the personal liberty and security possible in the 
commercial societies of Holland and England by the late seventeenth 
century, re-exported and revised a generation later by continental 
intellectuals as part of their own struggle against absolutist government.’ 
(p.104). 
 
The Enlightenment in Britain, therefore, produced a society presented as enshrining 
greater freedoms than the feudal order it had replaced.  While the monarchy remained in 
Britain, government came to be increasingly dominated by parliament while, as 
Murdoch points out, personal freedoms and economic freedoms grew, for some at least, 
as the country entered the industrial revolution. 
 
These ‘British values’ can be placed under the general heading of Liberalism; 
this is the first factor at the national scale (Table 5.1).  Mandler (2005) describes what 
this meant for the state: 
 
‘Liberalism did involve a distinctive configuration of power, one in 
which power was more widely diffused throughout society, and not 
concentrated in the state.  It also entailed, partly as a consequence, a 
distinctive pattern of national belonging, one which was not so attached 
to or generated by the state.’ (p.354). 
 
While this diffusion of power should not be exaggerated, or used to produce an 
idealized picture of British society at this time, it is the role in the production of national 
belonging, and therefore in the imagining of the ‘Self’, which is of particular 
importance.  This contributes to how British geopolitical codes and foreign policies 
developed through the creation of the Empire onwards. 
 
In this regard, Barker (1994) comments: 
 
‘When a commanding position in Europe was combined with a 
command of empire across and around the world, Britain could appear 
to itself as the source rather than destination of political thought, 
exporting liberalism, progressivism, or constitutionalism in intellectual 
free trade or free benefaction.’ (p.5). 
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Perhaps few of the subjects of the British Empire would agree that it was liberal and 
progressive, however from the perspective of Britain, and its construction of national 
identity, this concept could be combined with the realities of power and Empire to 
create a sense of the ‘Self’, as Barker says, it ‘could appear to itself’. 
 
In common with liberalism, freedom and liberty (Table 5.1), acted as 
components of the emerging British ‘Self’.  May (1999) argues that: ‘War, religion, 
empire, prosperity and parliamentary “freedom” combined to forge a widespread and 
active “British” patriotism, which defined itself largely by opposition to the culture of 
continental Europe.’ (p.1).  Freedom is expressed here in terms of parliament, and it was 
noted by Barker that constitutionalism was a feature of the British self-image.  This is a 
crucial part of the construction of the British ‘Self’.  It was of course far from 
democratic at this time, but it is the idea that has greater importance in the construction 
of the British state-nation rather than the reality. 
 
Economic liberalism was also a feature of the British approach to the world.  
The primary aim was to enrich Britain itself, even if it was represented as more widely 
beneficial.  Smellie (1962) says: 
 
‘With the fact of sea power went a complex system of ideas about the 
economic and political facts of life – what one may call the liberal 
philosophy of life, at once the glory and the ruin of the British peace.   It 
had two main elements, the doctrine of free trade and the aim of self-
government for all people on earth.’ (p.252). 
 
Free trade and economic liberalism, were therefore seen by powerful actors as being 
beneficial to Britain.  In turn economic liberalism could be written into the national 
mythology as part of the liberalism that Britain supposedly represented, alongside 
political liberalism, which included the notion of self-government.  However, this was 
more conditional than Smellie’s passage indicates, as only those whom Britain deemed 
to be ready were to be given such a privilege. 
 
This liberal concept of free trade is a central component of commercialism, or 
commercial spirit (Table 5.1).  So important was it, that it was a major determinant for 
British geopolitical codes in the 19th century, underpinning a determination not to 
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become embroiled in conflict on the European continent in order to protect British 
commercial and trading interests around the world.  Porter (1987) argues: ‘In the 1840s 
and 1850s as well as in the 1860s, and despite appearances to the contrary, Britain was 
never likely to become involved in a European conflict, unless she was attacked directly 
herself or on her commercial frontiers.’ (p.27).  Understood through these codes, 
commercial interests were a reality that had to be protected for the continued prosperity 
of the country.  However this also fed into the representations that made commercialism 
a defining British characteristic. 
 
Vital to the construction of separation or difference from continental Europeans 
is the physical barrier that the sea provides between ‘them’ and ‘us’.  Yet again reality 
and representations are inextricably linked.  Reynolds (1991) puts it thus: 
 
‘…the Channel is a psychological as much as a physical barrier.  In an 
era of seapower the “moat defensive” permitted greater security at lower 
cost than that enjoyed by continental states.  In 1940 it was of critical 
importance for Britain’s survival, and the experience divided Britain 
from continental Europe for a generation.  In the post-seapower era the 
Channel has become progressively irrelevant to security, while at the 
same time proving a major obstacle to economic integration within the 
emerging European economy.’ (p.304). 
 
The lack of land borders with other states allowed Britain to stand apart from many 
conflicts in Europe and concentrate instead on developing commercial links around the 
world.  The idea of Britain as an island, rather than just a state, is therefore extremely 
important in defining the ‘Self’, and is closely linked with idealized notions of a 
maritime nation.  It is part of a constructed image of the ‘Self’, which maps the channel 
as a boundary defining the difference from the continental ‘Other’.  This has roots in 
reality drawing upon particular experiences, the most recent of which was the Second 
World War.  The ‘Island Nation’ concept completes the set of factors operating at the 
national scale (Table 5.1). 
 
At the global scale the first factor is the colonial legacy (Table 5.1).  
Colonialism has been closely interwoven with the construction of the British ‘Self’, and 
of British geopolitics in the past, and continues to have resonance in the present.  The 
process of colonization ‘sited’ large parts of the world as colonies, formal or otherwise, 
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of Britain, represented as the liberal power ‘improving’ the world.  This application of 
power to ‘geo-graph’ the world through colonization is demonstrated by the practices of 
the colonial geographer Halford Mackinder.  Ó Tuathail (1996) explains that: ‘To the 
British Foreign Office, The Royal Geographical Society (RGS), and aspirant 
professional geographers, the interior of “British East Africa” was a territory in need of 
in-sight/site/cite-ment.’ (p.81).  In line with this: ‘The purpose of Mackinder’s 
expedition to Mount Kenya was to write on this blank page, to focus a British scientific 
and imperial eye on the region and thereby in-sight/site/cite it.’ (p.81).  Hence, 
colonialism was a means by which the, supposedly superior, British ‘Self’ could apply 
the progress of the Enlightenment to a wider world, simultaneously exploiting it in 
British interests.   
 
Influential individuals like Mackinder reproduced the discourses of imperialism 
in the public consciousness to reinforce and normalize the practices of Empire.  Thus, Ó 
Tuathail argues that Mackinder’s geography was: ‘…an incitement of an imperial 
imagination, a challenge to ordinary people to think of their interests in global terms.’ 
(p.109).  Colonialism could become accepted as a ‘natural’ practice for a country that 
was understood to encapsulate liberal values, and seek commercial opportunities.  For 
Britain, Empire was an ‘obvious’ extension of its values and interests. 
 
The Empire did not unravel completely following the Second World War, 
allowing British imperialists to retain a sense that Britain could continue to have a 
global role through this mechanism.  Porter (1987) explains: 
 
‘It was in any case perfectly possible to regard India (and Ceylon and 
Burma, who left at about the same time) as being quite apart from any 
dominant trend, and not at all the forerunner of an overall imperial 
decline.  Many imperialists had already cut their Indian losses some time 
before, and centred their imperial ambitions in Africa, where most of the 
dynamic imperialism of the 1940s and the 1950s was taking place.’ 
(p.116). 
 
The implication is that despite the loss of some colonies, British geopolitical codes still 
retained an imperial focus.  As Said (1978) showed in his discussion of Orientalism, 
discourses of imperialism allowed the process of colonization to be understood as one in 
which the ‘Other’ was inferior and in need of improvement.  For Britain, if this could be 
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accomplished to a sufficient level, it made ‘sense’ that they should be given a degree of 
self-government, while remaining within the British sphere of influence. 
 
The impact of the Suez crisis was considerable in terms of the perception of 
Britain’s place in the world, and how geopolitical codes would be adapted and 
constructed in the future.  Reynolds (1991) notes that: 
 
‘British policymakers had known for years of their underlying 
weaknesses, but the public image, accentuated by 1940, 1945 and post-
war recovery, was of a country that was still a major power.  For an 
Egyptian ex-colonel to twist the lion’s tail and get away with it, was a 
palpable and lasting blow to national self-esteem and international 
prestige.’ (p.205). 
 
By the time of Suez the reality of decline was already becoming apparent even if the 
codes had not fully adapted to the circumstances.  This is a reflection of the relationship 
between discourse and reality that Agnew and Corbridge (1995) identified.  The 
representation of Britain as a major power persisted despite the changing realties, only 
when events undermined these interpretations were the discourses and geopolitical 
codes reinterpreted to accommodate the country’s weakened position.  The rapid 
decolonization that followed in the years after Suez, while not necessarily a 
consequence, can perhaps be taken as evidence of these changes finally affecting policy. 
 
The components of the British ‘Self’ underpinned a belief by many that Britain 
should have a global role (Table 5.1, column 3).  Globalism became enshrined in 
dominant understandings of what Britain was, and its role in the world, such that in the 
post-War world: 
 
‘The conviction that Britain should maintain a world role, independent 
of the United States, was exhibited by an imperial determination to 
remain ensconced in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.  At the same 
time, Churchill and Eden instinctively distanced themselves from 
European integration and refused to become fully constrained by 
membership of NATO.’ (White, 1999, p.29). 
 
Even with a decline in Britain’s relative power at this time, the influence of globalism 
was still important in the evolution of geopolitical codes.  A regional role in Europe was 
not considered by the powerful actors to be fitting of Britain’s supposed status.  Policies 
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developed that continued with colonialism and distanced the country from Europe, and 
American domination, as much as the reality of the circumstances would allow.  
Therefore, the relevance of the global role goes beyond the purposes of trade, important 
as this was, and encompasses the discourses underlying colonialism and the geopolitical 
codes of the time. 
 
Nevertheless the image of Britain as a Great Power (Table 5.1) was a persistent 
one.  Thus, the transition to an acceptance of diminished influence and power during the 
Cold War was not easy.  Sanders (1990) points out:  
 
‘That a country which by the early 1980s had slipped to twenty-first 
position in the world economic league could still exhibit undiminished 
“Great Power” aspirations was testimony to the hold which “Great 
Power syndrome” continued to exercise over the British government’s 
collective imagination.’ (p.291). 
 
Hence, for Britain, despite the end of empire in a formal sense, the ‘global role’ 
continued as far as the construction of geopolitical codes were concerned. 
 
Attempts to characterize a post-War/post-imperial role have given rise to the 
‘geo-graphing’ of Britain as a link or bridge (Table 5.1) between different world actors.  
Imagining such a role ‘…Churchill observed that there were “three great circles among 
the free nations and democracies”: the British Empire, the “English speaking world”, 
and “United Europe”.’ (May, 1999, p.9).  Most prominent in the English speaking world 
is of course the United States, while United Europe was not at this time represented as 
including Britain, which, in Churchill’s view, stood apart from each of the three, 
providing the connection between them all.  From the dilemma of positioning Britain 
comes this apparently positive representation of the country as a bridge between the 
three circles: ‘…Churchill’s notion that the British “have the opportunity of joining 
them (the three circles) all together” suggests a sort of freewheeling “bridge building” 
role for Britain, which has been a powerful self-image throughout the postwar period.’ 
(White, 1992, p.9).  It is an attempt to make a virtue out of the difficult situation in 
which the country had found itself, as reality changed, while the influences that drove 
its geopolitical codes in the past remain strong. 
Atlanticism or Europeanism?  Competing Codes in Post-Cold War Britain 
188 
Accompanying the bridging role was the Atlantic Alliance (Table 5.1), or 
‘special relationship’.  It was constructed as a central plank of British Cold War, and 
increasingly post-Cold War, geopolitics.  NATO was the structure upon which this 
alliance was based, and one to which Britain was completely committed: ‘NATO 
confirmed America’s commitment to the defense of western Europe, but it also 
symbolized Britain’s preference for “Atlantic” rather than purely west European 
solutions to the problem of international organization.’ (May, 1999, p.15).  These 
policies were formulated in the context of British discourses of globalism, privileging 
global engagements rather than being restricted to the European scale. 
 
While relations with the United States were not always smooth, there was 
nevertheless an absolute commitment in British policy to keep the Americans involved 
in the defence of Europe in light of the perceived threat from the Soviet ‘Other’ 
occupying Mackinder’s ‘pivot area’.  White (1992) explains: 
 
‘To the extent that the United States had “saved” Britain, it was crucially 
necessary to postwar British security to retain that relationship at the 
centre of policy.  Growing perceptions of a major Soviet threat after 
1946 only served to underline this imperative.’ (p.13). 
 
Furthermore, Bartlett (1989) emphasizes just how central the Atlantic Alliance had 
become for the post-War Labour government: ‘By 1950 Bevin was arguing that 
Britain’s policy in Europe should be guided essentially by what she needed to do in 
order to satisfy the United States.  The American connection had become the “kernel” 
of British foreign policy.’ (p.81).  British policy was guided by its long-term geopolitics 
that pointed to global engagements and staying apart from Europe.  Great Power status 
continued to be an objective that, in the context of the discourses of the state, may be 
understood to have been threatened by integrating with Europe.  America, on the other 
hand, appeared to policy-makers to offer an association protecting Britain’s position, 
and conforming to its liberal and commercial heritage. 
 
The first of the regional factors (Table 5.1) is the ‘threat’ thought to emanate 
from the continent, particularly in the form of Germany in the two World Wars, but 
prior to that from France.  In the 18th and 19th centuries, it was France that was the 
principal ‘threat’ in the construction of British geopolitical codes.  This, Colley (1992) 
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argues, was vital in the ‘invention’ of the British ‘Self’: ‘Time and time again, war with 
France brought Britons, whether they hailed from Wales or Scotland or England, into 
confrontation with an obviously hostile Other and encouraged them to define 
themselves collectively against it.’ (p.5).  This was the first continental ‘Other;’ 
threatening the British ‘Self’, but in the early to mid 20th century it was rapidly 
superseded by Germany. 
 
Germany was the focus for the construction of an intermittent sense of threat.  
Referring to the period following the First World War, Reynolds (1991) says: 
 
‘With Germany defeated, re-establishing Britain’s global position was 
more important than commitments across the channel.  Here geography 
was fundamental: France had only a land border with Germany – a 
country with 50 per cent more people and four times France’s heavy 
industry.  For island Britain, by contrast, once the German fleet had been 
eliminated, Germany posed very little threat.’ (p.116). 
 
The idea of the ‘island nation’ was therefore crucial to the way in which the German 
threat was understood in British geopolitics; as long as the sea could be controlled by 
Britain, Germany was of relatively little importance.  This changed with the arrival of 
aircraft in the Second World War but the sense of isolation still gave Britain a 
physiological, and indeed practical, protection.  After the Second World War the 
significance of the German threat was restricted to the historical legacy of holding out 
against invasion.  Instead, the Soviet Union appeared to British policy-makers to be a 
far more urgent focus for their attention. 
 
Representations of the Soviet threat (Table 5.1) encompassed not only invasion, 
but also the new menace of nuclear weapons, and was consequently less restricted by 
the sea barrier, and potentially more destructive.  Britain had been weakened by the war 
with Germany and, while it still sought Great Power status, was no longer in a position 
to contemplate engaging with this apparently new threat alone.  Hence: ‘As a direct 
response to this perceived threat Britain sought both to strengthen its political and 
military ties with Western Europe and to convince the United States that it should join 
the Europeans and underwrite their collective defence.’ (Sanders, 1990, p.71).  The 
reality of Britain’s weakened position necessitated policy changes that involved closer 
cooperation with other European states and attempts to use the United States to provide 
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protection to Britain and protect the ‘Rimland’, continuing the close alliance of the war, 
as already discussed.   
 
By tying itself closely to the United States in this way, Britain became locked 
into the Western side of the Cold War binary identified by Sharp (2000) and Dalby 
(1990).  The positive West was understood, through this discourse, to be threatened by 
the negative Soviet ‘Other’.  Given these circumstances it made ‘sense’ for the Western 
states to stick together.  This was helpful to Britain given its own declining power.  
Indeed, Britain was itself a crucial player in the geopolitical relations that led to the 
Cold War.  Taylor (1990) notes that: ‘At the end of the war, therefore, there were three 
superpowers, not our familiar two… …the Cold War resulted from post-war 
interactions between all three of the wartime Grand Alliance.’ (p.25).  The influence of 
globalism and great power pretensions, and the attraction of an Atlantic Alliance for 
British policy-makers in this respect, was therefore important in driving Britain’s part in 
the evolution of the Cold War, and especially the attempt to move closer to the 
Americans in this. 
 
Although Britain was very close to the United States, adopting a similar 
East/West binary in constructions of the Soviet ‘Other’, British policy included greater 
involvement in Europe as well, representing a continuation of the long-term feature of 
British geopolitics – the dilemma of how much engagement is appropriate on the 
continent.  This, and Britain’s continued global ambitions, independent of the United 
States, means that a picture of Britain as part of a homogeneous West, under the 
influence of America, and in opposition to the Soviets, is too simplistic.  Indeed, 
European integration (Table 5.1) has had an increasingly important part to play in 
British geopolitics.  Simultaneously, Britain’s close relationship with the United States, 
or at least the mythology of the ‘special relationship’, has an effect on its production of 
geopolitical codes. 
 
Although post-War British governments were prepared to commit to European 
cooperation to a limited extent, this did not extend to an enthusiasm for integration of 
the sort envisioned by the founders of the European Communities. 
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‘…Britain was unwilling to forge closer links with Western Europe 
because a close identification with the continent was not consistent with 
the prevailing conception of Britain as a global power, and, moreover, 
policymakers feared that it would damage relations with the Empire and 
Commonwealth.’ (White, 1992, p.14). 
 
British globalism tended to guide policy away from the regional scale, the global scale 
being where a great power ‘should’ be operating, according to these interpretations.  
The Empire and Commonwealth demonstrated to policy-makers, what they believed to 
be, Britain’s continuing ‘greatness’ and global role, therefore, from their perspective, 
these could not be undermined by over-involvement in Europe. 
 
However, the reality of Britain’s relative post-War decline economically, and in 
terms of its power to operate globally, and sustain its Empire, inevitably caught up, and 
the regional option became more attractive as a result.  Accordingly: 
 
‘It seemed to imply a fundamental and permanent reorientation of the 
British conception of “community”, away from the former imperial 
conception of Britain’s world role and towards a new basis for great 
power status as a leading player in an economically dynamic and 
politically united Europe.’ (Ward, 2001, p.158). 
 
The reconstruction of geopolitical codes could not be removed from its historical 
context, and therefore Britain could not be suddenly re-imagined as a purely regional 
actor.  Instead, a more active regional role in Europe could be understood through the 
existing discourses as a means for sustaining the supposed global role, and the status of 
a great power, by gaining influence in a new powerful regional body. 
 
A smooth transition from the earlier vision of Britain’s global role was never 
going to be straightforward given the deeply rooted part that it played in the 
reproduction of the British ‘Self’.  The emerging geopolitical codes were consequently 
troubled by contradictions that impacted negatively upon relations with Europe.  Thus: 
 
‘A consistent pattern has emerged since 1945, however, of British 
governments initially standing aloof from the latest thrust of integration, 
then finding themselves on the sidelines, then being forced to join in 
when the mould has been set and it has been difficult to shape the 
emergent institutions and policies in a form more compatible with 
British interests.’ (May, 1999, p.93). 
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Global influences underpinning constructions of British geopolitics, and policies of 
European integration are consequently difficult to reconcile. 
 
The narrative of American Alliance continues to pull British actors the other 
way as a feature of the global role and difference from Europe that they understand the 
country to have, given the longstanding representations of the British ‘Self’ and the 
continental ‘Other’.  As integration has deepened in the post-Cold War period this 
friction with the geopolitical aspirations of continental neighbours has, if anything, 
intensified, and is apparent in relation to the creation of a Common Foreign and Defense 
Policy: 
 
‘Minimalists, including the United Kingdom (UK) and Denmark, favour 
keeping a strong US presence in Europe.  At the other extreme, 
federalists, headed by France and Benelux, favour supranational CESDP 
[Common European Security and Defence Policy] that excludes the US 
from European security arrangements.’ (Winn, 2003, p.49). 
 
Nevertheless, British policy-makers continue with their attempts to forge geopolitical 
codes that encompass both globalism/Atlanticism and European integration.  This 
uneasy balance is the ultimate product of so many competing forces in British 
geopolitics.  The relative decline of British power has destabilized many of the 
foundations on which earlier codes were built, without removing the assumptions and 
representations of the ‘Self’ to which they contributed.  As Britain has sought to be a 
bridge, particularly between Europe and America, in the post-War period, it continues 
to find it difficult to choose between a global role acting as a sovereign state that its 
self-image and mythology suggest is its right, and a regional role that requires a pooling 
of sovereignty and potentially less independence of action globally. 
 
Post-Cold War: Seeking a New ‘Other’ 
The sudden disappearance of the Soviet enemy in 1989/1990 inevitably had 
consequences for Britain.  Agnew (2001) argues that: 
 
‘It is inadequate to claim, therefore, that world politics can be simply 
understood as “out there”, independent of human thought and practice, 
or as textually driven by perpetually recycled tropes and metaphors.  It is 
the outcome of sociological praxis based on rules, practices, and ideas 
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(including geopolitical discourses) that are not set for all time but change 
as a result of the contingencies of world history.’ (p.45). 
 
Consequently, the discursive structure that had developed to support interpretations of 
the Cold War world was insufficient to cope with the realities of post-Cold War 
geopolitics, and had to evolve and be re-made in response. 
 
Given that Threat was an important Cold War discourse, it persisted, conforming 
to the time lag between changes in reality and discourse identified by Agnew and 
Corbridge (1995).  Following Connolly’s concept of Identity/Difference, a requirement 
exists for an ‘Other’ against which the ‘Self’ can be positively compared.  As in 
America, Identity/Difference is therefore the main discourse that underpins all the other 
binaries in British representations.  Connolly speaks of: ‘…the wish of the self to 
believe that its identity is intrinsically true, therefore to treat those who deviate from it 
as false, hence to look at the other as the source of evil…’ (p.151).  This discourse 
remains from earlier constructions stretching as far back as the emergence of the 
sovereign state.  To construct a British identity, a negative ‘Other’ is created; the 
presence of this binary leads to interpretations suggesting the continuing existence of a 
Threat.  In a similar way to America, it is presented as coming from an array of sources: 
 
Britain must be a key player on major transnational issues; the 
environment, drugs, terrorism, crime, human rights and development.  
Human rights may sometimes seem an abstraction in the comfort of the 
West, but when they are ignored human misery and political instability 
all, too easily follow. (Blair, 1997)2
The imprecise nature of these multiple Threats reinforces their threatening character.  
Drawing on the British liberal and free self-image, through the Order/Disorder binary 
and a narrative of Freedom (this narrative, if less important than in the United States, 
does make a connection with the influential idea of freedom and liberty); the West 
represents order and progress through development and human rights, compared to the 
‘outside’, which is disordered, unstable and inferior.  Said (1978) reflects: ‘In the 
system of knowledge about the Orient, the Orient is less a place than a topos, a set of 
references, a congeries of characteristics…’ (p.177).  Thus, Orientalism, a familiar 
 
2 This quotation comes from a speech by Tony Blair – ‘The Principles of a Modern British Foreign 
Policy’ – at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet. 
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discourse of the Cold War era, and of colonialism, is reproduced again.  Britain, of 
course, has a long history of intervention in the Middle East, both in colonialism and 
more recently, for example in the Gulf War of 1991.  There is thus an established 
Orientalist representation of this part of the world, the very term ‘Middle East’ itself 
being discursively constructed to represent a space of instability, violence and indeed 
terrorism (Sidaway, 1994, p.357).  The binaries of Self/Other, Order/Disorder, 
Inside/Outside and East/West combine and reinforce each other in the construction of 
the new Threats. 
 
Terrorism, is one of the potential Threats.  Britain has had previous experience 
of groups assigned the term ‘terrorist’, groups that have indeed cased terror.  Most 
recently, and perhaps most notably, has been the conflict in Northern Ireland, where for 
around 30 years groups such as the IRA and other republican and loyalist organisations 
carried out attacks in Northern Ireland itself and also on occasions in Britain.  
Representations of terrorist Threats are therefore not unfamiliar in the British context, 
although these terrorists are more closely associated with the ‘inside’ than the newer 
incarnation being discussed here. 
 
The terrorist is represented through the discourse of Positive/Negative.  This 
emphasizes the negativity of the ‘Other’ compared to the positive attributes of the 
British, and Western, ‘Self’.  Blair discussed the terrorist Threat in 1998, at the UN 
General Assembly, as follows: 
 
The past year’s global roll call of terror includes Luxor, Dar es Salaam, 
Nairobi, Omagh and many others.  Each one is a reminder that terrorism 
is a uniquely barbaric and cowardly crime.  Each one is a reminder 
terrorists are no respecters of borders.  Each one is a reminder that 
terrorism should have no hiding place, no opportunity to raise funds, no 
let-up in our determination to bring its perpetrators to justice.  This 
applies to the new phenomenon of stateless terrorism as much as to its 
more familiar forms. (Blair, 1998) 
 
Blair uses real and horrific events to root the Threat from the terrorists in reality, 
making it seem more dangerous. Terrorists are identified as ‘barbarians’ and ‘cowards’, 
separating them from the ‘good’ British and Western people.  Furthermore, they do not 
respect borders and are increasingly ‘stateless’.  Anderson and O’ Dowd (1999) note 
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that: ‘Territoriality, therefore, necessarily produces and focuses attention on borders.  It 
is embodied in the modern, sovereign, “territorial nation-state” and provides the basis of 
the states system in which states claim sovereignty and immunity from outside 
interference within their own borders.’ (p.598).  For terrorists to operate an alternative 
territorial form that does not respect state borders, consequently disrupts the foundations 
of the sovereign state itself.  It is at odds with neorealism, and therefore they are 
potentially undermining and threatening to the state, not just for the acts they carry out, 
but for the way they operate spatially. 
 
Over the period of the study Threat is the most common discourse, as is shown 
in Figure 5.1. The Positive/Negative discourse also appears in more than half the 
documents.  Order/Disorder is the third most frequent, however Inside/Outside, 
Self/Other, Good/Evil and East/West are also apparent at a moderate level.   This 
reflects the strong sense of Threat that is constructed, particularly after September 11th.
Breaking the documents down into five periods reveals more. 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the discourses prior to September 11th. At that time the 
dominant discourse was Inside/Outside, with Threat and Order/Disorder also in over 
40% of documents.  This results from the relatively vague Threat being constructed.  
Immediately after September 11th this changes with a significant increase in Threat, but 
also in Positive/Negative and Good/Evil (Figure 5.3).  The emphasis is on negativity at 
this time, and is therefore more prominent than the source of the danger; consequently 
the binaries that underpin the former dominate.  By 2002 (Figure 5.4) Good/Evil has 
fallen away as the immediate shock has passed, and the Threat begins to be widened.  
Moving into 2003 (Figure 5.5) and 2004 (Figure 5.6), most binaries are reduced, 
though still present to a moderate extent, underpinning the construction of the 
threatening ‘Other’.  This is a reflection of the continued reproduction of the Threat 
from terrorists and Rogue States with WMD, but one that is now more established as a 
product of the disordered outside; the focus by that time was on removing the supposed 
‘danger’.  In 2003 (Figure 5.5), Threat was more frequent than Positive/Negative with 
the positions being reversed in 2004 (Figure 5.6).  2003 was the year when the Iraq war 
began and a Threat from this state was being constructed, by the following year the 
emphasis had moved back to the more general negativity of the terrorist ‘Other’ 
including in Iraq. 
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Figure 5.1 
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Figure 5.3 
 
Occurrence of Discourses in 2001 Post-September 11 (U.K.)
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0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
IO SO GE OD EW TH PN
Discourses
IO – Inside/Outside    OD – Order/Disorder        PN – Positive/Negative
SO – Self/Other          EW – East/West 
 GE – Good/Evil          TH – Threat            
 
IO – Inside/Outside    OD – Order/Disorder        PN – Positive/Negative
SO – Self/Other          EW – East/West 
 GE – Good/Evil          TH – Threat            
Atlanticism or Europeanism?  Competing Codes in Post-Cold War Britain 
198 
Figure 5.5 
 
Occurrence of Discourses in 2003 (U.K.)
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Refining the Threat 
 September 11th immediately made terrorism the focus of constructions of Threat 
in British geopolitics.  The dramatic images and the significance of an attack on the 
American hegemon added substance to the representations.  As in the United States, this 
was a time in which the Threat was made specific to terrorism, and the danger that this 
was alleged to pose was built up.  Powerful individuals made use of the events of 
September 11th to support their negative characterization of terrorists through the same 
binary discourses that were familiar from the past.  As such, the image they constructed 
and warnings of danger they gave, could appear reasonable in the context of the 
discourse, and the real events that were being interpreted through it.  Tony Blair’s 
statement on September 11th is representative of this: 
 
… this mass terrorism is the new evil in our world.  The people who 
perpetrate it have no regard whatever for the sanctity or value of human 
life, and we the democracies of the world, must come together to defeat 
it and eradicate it.  This is not a battle between the United States of 
America and terrorism, but between the free and democratic world and 
terrorism.  We, therefore, here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with 
our American friends in this hour of tragedy, and we, like them, will not 
rest until this evil is driven from our world. (Blair, 2001a) 
 
There is no room for ambiguity; the terrorists are ‘evil’ while ‘we’, in the democratic 
world, are ‘good’.  Good/Evil is an extremely powerful discourse that makes the ‘Other’ 
repugnant and completely at odds with the ‘Self’, but crucially it makes the ‘Other’ 
particularly threatening.  The Positive/Negative discourse works closely with the 
Good/Evil and Self/Other binaries here to reinforce the division.  An American Alliance 
narrative is drawn on to link Britain to the victim and build the idea that ‘we’ have been 
attacked too.  In this regard, the historic notion of a ‘special relationship’ in British 
geopolitics is relevant.  It allows Blair to construct an understanding of the events that 
suggests Britain is effectively under Threat itself; such an association prepares the 
ground for subsequent responses and reaffirms the close political relationship that Blair 
wishes to maintain with the United States. 
 
The Good/Evil discourse is not one of the most common overall (Figure 5.1).  
Figure 5.7 shows how it only appears in a fifth of documents before September 11th, but 
following the attacks it suddenly rises to around 60%.  This is the period when attempts 
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are being made to characterize the terrorists.  However, by 2002 it falls away 
dramatically, and by 2003 and 2004 has returned to the levels of pre-September 11th.
This is related to the way in which the Good/Evil discourse is constructed in British 
geopolitics.  While terrorism is clearly seen as a negative, and indeed threatening, 
activity, carried out by people who are reprehensible and unpredictable, the use of the 
word ‘evil’ has a largely descriptive function.  It is not, as in the United States, 
representing terrorists as in some way agents of the devil with the British on the side of 
God.  This results from the lack of a divinely inspired narrative relating to the ‘Self’. 
Figure 5.7 
The Good/Evil Discourse Over Time (U.K.)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Pre 9/11
01 Post 9/11
2002
2003
2004
Nonetheless, this process of ‘Othering’ is not new in British geopolitics.  Bhatia 
(2005) comments: ‘From the Romans to the British Empire and the present period of 
United Nations-sanctioned territorial administration, the construction of a savage, 
lawless or unordered subject is a noted prerequisite of intervention.’ (p.14).  Indeed, the 
construction of terrorism as a new Threat and ‘Other’ relies on the reproduction of these 
existing discourses and the rhetorical connection with past ‘enemies’.  This creates a 
sense of a continuing impinging ‘evil’ through time. For example, Peter Hain, then 
Minister of State at the Foreign Office, writes in the Guardian newspaper on the 24th of 
September 2001, that: 
 
The values that the terrorists attacked last week were human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law – values that are not western but 
universal.  They are the same values that inspired the British left in the 
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1930s to fight fascism in Spain and oppose appeasement of the Nazis, 
and in the 1970s and 1980s to back liberation struggles in southern 
Africa. (Hain, 2001a) 
 
Britain is presented as being part of a good force that has continually battled against the 
Threats of ‘evil’.  It is a force that is underpinned by the values of liberalism that it has 
supposedly defended over the years.  Hence, this latest Threat from terrorism must, in 
terms of binary discourse, be in the same category as these other enemies from the past.  
The corollary of this negative construction of the terrorist is the (re)construction of the 
positive British ‘Self’.  Ó Tuathail and Dalby (1998) discuss the ‘practices of 
nationhood’ that: ‘…involve ensembles of acts to create nation-space and nation-time, 
the projection of imaginary community, the homogenization of nation-space and 
pedagogization of history.’ (p.3).  Hain draws on a narrative of History that represents a 
positive British past characterized by supposedly great achievement, and a prominent 
role in the world.  This is closely related to the images of greatness and globalism in 
British geopolitics, in addition to the promotion of liberalism that he highlights here.  It 
is worth noting that Hain seems to focus more on the values that he believes Britain 
stands for than Tony Blair who places greater emphasis on the negativity of the ‘Other’, 
a nuance that may reflect differences of individual approach to the issue even within the 
British state’s government, but perhaps also the more ‘left leaning’ audience for whom 
he is writing in this instance. 
 
Despite many examples to the contrary, terrorism is characterized as a non-state 
actor.  Describing this construction, Walters (2004) says that: ‘The enemy is the 
networks, gangs, terrorists which cut across/under borders… …the logic is to unite the 
police agencies and authorities across borders in the name of a perpetual struggle or war 
against a postnational (and postpolitical) enemy.’ (p.682).  The terrorist sits outside the 
neorealist state system and the discourses thereof; in so doing it becomes 
incomprehensible and endangers the ‘order’ of the system.  During a visit to Moscow, 
Jack Straw elaborates: 
 
No one can now doubt that a primary threat to our security comes from 
groups which act outside states and the rules of the international 
community, or from places where the state and the rule of law do not 
function.  No longer can any of us afford to ignore distant and 
misgoverned parts of the world. (Straw, 2001a) 
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This reinforces the binary between the ordered inside and the disordered, and hence 
threatening, outside.  It also underpins the Threat, as by exporting terrorism, disorder is 
also transferred.  Thus, if terrorism is allowed to penetrate the inside, the result will be 
disorder and instability and the ‘Self’ will be corrupted just like the ‘Other’.  
Accordingly, he points to groups that do not follow the neorealist ‘rules of the 
international community’ as being threatening.  These groups represent, and emerge 
from, disorder, places that are ‘misgoverned’.  Through neorealist discourse this is 
troubling, as the primary purpose of the state system, according to Bull (1977), is the 
maintenance of order.  For Britain, which has a history of geopolitical codes that 
enshrine a mission to impose a particular order upon supposedly disordered parts of the 
world, the need to do so again is not out of step with that geopolitical history, making it 
more easy to develop and promote policies with this objective. 
 
Bundling Threats: Rogue States and WMD 
 In 2002, as the events of September 11th became more firmly established within 
geopolitical representations, the focus and characterization of the Threat changed.   The 
narratives of Rogue State and Weapons of Mass Destruction now became associated 
with terrorism.  Figure 5.8 tracks the change over time of both narratives, and reveals 
that while they appeared in a fifth or fewer of documents before, and immediately after, 
September 11th, in 2002 there was a dramatic change.  The focus increasingly widened 
to other Threats.  This formed the basis for the arguments in favour of invading Iraq in 
2003, when the narratives remained common, although the link had now been 
constructed and therefore there was a slight reduction that continued in 2004.   
 
These changes are repeated in the relative position of the narratives.  Figures 5.9 
and 5.10 demonstrate that they were among the least frequently occurring, before, and 
just after, September 11th; they were after all only two of a range of Threats.  In 2002 
WMD, and to a lesser extent Rogue State, suddenly became the leading narratives 
(Figure 5.11).  This was a time when these Threats began to be connected to terrorism 
in representations, such as the potential risk of terrorists using WMD.  In 2003 (Figure 
5.12), the year when the Iraq war began, partly justified on the basis of these 
connections, the narratives were still among the most widely used; even in 2004 (Figure 
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5.13) this remained the case as the conflict continued in Iraq and required a perpetual 
reemphasis of its underlying ‘logic’. 
Figure 5.8 
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Figure 5.10 
 
Occurrence of Narratives in 2001 Post-September 11 (U.K.)
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Figure 5.11 
 
Occurrence of Narratives in 2002 (U.K.)
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Figure 5.12 
 
Occurrence of Narratives in 2003 (U.K.)
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Figure 5.13 
 
Occurrence of Narratives in 2004 (U.K.)
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This was not simply a revival of the selection of Threats that existed before 
September 11th; it is part of an accelerating process to bundle these separate Threats into 
one common enemy.  Putzel (2006) argues that connected to the reasons given for the 
Iraq War: 
 
‘…have been moves by both the US and British authorities to join 
together threats (especially of the use of weapons of mass destruction) 
from non-state radical organizations pursuing terror politics with those 
represented by so-called “rogue regimes” operating outside of 
international law.’ (p.73). 
 
Beginning with a less specific process of linking terrorism with Rogue States and 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, the governments of Britain and the United States started 
to construct a context for war based on this premise.  In November 2002, at the Lord 
Mayor’s Banquet, Tony Blair claimed that: 
 
Terrorism and WMD are linked dangers.  States which are failed, which 
repress their people brutally, in which notions of democracy and the rule 
of law are alien, share the same absence of rational boundaries to their 
actions as the terrorist. (Blair, 2002) 
 
This representation implies that if the ‘Others’ are irrational they could strike at any 
time – and use WMD.  In Britain the debate surrounding WMD and Iraq was notable for 
the prominent claim that the weapons could be delivered in 45 minutes.  While the 
specifics of what this referred to (what types of weapons and where they could reach 
within 45 minutes) were not made particularly clear it nevertheless relates to theories of 
space-time compression; the WMD technology reducing the effect of distance by 
making an attack possible within a very short period of time accentuating the Threat 
posed by such weapons and by Iraq. 
 
Blair also argues that democracy and the rule of law are ‘alien’ to Rogue States, 
reinforcing the difference from the ‘Self’, for which these are supposedly part of the 
defining liberal principles.  The implication is that since Rogue States and terrorists are 
of similarly ‘evil’ and ‘irrational’ character they are likely to cooperate.  The 
relationship is simplified to one in which the Rogue States provide territorial bases and 
WMD, while the terrorists offer their abilities to operate outside the state system, 
creating a Threat that appears greater than the state enemies of the past. 
Atlanticism or Europeanism?  Competing Codes in Post-Cold War Britain 
207 
The link that has been constructed between the three Threats provides the 
opportunity to deploy the discursive practice of ‘common sense’ in presenting a Threat 
from Iraq.  Dalby (1990) demonstrates how this was used to show that what was good 
for America was good for everyone during the Cold War.  It allows, as Sharp (2000) 
points out, ‘a silencing of complexity’ such that true or false conclusions can be 
reached.  Accordingly, in the build up to the Iraq War, Iraq and al Qaeda are presented 
as the major Threats to Britain: 
 
The two greatest threats facing Britain in the next decade are terrorists 
and rogue states with WMD.  The most dangerous terrorist organization 
is Al Qa’ida.  The most aggressive rogue state is Iraq. (Straw, 2003b)3
Through the single Threat formed by bundling of terrorism, Rogue States and WMD, it 
seems ‘common sense’ that Iraq and al Qaeda, should be allied.  Following these 
assumptions, the possibility appears to be made real that Iraq will supply al Qaeda with 
WMD.  When appreciated through this discursive construction, the ability to penetrate 
borders that the terrorists have shown makes Iraq a direct Threat to Britain.  Taking 
such a position allows Britain, and Tony Blair personally, to sustain its links with the 
United States where a similar set of assumptions were made.  
 
A ‘War On Terrorism’ 
Having constructed the terrorist Threat as a distinct ‘Other’ compared to the 
positive ‘Self’, Britain’s geopolitics post-September 11th would almost inevitably 
require an active response.  Furthermore, in the context of the representations, that 
response must include a military element.  The discourses through which the Soviet 
Union was represented, argues Dalby (1990), supported militarism as a natural 
response, given the nature of the Threat.  A dangerous ‘Other’ made it ‘obvious’ that the 
only solution was one based on military means.  A similar process can be seen in post-
September 11th Britain.  Boggs (2002) depicts the relationship that has been created 
between terrorism and state responses and describes it as: ‘…an unfolding scenario that 
is best understood as a deadly cycle of militarism and terrorism – twin expressions of 
the same New World Order…’ (p.241).  In such circumstances it becomes ‘common 
sense’ that terrorists need to be challenged before it is too late. 
 
3 This passage is taken from a statement to the House of Commons on the 21st of January 2003. 
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It is therefore unsurprising that the narrative of War on Terrorism which barely 
registered before (Figure 5.9), should have become the most frequently occurring after 
September 11th (Figure 5.10).  The dramatic change is made clear by examining its 
occurrence over time in Figure 5.14. Peaking at about 60% in late 2001, the narrative 
fits comfortably into the representations at this time, when the negative characterization 
is also at its height.   The decline in the following years, that the graph shows, is 
precipitated by the reduction of the negative characterization.  The narrative is 
established, providing the context in which government responses citing terrorism can 
be given a veneer of ‘common sense’. 
Figure 5.14 
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Given the way in which the Threat has been constructed, the method of 
removing it must be focused on the disordered spaces from which it is said to emerge.  
This appears to fit into the long history of British engagement on a global scale, 
allegedly bringing ‘order’ to the world by applying political and economic liberalism.  
Through these discourses, Britain must act once again to order the disorder beyond its 
boundaries: 
 
By engaging with the world, and driving back the boundaries of chaos, 
we are helping to prevent instability and insecurity, in order to stop 
conflict, tyranny and terrorism. (Straw, 2002b)4
4 Straw was talking about relations between Europe and the United States at the Brookings Institution in 
Washington D.C. 
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This is apparently beneficial to the countries in question and to the ‘Self’, which will no 
longer be threatened as a result.  Underlying these arguments is the familiar discourse of 
Orientalism, where the Occident intervenes to help and ‘improve’ the inferior Orient 
(Said, 1978).  Hence, the Orientalist discourse that underpinned British colonialism is 
reproduced and adapted to the present realities in order to justify British engagement on 
the outside. 
 
However, the form that the engagement should take is more complicated than 
may first appear.  Although militarism is certainly a possibility that the representations 
allow (for example in Afghanistan and Iraq), the British ‘War Against Terrorism’ is a 
more diverse concept than the American equivalent with its crusading character.  The 
implications of a war on terrorism, are expressed by Tony Blair at the Mansion House 
in November 2001: 
 
The war against terrorism is not just a police action to root out the 
networks and those who protect them, although it is certainly that.  It 
needs to be a series of political actions designed to remove the conditions 
under which such acts of evil can flourish and be tolerated.  The dragon’s 
teeth are planted in fertile soil of wrongs unrighted, of disputes left to 
fester for years or even decades, of failed states, of poverty and 
deprivation. (Blair, 2001e) 
 
There is a clear use of the Organic narrative here (this is never a common narrative, but 
reinforces the negativity of the ‘Other’), which operates through the Good/Evil 
discourse, terrorism is a weed that needs to be ‘rooted out’, but more than that it is 
associated with the image of a dragon, demonstrating how dangerous it is.  Such 
dramatic rhetoric contrasts with the more moderate, though still negative, threatening 
characterization, in the previous quote from Jack Straw.  Again, there is an element of 
variation between different British political leaders; the general representation is the 
same, but the more aggressive tone of Blair’s speeches tends to be muted in those of 
Foreign Office figures like Straw, pointing to the possibility of an alternative slightly 
less conflictive, militaristic or even Atlanticist course.  Nevertheless, although there is 
an acceptance of the use of military action, there is also a subtler dimension to the War 
narrative; the ‘fertile soil’ in which terrorism grows requires political actions to remove 
it.  This corresponds with the British colonial vision in which imperialism was 
understood to be as much a means of exporting British liberal values in support of 
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British interests as it was about conquering via military action.  Similarly, by spreading 
those same values, removing the chaos from which it is meant to grow, terrorism can, it 
is said, be eliminated, and British political interests are protected and furthered in the 
process. 
 
Placing British Responses in Historical Context 
 What has begun to emerge is that Britain’s historical participation at a global 
scale, and the legacy this has left in terms of the construction of geopolitical codes, are 
central to how responses to terrorism have been developed.  Hence, one important 
narrative in these constructions is History.  This is drawn primarily from the national 
scale, and it supports another narrative that is relevant here, that is the Global Player.  
Although this obviously places Britain in a global context, it can again be traced back to 
the national scale as a narrative encapsulating the supposed glory and greatness of 
Britain, entitling it to an influential place in the world. 
Figure 5.15 
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Use of the History narrative was most frequent before September 11th, when 
almost 50% of documents showed evidence of it (Figure 5.15); the Global Player 
narrative matched this.  A considerable reduction is apparent thereafter, particularly for 
History, which was not drawn on at all in those documents analysed from 2002.  
Following this it appears again at a lower level, while the Global Player narrative 
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stabilizes at around 20% of documents.  The need to reproduce these narratives is 
greatest when the new Threat has not been fully established in the representations, that 
is when the ‘enemies’ are multiple and indistinct.  As the terrorists were (re)constructed 
after September 11th, History could help to bind the new Threat with a succession of 
vanquished enemies, while the need for British involvement in the global response was 
also emphasized.  Once this understanding had been constructed, the Threat was 
established, and required less historical contextualization as this was now ‘obvious’.  
However, Britain’s ‘global role’ is an ever present theme that must be repeated, if less 
frequently than before. 
 
Both narratives are evident when Tony Blair discusses Foreign Policy early in 
his Premiership: 
 
We also enjoy a unique set of relationships through the Security Council, 
NATO, the G8, Europe and the Commonwealth, not to mention our close 
alliance with America.  We hold the presidency of the European Union 
and the G8 next year, and are hosting the second Asia-Europe Meeting.  
By virtue of our geography, our history and the strengths of our people, 
Britain is a global player.  As an island nation, Britain looks outward 
naturally.  The British are inveterate travelers. (Blair, 1997)5
By virtue of its ‘geography’ and ‘history’, Blair claims that Britain is in a position of 
influence.  The idea of Britain as an ‘island nation’, that has been so repetitive in its 
self-image, is drawn on again as the basis for its global role.  Van der Wusten and 
Dijkink (2002) identify the most central concern of British geopolitical discourse as: 
‘…the space of flows that make up the global system.’ (p.34).  By pointing to the links 
that the country has, Blair continues this pattern and reproduces the Global Player 
narrative in the modern context, using the History narrative to draw parallels with the 
past, in which Britain was a ‘great power’ operating at the global scale. 
 
A ‘Coalition Against Terrorism’ 
 For the United States a Coalition Against Terrorism provides political and 
practical support to a primarily unilateral ‘war’; for Britain it implies a deeper 
commitment and a closer alliance.  The historical experience of the Second World War, 
 
5 Tony Blair was speaking at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet. 
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and the Cold War, was of a close alliance with America for the purposes of security, and 
of sustaining an element of global influence as a component in its continuing great 
power ambitions.  The new Threat offered an opportunity to renew this alliance with 
America and, where appropriate, the other historical connections that Britain claimed to 
have as a Global Player.  In an interview with CNN on the 16th September 2001, Tony 
Blair commented: 
 
And I think you will find there is enormous support for the idea that we 
must put together a broad-based coalition, to hound these people down 
and bring them to justice. (Blair, 2001c) 
 
This is an early reaction to the September 11th attacks, demonstrating the importance of 
Coalition in Britain’s immediate response.  There is no question that America should be 
left to act alone.  Therefore, the British Coalition narrative conforms to neorealism up to 
a point as it underpins the formation of policies of cooperation between sovereign 
states.  In that regard it is aligned with the American vision.  On the other hand, the 
narrative is moulded by the influence of Britain’s historical experience, the global 
position that this has supposedly provided, and also British experience of deeper 
integration in Europe.  Blair wanted to have influence on, and participate in, the 
response to the September 11th attacks; a Coalition would allow this strategy to be 
pursued. 
 
Britain and Europe 
 The same reluctance to be too involved in Europe, that influenced policy 
decisions in the post-War period, remains prominent in British geopolitics today.  This 
generates a dilemma, reflected in the way Europe is imagined in British geopolitical 
codes; there is an element of cooperation and pooling sovereignty, alongside a stubborn 
determination to protect the Westphalian model of the sovereign state. 
 
These competing concepts are supported by the simultaneous use of different 
narratives.  Figure 5.16 reveals that Coalition was drawn upon in around 75% of 
documents after September 11th, before becoming relatively insignificant at around 
10%.  Conversely, the European Unity narrative, which represents a deeper level of 
cooperation, is consistently present in between 40 and 60% of documents.  However, a 
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more detailed examination shows that there is a reduction in use of the narrative after 
September 11th when Coalition is most frequent. 
Figure 5.16 
The Coalition, European Unity and American Alliance 
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The American Alliance narrative always occurs less often than European Unity, 
but in many ways follows a similar pattern.  One noticeable difference is that it is lower 
in 2002 and 2003 than in 2001.  This is despite the war in Iraq, but may reflect attempts 
to reconcile the European dimension with this more neorealist conflict being pursued in 
close alliance with the United States.  These two, in many ways contradictory, 
narratives are therefore fairly consistent in comparison with Coalition, which is used 
mainly in the aftermath of September 11th as a less specific and neorealist construction 
of cooperation. 
 
The European Union is not presented as a replacement for the British state, 
which continues to have pre-eminence in representations.  Instead, it is discussed in 
terms of a regional organization of growing importance, but ultimately subservient to 
the state.  In a speech on Europe during the Kosovo conflict, Blair describes it as 
follows: 
 
It will be a new and different sort of entity.  Power will be diffuse with 
decisions taken at the European level when they need to be and taken at 
the local or national level when they can be. 
In reforming our European structures, we should not imitate the 
constitutional theory of a sovereign state, but rather build the structures 
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we need to achieve our objectives, recognizing the unique nature of the 
Union.  (Blair, 1999b) 
 
Then in his 2000 Mansion House speech, he adds: 
 
We have now entered the debate about Europe’s political future, arguing 
that Europe can be a superpower, but should not be a superstate in which 
national identity is subsumed. (Blair, 2000) 
 
Although Blair is trying to avoid antagonizing his domestic Euro-sceptic audience by 
attributing too much power to the region over the state, and therefore gives little detail 
as to the roles of each layer, these passages appear to characterize multi-layered 
governance not entirely removed from that proposed by Held (1995).  The crucial 
difference is that the state is still considered, on the surface at least, to be in control.  
The State-Centric Model described by Hooghe and Marks (2001) appears to come 
closer to the British outlook: ‘This model poses states (or, more precisely, national 
governments) as ultimate decision makers, devolving limited authority to supranational 
institutions to achieve specific policy goals.’ (p.2).  This reflects the continuing 
requirement in British geopolitics for a global role for Britain as a state, separate from 
the Europeans.  Indeed, corresponding with Blair’s assessment of European structures, 
Goetschel (2000) says: ‘…Europe is not constituted security-wise as yet another state or 
nation.’ (p.270).  Yet simultaneously Britain needs closer relations with Europe, in a 
world in which it no longer has the power it once did, if it is to continue to have 
influence regionally and globally. 
 
Europe is constructed as an ordered space with the power to spread its positive 
influence, bringing order to the disorder of the outside.  This is significant as it shows 
how the narrative of European Unity is working with discourse to construct a positive 
‘Self’ – a European ‘Self’ – beyond that of the British ‘Self’.  It does not replace Britain 
but is representative of a shift towards a regional perspective in British geopolitics in 
combination or even competing with the state centric vision.  To an extent, this is also 
indicative of differences within British representations as constructed by individuals 
within government.  The agency of each political figure plays a part in the overall 
representations and ultimately policies of the state, but contrary to neorealism, the state 
is not a single unit and its agents can present subtly varying visions.  The following 
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passage from Jack Straw suggests a slightly more integrated Europe with a greater 
geopolitical role than the vague layered model that Tony Blair described: 
 
…Europe must play an increasingly influential role in international 
affairs.  Enlargement in 2004 should be an opportunity for the Union to 
broaden its horizons beyond central Europe, and to focus on the 
challenges of spreading democracy and prosperity on its southern and 
eastern frontiers. (Straw, 2003a)6
European Unity has brought order to the continent, and it is this ability to eliminate the 
perceived sources of Threats that, it is argued, must now be used outside the European 
borders.  Ward (2002) argues that: ‘The nation-state represents a mythical epitome, and 
the European Union, as the ultimate nation-state, is the ultimate mythology; the 
complete market sealed against the destabilizing effects of the barbarian “other”.’ 
(p.225).  By expanding the space within its boundaries – the inside – order and stability 
are also spread.  As such, it is reminiscent of the British approach to Empire, an 
expansion of the EU is believed to deliver liberal values and stability, but only if 
accompanied by order.  British policy generally promotes an enlarged Europe over a 
deeper Europe, and therefore representing it in this way helps to underpin these policy 
objectives. 
 
With the European Unity narrative now embedded in British discursive 
structures, Europe has become central to Britain’s vision of cooperation.  Hettne and 
Söderbaum (2000) comment: ‘The unbundling of state functions forms part of a new 
structure of multilevel governance where the region constitutes one level.’ (p.465).  
Consequently, Europe can act at a global scale to improve security, and at the same time 
strengthen Britain’s position in the world: 
 
The EU makes us stronger at home, and stronger abroad.  The same logic 
applies.  It would be foolish to waste the potential of the EU as a force 
for good in the world.  It is time we all recognized that the EU allows us 
to magnify and strengthen our influence as a nation on the world stage. 
(Straw, 2001b)7
6 Jack Straw was speaking at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Leadership Conference in London. 
7 This passage was taken from Jack Straw’s speech at the Royal United Services Institute in London on 
the 11th of December 2001. 
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Again, Straw sees an important role for Europe without ignoring the continuing position 
of Britain as an actor globally.  Britain can no longer hold a dominant position in the 
world; so close cooperation with others, particularly in Europe, is required.  This 
continues the practice of using connections with other states to enhance British 
influence.  With the construction of a new cross border Threat, it appears an even more 
appropriate means of responding.  For British policy-makers the European Union acts as 
a model for bringing order and Freedom to the world, even if their views of how this 
might be achieved are not always identical.   
 
Europe and America: A Bridge or A Contradiction? 
The alleged ‘special relationship’ with America is central to British attempts to 
maintain its global role.  For British policy-makers the challenge has been to combine a 
state-to-state alliance of this sort with participation in a deeper regional organization 
that demands more consensual decision-making.  Thus, Tank (1998) points out that in 
Europe: 
 
‘…there is the divide between the Atlanticists who maintain that 
intergovernmental cooperation within already established security 
organizations such as NATO is the best option available, and the 
Europeanists who see the eventual development of a unified European 
approach in security and foreign affairs, independent of American 
involvement.’ (p.14). 
 
Speaking at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet in November 2001, with the Afghanistan 
conflict underway, Tony Blair attempts to reconcile the potential contradictions: 
 
I hope, too, we have buried the myth that Britain has to choose between 
being strong in Europe or strong with the United States. Afghanistan has 
shown vividly how the relationships reinforce each other; and that both 
the United States and our European partners value our role with the 
other.  So let us play our full part in Europe not retreat to its margins; and 
let us proclaim our closeness to the United States and use it to bring 
Europe closer to America. (Blair, 2001e) 
 
Blair is returning to the classic idea of Britain acting as a bridge to link Churchill’s 
circles.  The problem remains that Britain is part of Europe whereas it has a bilateral 
relationship with the United States.  These relationships operate differently, and can 
produce policy conflicts as a result (e.g. Iraq).  Putzel (2006) says: ‘The debate at the 
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United Nations over US-Anglo intervention in Iraq demonstrated the green shoots of an 
emerging divergence between some of the strongest members of the European Union 
and the United States.’ (p.81).  However, as far as the British state is concerned, to 
protect the country’s interests, particularly in the realm of security, it must continue to 
be closely involved in European integration and simultaneously retain strong links with 
others, most of all America: 
 
…That means our strong network of alliances and cooperation around 
the world, combined with the global connections which our history and 
language provide, are more important today than ever.   
 
Our membership of the European Union and our relationship with the 
United States are central to almost everything we do internationally.  It is 
also of paramount importance to our future prosperity and security that 
the relationship between Europe and the US continues to be strong. 
(Straw, 2004)8
The imperial legacy of Britain as a global power is once again influential for British 
geopolitics when supposedly confronted by new Threats.  Europe and America are the 
two ‘circles’ that are most prominent today.  Hence, the assumption is, that they must 
both be retained and used to further British and global interests.  British geopolitics is 
therefore constructed to include both Atlanticist and Europeanist perspectives at the 
same time, reproducing a contradiction at the centre of the British worldview.  
 
The Global Community 
For British policy-makers, seeking to establish an influential role for the country 
in the post-Cold War world, the logic of the Coalition retains its attraction.  Despite this, 
the limited idea of state-to-state alliances has been increasingly augmented by 
representations of a global or international community.  In the narrative of Global 
Community the state system is far more structured and regulated than the realist world 
identified by Bull (1977).  Instead of an anarchic world of states, the model being 
represented appears closer to the European Union, where states follow rules and 
participate in collective decision-making, creating interdependency between states.  
This vision was already well developed before September 11th, but the reality of the 
 
8 Jack Straw was speaking to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London on the 12th of 
February 2004. 
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attacks made it appear even more appropriate in the context of constructions of a non-
state terrorist Threat.  It is also a convenient rhetorical device when attempting to gain 
support for a ‘War on Terrorism’ and measures associated with this; by suggesting that 
‘terrorism’ is contrary to the interests of a Global Community other states could be 
pressurised to participate in and support such measures, as indeed could the public who 
constitute part of the audience for the speeches. 
 
Figure 5.17 charts the occurrence of this narrative over time.  The most 
noticeable feature of the graph is the change from pre-September 11th to post-September 
11th. While it was not insignificant before the attacks, thereafter it appears in 50% or 
more of documents.  Referring back to the graphs comparing the narratives in given 
time periods, demonstrates how the Global Community narrative becomes increasingly 
more important relative to the others.  Prior to September 11th it is comparatively low 
(Figure 5.9), the increase following this (Figure 5.10) contributes to the narrative 
becoming the third most frequent in terms of the number of documents in which it 
appears.  While the concentration on WMD and Rogue States in 2002 (Figure 5.11) and 
2003 (Figure 5.12) means that it is only one of a number of prominent narratives, by 
2004 Global Community occurs in more documents than any other. 
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A speech made by Tony Blair in Chicago in April 1999, at the time of the 
Kosovo conflict, was extremely important in defining the idea, and role of the Global 
Community, from a British perspective: 
 
We are witnessing the beginnings of a new doctrine of international 
community.  By this I mean the explicit recognition that today more than 
ever before we are mutually dependent, that national interest is to a 
significant extent governed by international collaboration and that we 
need a clear and coherent debate as to the direction this doctrine takes us 
in each field of international endeavour.  Just as within domestic politics 
the notion of community – the belief that partnership and co-operation 
are essential to advance self-interest – is coming into its own; so it needs 
to find its own international echo.  Global financial markets, the global 
environment, global security and disarmament issues: none of these can 
be solved without intense international co-operation. (Blair, 1999a) 
 
The argument that Blair puts forward is that the interdependent nature of the modern 
world, and the range of Threats, make it necessary for states to work together to a far 
greater degree than ever before.  While some sovereignty is lost, the greater goal of 
promoting the states’ interests is achieved.  However, the British Global Community 
does not transcend the neorealist discourse, it is an attempt to re-construct the discursive 
structure through which the post-Cold War world, and Britain’s place in it, is 
understood. 
 
Nevertheless, the introduction of this narrative has implications for the 
reproduction of the sovereign state.  Neorealist interpretations are disrupted by the 
imagining of some form, however limited, of global structure that reduces the supposed 
anarchical nature of the state system.  In respect of Europe, Gualini (2004) states that: 
‘At stake in building multi-level governance is hence a qualitative change in processes 
of state formation, challenging conceptions of state sovereignty intimately connected to 
its territoriality, as the mutually reinforcing source of both its power and identity.’ 
(p.553).  It changes the nature of the state, and allows global and regional layers of 
governance to make ‘sense’.  In March 2004, Tony Blair directly challenges the 
principles of the Westphalia treaty on which realism is founded: 
 
So, for me, before September 11th, I was already reaching for a different 
philosophy in international relations from the traditional one that has 
held sway since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648; namely that a country’s 
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internal affairs are for it and you don’t interfere unless it threatens you, 
or breaches a treaty, or triggers an obligation of alliance. (Blair, 2004) 
 
No longer is the inside beyond the scope of international relations, now states forming 
the Global Community have the right to intervene where they perceive certain rules or 
standards are not being met.  Mansbach (2005) argues that: 
 
‘A postinternational lens de-emphasises the distinction between 
“domestic” and “foreign,” although not between “inside” and “outside.”  
The former refers to the impact of sovereign boundaries, whereas the 
latter delineates the borders between moral communities, often rooted in 
dramatically contrasting definitions of the “self “ and “other.”’ (p.30). 
 
While this may go further than the British understanding, that Britain should adopt such 
a position is not entirely surprising for a state that has already become part of a regional 
body with substantial powers of intervention in internal matters.  A Global Community 
appears to provide a structure through which political solutions can be sought to 
potential Threats, bringing order to the disorder just as European integration is said to 
have done.  Conversely, it also provides a basis for military interventions such as an 
invasion of Iraq, where a state considers another to be a potential Threat (though only 
where the intervening state has power and influence). 
 
Hence, a Global Community, when understood through the lens of British 
geopolitics, is a structure that offers the opportunity to enshrine British influence in the 
post-Cold War world.  In the same 2004 speech on the ‘Global Terror Threat’, Tony 
Blair states: 
 
The doctrine of international community is no longer a vision of 
idealism.  It is a practical recognition that just as within a country 
citizens who are free, well educated and prosperous tend to be 
responsible, to feel solidarity with a society in which they have a stake; 
so do nations that are free, democratic and benefiting from economic 
progress, tend to be stable and solid partners in the advance of 
humankind.  The best defence of our security lies in the spread of our 
values. (Blair, 2004) 
 
Blair holds up the values of the ‘Self’ as superior, reproducing the Freedom narrative to 
emphasise this.  These values have delivered peace on the European continent and 
therefore, it is argued, they must be spread further if order is to be brought to the 
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outside.  Creating a Global Community gives Britain a chance to be at the centre of 
efforts to re-order the world in this way, something that would be impossible without a 
system of close cooperation.  Elden (2005) comments: 
 
‘The Blair doctrine of international community is – at least in its ideal 
form – a multilateral strategy, whereas the US policy… …is avowedly 
unilateral.  Blair’s attempts to provide multilateral support for the USA’s 
unilateralism failed to deliver the second Security Council resolution on 
Iraq, and yet he still went along with the USA.  This is the unresolved 
tension at the heart of Blair’s foreign policy.’ (p.2095). 
 
By acting in a European Union, and in a similarly structured Global Community, Britain 
can achieve more and fulfil its globalist and great power ambitions in a way that it could 
not in the anarchic state-system.  Through the British discursive structure this makes 
‘sense’ as a system for dealing with the new Threats, as it appears to be the best way to 
introduce British liberal values to the rest of the world.  At the same time the 
contradiction in British geopolitics continues to impact upon policy-making.  As Elden 
describes, the multilateralist vision may be undermined when the demands of 
Atlanticism require it.  This, of course, is as much an implication of individual agency 
on the part of politicians such as Tony Blair, as of the two competing worldviews that 
provide the context for geopolitical policy-making in Britain. 
 
Conclusions 
 There is therefore a continuing process taking place in which British geopolitical 
codes are being re-moulded in response to the new post-Cold War and post-September 
11th circumstances.  This does not take place outside the historical and political 
influences that have driven the long-term worldviews of the country.  These codes are 
developed in a world in which neorealism is being challenged; but as a state that is itself 
built upon neorealist philosophy, Britain cannot completely remove itself from the 
confines of this.  Instead, codes are being adapted, in the British case the realities that it 
faces are leading to competing but entangled codes, as it struggles to come to terms with 
a diminished role in the world, while retaining a long-established self-image as a global 
actor and great power.  This image is drawn from the philosophies of liberalism that 
have been crucial to the construction of the British state.  The source of these ideas is of 
course the same Enlightenment thinking that underpinned the formation of the realist 
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sovereign state itself, and therefore British post-Cold War geopolitical codes cannot be 
removed from this context.  
 
Prior to September 11th a range of Threats were constructed through established 
binary discourses, as the need for an ‘Other’ against which the ‘Self’ could be 
reproduced was undiminished.  Hence, the outside remained a space that was imagined 
to be disordered.  It was from the disorder that Threats were supposed to come, even if 
these were not yet clearly specified.  In the discursive structure that had evolved over 
time, British identity as a neorealist state required such a threatening ‘Other’ for its 
reproduction.  New threats could therefore be understood as part of a long line of 
menaces of similar negative character. 
 
September 11th allowed the Threat to be focused on terrorism, and the terrorist 
could be characterized in the wake of this event.  Discourses of Good/Evil and 
Positive/Negative were used here, though not in the same religious sense as in America.  
The addition of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Rogue State narratives enhanced the 
sense of danger even further.  These formerly separate Threats were now bound 
together, firstly by implication, and then by specific linkage.  Drawing on the logic of 
‘common sense’, arguments could then be made for action to eliminate the Threats that 
were supposedly growing in the disorder. 
 
The British response was to support an American led ‘war on terrorism’.  
However this did not follow the same crusading zeal as the American’s, given the 
different historical background to the state.  As was apparent from some of the 
quotations, there is also a sense in which British interpretations of the situation, and 
visions of how it might be tackled, lack the homogeneity that (neo)realists attribute to 
the state.  The various actors within a state all have agency and therefore influence over 
the (re)production of discourse and the generation of policies and geopolitical codes, 
although this influence will differ from person to person. 
 
In the British case this difference in approach appears more noticeable than was 
true of the American material, nevertheless there remains a certain conformity to the 
representations; it would be extremely difficult for politicians to remain in government 
together if they diverged to a great extent.  However, the nuances apparent between the 
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Prime Minister and the Foreign Office on several occasions are a complexity that 
neorealist accounts lack; critical realist analysis can include these, and the agency that 
they represent, as part of the process that ultimately forms geopolitical codes and, in the 
British example, policies that mix militarism with alternative measures.   
 
For British policy-makers military action was an option, but political solutions 
were also important.  This followed the long-term pattern of British policy, stretching 
back to imperialism, where the country’s interests were thought to be best served by 
avoiding war and using economic and political means to gain power and influence.  The 
history of globalism and search for great power status that was encapsulated in 
imperialism also meant that there was no question about Britain’s role in this ‘war’; it 
should be at the centre of the action working closely with its Cold War ally America.  
Thus, narratives of History and Global Player were used in representations of Britain. 
 
For Britain, the best way to tackle terrorism and the other ‘related’ Threats was 
as part of a Coalition.  Relying on such relationships had become ever more important 
with the decline of its power.  The Atlantic Alliance or special relationship could be 
renewed giving Britain influence, and its alleged historic links around the world could 
be utilized, making the country feel invaluable in the ‘war on terrorism’. 
 
The experience of pooling sovereignty in Europe to gain global influence and 
cope with cross border challenges is therefore influential in reconstructing British 
geopolitics as a whole.  For Britain there is now a European ‘Self’ in addition to, if 
subservient to, the British ‘Self’.  Europe is an example of how cooperation can deliver 
the much sought after order and liberalism without resorting to war.  Nevertheless, the 
old image of the island nation with a global role persists.  The dilemma is most apparent 
in attempts to reconcile an Alliance with America, and be an active regional player in 
European Unity.  The American Alliance has been central to British geopolitics since 
the Second World War, as it is believed to give security and influence.  It is essentially a 
(neo)realist relationship between two sovereign states and is the model that America’s 
Coalition Against Terrorism would be closest to.  Europe, with its deeper integration 
and sovereignty pooling, begins to move away from neorealism, and yet is also 
represented as crucial for Britain’s influence, not only at the regional scale, but globally, 
including with America.  Indeed, both these relationships are presented as being 
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essential for the maintenance of the other, and thus for Britain’s role in meeting the new 
Threats.  The fundamental differences and the historical vision of Britain’s global role 
create a constant tension between the two worldviews, generating a pair of competing 
geopolitical codes. 
 
British policy-makers imagine the world in terms of a Global Community.  This 
applies many of the features of the European Union at the global scale and therefore 
represents deeper cooperation than a mere neorealist Coalition.  This narrative suggests 
a more structured system in which sovereignty is pooled to match the cross border, non-
state Threats of the post-Cold War world.  It is compatible with British globalism as it 
gives the country a position where it can influence decisions and participate in 
responses in a way that is not possible in a purely neorealist system, and therefore offers 
the opportunity to achieve ‘great power’ status.  Britain is imagined as a crucial player 
in such a community – a Global Player – given its historic links around the world forged 
through Empire and alliances with the United States and Europe.  The idea of a British 
bridging role, joining Churchill’s three circles, once again underpins this new Global 
Community vision.  The Global Community is, therefore, a vision that in many ways 
moves beyond the neorealist state system in the same way that the European Union has 
at the regional scale, but from a British perspective it still retains many of the features 
and discourses of neorealism, as the British state remains paramount.  Hence, it contains 
elements of Britain’s two competing worldviews and geopolitical codes that are so 
difficult to reconcile and yet are always entangled.   
 
From here we can draw out a British discursive structure (Figure 5.18).  As 
discussed, the structure includes discourses and narratives that, while similar to those of 
America in some cases, are particular to Britain.  Through this discursive structure, the 
two competing British geopolitical codes can make ‘sense’.  The factors influencing 
geopolitical codes operate at three scales, and likewise the codes themselves can be 
considered in this way.  The national scale is where the codes demand a reinforcement 
of national unity, and the protection of the ‘Self’.  British values of liberalism must be 
defended and this cannot be removed from the continuation of Britain’s independent 
global role.  These factors are common to both codes.  At the regional scale Britain has 
an interest in integration, particularly in terms of its post realist code.  Even the realist 
code requires close cooperation with Europe as a means of sustaining influence, and 
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spreading British values, but the need for separation from Europe and engagement with 
America also encourages policies of detachment when applying this realist code.   
Figure 5.18 
Diagram of the British Discursive Structure 
 
This brings us to the global scale where Britain’s self-image implies that it 
should be a major actor.  The realist code still requires close cooperation with other 
states, most notably the United States, but also Europe and the rest of the world.  This is 
a necessity for sustaining British influence and tackling non-state Threats, and is a 
function of the vision of a British bridging role.  At the same time, through the post-
realist code, these engagements are represented as more rigid and deeper.  This code 
determines that British global influence, as a state, is only possible by pooling 
sovereignty as in Europe, and this is also the best way to challenge Threats that 
contradict realism.  By acting through Europe and as part of a Global Community it is 
argued that British values can be spread as order is introduced to the disordered spaces 
of the world from where Threats emerge.  The two codes, therefore, draw on the same 
discursive structure and seek similar outcomes, but with subtly different worldviews, 
neither being completely removed from the other. 
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Chapter 6
. . . . . . .
Cooperation and Independence: Geopolitical 
Codes of French ‘Greatness’ in the Post-Cold 
War World 
. . . . . . . .
Introduction 
 France is a state that has been at the forefront of regionalization in Europe, and 
is therefore a useful example to compare with the more ‘Euro-reluctant’ United 
Kingdom and the hegemonic United States.  Understanding how geopolitical codes have 
developed in France can help to reveal how the specific context in which a state’s codes 
develop affects the nature of the codes, and the policies of different states.  The 
historical and political context acts in combination with discourse, narratives and the 
agency of powerful individuals, changing with time as noted by Agnew and Corbridge 
(1995), and establishing geopolitical codes unique to that country and the circumstances 
of the time. 
 
As I have argued previously, a geopolitical code is the product of an evolving set 
of discourses and narratives, political realities and individual agency, both past and 
present, that are understood through this discursive structure.  In the case of France, the 
codes are developed at the intersection of three scales and are therefore the product of 
local, regional and global factors.  These factors are processed historically, resulting in 
geopolitical codes that are set within long term national representations and policy 
stances, positioning the codes as part of an unbroken line that is adapted to meet present 
circumstances while retaining grounding in the country’s past. 
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Thus, as in the examples of the United States and Britain, the earlier foreign 
policy of France forms a crucial part of the discussion.  It will allow me to explore the 
essential characteristics that differentiate France from other states, and provide a context 
for discussing the discourses and narratives that have been identified through discourse 
analysis.  In the French case the discourses are, on the surface, the same as those in the 
United States and Britain – Identity/Difference, Threat, Inside/Outside, Order/Disorder, 
East/West, Self/Other, Positive/Negative, Good/Evil – but again these are French 
versions (re)produced in the French context in interaction with French narratives and 
each other.  As before, the binaries support and strengthen one another, and underpin 
representations of the positive French ‘Self’ and the negative threatening ‘Other’ in a 
situation in which the sovereign state and associated realist interpretations are 
understood, through discourse, to be ‘normal’.  As such, it is a repetition of 
longstanding binary discourse separating the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, territory being an 
essential component of the state. 
 
France also has a set of narratives relating to its history, political circumstances 
and experiences.  These ten narratives – Organic, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Battle 
Against Terrorism, Humanist Values, Collective Responsibility, Global Player, 
European Unity, Multipolarity, World Democracy, and Global Community – support 
and mould each other as they interconnect, and do the same in interaction with the 
discourses.  France’s self-image is reproduced through these narratives in relation to 
events in the present, while drawing on historical experience.  In turn, the binary 
discourse dividing this ‘Self’ from the current ‘Other’ is also reproduced, as it has been 
in earlier periods when the ‘Other’ may have been different but the assumptions were 
essentially the same.  French geopolitical codes are therefore developed through these 
discourses and narratives, contextualizing them in particular imaginings of the French 
sovereign state. 
 
Each of these discourses and narratives will be discussed, analyzing how they 
operate and relate to one another.  This will form the core of the chapter.  As in the 
other two chapters, it begins with an examination of the construction of a dangerous 
‘outside’, a place from which Threats emerge, reproducing familiar binary discourse.  
The French characterization of the terrorist ‘Other’ is then assessed and, continuing the 
pattern from the other chapters, the third section looks at Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
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and how France understood the likelihood of a Threat from Iraq.  From here the 
responses of the French government are analysed, starting with the French ‘Battle 
Against Terrorism’ narrative.  The values that French policy-makers hope to spread and 
defend are then discussed, before moving on to their emphasis on collective responses.  
Connections are made from this to the European experience, and then to attempts to 
expand this type of approach to a global scale through Multipolarity and Global 
Community.  The chapter will conclude by relating this analysis to the context, 
demonstrating how the factors that define the French state provide a foundation for the 
construction of geopolitical codes that operate at three discernable scales. 
 
Construction of Geopolitical Codes: The French Context 
French values and history created the state-nation, and defined the national 
‘Self’.  This ‘Self’ became a model, which has been projected regionally in Europe and 
globally, firstly through colonialism, and now through policies of multipolarity and 
cooperation.  The factors influencing French geopolitical codes can be grouped 
approximately under the three scales from which they operate (Table 6.1).  However, 
they overlap and connect with each other across scales and cannot be considered to be 
isolated. 
Table 6.1 
Factors Influencing French Geopolitical Codes 
National Regional Global 
Republican Values 
Secular State 
‘One France’ 
Superiority 
Immigration 
German Threat 
Soviet Threat 
European Integration 
French Leadership in Europe 
European Europe 
Greatness/World Power 
Independence 
Nuclear Deterrent 
Atlantic Alliance 
Multipolar Ambition 
Colonialism/Worldwide Presence 
 
The French Revolution continues to be a defining period, not just in the history 
of the country, but as a source of inspiration for the reproduction of the nation.  In this 
regard the values established in the revolution are the most persistent elements of it in 
the construction of the national ‘Self’ and, by extension, in the production of 
geopolitical codes (Republican Values is the first factor acting at the national scale as 
Cooperation and Independence: Geopolitical Codes of French ‘Greatness’ in the Post-Cold War World 
229 
shown in Table 6.1).  The principal source of these values is the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man of August 1789, encompassing rights to liberty, property, security and 
resistance to oppression (Stevens, 2003, p.5).  The values are, however, most commonly 
repeated as liberty, equality and fraternity.   
 
Perhaps the most important implication is that all citizens are considered equal.  
Hargreaves (1995) argues that The Rights of Man: 
 
‘…were held to be valid not only for every individual in France but also 
for the whole of humanity.  Within republican tradition the nation, 
including its political incarnation in the form of the state, is indivisible: 
no intermediary orders are recognized between the individual and the 
unitary state of which he or she is a member.’ (p.160). 
 
This emphasis on the rights of the individual, and of humanity, appears to correspond 
with the modernist ideas arising from the Enlightenment, discussed in chapter two.  The 
state was, of course, also a product of Enlightenment rationality and was enshrined in 
the Treaty of Westphalia.  Hargreaves’ argument is underpinned by this discourse of the 
state.  The binary division of inside and outside identified by Walker (1993) manifests 
itself here in the form of the indivisible nation within a unitary state. 
 
However, as was argued by Connolly (1991), to define identity requires the 
existence of ‘Others’ who are negative in comparison to the ‘Self’.  Ward (2002) 
reflects that: ‘…the same cultural politics which provides the fuel for nation self-
determination also marginalizes the “other” as alien, and supports the pretence of the 
nation-state as the political refraction of uniformity and homogeneity.’ (p.227).  
Applying this logic to France must imply that those on the outside cannot have values of 
equal worth to those that define France.  While the Rights of Man may apply to every 
individual, through this discourse, it must be exclusively the French state that 
encapsulates these values in their pure form. 
 
The revolution also provided France with the impetus to move towards an 
entirely secular state (the second national factor in Table 6.1).  The secular state has not 
always been absolute, with periods when the church has had greater influence, and 
others when ties to the state are removed (McMillan, 1992), neither does it mean the 
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abandonment of religion within France.  However, in the fifth republic there is a clear 
separation of church and state extending to the exclusion of religion from state schools.1
Secularism is a requirement that has emerged from an interpretation of the Republican 
Values that deemed religion to be an alternative source of identity and loyalty that 
would impinge on equality, and on the unity of the state.  Hence, Enlightenment 
reasoning led to the assessment that religion would only disrupt this ‘natural’ order.  
Hargreaves (1995) explains that: 
 
‘The principle of laïcité (secularism), a term which entered currency 
only in the later part of the nineteenth century, includes both freedom of 
conscience, already proclaimed during the revolution of 1789, and the 
formal separation of the state from any religious order.’ (p.160). 
 
It is, therefore, not that religion itself is unacceptable in the republican context, rather 
such orders must be kept strictly separate from the state if the unity of the nation is to be 
maintained. 
 
In a similar vein, the concept of ‘one France’ (Table 6.1) is an essential part of 
the mythology of the national ‘Self’.  Safran (1989) comments: 
 
‘For many years, French politics and society were viewed in the context 
of a myth about “France: one and indivisible”.  That myth was reflected 
in the political structures and regnant ideologies of the country from the 
Revolution of 1789 to the Fifth Republic.’ (p.176). 
 
The unitary state is, by definition, a single whole that cannot be divided without 
destruction.  Thus, in this interpretation, for the continuation of the Republican Values, 
and of France, no divisions must be introduced.  This was applied in terms of religion, 
and has also been followed in the Jacobin approach to governance and society. 
 
This set of French values and their related political constructions feed into a 
sense of the supposedly superior position of France in relation to the rest of the world 
(superiority is the fourth national factor in Table 6.1).  This is enhanced not only by the 
revolutionary history, but also by past experience, and has been a persistent feature 
driving French foreign policy: 
 
1 While there are no state run religious schools allowed in France, private church schools are not illegal 
and the Catholic Church has long supported many of these (McMillan, 1992). 
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‘For more than two hundred years, (since the French Revolution, if not 
since the time of Louis XIV) the idea of playing the role of nation phare 
had tempted the French, and history had given them a sense of national 
importance in international affairs.  Expressed in the famous mission 
civilizatrice of colonialism, this particular French feeling of national 
eminence, if not superiority, was carried through into the Fourth 
Republic and remained embedded in the country’s consciousness 
notwithstanding the experience of World War II.’ (Gordon, 1993, p.16). 
 
Thus, the French state uses selective historical examples to reproduce its own image of 
superiority.  When this is applied as a factor in foreign policy it has the effect of 
normalizing the search for power and influence for France by diminishing the relative, 
imagined, status of others. 
 
Therefore, central to the outlook of France is its belief in its right, or even 
destiny, to achieve ‘greatness’ and the status of a ‘world power’, this is the first of the 
factors operating at the global scale (Table 6.1).  Both these terms are constructed 
through binary discourse and assume the existence of an inferior ‘Other’, compared to 
which France is ‘greater’ and more important in world politics.  After the Second World 
War, this status was no longer so easily achieved by a country that had been devastated 
by occupation, and now had to adjust to a world in which there were two competing 
superpowers.  Macridis (1992) describes the problem: 
 
‘Thus the dilemma confronting France’s post-World War II 
governments and political elites was either to accept the situation as it 
developed after World War II or to continue to seek “greatness” and 
“rank” without the physical, military and economic resources to 
implement it.’ (p.34). 
 
French values and the sense of superiority that they generated would not allow an easy 
acceptance of the situation; instead they implied the need for the continued search for 
‘greatness’ and ‘rank’. 
 
This was sought more determinedly after the return of De Gaulle and the 
formation of the Fifth Republic in 1958.  Under the leadership of ‘The General’ France 
became the only country to withdraw from the military structures of NATO in 1966 
(Stevens, 2003, p.19), a policy resulting from the geopolitical code that defined France 
as an independent actor in charge of its own relations with the superpowers.  
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Independence is the second factor in the global column (Table 6.1).  Nevertheless, 
France did remain within NATO, and continued to be aligned closely with the West, 
attempting to sustain its independence while still achieving security.  Moïsi (1989) 
describes the activities of France during the Cold War: 
 
‘Whenever the global East-West crisis assumed a character of urgency, 
the French rallied behind the United States (as in the Berlin, Cuban or 
Euromissile crises).  Whenever East-West tensions receded, the French 
played their own cards toward Moscow in a dual effort of differentiation 
from the United States and of competition with respect to West 
Germany.’ (p.212). 
 
Despite the longstanding geopolitical codes, French policy-makers could not ignore the 
reality of the changed situation.  As Agnew and Corbridge (1995) described, a 
relationship exists between reality and discourse.  Policy-makers had to work within the 
constraints of the Cold War conflict, and consequently construct discourses through 
their representations that made ‘sense’ of the Cold War world, and the actions they were 
taking within it.  However, their agency was not completely detached from the 
discourse through which they understood the world.  Therefore, where the 
circumstances allowed, the French code prioritizing independence was accommodated 
within the confines of the binary conflict, allowing France to follow policies of 
engagement with the USSR separate from the Americans. 
 
Perhaps the most notable policy application of French independence was the 
acquisition of an independent nuclear deterrent (Table 6.1).  So important was this that 
it became symbolic as a representation of the ‘greatness’ of France as well as of its 
independence from the United States in the realm of security.  Macridis (1992) says of 
the ‘force de frappe’:  
 
‘Their atomic and nuclear weapons – the force de frappe, the French 
have insisted, should not be counted as part of the allied nuclear force – 
irrespective of whether it relates to European deployment involving 
intermediary missiles, INF, or strategic talks involving intercontinental 
ballistic missiles.  Their force is not integrated; it is independently 
targeted.  It can come into play only when vital French interests are 
involved.’ (p.53). 
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Once again, in this passage, the distinctive French discourses and geopolitical codes are 
made apparent.  France did not conform to the American code that represented the 
world as two blocs led by superpowers; the French code placed France in the role of a 
‘world power’ that could act independently within this conflict.  It therefore required its 
own nuclear weapons as the ‘ultimate discriminants of “superpower” or “great power”’ 
(Luke, 1989, p.222), and these must be under its full control rather than considered part 
of a Western bloc. 
 
In neorealist terms, and with an identity based on difference from the ‘Other’, 
French geopolitical codes are heavily influenced by the supposed Threat from external 
‘Others’.  Most prominent in this regard over the last century are Germany and the 
Soviet Union.  Sharing a border with Germany and the experience of invasion and 
occupation, made this Threat prescient in the construction of French codes and 
dominated geopolitical thought in the country, this is the first of the factors operating at 
the regional scale (Table 6.1).  Post-War codes were driven primarily by the need to 
eliminate the potential for future invasion by Germany.  Thus: ‘The fact that the Soviet 
Union had gained a foothold in the heart of Europe did not alter the traditional French 
reflexes; Germany was the enemy of France.’ (Macridis, 1992, p.35).  Furthermore, he 
adds: 
 
‘Among the French political elite (even when public opinion seemed in 
favor of unification), the realization that a united Germany – with over 
75 million people and economic and financial resources far superior to 
those of France – was again to emerge in Europe aroused anxiety and 
fear.’ (p.62). 
 
This suggests a continuation of the influence of the German Threat discourse upon 
geopolitical codes from the immediate post-War period right up to the end of the Cold 
War.  Despite the fact that France and Germany had become close allies, the fear of the 
German ‘Other’ was still present for some, with the potential for influencing the 
construction of post-Cold War geopolitical codes. 
 
Although France did not immediately view the USSR as the main Threat, the 
reality of the Cold War could hardly be ignored (it is the second regional factor in Table 
6.1).  Macridis discusses the positioning of France between the Soviet Union and the 
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United States in the 1980s: ‘The Soviet menace appeared far worse to the French than 
the American presence, and perhaps for the first time since the Cuban missile crisis in 
1962 did a president of France come so close to the American strategic concerns.’ 
(p.55), and: ‘…under Mitterrand the French military posture became increasingly 
Atlanticist.’ (p.55).  While this statement reproduces negative representations of the 
Soviets, it also demonstrates the role of the Atlantic Alliance in French thinking, 
particularly under Mitterrand.  This alliance was always important in terms of security, 
first from Germany and then from the Soviets.  It was, however, an alliance that France 
wished to maintain on its own terms, in common with the demands for independence 
and ‘greatness’, but also given the direct experience of invasion that highlighted the 
reality of the Threat (Atlantic Alliance is in the global column of Table 6.1). 
 
It is the search for ‘greatness’ and independence, added to the imperative to 
neutralize the German Threat, which underpins the French position on European 
integration (Table 6.1).  Through the vehicle of Europe, France can maintain a 
detachment from America, and also adopt a leadership role that its ‘superiority’ 
demands.  Gordon (1993) lists the main reasons for France’s adoption of European 
integration: 
 
‘…a federal Europe would (1) prevent European nations from resuming 
the internecine warfare that had destroyed them twice in three decades; 
(2) provide a means for controlling Germany, the country seen as most 
responsible for this bloodshed; and (3) help create a counter-weight on 
the Eurasian continent to the newly threatening Soviet Union.’ (p.13). 
 
The historical experience of war, and in particular the Threat of Germany, was central to 
the emergence of European integration, but so too was the perceived Threat of the 
USSR and the determination to have an independent means of security resisting the 
binary division of the world. 
 
A European entity, in the vision of French policy-makers, gave France an 
opportunity to achieve the ‘greatness’ and ‘world role’ that it craved.  France, they 
believed, had a ‘natural’ right to be a leader in the new Europe (Table 6.1).  Thus: ‘The 
common market suggested the possibility that a larger European “whole” could be 
placed under the leadership of France, armed with atomic weapons that were denied to 
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Germany by virtue of the Paris accords.’ (Macridis, 1992, p.44).  The Common Market, 
later to become the European Union, consequently provided a mechanism through 
which France could potentially gain greater influence in the world, as its national 
mythology suggested it deserved.  To accomplish this it required a leadership role in the 
developing organization, and indeed that same mythology implied that this was a right 
that France would inevitably obtain. 
 
It follows from this that the Europe France attempted to create was one that was 
independent from the super-powers.  If Europe were to be the means by which France 
could establish itself as a ‘world power’, then it would also have to adopt the French 
demand for independence.  Defarges (1989) points out that: ‘France has always 
promoted the idea of a European Europe, with its own voice, particularly in East-West 
relations.’ (p.233).  Furthermore, Moïsi (1989) remarks: ‘In a famous and ambiguous 
statement about a Europe that would stretch from the Atlantic to the Urals, de Gaulle 
constituted a perfect negation of the enduring ideological nature of the East-West 
divide.’ (p.218).  The notion of a European Europe is an extension of French attempts to 
break out of the binary Cold War world by creating a third pole, and resisting attempts 
by the super-powers to carve up Europe.  Thus, the Cold War representations, familiar 
in American geopolitics, are disrupted in France by the introduction of a third actor with 
France at its head.  This is not to say that binary representations are absent, as a 
(neo)realist state, France is built upon such discourse.  However, in the French 
perspective, there is more than one ‘Other’, even if some seem more ‘threatening’ then 
others.  A European Europe is thus a vital factor in post-War French geopolitics, and 
constitutes the final factor at the regional scale (Table 6.1). 
 
Resistance to the division of the world in binary terms also informs the French 
commitment to multipolarity (Table 6.1, column 3) that developed in the Gaullist years.  
French policy-makers, in line with their world power ambitions, and their determination 
to maintain French independence, envisioned a world in which countries, and groups of 
states, would be able to act outside the control of the super-powers.  Smouts (1989) 
refers to this multipolar strand in French geopolitics: ‘The efforts of the developing 
countries to organize themselves into a non-aligned political force coincided with the 
Gaullist ambition of a multi-polar world in which middle-range powers would have a 
margin of maneuver next to the two superpowers.’ (p.239).  Underlying this statement 
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are the French geopolitical codes of the time, constructing a vision of a world in which a 
number of potential ‘middle-range powers’ might emerge as poles with influence.  This 
conditioned the reactions, and policies, of France towards the creation of the non-
aligned movement and the developing world generally.  However, it cannot be 
understood without taking account of the important part that French colonial history 
(Table 6.1) has in relations with developing countries. 
 
Until its breakup in the post-War years, France had one of the largest empires of 
the European states, demonstrating, in the minds of powerful French actors, France’s 
position as a ‘world power’, by reinforcing the perception of ‘greatness’.  Thus, 
decolonization was not an easy process, nor was it the end of the close connections with 
former colonies, particularly in the Middle East and Africa.  Smouts argues that: ‘She is 
probably the least successful in integrating the psychological consequences of 
decolonization.  Her ambitions of grandeur still feed on the dreams of distant horizons.  
She cannot imagine herself powerful without a presence beyond her borders and an 
influence overseas.’ (p.235).  The imperial past is crucial for the French sense of 
‘greatness’ and this, supposedly positive, history can still be drawn upon today in the 
construction of geopolitical codes, reproducing the self-image of a ‘world power’ 
requiring a global role. 
 
While France is not alone in having an imperial past that impinges upon its 
present geopolitics, it does have circumstances that make the relationship unique.  The 
way in which France administered its colonies had huge implications for decolonization, 
but also for the relationship with immigrants from its former colonies.  Macridis (1992) 
explains that: 
 
‘Its cementing ideology was that of “assimilation” – the notion that 
ultimately every inhabitant would become a French citizen to be 
represented in the French Parliament – a notion at marked variance with 
the Anglo-Saxon conception, according to which political and cultural 
evolution of the colonial peoples would ultimately bring about political 
autonomy and self-government.’ (p.38). 
 
This concept encapsulates the binary of Occident and Orient that Said (1978) discusses.  
When interpreted through such discourse, France was considered to be superior due to 
its Republican values; the inferior Oriental ‘Other’ was colonized to help it to 
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‘improve’.  In accordance with the principle of ‘one France’, when the ‘Other’ reached 
the level of advancement supposedly achieved by France, the colonies would become 
part of France rather than governing themselves.  In practice there was considerable 
variation in the extent to which this occurred.  Algeria, in contrast with most other 
colonies, became a departement of France.  However, the Algerians then fought a war 
for independence.  This war had an enormous impact on France, precipitating the end of 
the Fourth Republic and bringing De Gaulle to power in 1958 (McMillan, 1992, p.162), 
and only ending in 1962 (p.161). 
 
Where possible, France has continued to take a close and active interest in its ex-
colonies in Africa.  This is symptomatic of the belief that ‘greatness’ comes only 
through a world presence and furthermore, through the French worldview, it justifies 
such a presence.  Macridis (1992) says: 
 
‘Without much publicity and with little rhetoric, France has maintained a 
military presence in her former colonies and especially in Equatorial and 
Western Africa… …Of all Western powers, France has been the only 
one to manage a continuing oversight over the former colonies in the 
African continent and beyond.’ (pp.54-55)2.
In addition, France has attempted to retain close ties and influence with the Middle East: 
 
‘Franco-Iraq ties in the late 20th century rest on the twin foundations of 
oil and trade.  Iraq is the principal country of the Arab Mashreq and the 
Gulf with which France has had strong economic ties throughout the 20th 
century.  This is due to the roots of the French oil industry originally 
lying in the 22.5 per cent stake in oil concessions in Mesopotamia, 
sequestered from Germany and awarded to France at the end of the 
1914-1918 war.’ (Styan, 2004, p.373). 
 
Thus, the presence and connections that France has maintained, even after the apparent 
end of its Empire, are important, not only in economic terms, and in their contribution to 
the reproduction of France’s self-perception as a world power, but also in the impact 
that these relationships have on the geopolitical codes that France has constructed 
during the Cold War, and since. 
 
2 France still retains three military bases in Africa at Abidjan, Dakar, and Djibouti, although there were 
previously more (Howorth, 2001, p.170). 
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I have already pointed to the alternative position that France took in the Cold 
War, where it engaged with the non-aligned movement.  The impact of the colonial 
relationships contributed to this code, as French policy-makers believed that the country 
had an interest in the developing world, one that they could continue to derive benefit 
from, especially in Africa and the Middle East.  Thus: 
 
‘France has become particularly sensitive to the need for dialogue 
between the industrialized and the developing countries, thanks to the 
precariousness of her sphere of influence, the increasing tensions in the 
Middle East and along the shores of the Mediterranean, the vulnerability 
of her overseas territories to the convulsions around them, and the co-
existence at home between French and North Africans, epitomizing 
many of the aspects of North-South relations.’ (Smouts, 1989, p.241). 
 
French foreign policy towards the developing world is written through geopolitical 
codes that are constructed in the context of various factors including the delicate 
position it finds itself in as regards its remaining colonies and presence in Africa and the 
Middle East – particularly the area around the Mediterranean, given its proximity to 
France.  This area is also prominent in French thinking, as Smouts points out, due to the 
large number of immigrants who originate there, and have settled in France. 
 
The last factor is immigration (Table 6.1).  While the countries of origin in the 
past tended to be in Europe, since the Second World War, and particularly since the end 
of the Empire, immigrants have come from former colonies.  Large numbers of people 
have arrived from North Africa, especially Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.  Thus, they 
have different cultures and also religion, with most being Muslims, from the majority 
population in France.  In response to this substantial North African immigration, which 
has contributed to France having the largest Muslim population in Europe, and also 
Islam being the second largest religion in France (Hargreaves, 1995, p.118), there has 
been a reaction against immigration and the granting of citizenship.  This has been led 
by the far right, particularly the National Front, but has also permeated more widely into 
French politics and society (Weil, 2001, p.211).  Driving the animosity towards the 
immigrant population is the question of assimilation that underpinned the colonial 
project itself.  The argument put forward by those opposing immigration is that the 
North Africans are too different culturally to assimilate as the Europeans have 
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supposedly done in the past; this, they argue, is at odds with the principles of the French 
‘Self’. 
 
The concepts of secularism and ‘One France’, derived from the Republican 
values, construct a unique context for the relationship with immigrant communities.  
Thus: ‘In the assimilationist view, French policy towards these immigrants has been an 
attempt to integrate them into society by translating into practice the ideal of the French 
nation-state, as derived from the Enlightenment and the Revolution.’ (Weil, 2001, 
p.221).  As such: ‘It implied the idea of unilateral adaptation of the immigrant to the 
laws and customs of France and of the French.  It also implied the idea of the superiority 
of French culture and national identity and the need for a sort of cultural excision of the 
immigrant’s own identity and culture to permit adaptation into French society.’ (p.222).  
As France, when understood through the discourses and narratives underpinning the 
‘Self’, is said to be indivisible, it is difficult to reconcile this with the existence of a 
number of distinct cultures and groups.  In addition, the sense of superiority that exists 
around French values and culture produces a belief that those wanting to live in France 
and become citizens should change to become ‘French’ rather than retain their own 
identity. 
 
Consequently, there have been considerable internal strains, as some sections of 
society perceive the Muslim population to be resisting integration to the French whole.  
This was particularly apparent in the debate over the wearing of headscarves by Muslim 
girls at school3. Tensions have also arisen in relation to events outside France, for 
example the occurrence of a number of bombings connected to the conflict in Algeria.  
There is, therefore, a connection between these internal strains and relations on a global 
scale.  The challenge posed to the traditional view of the national ‘Self’ by the different 
cultural practices of immigrant populations are replicated on the global scale when 
engaging with former colonies, and indeed North Africa and the Middle East generally.  
Hence, these internal experiences are an important factor in the construction of 
geopolitical codes, particularly in the post-Cold War period.  The factors set out in 
Table 6.1 that have been discussed here, therefore continue to be relevant to the 
 
3 This issue first came to prominence in 1989, but has persisted since (Weil, 2001, p.224).  The argument 
that has been made is that this religious symbol contravenes the secularism of state schools despite the 
fact other religious items have been permitted. 
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construction of geopolitical codes today as they have been in the past, impacting, as 
they do, on the three scales at which French geopolitical codes are defined.  
Consequently, they must be considered as the context for the following discussion of the 
post-Cold War/post-September 11th period. 
 
After the Cold War – A Disordered World 
 A notable feature of French post-Cold War representations is the repeated 
identification of a range of unrelated Threats.  This is, of course, familiar from Britain 
and America.  These representations depict instability, a world where it is unclear where 
Threats come from or what they might be, the common denominator is the disorder 
from which they apparently emerge.  Mansbach (2003) argues that: ‘The essence of a 
globalising world consists of increasingly porous political boundaries and the declining 
relevance of physical distance and the growing autonomy capacity of non-state groups.’ 
(p.20).  Therefore, when understood through neorealist discourse, the new non-state 
Threats are considered to be all the more threatening because of their networked nature.  
They are threatening to the ‘inside’ in a way that states are not, as boundaries are not 
guaranteed to stop them.  When opening the Tenth Ambassador’s Conference in 2002, 
Foreign Minister Domminique De Villepin offers an assessment of the nature of the 
Threats, and how they operate: 
 
On top of these long-existing problems, we now have new threats fuelled 
by the world’s instability: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and organized crime.  These are leading to the emergence of 
new players taking advantage of the deficiencies in the world order: 
States, Mafias, terrorist groups.  All these changes are working in their 
favour; the new law of the world, the network, is familiar to them.  The 
Silk Road of ancient times has become a maze of open routes: not just 
trade routes, information highways and migration trials, but also drug 
dealing, arms trafficking and terrorism routes.  Finally, the globalized 
economy, lacking rules and law enforcers, provides them with many 
entry points. (De Villepin, 2002a) 
 
Presenting all these actors and networks through the discourse of Threat, he constructs 
the idea of an incredibly complex world of threatening actors all being supported by 
globalization, and the trans-national networking that it facilitates.  The lack of order, 
and thus the instability that this represents, are the perfect conditions, he argues, for this 
tangle of Threats to thrive.  France has, of course, a persistent perception of Threat 
Cooperation and Independence: Geopolitical Codes of French ‘Greatness’ in the Post-Cold War World 
241 
coming from the outside, firstly from Germany and then from the USSR, there is 
therefore an assumption that some new Threat will emerge, but this cannot be specified, 
leading to the vague sense of a threatening disordered world.  Rostoványi (2002) claims 
that: ‘The rapid increase in the number of non-state players and their explicit aspiration 
for direct participation in international relations is an obvious “threat” to the state 
violence monopoly.’ (p.76).  These Threats can pass through borders and appear on the 
inside, as was shown by September 11th, and therefore the discourse of Threat is 
reinforced by the danger made obvious by this unpredictable, un-realist nature. 
 
Figure 6.1 shows a comparison of discourses pre-September 11th, and 
demonstrates how Threat is second only to Order/Disorder during this period.  
Order/Disorder is consistently in the background informing representations of a world 
lacking in order and predictability, and therefore dangerous, hence the Threat discourse.  
While Positive/Negative is apparent, the other discourses are negligible. 
 
After September 11th the Threat becomes more specific, and so it is the 
Positive/Negative binary that dominates (Figure 6.2).  Order/Disorder and Threat do not 
become the leading discourses again until 2002 (Figure 6.3) when the immediate impact 
of the attacks has subsided, and the focus has moved from characterizing the actions of 
the terrorists back to the general sense of a dangerous outside.  In 2003 (Figure 6.4), 
and 2004 (Figure 6.5) Order/Disorder, Threat and Positive/Negative remain the most 
common discourses, although there is a tendency for these to be in fewer documents 
than previously.  The passage of time since September 11th is a likely explanation for 
this, but their continued relative prominence is a result of the importance of the terrorist 
Threat, and the supposed Threat from the disordered outside generally. 
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Figure 6.1 
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Figure 6.2 
 
Occurrence of Discourses in 2001 Post-September 11 (France)
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Figure 6.3 
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Figure 6.5 
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In light of this representation of the post-Cold War world, in French foreign 
policy, it falls to the West to bring order to those parts of the world that lack it and 
constitute a Threat.  A sentiment emphasised by Jacques Chirac during President Bush’s 
visit to France in May 2002, when unity of purpose is stressed: 
 
Strengthened by their long-standing endeavour to achieve peace, 
democracy and prosperity, the United States and France, the United 
States and Europe, must undertake together, as partners, to eradicate the 
scourges that form the breeding ground of wars and hatred.  Our enemies 
today, let us make no mistake about it, include poverty and oppression 
and entrenched conflicts.  They include the unconscionable ravages of 
AIDS and the serious harm that is being done to the ecological heritage 
of our planet. (Chirac, 2002b) 
 
An Organic narrative appears here.  It never dominates (See Figure 6.6), but is 
important nonetheless.  The Threats are presented as being able to ‘breed’, like weeds or 
diseases in an environment of disorder.  The conditions identified in the French vision 
are focused on poverty and actual disease, in addition to the oppression more familiar in 
American representations.  This should be considered in the context of the French 
colonial experience.  Then, as now, French policy-makers saw France’s role as going 
into disordered parts of the world, improving them, and bringing order.  Thus, in French 
IO – Inside/Outside OD – Order/Disorder PN – Positive/Negative 
SO – Self/Other EW – East/West 
GE – Good/Evil TH – Threat 
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rhetoric, mere military solutions to the ‘breeding grounds’ are insufficient as the nature 
of the problem is to a great extent tied up with poverty.  Talking in such terms allows 
the French government to seek support from developing countries and in so doing 
differentiate it from the American position.  This could be used to reinforce French 
interests and influence in these countries as a distinct European state pursuing 
independent policies from those of America. 
Figure 6.6 
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To an extent, it is the East that these problems are focused on, although it would 
be wrong to overemphasise this, as the East/West binary is not prominent compared to 
the other discourses (see Figure 6.7).  This is particularly so prior to September 11th,
however there is little change after this point either (Figure 6.8).  It does rise to more 
than 15% of documents in 2002, reflecting the characterization of the September 11th 
terrorists as coming from the East.  Given the tendency in French representations to 
resist the bi-polar Cold War world, it is, perhaps, not surprising that this East/West 
binary remains relatively weak.  In addition, France has interests in the Middle East that 
it wished to protect, and also its own substantial Muslim population originating 
primarily from North Africa.  To continually emphasise a negative image of the East 
would be contrary to these interests and to internal stability.  However, the discourse is 
still present, for example, in the following passage from an interview of President 
Chirac in the L’ Orient Le-Jour newspaper in October 2002: 
BT – Battle Against Terrorism EU – European Unity CR – Collective Responsibility
OG – Organic   GC – Global Community WY – World Democracy 
WD – Weapons of Mass Destruction HV – Humanist Values 
GP – Global Player  MP – Multipolarity 
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The Middle East is at the heart of an arc of crisis stretching from the 
Eastern Mediterranean to South-West Asia: an area rife with political 
divisions and with rich and poor countries and the haves and have-nots in 
society living side by side.  We all remember the large number of 
domestic and international conflicts which have shaken that region for 
over fifty years. (Chirac, 2002d) 
 
The ‘arc of crisis’ appears to epitomize the sort of dangerous and disordered space that 
is represented in the French vision of the world, and again resonates with the concepts 
of ‘shatterbelts’ and ‘rimlands’.  The Order/Disorder binary is combined with 
Inside/Outside and, to a lesser extent, East/West, familiar from colonial and Cold War 
discourses, to construct an unstable and dangerous space.  This corresponds with Said’s 
(1978) Orientalism where the Orient is inferior to the Occident, a characterization 
central to colonial understandings; here again it runs through Chirac’s representations of 
the East.  Instability in developing countries also has particular resonance for France, 
given its continuing presence, and connections with its former colonies.  From the 
French perspective, only by intervening to improve the conditions in these countries can 
the Threat be diminished. 
 
Figure 6.7 
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Figure 6.8 
The East/West Discourse Over Time (France)
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September 11th and Refining the ‘Other’ 
As in other countries, in the immediate aftermath of September 11th, the 
discourse of Threat became less evident, Positive/Negative dominating instead (Figure 
6.2). The terrorist ‘Other’ could be distinguished from the ‘Self’, drawing upon the 
apparent evidence of such a dramatic event to justify representations.  Figure 6.9 
compares Threat and Positive/Negative over time, showing how Threat is reduced as 
Positive/Negative increases.  After 2001 Threat again becomes more prominent as the 
September 11th attacks now provide a dramatic example around which the danger of 
terrorism can be constructed.  At the same time Positive/Negative gradually falls away, 
the passage of time after September 11th reduces the prominence of the events, and 
those responsible, in representations, affecting the frequency of the discourse.  
Nevertheless, the clearer characterization that is now possible based on the events 
means it never reaches the low levels of before. 
 
There is also an increased use of the Good/Evil binary in the months following 
September 11th, a discourse that had not previously been apparent.  Figure 6.10 shows 
the change in Good/Evil over time, clearly depicting the concentration after September 
11th. By referring to Figure 6.2 it is shown that Good/Evil is also one of the more 
notable discourses at this time, but compare this to Figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 and the 
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change in relative position in later years is clear, Good/Evil reverts to being a very 
minor discourse.  It is therefore not central to the French construction of the terrorist 
Threat, but merely a minor contributor to the general theme of negativity. 
Figure 6.9 
The Threat and Positive/Negative Discourses Over Time (France)
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Figure 6.10 
The Good/Evil Discourse Over Time (France)
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The negative image of the terrorist is built by making connections with the 
Threats of the past.  Chirac deploys this technique in an interview with the International 
Herald Tribune in 2002: 
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Bin Laden founded an organization whose aim is to impose his idea of 
Islam: an idea that also happens to be very perverse, false, aggressive and 
very far from what Islam is in reality – a religion of peace, like all 
religions – but the idea that that man wanted to impose is his own idea of 
it.  We’ve seen this process in other, very different circumstances – think 
of Hitler, for example. (Chirac, 2002a) 
 
These characteristics are emphasised to put the terrorist beyond any acceptability, and 
then the link is made to Hitler, a vanquished enemy of the past, and a figure that has 
come to represent ‘evil’.  By linking Bin Laden and Hitler the former takes on the 
depraved characteristics of the latter.  Germany has relevance for France due to its 
wartime experience, and as I have noted, this has been an influential force behind 
French post-War geopolitics.  Thus, the hatred felt for Hitler is linked to the new Threat, 
creating a sense that they come from the same source; they are ‘negative’, ‘threatening’ 
and even ‘evil’. 
 
The historic link also allows a contrast to be constructed between the values of 
the ‘Self’ and the lack of values of the ‘Other’ which, in this logic, threatens those 
values: 
 
The century which has just ended had already revealed to us the 
monstrous nature of the demons which can lurk in the human soul.  We 
now have dreadful confirmation that people still exist who are capable of 
perpetrating crimes against humanity, against the universal conscience of 
mankind – quite simply against life itself. (Chirac, 2001b)4
In this case the Threat is not merely physical, but one to more abstract concepts of life 
and humanity, consequently the terrorists are de-humanized, as it is they who threaten 
humanity so they cannot be thought of as part of it.  This in turn adds to the sense of 
their menace.  It is worth reflecting again on the definition of terrorism given by Corlett 
(2003, p.119).  Definitions tend to work through neorealist discourse, allowing only the 
state to use violence and requiring a prior moral code that may not be accepted by the 
terrorist.  By implying that there is some universal code, as Chirac does, it is possible to 
place the terrorist outside it.  This is entirely compatible with the French privileging of 
 
4 This passage comes from a speech by President Chirac shortly after September 11th, on the 19th of 
September 2001.  He was speaking in Washington D.C. to ‘The French Community’. 
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Republican values.  As the terrorists do not follow these values they are assumed to be 
opposed to life and threatening to the ‘Self’. 
 
This is apparent in speeches in the immediate aftermath of September 11th. On a 
visit to the United States5 on the 18th of September, Chirac proclaims that: 
 
…we are determined, utterly determined, to do everything necessary to 
wage an effective battle against this new type of absolute evil which the 
President talked about a moment ago: terrorism. 
 
And I also wanted to tell them, that France is ready and waiting to 
discuss all the ways and means of making the fight against terrorism 
effective and enabling us really to eradicate this evil of our time.  
(Chirac, 2001a) 
 
By characterizing terrorists as being ‘evil’ the ‘Self’ is reinforced as being ‘good’, this 
supports the more frequent Positive/Negative binary (Figure 6.2), and therefore the 
construction of the concept of the ‘evil’ and threatening terrorist, who is completely the 
opposite of the ‘Self’.  If the terrorist is ‘evil’ then they are completely beyond 
acceptability.  Gilbert (1994) points out that: ‘The innocence claimed for the terrorist’s 
targets underlies the fact that they, unlike the terrorists, are following out the “accepted 
codes of behaviour” within a legitimate political system.’ (p.50).  Applying the logic of 
Dalby (1990) in respect of the Cold war, the construction of the terrorist in this way 
implies that the Threat must be eliminated, justifying practically any response.  
However, France today and Cold War America are very different, and ‘The identities 
and interests of actors arise out of historically-specific contexts of action.’ (Agnew, 
2001, p.44).  Consequently, the circumstances do not necessarily provoke a French 
drive towards a military response. 
 
Reviving Other Threats: Iraq and WMD 
 By 2002 the events of September 11th were more distant and another Threat 
came to prominence, combining with terrorism to create a greater danger – that Threat 
was Weapons of Mass Destruction.  Given that France opposed the war with Iraq, this 
may seem surprising, but in the build up to the war WMD became a major narrative.  
 
5 This may be important in terms of his use of similar language and representations as the Americans, 
hence his use of the Good/Evil binary. 
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The French opposition to the war was not in fact absolute, coming instead from the 
different perspective from which France approached the situation compared to America 
and Britain.  Styan (2004) argues that: 
 
‘While France rejected any automatic link between Iraqi concealment of 
weaponry and military invasion, it should be stressed that a key plank in 
the French position was refusal to rule out participation in military 
action if Iraq did not comply with new weapons strictures.’ (p.380). 
 
Thus, France was prepared to consider war under certain circumstances, as it had done 
in 1991, but it was a course of action that the French government wanted to avoid as it 
did not conform to its interests and strategy in Iraq and the region more generally.   
 
As was noted above, France has historic economic ties with Iraq, a relationship 
that has impinged on its policies towards the country, added to this was its wider policy 
of building good relations with Arab states:  
 
‘While France’s historic relationship with Iraq, a legacy of close oil and 
trade ties in the 1970s and 1980s, does in part explain the manner in 
which Paris, uniquely among OECD states, did shift against sanctions in 
the later 1990s, such bilateral ties with Baghdad were not the primary 
reason for the French stance against military action in 2002-2003.  Yet 
broader considerations linked to the long-standing and nebulous notions 
of a “Gaullist” French “Arab policy”, with which Jacques Chirac 
identifies, including notions of self-respect and sovereignty for Arab 
states, did play a role.’ (Styan, 2004, p.383). 
 
This variation in policy from that adopted by Britain and America conforms to the 
French tendency to take an independent line from that of the hegemon, and to 
characterize itself as an alternative world power more in tune with the interests of 
developing states.  It is therefore this vision, alongside economic interests in the region 
that drove the anti-war policy of the French government in 2003 rather than any 
aversion to war.  France shared the concerns about WMD, but its historic associations 
with Iraq and other Arab states shaped its policy of promoting weapons inspections over 
military action for as long as possible. 
 
Figure 6.11 shows the Weapons of Mass Destruction narrative over time.  It is 
relatively rare before September 11th, and immediately afterwards is even less 
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noticeable.  However, from 2002 it becomes one of the most dominant narratives as the 
build up to the Iraq war begins, and the Threat of the terrorist is widened and 
embellished.  After the war, there is a slight drop, but it remains a major narrative.  
Figure 6.12 compares it to other narratives in 2001, post September 11th, contrasting 
this with Figure 6.13 shows that whereas it was barely noticeable in 2001 it became one 
of the most important in 2002.  In Figure 6.14 it is shown that this trend continues in 
2003 – the year of the war – when it is the second most common narrative, and it is still 
the fourth most frequent in 2004 (Figure 6.15). 
Figure 6.11 
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Figure 6.12 
Occurrence of Narratives in 2001 Post-September 11 (France)
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Figure 6.13 
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Figure 6.14 
 
Occurrence of Narratives in 2003 (France)
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Figure 6.15 
Occurrence of Narratives in 2004 (France)
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This was not simply a response to the messages from America; France too 
represented Iraq as a part of the Threat.  For example in September 2002 De Villepin 
spoke to the UN General Assembly: 
 
Here is a country that has defied the authority of the Security Council 
and flouted international law for several years.  Here is a regime that is a 
grave threat to security, especially the security of the peoples in the 
region because of the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and whose conduct is the direct cause of the great suffering 
endured by its people. (De Villepin, 2002b) 
 
Furthermore, this was not just for the UN audience, as he wrote the following in the 
French newspaper Le Monde on the 1st of October: 
 
Yes, Iraq is a potential threat to the region’s and international security.  
Yes, the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
presents an essential challenge for the future of every one of us.  Yes, 
Iraq has defied the international community by concealing programmes 
concerning these weapons: if she does not yet have nuclear capabilities, 
all the indications make us think that she has reconstituted biological and 
chemical capacities. (De Villepin, 2002c) 
 
BT – Battle Against Terrorism EU – European Unity CR – Collective Responsibility
OG – Organic   GC – Global Community WY – World Democracy 
WD – Weapons of Mass Destruction HV – Humanist Values 
GP – Global Player  MP – Multipolarity 
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Iraq’s supposed WMD capabilities are presented primarily as a Threat to stability in the 
region.  Given the French determination to have a presence in the Middle East and 
around the Mediterranean, they are likely to be concerned about the implications of 
states acquiring WMD, but also of the impact of a war, and its effects on their influence 
relative to that of America.  This is of particular relevance in the case of Iraq a country 
that, as we have seen, France has had close ties with.  Van der Wusten and Dijkink 
(2002) comment: ‘The French have always been active players in two arenas 
simultaneously, the European and the global…’ (p.34), a situation that France’s leaders 
attempt to maintain.  The French worldview is influenced by considerations of influence 
and presence, as well as attempting to maintain stability.  Thus, a military approach is 
not the first choice for France in this case. 
 
Responding to the Threat: A Battle Against Terrorism 
 Whereas in America the ‘obvious’, ‘common sense’ response to September 11th 
was to begin a war, in line with historic patterns (Stephanson, 1998), in France the 
context is different, and so the reaction to terrorism also varies.  At first glance the 
representation and narratives are very similar.  Figure 6.12 above, shows the narratives 
in 2001, post-September 11th; it is clear that Battle Against Terrorism (I have given it 
this name to emphasise the differences in this French narrative from those of The United 
States and Britain) is the dominant narrative at this time.  Figure 6.16 shows that before 
the attacks it is a very minor narrative, but immediately afterwards it peaks, before 
declining to around 40% in the following years.  This is indicative of the impact of the 
event, allowing the government to develop its responses in the knowledge that these are 
likely to be accepted.  This effect continues to a lesser degree with the passage of time. 
 
On the 12th of September 2001 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Vedrine 
spoke at an Extraordinary E.U. General Affairs Council in Brussels: 
 
We are all determined to be firm, resolute, in a relentless fight against 
terrorism, against everything that fuels it, and determined to eradicate it. 
(Vedrine, 2001) 
 
Emphasising the positive characteristics of the ‘Self’ in the ‘fight’, he leaves no room 
for doubt that there will be a major campaign against this ‘enemy’.  Thus, the narrative 
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is close to that of the United States.  This might be expected so soon after the event and 
to this international audience, when an effort is being made to show international unity, 
and when the impact is still fresh, however it should be noted that the term ‘war’ is not 
used here, instead it is a ‘fight’. 
Figure 6.16 
The Battle Against Terrorism Narrative Over Time (France)
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This is of great significance; clearly ‘war’ does not sit easily with the French 
version of this narrative.  Hence, on the 18th of September, on a visit to the United 
States, President Chirac addresses the point directly: 
 
I don’t know if we should use the word “war”.  What is certain is that we 
are dealing with a new kind of conflict, one which is critically important 
for upholding human rights, freedom, human dignity, and that everything 
must be done to protect these essential values which are those of our 
civilization. (Chirac, 2001a) 
 
The term ‘conflict’ is used instead of ‘war’.  Although a war is a conflict, a conflict is 
not necessarily a war; the fact that Chirac makes this distinction suggests that he does 
not think, or does not want, this conflict to be a war.  For Chirac to say this in the 
United States demonstrates how clearly France diverges on this matter.  As in the Cold 
War, he is trying to mark out a distinctive position for France rather than become 
subservient to the American policy.  Winn (2003) notes that: ‘France, one of the most 
ardent proponents of a European identity separate from America, has often been the 
most assertive of its own foreign policy autonomy, even when this insistence contradicts 
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the positions of its European partners.’ (p.54).  For France, it may be a ‘conflict’ and a 
‘fight’, but it is not a ‘war’, and therefore the nature of the actions involved is 
potentially different.  By bringing in the narrative of Humanist Values, Chirac develops 
this difference by tying the conflict to a set of values said to be under attack.  This 
connects with France’s Republican values.  By suggesting these are under Threat, it 
becomes easier for policy-makers to argue for a particular form of response. 
 
These are the foundations on which the French ‘Battle Against Terrorism’ is 
built.  By 2003 it can be more clearly articulated by Dominique de Villepin: 
 
Because in recent years it has taken on a strategic dimension, the terrorist 
threat calls for a global response.  We have to tackle it head-on, with all 
the resources at our disposal: military, police, judicial, financial and 
intelligence.  Then we have to fight the scourges on which terrorism 
battens, from regional crises to chronic poverty.  For terrorism breeds on 
the running sores of the world.  It feeds on feelings of injustice, 
humiliation and incomprehension.  This is why there can be no lasting 
solution without resolute action against these hotbeds of crisis, and a 
tough and courageous dialogue between the parties concerned.  In the 
long term, there is no more solid bulwark against fanaticism than a 
genuine sharing among peoples and religions. (De Villepin, 2003e)6
De Villepin places Battle Against Terrorism alongside Humanist Values that must be 
adopted if order is to be restored.  Terrorism ‘breeds’ in the disorder that is caused by 
poverty and injustice, and therefore any Battle Against Terrorism, according to the 
argument, must encompass an effort to resolve these problems.  This cannot be read in 
purely altruistic terms, it must be remembered that France is conscious of its world 
presence in developing countries, and also of its large Muslim population. 
 
‘France’s ambivalent relationship to her ex-colonies, particularly 
Algeria, and her fear of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism or 
intégrisme, has created tension within French society, with immigrants of 
Islamic origin being stereotyped as “fundamentalists” or “terrorists”.  
The global political context even before the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 gave support to those who saw Islam as a threat to 
the security of Western countries, with events such as the Gulf War and 
the rise of fundamentalism in Iran, Algeria, and elsewhere only adding to 
 
6 De Villepin was speaking to the Eleventh Ambassadors’ Conference in Paris, on the 28th of August 
2003. 
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the fears of the French concerning the dangers that Islam posed to their 
country.’ (Freedman, 2004, p.6). 
 
Therefore, the French government does not want the American ‘war on terrorism’ to 
destabilize parts of the world that it considers itself to have a special role in, nor does it 
want unrest at home by being associated with unpopular actions in Muslim countries, 
particularly in North Africa, having already experienced bombings connected with 
events in Algeria.  Add to that the economic interests of France in the Middle East and 
North Africa, and there is a further imperative for avoiding destabilising or 
unnecessarily antagonising governments in the region.  The subtly different narrative 
from that in America or Britain leads to an emphasis on different methods and to less 
war-like language, while still following the same broad objective.  France could, 
therefore, participate alongside the United States in Afghanistan, while representing the 
wider conflict in its own unique way, just as in the Cold War. 
 
Defending French Values 
 The Republican values, at the foundation of the French ‘Self’, are assumed to be 
universally positive and suitable for adoption at the global scale.  These values are 
rooted in positive historical references of the French nation, most notably the 
revolution: 
 
As you know, the French Revolution at the end of the 18th century was a 
great source of strength for France – people still talk about it today.  It 
made France the first country to say that the imperatives of equality and 
fraternity were essential imperatives for the organization of the world, 
and that liberty – liberty, equality, fraternity – were vital imperatives for 
a modern world and the respect of human rights.  Today, I believe, that 
message must be brought to the international level: liberty, equality, 
fraternity.  Adapting it, of course, to the modern world. (Chirac, 2002a)7
Given that the values of ‘liberty’, ‘equality’ and ‘fraternity’ play such a central role in 
the representation of France as a nation and as a state, in as much as the state is 
supposed to encapsulate these, then they will be constructed as positive attributes.  
France is defined as separate from the ‘Other’ by virtue of the Republican values.  The 
effort to apply these values externally appears to make sense in a (neo)realist state 
 
7 This quotation comes from an interview in the International Herald Tribune on the 28th March 2002. 
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where, following Connolly (1991), the positive identity of the ‘Self’ is dependent on the 
negative characterization of the ‘Other’. 
 
These values are believed to be under Threat from terrorism, and thus they are 
invoked as a justification for fighting terrorism: 
 
In the present circumstances, we must ensure more than ever before that 
we maintain our national unity by upholding the values of the republican 
pact.  It’s precisely these values which terrorism wants to repudiate by 
causing chaos, doubt and division in our democratic societies. 
 
In the battle against terrorism, our commitment to our founding 
principles – those of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 
and of our republican motto – is our greatest strength. (Jospin, 2001b)8
Before a domestic audience, the Prime Minister is contrasting the positive values, which 
France represents, and the chaos that the terrorists allegedly want.  Huntington (1996) 
recommends that the unique Western civilization must be protected from the non-West.  
For Jospin, it is French civilization, as it is unique and superior, according to the 
national mythology.  He draws on the Humanist Values narrative to support the 
continued reproduction of the nation by constructing a Threat to these values.  If the 
values are threatened then so is the ‘Self’, and perhaps even civilization. 
 
Consequently, it is not enough for France to protect these values; it must act to 
have them enshrined at the global scale.  Hence, Dominique de Villepin declared to the 
United Nations in March 2003: 
 
Regardless of the example you take, be it the 1789 Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen or the abolition of slavery by Victor 
Schoelcher, France has been guided by an ideal.  She has long placed 
civil and political rights at the very heart of her action.  Because these 
constitute mankind’s common heritage, they must be recognized by 
everyone. (De Villepin, 2003b) 
 
The Humanist Values that have guided France since the revolution are not unique; they 
are ‘mankind’s common heritage’ and therefore are for the whole world to adopt.  In 
line with the history of French foreign policy, France must actively pursue their 
 
8 This is a passage from a speech to the National Assembly on the 3rd of October 2001.  
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adoption by continuing its search for ‘greatness’ in a post-September 11th world.  A 
focus on these values is a convenient and effective means of re-emphasising the contrast 
with America that French elites wish to draw, especially at the time de Villepin is 
speaking.  It can be used as a means of strengthening national unity and, as a useful 
product of this, support for government policy.  Furthermore, for a global audience it 
reinforces the idea of France as a non-hegemonic alternative to which they can align.  
France can further the promotion of its Humanist Values through the principle of 
collectivity. 
 
Collective Responses 
 Collective Responsibility is the narrative that encapsulates this.  As is evident 
from Figure 6.17, the narrative is limited before and immediately after September 11th.
However, as the response to the attacks is developed, Collective Responsibility appears 
consistently in about a third of documents.  This corresponds with Humanist Values, 
which also became more apparent at this time.  They are related, in that the French can 
only bring their influence and values to the world if a collective approach is adopted.  It 
is also a result of the belief that this is a way in which the new Threat can be combated 
without destabilising the developing world, in which France wishes to retain its 
influence. 
Figure 6.17 
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Thus, France insisted on a collective approach to Iraq, agreeing that it posed a 
Threat, but not supporting a war.  At the beginning of the war, on the 20th of March, 
President Chirac says the following in a broadcast: 
 
…France, true to her principles – primacy of the law, fairness, dialogue 
between peoples and respect for others, - will continue to do what she 
can to ensure that fair, long-term solutions are found to the crises bathing 
the world in blood or threatening it, through collective action, i.e. in the 
framework of the United Nations, the only legitimate framework for 
building peace, in Iraq as elsewhere. (Chirac, 2003) 
 
Collective action, agreed through the United Nations and underpinned by a set of rules 
and principles, is the only ‘obvious’ way, through the French worldview, of resolving 
the world’s problems, such as the question of Iraq.  France could not accept an 
American dominated solution, as this would deny it the influence that its ‘greatness’ 
demands; only a collective response would meet these requirements.  In addition, there 
was the complication of close French relations with Iraq, and the opportunity to 
rhetorically position France apart from the Americans, sustaining the relationships that 
it has nurtured in the Middle East, North Africa and the developing world generally.  By 
insisting on collective action these relationships could be protected and the French 
desire to pursue an independent path from America could be met.   
 
The Collective Response has developed from the perceived need for France to 
forge an independent foreign policy, with influence and ‘greatness’ in a world in which 
French values are enshrined.  Hence, the Humanist Values and Collective 
Responsibility narratives are frequently found together.  Following the Iraq War, de 
Villepin sets out this combination of values and collectivity: 
 
Our country embodies an original and determined vision founded on 
three objectives: the primacy of the political; the demand for action 
guided by the principles of solidarity, justice and respect for the Other; 
the necessity, finally, of an international order based on collective 
responsibility. (De Villepin, 2003e)9
In an earlier article in Le Monde, on a similar theme he said: 
 
9 De Villepin was speaking to the Eleventh Ambassadors’ Conference in Paris on the 29th of August 2003. 
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…Collective responsibility is a moral and political necessity.  Moral, 
because democracies become totally meaningless if they fail to honour 
abroad the principles underpinning them at home.  Political, because only 
collective decisions secure the legitimacy necessary for far-reaching, 
coherent and effective action.  Force can be only a last resort. (De 
Villepin, 2002c) 
 
Political solutions and their collective application can bring order to the world according 
to De Villepin.  This French vision does not preclude force, as in Afghanistan, but it is 
‘a last resort’, and can only be taken collectively if it is to have any legitimacy.  Inside 
and outside are blurred by expanding the values of the inside to actions on the outside, 
but neorealism is not abandoned; France, as a state, is still at the heart of considerations 
and must not be subsumed into some collective whole.  It was the French imperial aim 
to ‘improve’ ‘Others’ until they could be part of France – an indivisible France.  The 
application of Collective Responsibility as a means of influence is not new to France 
either, as it has been adopted in the process of European integration.  Therefore, by 
insisting on collective decision-making, France can play a part in global decisions, just 
as they have in Europe. 
 
The European Pole 
In the post-War period, France has been involved in the European project from 
the start, and therefore considers itself to be a central part of the Union, not just as an 
organization, but also in the philosophy and reasons underpinning its existence.  There 
is a clear vision of what Europe is and what it means.  This follows from France’s 
rationale for European integration – constraining the German Threat and creating a 
vehicle through which France can acquire greater influence globally, thus guaranteeing 
its independence from the superpowers.  Boyer (1998) says:  
 
‘For the French, the European construction is far more than a free 
market agreement.  It is, above all, a political project whose objective 
is the creation of an unprecedented historical union between countries 
which have been at war so many times in the past and which are now 
confronted with many challenges requiring common, integrated and 
unified policies, particularly in defence and foreign affairs.’ (p.99).   
 
The French vision of Europe puts the values that they wish to instil in a Global 
Community at the foundations of the regional community.  Furthermore, for France, 
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Europe does not simply begin with the formation of an organization through the Treaty 
of Rome; it stretches as far back as the Enlightenment, and is an idea as much as a 
practical arrangement. 
 
This is evident when Dominique de Villepin reflected on the past and future of 
Europe, in the Senate in November 2002: 
 
Above all there was the emergence of a European humanism, enriched 
by dialogue and interchange built of tolerance and openness, which is the 
hallmark of the European spirit.  And it is the same spirit which must 
inspire us today in the enlargement process.  We shall thereby be doing 
nothing other than returning to the noblest springs of European thought, 
the source of our honour and our originality, of what impels us to keep 
faith with our illustrious ancestors, what makes ours a continent of 
liberty and solidarity. (De Villepin, 2002d) 
 
De Villepin presents Europe as an idea and a formation built on Humanist Values, and 
as such it is understood through the Positive/Negative discourse as a positive body.  
Consequently, a European ‘Self’ is constructed that embodies this European humanism 
and has a European spirit.  Scott (2002) notes that: ‘Both the definition of Europe as a 
“region” and of “Europeanness” as an element of identity-formation are subject to very 
different interpretations, often influenced by national and local experience.’ (p.149).  
Hence, these, supposedly, European values show an extraordinary similarity to those 
attributed to France. 
 
This is demonstrated by the references to historical participation of France and 
French statesmen in Europe’s foundations: 
 
The Royal jurists have bequeathed to us the concept of general interest; 
the Revolution proclaimed the idea of human rights; Robert Schuman 
and Jean Monnet founded the European dream; since time immemorial, 
our country has been called upon to work for the universal, the defence 
of values today essential for world peace and stability. 
 
Haunted by centuries of fratricidal wars and two self-destructive world 
wars, we have learned the lessons of these tragedies by creating a united 
Europe.  Within it, countries which, too often, had waged war against 
one another, such as France and Germany, now enjoy relations of deep 
and sincere friendship.  Their cohesion is generating a stability which is 
spreading throughout a whole continent.  This unique experience has 
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taught us the extent to which the emergence of strong regional entities is 
conducive to stability and peace. (De Villepin, 2002a)10 
A link is made from French history, and the values it bestowed on the country, the 
founding of European integration by French statesmen, and the Europe of today.  In 
essence, the Humanist Values of France are considered, in French representations, to 
have been adopted and replicated at the European scale.  Europe’s historical experiences 
of war have prompted it to seek this unity and it has in turn brought peace by following 
humanist principles.  Regional unity has, it is suggested, led to order spreading across 
Europe, and therefore this provides a suitable model for the world, but it is French 
values that are at the root of this project. 
 
If the benefits that Europe has gained from integration are to be offered to the 
wider world then it is essential, according to the French position, that Europe as an 
entity plays a greater role in the world, just as France did in Europe.  This will in turn 
provide France with greater influence in the world. 
 
Hence, Dominique de Villepin said on a visit to Ireland in January 2004: 
We want Europe to be a pillar of tomorrow's world, to wield genuine 
influence over the course of events and to shoulder its responsibilities 
wherever its presence is desired and required. Therefore, it must 
imperatively establish a fully-fledged foreign policy and an autonomous 
defence capability. That is essential if we are to respond, in our 
interventions, to the demands of today's world and the new threats it 
harbours with the requisite flexibility and transparency vis-à-vis each of 
the member States. (De Villepin, 2004) 
 
The need for Europe to be an independent regional pole necessitates its development as 
a Global Player, hence the use of this narrative.  Schnapper (2002) claims that: ‘The 
European nations are too small and too weak to assert themselves alone in world affairs.  
Together and united, they can retrieve some of their power.’ (p.7).  As such, and in the 
French view, Europe must develop Foreign and defence policies and capabilities 
consummate with such a power.  This will give it, and through it France, far greater 
influence at the global scale. 
 
10 This passage comes from de Villepin’s speech to the Tenth Ambassadors’ Conference, in Paris on the 
27th of August 2002. 
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Figure 6.18 
The Global Player and European Unity Narratives Over Time 
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Therefore, European integration has remained relevant after the Cold War.  The 
European Unity narrative has been occurring with considerable regularity since before 
September 11th (see Figure 6.18).  The September 11th attacks have caused a further 
increase in the occurrence of the narrative as responses were developed, indicating the 
importance that Europe held for France in solving the terrorist problem, and in meeting 
the perceived Threats of the post-Cold War world generally.  The focus on the Threat of 
WMD in 2003, and the divisions over this, may explain the drop in that year, but by 
2004 the narrative was once again dominant by a substantial margin (see Figure 6.15).  
The demand for Europe to develop a more influential role in the world precipitates the 
Global Player narrative.  It is not unusual in relation to Europe, if relatively limited 
overall, and follows approximately the same pattern as the other narrative (Figure 6.18).  
For France, this reflects the purpose of Europe – a formation through which France can 
continue to have a world role.  Thus, when sovereignty is shared at regional level, when 
Europe takes on powers on the international stage, these are not powers lost to France, 
but rather an increased influence for France, and of French values, in the world. 
 
A Multipolar World 
 In the French vision, the European pole is one of several in a multipolar world.  
This is not a new concept, as multipolarity was an aim for France during the Cold War.  
Such a system would, it is thought, provide the mechanism through which French 
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influence could achieve practical results, and provide an alternative to the bi-polar 
world of the Cold War, or the post-Cold War uni-polar world.  A multipolar vision does 
have the potential of undermining or contradicting the concept of Collective Responses 
to global problems like international terrorism. 
 
The narrative of Multipolarity can be related closely to a second – World 
Democracy.  As democracy is closely associated with the values that France allegedly 
seeks to proselytise, World Democracy also has an important role to play in the 
representations.  These narratives are, however, relatively limited (see Figure 6.6), 
although Multipolarity becomes more widely identifiable as time goes on (Figure 6.19).  
Again, this reflects the developing policies of France on the terrorist Threat.  As the 
country resists the tendency for America to dictate the responses, it continues to 
construct an alternative vision that would give France greater influence. 
Figure 6.19 
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The divisions over Iraq were symptomatic of this French interest in responses 
based around a Multipolar World Democracy.  Speaking to the UN Security Council 
prior to the war in March 2003, Dominique de Villepin argues: 
 
Yes, we too want more democracy in the world.  But we will achieve this 
objective only within the framework of a true global democracy based on 
respect, sharing, the awareness of a true community of values and a 
common destiny.  And its heart is here at the United Nations. (De 
Villepin, 2003a) 
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The Humanist Values and Collective Responsibility narratives are drawn on here to 
support the narrative of World Democracy as a non-military alternative and, they would 
argue, more effective means of delivering democracy to the disordered parts of the 
world.  The institution through which this can be achieved is, De Villepin claims, the 
United Nations.  This connection between World Democracy and the UN demonstrates 
how De Villepin attempts to use this idealistic vision to gain support for, and ultimately 
deliver, French policies, in this case with respect to Iraq. 
 
The United Nations is after all only an organization through which issues can be 
discussed and agreements made, and thus the French vision does not ignore the 
practicalities of (neo)realist states, even if it does re-work the (neo)realist interpretations 
of their relationships.  Consequently, there is an acceptance that there will be fewer 
major actors or ‘poles’; it is around these, that the new system of organizing the world 
would be structured.  In a speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in 
London, on the 27th March 2003, de Villepin says: 
 
To be truly stable, this new world must be based on a number of regional 
poles, structured to face current threats.  These poles should not compete 
against one another, but complement each other.  They are the 
cornerstones of an international community built on solidarity and unity 
in the face of new challenges. (De Villepin , 2003c) 
 
The worldview is, therefore, of a number of regional poles, working collectively in a 
World Democracy, following rules and principles, and tackling the disorder that leads to 
Threats.  In a similar manner, Held (1996) argues that: ‘Globalization denotes a shift in 
the spatial form of human organization and activity to transcontinental or inter-regional 
patterns of activity, interaction and the exercise of power.’ (p.340).  However, despite 
the similarities of a Multipolar system to that of the Great Powers of the past, the 
elements of Humanist Values, Collectivity and Democracy would, the French suggest, 
make this a very different formation and remove any contradictions in the system.  
Actually fulfilling this goal of Multipolar World Democracy through the UN or any 
other avenue is unlikely in the near future, if ever, a fact politicians like De Villepin will 
be aware of.  This points to a certain rhetorical and opportunistic motive behind such 
remarks; at the time of the Iraq war, presenting an alternative vision of the world could 
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reinforce the image of France as different from, and even superior to, the United States 
when speaking to both domestic and international audiences opposed to the war. 
 
A Global Community 
 The Multipolar system is encapsulated in the concept of a Global Community.  
Such a community could extend many of the principles that France has found so 
attractive in Europe to the global scale, and introduces a more structured system for 
tackling global issues such as terrorism.  Crucially it allows countries like France to 
play an active part, rather than being dominated by the American superpower.  
America’s simple view of coalitions of convenience is far removed from the French 
position, which envisages a more permanent structured system of states working 
together and governed by rules.  In this respect it has parallels with the British Global 
Community concept. 
Figure 6.20 
Change in the Global Community Narrative Over Time
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The Global Community narrative appears consistently throughout, even before 
September 11th (Figure 6.20).  It reaches a peak in 2003, the year of the Iraq war, when 
the greatest divisions are apparent in the world, threatening the prospects for this 
community.  At that time America appeared to be acting unilaterally without 
consideration of what other countries thought, and therefore France’s need for 
Cooperation and Independence: Geopolitical Codes of French ‘Greatness’ in the Post-Cold War World 
269 
‘greatness’ required that it push for a more influential role, one that could be found in a 
Global Community. 
 
Prior to the Iraq War the Prime Minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, in a speech to the 
National Assembly, warned of the dangers of acting unilaterally: 
 
The war, obviously, would weaken the coalition against terrorism.  This 
is a major consideration for us.  An international community was created 
against terrorism in the wake of 11 September.  A war would weaken 
that coalition.  It would provoke – and this must give everyone food for 
thought – an upsurge in terrorism at the very time when we need 
precisely to fight this scourge which threatens us all, over there as here. 
 
Over and above that, a war would rock the international order by 
undermining collective security and multilateralism, by the primacy 
accorded to the doctrine of pre-emptive action over the principle of 
legitimate defence. (Raffarin, 2003) 
 
The coalition, in this representation, is essentially a product of a Global Community of 
rules and values, thus to break those rules is to undermine the foundations on which the 
coalition is built.  It is not, as in the American understanding, a coalition which can be 
sustained for one purpose but ignored for another; all the actions of states are thought to 
be within the context of the Global Community and therefore breaking its rules damages 
the whole structure. 
 
Dominique de Villepin expressed the vision of a Global Community to a 
domestic audience in August 2002: 
 
In a complex environment, where everything hangs together, everything 
interacts, where states are no longer alone, a safer world has to be one 
which is at peace.  In an international society, which, increasingly, forms 
a real community, its use must integrate the new demands for 
democracy, freedom and respect for the law.  In open societies, aspiring 
to total control increasingly appears an illusionary ambition, as costly as 
it is dangerous.  Power now flows through channels of influence rather 
than those of authority. (De Villepin, 2002a)11 
11 This extract comes from a speech to the Tenth Ambassadors’ Conference in Paris, on the 27th of August 
2002. 
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Once again it is entwined with Humanist Values.  These values form part of the image 
of a different kind of world in which states are not the only actors, but are joined by 
actors that cross borders and form networks making them less easy for states to control.  
In such a world it is not possible for states to act alone without destabilizing the whole 
system.  As McGrew (2005) says: ‘The sovereign power and authority of national 
government – the entitlement of states to rule within their own territorial space – is 
being transformed but by no means eroded.’ (p.33).  By maintaining rules in a 
community, French policy-makers believe a level of control can be achieved, and values 
protected.  As such, it gives France a greater role both in itself, and through a European 
pole. 
 
Conclusions 
 France is, therefore, attempting to forge geopolitical codes appropriate for the 
new circumstances that it is faced with, but in doing so it cannot be detached from the 
influences that have driven its worldviews over a much longer period of time.  Simple 
(neo)realist models are increasingly insufficient to explain events, and yet France cannot 
abandon (neo)realism; as a state itself, to deny (neo)realism is to deny its own continued 
existence.  It can however adapt its codes, as it has done in the past.  Enlightenment 
thinking was at the foundations of realism, and it has also been shown to be at the roots 
of the modern French nation.  French post-Cold War geopolitics is set firmly in this 
context. 
 
As the Soviet Union no longer posed a Threat, discourse changed, but the binary 
division between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ remained.  This was reflected in the 
(neo)realist division between Inside and Outside, and the Order/Disorder binary to 
which it is related.  Thus, the end of one Threat did not mean that all Threats were 
eliminated in French interpretations.  However, initially the sense of Threat was vague 
and multiple, the only common feature being that it came from the ‘outside’ as with the 
German and Soviet Threats of the past. 
 
September 11th was the event that allowed the Threat to become more specific.  
Although this was not a state enemy it could nevertheless be characterized in a negative 
way, just as those in the past had been.  Indeed, historical references to past enemies 
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allow the characterization to make ‘sense’ and become acceptable.  Despite this, 
terrorism was still not the only Threat; significantly Weapons of Mass Destruction came 
increasingly to the fore, but by being discussed alongside terrorism an implied link 
could be developed.  This too was a Threat from the ‘disordered’ ‘outside’ and was 
therefore linked by its common source. 
 
France responded to the September 11th attacks by arguing that a Battle Against 
Terrorism was necessary.  This narrative allowed for a variety of policies including 
military action, but focused more upon political methods.  Such an approach 
corresponds with French concerns for its own internal stability given its large Muslim 
population, its interest in the stability of the Mediterranean region, and its determination 
to retain influence over events in the Middle East.  This in turn is connected to French 
sensibilities about ‘greatness’ and independence of foreign policy.  An alternative policy 
would have to be founded upon French Republican values that are so central to French 
identity.  This is important as the terrorists were represented as being a Threat to these 
values, and consequently they must be a Threat to the unity of the French nation.  In 
these circumstances it becomes possible to justify particular policies, be they military or 
otherwise.  These must involve the spread of French values to the rest of the world, as in 
the colonial period.  From this is derived the Humanist Values narrative that was so 
common in the representations. 
 
It has also become clear that a narrative of Collective Responsibility is used 
when discussing solutions to terrorism.  It applies, not only to the political methods that 
France promotes, but also to decisions regarding military action, as in the example of 
Iraq.  France considers it necessary for states to act collectively and to take decisions in 
this way when confronted by Threats rather than follow the neorealist approach.  This 
goes beyond the American Coalition Against Terrorism.  However, France is acting in a 
neorealist manner here; by enshrining collectivity in world politics, France can gain 
greater influence.  It can, therefore, more easily sustain its own independent foreign 
policy, achieving ‘greatness’, while retaining an alliance with America.  In essence 
France is trying to introduce the collective decision making to the global scale that it has 
found so rewarding at the European scale. 
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European integration has been a central part of French geopolitical codes since 
the Second World War.  Thus, a narrative of European Unity is very common in 
discussions in the post-Cold War period.  Europe has given France the opportunity to 
assume leadership at the regional scale through its structured, collective decision 
making.  It has also brought peace to the continent, removing the Threat of Germany.  
France believes its values have been encapsulated within the European Union, allowing 
it to gain more power and expand its influence beyond its own borders to a wider 
European ‘Self’.  Hence, France wants to see Europe gain more power in the world by 
adopting foreign and defence capabilities, becoming a Global Player.  This will 
guarantee Europe’s independence from America, a fixation of France since the Cold 
War, and through it the independence of France. 
 
This European pole would be one component of a multipolar world, hence the 
narrative of Multipolarity.  This is a principle that has again been driving French 
geopolitics since the Cold War.  The loss of power that France felt in the bi-polar Cold 
War world is replicated in the uni-polar post-Cold War world, thus the solution remains 
the same, to develop other poles of power.  Between these poles, France believes the 
world can be ordered, and Threats that now cross borders can be more easily tackled by 
adopting the collective approach at the global scale.  France itself gains, both in the 
common good of a less threatening world, and by having more influence over events. 
 
From Multipolarity comes the concept of the Global Community.  This goes 
beyond neorealist states working together in coalitions and alliances, and suggests a 
more permanent and structured world.  It does not mean the end of states and conflicts, 
as these are the components of the community, however it does involve a far greater 
level of collective decision making.  France considers that such a community would 
embrace the values that it believes are universal, and create a democratic and collective 
system for managing global problems.  It could achieve at the global scale what 
European integration has at the regional scale.  Furthermore, and perhaps most 
importantly, France could play a central role, its tendency to ‘greatness’ could be 
fulfilled and its independence guaranteed. 
 
A French discursive structure can therefore be identified (Figure 6.21), that 
follows the familiar layered pattern of those from the United States and Britain.  
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However, as has emerged, it includes French narratives that, when combined with the 
agency of influential actors, engage with and adapt the discourses and each other.  It is 
through this structure that the French geopolitical code is constructed and ‘makes 
sense’. 
Figure 6.21 
Diagram of the French Discursive Structure 
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from the unity of France; the defence of the former provides the grounds for the latter.  
Integration continues to lie at the heart of France’s geopolitical code at the regional 
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Community of rules, democracy and values.  Hence, through this geopolitical code, 
France believes that the world can become more ordered and safer by eliminating the 
non-state and state actors that provide Threats in the post-Cold War world.  At the same 
time such policies would guarantee France the independence and ‘greatness’ that it has 
sought over a far longer period. 
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Chapter 7
. . . . . . .
Comparing Europe and America: the 
Regional Experience as a Context for 
Distinctive Sovereign States 
. . . . . . . .
Introduction 
 The last three chapters have each examined the construction of geopolitical 
codes in a specific state.  In so doing, they have offered little reflection on the 
similarities and differences between these codes and how they have been produced.  In 
this chapter I intend to rectify this by comparing the discourses and narratives that 
underpin representations of terrorism in the United States, Britain and France, and the 
geopolitical codes to which these contribute.  This will be approached with the principal 
aim of advancing the discussion regarding the questions of whether there are common 
European codes, and what differences exist between Europe and America. 
 
The United States, Britain and France have been shown to have distinct, though 
not completely unrelated, geopolitical codes.  America’s codes operate at national and 
global scales.  Isolationism is combined with expansionism to spread American values 
and eliminate Threats.  Britain is torn between two competing codes, encompassing 
three scales.  The contradiction is between integration and pooling of sovereignty at 
regional and global scales, or more limited cooperation that leaves Britain free to act 
independently to spread liberal values around the world.  France has a more singular 
code that again operates at three scales.  Integration is central to French codes regionally 
and globally, as a vehicle for spreading French values and influence, and bringing order 
to the world. 
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There are, therefore, clear variations between each of the state’s codes, but also 
parallels.  To analyse and explain these it will be necessary to consider the three states 
from a critical realist perspective.  In other words, they are sovereign states constructed 
through neorealist, and therefore modernist, discourse, but at the same time the 
relevance of discourse in their construction and representations, and the impacts of other 
actors cannot be dismissed.  Regionalization, and possible layered governance, in 
Europe is of particular interest in terms of this research, and the aims of the chapter.  
For example, Held (1996) argues that: ‘…within the EU sovereignty is now also clearly 
divided: any conception of sovereignty which assumes that it is an indivisible, 
illimitable, exclusive and perpetual form of public power – embodied within an 
undivided state – is defunct.’ (p.347).  If this is so, the implications for the formation of 
geopolitical codes may be considerable.  The comparison should therefore help to reveal 
the extent to which these changes are encouraging a common European geopolitics 
derived from the shared experience of regional governance, with the caveat that only 
two states are included in the analysis. 
 
As was discussed in chapter two, the effects of regionalization cannot be 
assumed to be even across all competencies.  In other words, the existence of common 
policies and integration in some areas, such as the economy or environmental policy, do 
not automatically produce or indicate the presence of similar layered governance in 
foreign and defence policy.  Thus, while regional governance exists in Europe and there 
have been attempts to expand into the generation of a common foreign and defence 
policy, these are considered important to the sovereignty of the state and are more 
limited and contested in terms of their adoption by the regional layer.  This is a 
reflection of the complexity of layered governance, where the boundaries between 
layers are often indistinct.  To question the existence of common geopolitical codes is 
therefore predicated on there first of all being a geopolitical presence of note of Europe 
as a region, as opposed to the states alone.  This could also have implications for the 
way in which regionalization impinges on the states and their geopolitical codes. 
 
In light of this, the comparison should allow conclusions to be reached as to the 
effect or otherwise that regional or multi-layered governance has on the geopolitics of 
the state.  Hettne and Söderbaum (2002) reflect: 
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‘One helpful way of conceiving the ongoing restructuring of the nation-
state and the new governance structures is to understand the Westphalian 
state as a “bundle” of functions, loyalties and identities, some of which 
in the new global situation are becoming delinked from the state level 
and associated with other political levels shaping a multilayered political 
landscape in which other actors than the state are also gaining strength.’ 
(p.42). 
 
Whether or not there are common European codes, an evolving layered governance in 
Europe potentially changes the way in which state codes are constructed.  Therefore, 
comparing Britain and France with the United States should provide an insight, not only 
into how the specific historical and political contexts of these states affect the 
geopolitical codes that are constructed, but also into the effect that regionalization, as 
exists in Europe, has had on the representations made at state level, and ultimately on 
how geopolitical codes are constructed. 
 
In addition, this chapter attempts to reflect on how effective the codes adopted 
by the United States, Britain and France have in fact been.  As was noted in chapter 
three, the enacting of discourses can be considered to be performative: 
 
‘Performative means that discourses constitute the objects of which they 
speak.  For example, states are made possible by a wide range of 
discursive practices that include immigration policies, military 
deployments and strategies, cultural debates about normal social 
behaviour, political speeches and economic investments.  The meanings, 
identities, social relations and political assemblages that are enacted in 
these performances combine the ideal and the material.’ (Bialasiewicz et 
al, 2007, p.406). 
 
The speeches and other documents that are discussed in this thesis can therefore be 
considered to be performances that invoke, and make meaningful and ‘known’, 
discourses in the respective states.  Following Bialasiewicz et al, the ideal of the state is 
combined with the real or the material in terms of events, institutions and structures, and 
so constituting the state (the ‘Self’) and the ‘Other’, whether it be other states or non-
state actors like ‘terrorists’.  Therefore, the ‘state does not pre-exist those performances’ 
(p.407).  Rather, it is the result of performativity that reality and representation are 
brought together through discourse. 
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 Hence, the discourses that underpin the sovereign state, and those that form the 
basis of understandings of specific states, such as America, Britain and France, 
‘constitute’ these states and the characteristics they are understood to embody and 
represent; it is only through performances that the states become real.  Equally, the 
‘Other(s)’, and the relationship of the ‘Self’ to this, emerge from the discursive practices 
that give them meanings and identities.  Again, the material realities are combined with 
ideals or imaginings.  These representations then inform the geopolitical codes that are 
constructed through discourse.  Geopolitical codes are therefore closely related to 
performativity; they are irreducible from the discourses through which they are 
constructed, and the objects that these discourses make ‘real’ are established through 
performance dependant upon by whom, where and to whom this performance is given. 
 
When the state or the ‘Other’ is constituted certain realities are written into the 
discourses, alongside these are the imaginings or assumptions that help to give the 
‘Self’ a positive character and the ‘Other’ a negative character.  Consequently, the 
likelihood is that the codes underpinned by such discourses and images of the state, and 
those of the ‘Other(s)’ to which they relate, may not always produce the expected 
results when applied to real situations.  In order to assess the success or otherwise of the 
geopolitical codes discussed in this thesis the performativity of the discourses and 
narratives of the states will be discussed as they are compared; in doing so it should be 
possible to offer some analysis on how aspects of the codes of each state have been 
applied in practice, and how effective these have been when compared with the 
understandings of that state, the ‘Other’ and the relationships between the two, as 
encapsulated in the discourses and narratives. 
 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the defining visions of each of the states.  
This is split into three sections focusing on the national, regional and global scales.  The 
purpose is to compare the narratives of each state that are used to define an idea of the 
‘Self’ and its place/role in the world, and for Britain and France – the region.  These are 
closely linked to the historical and political context, which has been shown in previous 
chapters to be so important in the construction of geopolitical codes, and as an influence 
on the political actors who make policy decisions.  Addressing these narratives at the 
start is a reversal of the structure of the three chapters dedicated to the individual states.  
The reason for this is that, having established how each state’s discursive structure 
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operates, in this chapter I now wish to demonstrate the way in which the different 
visions each state has (including the existence or otherwise of a regional dimension) 
affects the construction of the terrorist ‘Other’ and the responses to this, as much as 
these representations (re)produce the worldviews and self-images. 
 
The second section addresses the spatialization of the ‘Self and ‘Other’, a 
process identified in all three state’s representations, and based on a similar selection of 
binary discourses.  However, the analyses will reveal how the same discourses are used 
and constructed in slightly different ways in each country.  Similarly, the 
characterization of the threatening ‘Other’ displays variations in the construction and 
use of the discourses.  Analysis of this is covered in the third section.  A fourth section 
compares the responses of each state, in terms of the narrative used to underpin these, 
and how policy is affected.  By comparing the discourses and narratives, both where 
they are similar, and where a narrative is either unique or shared by only two of the 
states, it should become clearer where elements are common to all, and where the 
context is important in the construction of discourse and narratives, and therefore on 
geopolitical codes and government policy. 
 
A further section, looking at representations of terrorism by leading figures in 
the European Union foreign policy structures, will augment the assessment of possible 
European geopolitical codes.  This includes a brief outline of the history of the Foreign 
and Defence Policy element in the EU, and then an analysis of the discourses and 
narratives present in a sample of documents produced by the individuals involved.  It 
will then be possible to draw conclusions; firstly about the differences and similarities 
between the three states; secondly about whether the comparison between Britain and 
France, combined with the examination of the EU representations, provides evidence of 
common geopolitical codes; thirdly on the question of any divergence between Europe 
and the United States, and finally on the overall success or failure of the geopolitical 
codes. 
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Defining Visions – A Comparison 
The National Scale 
 Each of the states that I have studied has been shown to have narratives that 
policy-makers use in the construction of the ‘Self’.  The first is Exceptionalism, an 
exclusively American narrative.  As was explained in chapter four, this is closely tied 
up with Manifest Destiny, with its roots in the colonization of America.  As with the 
sovereign state itself, it draws from Enlightenment thought, and is central to the 
construction of a positive American ‘Self’.  Smith (2006) argues that: ‘If the 
Enlightenment promise of liberalism gestated a certain sense of manifest destiny in the 
United States, Woodrow Wilson was the first to make it truly global – to ground such an 
ambition explicitly in global and not simply international power.’ (p.7).  The 
expansionism and interventionism that became apparent in the First World War and 
increasingly after the Second World War, is therefore grounded in representations of the 
United States as Exceptional, with a divine mission to ‘improve’ the world, spreading 
the virtues that it supposedly embodies, as in the advance of the frontier.  Elazar (2001) 
says: 
 
‘American federal unity was built upon an indigenous American 
ideology which properly may be termed federal democracy, derived 
from the synthesis of the Reformed Protestant and Scottish 
Enlightenment experiences of the colonial period, and the western 
frontier encounter with American geography and the settlement of an 
open and extensive territory.’ (p.31). 
 
Exceptionalism is consequently a vital narrative in America’s construction of its ‘Self’ 
and underpinning the development of foreign policy. 
 
For Americans, Freedom is a virtue that is not only necessary for the defeat of 
‘evil’, but is only possible with American leadership.  It is, therefore, an important 
narrative in American responses to terrorism, and connects these representations and 
actions into the longer-term understandings of America’s ‘unique’ role in the world: 
 
‘While one factor in the emergence of the Bush doctrine at this time was 
the severe sense of uncertainty and insecurity occasioned by the 9/11 
strikes, its roots in fact lie further in the Administration’s past and, 
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beyond that, in some of the fundamental desires of European 
modernity.’ (Burke, 2005, p.320). 
 
Thus, while the Freedom narrative in America takes great importance post-September 
11th, and is given a divine association through its connection to Exceptionalism, there is 
also a link with the European roots of the colonialists, in terms of the Enlightenment 
thought that gave rise to the sovereign state. 
 
The Freedom narrative is, therefore, also present in British representations.  
However, in this case it is neither as frequently used, nor as important in the 
construction of the ‘Self’ and its responses to terrorism.  Figure 7.1 shows a comparison 
between the British and American versions of the narrative over the study period.  
Before September 11th it occurs in a slightly higher proportion of British documents, but 
following the attacks it becomes far more prominent in America.  As the narrative 
becomes widely used in American representations, it declines to become extremely 
limited in British equivalents. 
Figure 7.1 
Comparison Over Time of the American and British 
Freedom Narratives
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
United States United Kingdom
Pre-9/11
2001 Post-Sept. 11
2002
2003
2004
In Britain the narrative is different, it does not have the accompanying 
Exceptionalism with its religious implications; instead it is more in tune with the 
principles of liberalism that form an important component of the idea of British identity.  
Again these concepts are drawn from the Enlightenment, and are used to reinforce the 
sovereign territorial state.  The subtle difference between the two versions of the 
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narrative is shown in the following passages.  In the first, George Bush, speaking to 
Mayors and County Officials at the White House on the 24th of January, contrasts the 
‘evil’ of the ‘Other’ with the Freedom that, he argues, the American ‘Self’ represents: 
 
These are evil people that are relentless in their desire to hurt those who 
love freedom.  And since we’re the bastion of freedom, the beacon of 
freedom, we’re their target. (Bush, 2002a) 
 
Compare this with Tony Blair’s statement at the Foreign Office Conference in January 
2003, where he classes Freedom alongside other ‘values’; while these are being 
advocated as belonging to the ‘Self’, they are not exclusive or embodied in the ‘Self’: 
 
The values we stand for: freedom, human rights, the rule of law, 
democracy, are all universal values. (Blair, 2003) 
 
Freedom, in British terms, is represented as a positive feature of the British state; 
nevertheless it is not an attribute that only Britain can bestow on others (or ‘Others’), 
although it can play a part in this process.  The role of audience is also important in 
these extracts.  When Bush spoke, he did so to a largely supportive audience, whereas 
Blair had a sceptical public and members of his own government who were not 
convinced of his arguments.  Consequently, he may have felt the need to make a link to 
‘universal values’ in an effort to convince the sceptics of the validity of his policies.  
The rhetoric used in these statements therefore relates to the political position that the 
individuals find themselves in within their own states.  In order to strengthen their 
arguments they find it necessary to frame these in language that will be appropriate for 
the domestic audience, while also presenting the vision to a wider global audience. 
 
The reproduction of ‘shared’ values such as Freedom is vital in attempts to hold 
the state together.  Paasi (2003) notes that: ‘Whereas most places do not, territories – 
especially states – require perpetual public effort to establish and to maintain.’ (p.111).  
The use of historical experiences is also vital for reinforcing British identity.  For this 
reason the History narrative was apparent in British representations of the ‘Self’ and the 
responses to terrorism.  Although this was not used regularly over most of the period 
studied, it was deployed in support of an image of the country as an important actor at 
the global scale.  It therefore supports, as was demonstrated in chapter five, the more 
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frequent narrative – Global Player.  While History is only noticeable in the British 
example, this accompanying narrative is also present in the French representations. 
 
Again, the narrative differs between the two countries; in Britain it is entwined 
with the British state, its history as a ‘global power’, and the ambitions of policy-makers 
who want this to continue (and who make the assumption that it is still the case); for 
powerful French actors, as emerged in the previous chapter, the narrative is most 
commonly used in conjunction with European Unity when discussing the prospects of 
Europe as a whole being a Global Player.  This corresponds with the French strategy of 
pursuing a Europe that is clearly differentiated from, and independent of, the American 
hegemon, a Europe that offers an enhanced status and geopolitical power for France 
itself.  The two extracts below demonstrate the alternative versions of the narrative.  
Firstly, the British Prime Minister says: 
 
What are our strengths?  Part of the EU; and G8; permanent members of 
the UN Security Council; the closest ally of the US; our brilliant armed 
forces; membership of NATO; the reach given by our past; the 
Commonwealth; the links with Japan, China, Russia and ties of history 
with virtually every nation in Asia and Latin America; our diplomacy – I 
do believe our Foreign Service is the best there is; our language. (Blair, 
2003)1
In contrast the French President, addressing the Twelfth Ambassadors’ Conference in 
Paris in August 2004,  promotes the European dimension: 
 
A Europe I would wish capable of making its voice heard on the 
international stage and of assuming its responsibilities, including in the 
military field, in the framework of the European Security and Defence 
Policy and of NATO. 
 
A Europe that must be at the forefront of global economic competition 
and enjoy growth as strong as that in other regions of the world.  A 
Europe that must  strengthen its social model that is founded on justice 
and solidarity and which sets a worldwide example in this respect. 
(Chirac, 2004) 
 
For France the regional dimension is essentially an extension of France itself, 
‘greatness’ can be achieved if Europe is a Global Player.  Blair makes an argument for 
 
1 This also comes from Tony Blair’s Foreign Office Conference speech. 
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Britain as a ‘power’ that retains links around the world, and that therefore continues to 
have influence.  The more Euro-sceptic domestic audience that he must satisfy is a 
restraint on following the French approach, and thus contributes to the construction of 
the Global Player narrative as focused on the state.  Figure 7.2 reveals that with the 
exception of 2002,2 the narrative is always more frequent in Britain than in France, 
emphasising its greater importance in the construction of British geopolitical codes.  For 
the United States the assumption of an Exceptional nation, and its dominance in world 
politics, avoids any need for such a narrative. 
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At the core of representations of the French ‘Self’ are, as was discussed in 
chapter six, Humanist Values.  It encapsulates the Enlightenment values associated with 
the Revolution, in particular ‘liberty’, ‘equality’ and ‘fraternity’.  Therefore, in France 
Humanist Values cannot be removed from the Republican and revolutionary context.  
At the same time France, like Britain, must, according to its self-image, act to help 
‘Others’ to gain these values too, not to mention the strategic advantages that are 
considered by French elites to stem from this.  It is a narrative that is drawn from the 
same philosophical foundations as Freedom and, of course, the fundamentals of the 
sovereign state.  The context in each state is crucial to the construction of the narratives, 
and from these an identity for the ‘Self’.  Schnapper (2002) comments: 
 
2 This is the period before the Iraq War when France is attempting to have influence on this matter, and so 
the need for France and Europe to be a ‘Global Player’ may seem more prescient. 
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‘The Glorious Revolution of 1688 is not the French Revolution of 1789.  
The liberal British citizen is not the French Republican citizen.  The 
practical consequences and character of a particular conception of 
citizenship has always been and, for the moment, remains national.’ 
(p.9). 
 
In essence, while all three Western states developed out of modernism, and 
Enlightenment ideals of liberty and liberalism, each has a different history, and their 
own powerful figures with agency to influence events and the production of discourse 
and narratives. 
 
The idea of each state becomes possible through the discursive practices 
repeatedly performed by their elite actors: ‘Instead of there being a singular moment of 
constitution or invention that brings subjects into being, there is a process of recitation 
and repetition.’ (Bialasiewicz et al, 2007, p.407).  Repetition of Enlightenment ideals 
over a long period of time has underpinned the existence of these states and continues to 
do so in the present context.  At the same time the unique idea of each state’s identity 
has also been formed from this repetitive invocation of the discourses and narratives 
that define it.  Thus, the Exceptional United States embodying Freedom is a self-image 
that continues to be reproduced in the performance of speeches and of policies in 
relation to the terrorist ‘Other’.  For example, military interventions abroad in 
Afghanistan and Iraq conform to the American geopolitical code that seeks to follow an 
interventionist path in order to fulfil the manifest destiny of the Exceptional American 
people. 
 
This is of course an ideal vision of America and of its capabilities.  In 
performance this ideal is combined with realities of oppressive governments abroad and 
attacks such as those of September 11th to (re)establish this identity, and yet given the 
performative nature of such an identity and of assumptions of the relationship America 
has with the rest of the world, the practical results do not necessarily correspond with 
the performances.  The American invasion of Iraq for example does not entirely fit with 
this ideal, either in its conduct or in the achievement of the stated ambition of a free 
democratic country in the American mould.  In addition, there is a strong likelihood that 
actions such as this and the failure to deliver the promised benefits could increase the 
Threat to the ‘Self’ and Freedom inside America by provoking more hatred of the 
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country.  Furthermore, the very existence of such an idealistic Freedom in America 
must also be questioned, even more so since September 11th following which more 
restrictive practices and legislation (e.g. the ‘Patriot Act’) has been adopted. 
 
As with the United States, British performances involve considerable idealistic 
elements bound together with real historic relationships and real problems in today’s 
world.  Discursive practice, through performativity, materializes a state that has a 
unique position and ability to influence and improve the world as a Global Player.  
Again, however the practical results are not always what is expected from the 
geopolitical code(s). 
 
The extent to which Britain really does have influence, particularly with 
America, is doubtful; where the United States wishes to act it is likely to do so 
irrespective of the British policy on the matter.  Similarly for other states, the British 
influence may exist to varying degrees but not generally to the extent imagined in the 
self-image.  This was demonstrated in the build up to the Iraq War when attempts were 
made to gain wider support, but these largely resulted in failure.  As with the American 
case the British efforts to spread values often appear to be more imagined than real 
when applied in countries such as Iraq; the Freedom and liberal values appeared not 
much closer after the invasion than they had been before.  Perhaps the reduction in 
occurrence of this narrative after the Iraq War is not unrelated to this contradiction of 
the ideal by real events (Figure 7.1). 
 
The French self-image is repeated in the performance of speeches by French 
political elites.  However, the ability of France to operate as a Global Player with 
influence enough to promote Humanist Values has been shown to be limited where they 
are in disagreement with others, particularly the United States.  This was clear when 
France opposed the Iraq War but failed to stop it.  At the same time these Humanist 
Values are again more a discursive construction of a positive ‘Self’, made real through 
repeated performance, than an unbroken reality; France, like other states, adopts policies 
through self-interest as much as for the furtherance of a set of universal values.  Its code 
aims to enhance the country’s interests, and yet the alienation from America and Britain 
over Iraq, and the inability to stop the war going ahead suggests that these objectives 
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were not particularly successful, although greater influence with others who opposed the 
war may be a possible gain from this policy. 
 
The Regional Scale 
 Collective Responsibility is a French narrative that underpins arguments for 
more structured, rule-based, international governance, firstly at the regional scale and 
ultimately at the global scale.  French post-War European policy has followed this 
approach, the aim being to increase France’s influence and extend its Humanist Values 
beyond the state itself, sacrificing some sovereignty for these advantages.  Although it 
may be argued that: ‘…collective decision making among states involves a significant 
loss of control for individual national governments.’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, p.4), in 
the French worldview it offers greater influence both regionally and globally, and is 
therefore worth pursuing.  For French policy-makers, Collective Responsibility does not 
mean the end of the state, there is still a clear idea of French identity separate from any 
European identity, and focused around its values and a determination to seek ‘greatness’ 
and independence, especially from the United States. 
Figure 7.3 
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French representations of Europe, therefore, envisage a formation that is firmly 
based on collective principles.  This leads to a frequent reproduction of the European 
Unity narrative, one that is shared with Britain.  As Figure 7.3 demonstrates, it is 
consistently identifiable in the documents of both countries, varying more in France 
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than Britain where there is a gradual decline; in France it tends to be drawn on 
increasingly after September 11th.
French policy-makers understand the Union to be a strong actor that can operate 
in geopolitics alongside the states.  Crucially the EU is, for France, a body that 
enshrines what they see as their own values, values that ‘should’ be universal.  It is 
consequently a vital part of French geopolitical codes; a structure that can play a role in 
tackling Threats that cross borders, and can therefore be a model for global collective 
governance.  The following quote from a speech in Malta in October 2001 by Pierre 
Moscovici, the Minister Delegate for European affairs, uses this French European Unity 
narrative: 
 
… while no disorder could possibly explain, and still less justify 
terrorism, post 11 September it is more necessary than ever before to 
find solutions to the planet's problems. It is the natural role of the EU, 
whose primary purpose is to overcome the age-old conflicts which were 
tearing the European continent apart, to work for peace in the world. 
Built on a societal model based on solidarity, it is in the best position to 
promote the reduction of inequality as part of a process of globalization 
with a human face. To get this message of peace and solidarity across, 
the EU must, however, give itself the means to speak with a single voice 
on the international stage. It must become the "Europe-power" which 
France has been calling for. (Moscouici, 2001) 
 
The emphasis is clearly on a more powerful Europe, one that can, according to the 
narrative, deliver peace to the world.  French policy tends to favour European 
integration to a greater extent than Britain does.  Emphasising the advantages of 
European unity and the supposed shared values that Europeans have, indeed the very 
existence of a European identity, are crucial in the furtherance of this French 
geopolitical strategy.  This strategy of European integration as a means to enhance 
French interests and influence regionally and globally is distinct from how British 
political actors approach Europe.  The British narrative, while promoting regional 
cooperation and the advantages of this in terms of terrorism, suggests a more limited 
relationship: 
 
Co-operation with our European partners, under the EU umbrella, is a 
key element in guaranteeing our security against terrorism.  The EU 
allows us, uniquely, to combine and co-ordinate a joint response to 
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terrorism in fields as varied as foreign affairs, law enforcement, terrorist 
financing and aviation security.  In future, the EU will also assume a 
limited military role, complementary to NATO, too. (Hain, 2001c)3
This alternative incarnation of the narrative derives from the different historical policies 
and worldviews adopted by the British state.  Britain has tended to view relations with 
Europe as one of a number of global contacts that can give it influence and a unique role 
in the world.  The dilemma in the post-War period has been how to sustain this global 
outlook, and develop influence in a more integrated Europe.  When discussing Europe 
and formulating policies British policy-makers must be aware of, and respond to, the 
considerable Euro-sceptic sentiments of their domestic audience.  Politicians must be 
able to convince this audience of the validity of their arguments and the policies that 
they wish to pursue, and therefore these must fit into the longstanding vision of British 
detachment from the continent.  British strategy, in contrast to France, aims to act 
within Europe but simultaneously remain outside it, sustaining a close alliance with the 
United States.  The benefits and influence that both can bring are sought, and 
discussions of Europe and cooperation therein reflect these aims.  Thus, the advantages 
of cooperation in terms of non-state Threats are accepted by policy-makers without the 
same commitment to collective decision-making and shared sovereignty as in France.   
 
This perspective on integration has contributed to a restriction on the extent to 
which Europe has been able to acquire the attributes of a state, particularly in the realm 
of geopolitics: 
 
‘For post-World War II Europe, on the other hand, it soon became 
apparent that federation was too great a step.  Instead, there was a 
pragmatic withdrawal to “functionalism”, which would avoid explicit 
expression of the higher purposes of the unification effort.  In place of 
the use of terms like “federal” or “confederal”, terms like 
“supranational” and “political community” became the relevant political 
buzzwords.’ (Elazar, 2001, p.31). 
 
Britain and its representatives, operating through the worldviews discussed in chapter 
five, are among those who have been most resistant to deeper integration.  
 
3 Peter Hain was speaking at a meeting of the European-Atlantic Group in London on the 12th of 
December 2001. 
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Consequently, while the presence of the EU is of enormous significance for Britain as it 
is for France, the narrative that is constructed in response displays some divergence. 
 
British imaginings of European unity are performed both in speeches on the 
matter and in the approaches taken by government on moves to greater integration.  In 
both cases the relationship enacted is one of close cooperation while simultaneously 
retaining a detachment and independence.  Such a contradictory scenario is only really 
possible in these representations.  The practical results of policies underpinned by this 
British European Unity narrative, and reproduced in the performance of political elites, 
is a restraint on the influence that Britain has with other European states that doubt the 
commitment of Britain to European integration.  The unity that is sought through this 
narrative can be effective when all states agree such as in the general aim of fighting 
terrorism, but it is abandoned when disagreement exists, as in the case of the invasion of 
Iraq.  In this example European Unity was sacrificed for individual state interests. 
 
Again, for France, it is through performativity that the vision of Europe becomes 
established; in the speeches of political leaders and in the more active engagement in 
European projects, France becomes discursively located at the heart of Europe, and as 
one of its leading states pushing forward integration.  In the past this leadership role was 
indeed a real one, but in the context of a larger European Union it is somewhat diluted, 
the views of many new members favouring a less integrationist model with less 
Collective Responsibility than French governments have traditionally promoted.  Once 
again, the divisions over Iraq were the most obvious example of this, the French ability 
to lead Europe and drive deeper integration, moulding the Union in its own image, 
being brought in to question.  Indeed, in Figure 7.3 the graph shows the lowest 
frequency of use of the European Unity narrative was in 2003, the year of the Iraq War, 
a result perhaps of this more challenging time for presenting an ideal of unity when the 
reality was of deep division. 
 
The Global Scale 
 The experiences of regional integration appear to have an effect on British and 
French geopolitical codes in respect of the global scale, when compared to the United 
States.  This becomes apparent when comparing the use of narratives primarily of 
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global focus.  Two such narratives are Coalition and Global Community.  The first of 
these is shared by the United States and Britain, the second by Britain and France.  
Figure 7.4 shows the change over time of these narratives in the three states.  Coalition 
is revealed to be far more prevalent over all in the United States than in Britain, except 
for the period immediately following September 11th when British policy-makers are 
attempting to align themselves as closely as possible with America as part of the 
‘coalition against terrorism’.  Global Community on the other hand, while absent in 
American representations becomes far more common in Britain after the attacks.  This 
is a similar pattern to France, at least from 2002 onwards.  France, of course does not 
have a noticeable Coalition narrative. 
Figure 7.4 
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As I discussed in chapter four, the Coalition narrative in the United States is 
essentially realist, in that it underpins understandings of state-to-state relationships that 
are largely formed to achieve a given purpose where the interests of the states converge.  
Given that America is constructed through narratives of Exceptionalism, and virtues 
that the country supposedly embodies (e.g. Freedom), their can be no compromise in 
respect of American policy; hence Coalitions are formed only when they are 
convenient, when another state follows America’s ‘righteous’ leadership: 
 
At the same time, every nation in our coalition must take seriously the 
growing threat of terror on a catastrophic scale – terror armed with 
biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons.  America is now consulting 
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with friends and allies about this greatest of dangers, and we’re 
determined to confront it. (Bush, 2002c)4
It is ‘our’ Coalition, and it is America that takes the initiative to ‘consult’, but this is not 
part of a structured system of collective decision making; as became increasingly 
apparent in the events surrounding the war in Iraq, if members of the ‘Coalition’ do not 
agree, the United States acts unilaterally.  Thus, to speak of a Coalition, for American 
policy-makers is to a certain extent rhetorical; it would be helpful if other countries 
supported the American policy, but it is not essential for that policy to be put into 
practice.  A Coalition also gives American policies a certain respectability that helps to 
sell them to the domestic audience and to the wider global audience, but the power that 
the United States possesses as the hegemon provides the capability to enact 
interventions, military or otherwise, without being overly constrained by the interests 
and sensibilities of other states. 
 
For Britain, the Coalition is different, and tied up closely with the idea of a 
Global Community, the more important narrative.   There remains a strong neorealist 
dimension; Britain continues to aspire to the status of a major power, given its history.  
Policy-makers therefore attempt to sustain global connections in line with this 
worldview.  Britain continues to act as a sovereign state, forging neorealist 
relationships, while the cooperative structure, inherent in the regional dimension, 
impinges upon representations at the global scale.  Depicting a Global Community 
assists the policy agenda of the British government as they try to establish the 
conditions in which Britain can gain power and influence in the world beyond what it 
may be able to achieve in an anarchical state system.  This does not mean the 
abandonment of neorealist principles, but rather a strategy for the successful adoption of 
the state’s policies that accepts a degree of reduced sovereignty as the price for 
influence.  The following passage reproduces the British Global Community narrative, 
and demonstrates how this depicts a deeper relationship than the Coalition envisioned in 
American representations: 
 
This evening I suggest that there are four principles which need to 
underpin the modern idea of global community, if our world is to be 
 
4 This passage is from a speech by President Bush at the White House six months after September 11th, on 
the 11th of March 2002. 
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more peaceful and prosperous: First, that international relations must be 
founded on the idea that every nation has an obligation properly to meet 
its global responsibilities; Second, that the global community has the 
right to make judgments about countries’ internal affairs, where they 
flout or fail to abide by these global values; Third, that because our 
interests as nation states are now more entwined than ever, the global 
community must make renewed efforts to resolve those persistent 
conflicts which threaten the security of us all; And fourth, that the global 
community must play a more active role in dealing with conflicts within 
states, which in the past have been overlooked until too late. (Straw, 
2002a)5
The narrative helps to construct a vision of a more structured international system where 
the increased porosity of state borders caused by globalization is acknowledged, and 
where Threats from non-state, as well as state, actors can be challenged.  At the same 
time the existence of the Coalition narrative does not allow policy to move towards a 
point where such a structured system is completely acceptable.  Britain also has an 
American Alliance narrative.  This reproduces a neorealist relationship with another 
state, an alliance that is alleged to enhance the country’s status as a ‘great power’ and a 
Global Player.  These narratives undermine the communitarian elements of a Global 
Community, and indeed of a European Union, in British representations, making 
engagement in such structures problematic and attractive at the same time.  This 
contradiction lies at the heart of the competing, overlapping British geopolitical codes. 
 
Just as France constructs the European Union as a regional extension of its(Self), 
so too is a potential Global Community imagined in this way.  In French representations 
the narratives of Multipolarity and World Democracy are also closely connected with 
Global Community.  As I argued in the previous chapter, these two narratives work 
together in a French worldview that envisages poles such as Europe acting in a 
collective decision making system, enshrining French or universal values at the global 
scale.  This for French policy-makers is the basis for a Global Community, and is 
apparent in the extract below: 
 
Our era is torn between proliferating threats and historic opportunity: the 
chance for the international community to come together at last.  A 
modern vision is gaining ground, based on collective responsibility and 
 
5 Jack Straw was speaking at the Mansion House in London on the 10th of April 2002. 
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global democracy.  A new organization of the world is taking shape… 
(De Villepin, 2003e)6
This vision responds to the regionalizing and globalizing processes of the post-Cold 
War world, as well as to the diminished status of France.  By accepting the existence of 
a regional, and a potential global layer of governance in their codes, French 
geopoliticians appear to be moving towards multilayered governance.  However, De 
Villepin’s statement and the sentiments expressed within it should not be read as a 
vision that moves beyond the neorealist state.  France is still central both regionally and 
globally.  The Global Community does allow states like France to cope with the 
changing circumstances brought about by globalization, but it also allows France to 
present an alternative vision of the world to that of America.  In such a world the 
hegemon does not dominate to such an extent, giving states like France greater power.  
This is a vision that is expressed so as to be attractive to others, such that they might be 
more amenable to French policies and interests, and with the objective of reducing the 
power of America.  It is therefore in the interests of France that this Global Community 
is depicted, more than it is a belief in a likely move away from sovereign states. 
 
Greater multi-layered governance does not mean that the state is defunct, rather 
that the geopoliticians represent France as an important component of these layers.  Van 
der Wusten (2000) notes that: ‘The state system in Western Europe is not in terminal 
decline, but it has lost the selfevident (sic) and ever growing importance that it had 
acquired in earlier generations…’ (p.90).   For France and Britain the regional 
dimension, and the search for influence and status at the global scale, has prompted the 
production of narratives that have a more collective or cooperative character than those 
of the United States.  The regionalizing and globalizing forces that have created non-
state actors have forced the two European states to develop codes acknowledging 
changes to borders and territoriality.  However, as a product of its competing codes, and 
the choices made by political actors, British policy is less committed to the collective 
vision espoused by France. 
 
The interests of the two countries are different and they follow alternative 
strategies for advancing those interests and increasing their power.  Both make use of 
 
6 Dominique de Villepin addressed the Eleventh Ambassadors’ Conference on the 28th of August 2003. 
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cooperative systems in the hope of institutionalizing an influence in regional and global 
decision-making, but France is notably different in that its policy-makers are inclined to 
seek a separate vision from America.  While Britain keeps a close relationship with the 
United States, France tries to define an independent line and is troubled by the power of 
the hegemon.  Hence, the French worldview represents a vision of Multipolarity and 
cooperation globally, a vision that aims to attract others to its way of thinking without 
diminishing the role and the status of France as a sovereign state.  Discussions of Global 
Communities and Multipolarity must therefore be understood to be part of the strategic 
manoeuvrings of the representatives of sovereign states as much as an indication of the 
effects that regionalizing and globalizing forces are having on those states, their 
discursive structures and their geopolitical codes. 
 
While in performance French elites repeatedly identify a Global Community, 
one which enshrines a Multipolar system of World Democracy, the reality suggests that 
this is an aspiration that is a long way from fulfilment.  Although this may be an 
ambition, and one in which French interests and views could gain greater influence, in 
actuality events appear to have demonstrated that a unipolar model is closer to reality, 
especially since September 11th. French practice has been to act in many ways as if the 
Global Community is closer than it is, attempting to cooperate with the United States 
after September 11th, and trying to wield influence through the United Nations and the 
European Union over the question of Iraq.  However, the Americans have followed a 
unilateralist path making use of support when it is offered but ignoring opposition 
where it exists and continuing with its policies in a fundamentally realist way.  French 
visions of cooperation in a Global Community therefore lie within the realms of 
performative ideals rather than having a material existence.  The codes drawing upon 
these discursive foundations are consequently unable to deliver the level of influence 
that might be expected on the direction of the ‘war on terrorism’. 
 
The British Global Community is in some ways less clearly defined than the 
French version given the contested nature of British geopolitical codes, but it too is 
undermined in the same way.  Despite its repeated appearance in performance, 
particularly in speeches, perhaps less so in policy and strategy, it remains an imagined 
concept of an ideal system.  The Coalition, that is also a feature of British 
representations, is enacted not only as an ideal but also materially through actual 
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relationships with other states.  One of the most important of these is of course the 
American Alliance and this was prominent following September 11th. This alliance has 
been continually constituted in performance over a long period of time going as far back 
as the two World Wars, through the Cold War, and was then reinforced in speeches, 
policy, personal relationships between leaders and joint military actions as part of the 
‘war on terror’.  As such, there is evidence to suggest that the American Alliance and 
the concept of the Coalition generally has been a relatively successful part of British 
geopolitical codes, in as much as the relationship with the hegemon appears to have 
been reinforced.  At the same time, relationships with some other states, both in Europe 
and in the Middle East, may have been damaged or strained by such a close association 
with America and its policies.  Furthermore, the degree of influence that Britain actually 
has with America may be less than is presented.  In essence, while in performance 
Britain can be understood to have a very close and influential relationship with the 
United States as part of a wider Coalition this may be more of an appearance that 
conforms to the ideals of British and also American ideals. 
 
The American ideal of a Coalition was reiterated frequently after September 11th 
as shown in Figure 7.4. Its realist implications are, however, undermining to its 
practical potential when faced with the reality of varying interests and policies of 
Coalition partners.  The ideal vision of a Coalition led by America, and conforming 
unquestioningly to America’s worldview, might acquire meaning through performance 
in speeches, but ignores the differences that exist between states and the alternative 
worldviews and geopolitical codes that these states have.  Thus, while initially it was 
relatively easy for America to take a leadership role and gain support from others in the 
wake of September 11th, once it started to adopt more aggressive policies that conflicted 
with the outlook and interests of those in the supposed Coalition this was increasingly 
undermined and difficult to sustain.  This was to present difficulties for the furtherance 
of American aims; in Iraq, for example, the limited support for the war undermined the 
authority of the invasion and diminished the potential for success of American policy 
there, in turn this has damaged the reputation of the American government both 
externally and, increasingly, internally. 
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Spatial Constructions 
 Neorealism draws on binaries to reinforce the sovereign state as the main, 
indeed the only, unit of importance in geopolitics.  All states are, to an extent, drawn 
from such neorealist discourse, and the Enlightenment reasoning from which it 
emerged.  Therefore, the binary discourse apparent in one (Western) state is likely to be 
close to that of another.  However, the spatial context in which that discourse is 
reproduced differs from state to state, producing subtle differences in the discourses. 
 
In the last three chapters it has emerged that the United States, Britain and 
France all, in their own ways, construct a disordered ‘outside’ in contrast to an ordered 
‘inside’.  Furthermore, the ‘outside’ is often associated with the East, while the ‘inside’ 
represents the West.  Berezin (2003) reflects that: ‘The modern nation-state is also the 
territorial state and it owes its institutional durability plus its hold on the popular 
imagination to precisely its intersection of power, nature, and culture.’ (p.4).  By 
continually (re)constructing a spatialization of the ‘Self’ as separate from the ‘Other’ the 
territory of the state is re-emphasised and the nation can be reinforced.  The definition 
of territory through binary discourse is, therefore, essential for the reproduction of the 
positive ‘Self’.  This applies to any sovereign territorial state; hence it is common to all 
three examples here. 
 
Nevertheless, it is possible to discern variations in the use of the spatializing 
binary discourses.  Figure 7.5 compares Inside/Outside in the three states.  The most 
obvious difference is that the discourse is far less frequent in France, where the regional 
and global dimensions are emphasised more.  Secondly it is revealing how similar the 
trend is in America and Britain.  In both cases the discourse is most frequent before 
September 11th, falling afterwards before recovering slightly in 2002.  It then drops 
further, but more so in Britain than in America.  This may reflect the strong emphasis in 
U.S. geopolitical codes on the Exceptional ‘Self’, a (neo)realist state acting alone in the 
world.  For Britain, the distinction between ‘inside’ the state and ‘outside’ also remains 
prominent. 
 
Order/Disorder presents a different pattern (Figure 7.6).  Again it is a fairly 
important discourse in all three states, but in this case it is generally less frequent in the 
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United States.  In all three states it appears in more documents in 2002 than before 
September 11th, despite a noticeable drop in the United States and France immediately 
after the attacks, this is not repeated in Britain.  Thereafter it is reduced to a lower level 
than before September 11th, although the peak is later in America (2003).  Given that 
representations in all three states follow a similar pattern of differentiating the negative 
outside from the positive inside, the many similarities in the pattern of use are not 
entirely surprising.  It becomes emphasised most as they seek locations from which the 
terrorist ‘Other’ might have come.  For the European states, historical experience of 
more direct ‘Threats’, and perception of these, may help to explain their greater 
emphasis on this ‘dangerous’ disorder. 
 
Drawing on historical parallels, the East is often the place from which such 
Threats supposedly come.  This conforms to discourses reproduced in colonialism and 
more recently in the Cold War.  Hence, the East/West discourse is present in all three 
state’s documents, though significantly less so in France (Figure 7.7).  As the graph 
shows, this is a discourse that generally becomes more frequent after September 11th 
(though in the United States it briefly declines to a much lower level).  However, while 
in Britain and France it begins to decline again after 2002 when arguments have been 
made for the war in Afghanistan, and in Britain – Iraq, in the United States it continues 
to increase in frequency.  This could perhaps reflect the greater clarity in binary 
American representations.  In Europe other actors such as the EU complicate matters, 
while not removing East/West, particularly in Britain where Cold War policy 
conformed to this binary thinking more than in France. 
 
In addition the Organic narrative is common to all three states.  This runs 
through representations of the ‘outside’ and also of the ‘Other’.  It helps to characterize 
terrorists as a Threat that can ‘grow’ in ‘disordered’ spaces.  However, although it is a 
distinctive part of the constructions, it is never particularly common, as the graph in 
Figure 7.8 shows.  It is most frequent pre-September 11th in the United States, but still 
only appears in just over a quarter of documents.  Generally, it increases at times when 
Threat is emphasised, although the pattern is quite variable in all the states. 
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Figure 7.7 
Comparison Over Time of the American, British and 
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Figure 7.8 
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Policy-makers in the United States are operating in the context of the discourse 
of the (neo)realist state and the assumption that the state is the only important actor in 
geopolitics.  They, therefore, reproduce binaries that define territory, of the state and of 
the ‘outside’ – the ‘disordered’ spaces that Threats are said to develop in.  Gregory 
(2004) argues that: ‘If global capitalism is aggressively de-territorializing, moving ever 
outwards in a process of ceaseless expansion and furiously tearing down barriers to 
capital accumulation, then colonial modernity is intrinsically territorializing, forever 
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installing partitions between “us” and “them”.’ (p.253).  Thus, while America may 
engage with some elements of globalization, this does not appear to extend to an 
understanding of the world in terms of a multitude of actors, state or non-state, 
including potential layered governance.  Instead, representations continue to emphasise 
the difference between the ‘ordered’ ‘inside’, the ‘Self’; and the ‘disordered’ ‘outside’, 
the ‘Other’.  For example, when speaking to military personnel in California in August 
2003, President Bush said: 
 
A free Iraq will help to rid the Middle East of resentment and violence, 
and radicalism.  A free Iraq will show all nations of the region that 
human freedom brings progress and prosperity.  By working for peace 
and stability in the Middle East we’re making America, and future 
generations of Americans, more secure. (Bush, 2003) 
 
In this passage he draws on the East/West discourse, alongside Order/Disorder and 
Inside/Outside, as he attempts to make a connection between disorder in the East and a 
Threat to the American ‘Self’, and it is the American ‘Self’.  The security of America is, 
according to Bush, directly connected to the advance of Freedom in the East, this is part 
of America’s mission.  The rhetoric that appears in passages like this makes the case for 
the interventionist policies that the American government has adopted.  This is 
particularly effective, and most important as far as the politicians are concerned, as 
regards the domestic American audience, but also has relevance globally as the United 
States attempts to gain acceptance of its actions as a world leader.  Drawing on binary 
discourse allows Bush to provide an appearance of ‘common sense’ to these rather 
dramatic statements, and further his and America’s policy goals in the Middle East and 
elsewhere. 
 
Similarly, in Britain, these ‘disordered’ spaces are represented as the source of a 
Threat to the ‘Self’, but this time there is a more specific acknowledgement of non-state 
actors, all be it as potentially dangerous.  On a visit to Moscow in October 2001, Jack 
Straw claimed that: 
 
No one can now doubt that a primary threat to our security comes from 
groups which act outside states and the rules of the international 
community, or from places where the state and the rule of law do not 
function.  No longer can any of us afford to ignore distant misgoverned 
parts of the world. (Straw, 2001a) 
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While the Threat is still clearly from the ‘outside’ there is a subtle difference 
identifiable in the greater emphasis on ‘the rules of the international community’ as 
opposed to a focus on Britain as a state alone.  In this way the Global Community 
narrative is entwined with notions of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, and ‘order’ and ‘disorder’, 
the community is ordered and the ‘Other’ is a Threat to this.  As a consequence it is also 
a Threat to Britain as a state within this community.  The variation is only slight and 
should not be over-emphasised, but does point to the effect that the context of each 
state, and the resulting narratives, have on the discourses that they share. 
 
This, arguably, becomes even more noticeable when assessing the use of these 
discourses in France: 
 
We must increasingly take a global view when planning security.  It’s no 
longer just a matter of responding to a threat against our borders, which 
has faded, but above all of preventing, ending crises which may directly 
or indirectly affect us.  And it’s normal for us to act more and more in a 
European framework. (Chirac, 2002c)7
Chirac places the ‘Threat’ of disorder in both a global and regional context.  As such, 
narratives of Collective Responsibility and Global Community, in addition to European 
Unity, underpin the French understanding.  The ‘inside’ is not only France but also 
Europe, order can only, through these narratives, be spread by collective means 
regionally and globally.  This does not mean that France as a state is irrelevant, only 
that it acts with others to achieve security.  The desire of French geopoliticians like 
Chirac to avoid conflict in parts of the world where it has economic interests, in 
addition to the concern for stability internally, must be appreciated when considering 
such statements.  Preventing Threats is consequently not simply a move away from the 
traditional methods of sovereign states but a crucial strategy followed for the perceived 
benefit of French interests.  The regional layer is one element of governance through 
which France believes this can be achieved. 
 
Hence, in France, and to a lesser extent Britain, worldviews that have sought a 
more structured and collective geopolitics, first regionally, and increasingly globally, 
 
7 This is an extract from Jacques Chirac’s speech on the 29th of August 2002, at the Tenth Ambassadors’ 
Conference in Paris. 
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are impacting upon the (neo)realist division of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’.  Agnew (2001) 
explains that: 
 
‘Ever since the 17th century the claim to Europeanness, particularly at 
the borders of Europe, has involved commitment to and advertisement of 
the accoutrements of European statehood as defined by the dominant 
states, above all the clear demarcation of the state’s geographical limits 
and the associated matching of nation with state.’ (p.22). 
 
This remains the case, but the situation has been complicated by the establishment of a 
regional layer of governance and sovereignty sharing.  Borders are no longer the 
simplistic lines, demarcating the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of states, that they once were.  
Globalization and regionalization have brought new actors that are not constrained 
within individual states.   
 
Yet, at the same time, states still dominate and borders remain important: 
‘…while we cannot assume that state borders are fixed or settled, neither can we assume 
that they have become so porous as to be irrelevant, nor that their significance has been 
lost in a proliferation of other boundaries.’ (Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999, p.602).  In all 
three states examined here (neo)realist binaries remain central to representations that 
spatialize the location of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’.  Borders, and state territoriality, are 
still fundamental to the geopolitical codes of all three states when it comes to imagining 
the terrorist Threat. 
 
Each of the states therefore shares the binary division of space through their 
discursive practices.  As with all such practices, this division, these binaries, are 
established through performance.  When political elites speak or write about disorder 
abroad and in the East, contrasting this with an allegedly ordered peaceful and 
democratic ‘Self’, whether that be a state or even Europe, they contribute to the 
manifestation of this binary division of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’.  Equally, the policies 
and actions of the states reproduce the binary discourses.  Military action in Afghanistan 
or in Iraq or political/social interventions in supposedly disordered parts of the world 
are also performative in their effect of materializing difference; in the outside, where the 
‘Other’ resides, solutions must be found for the disorder and the Threat that this poses 
to the ‘Self’, on the inside there is order and so such measures are unnecessary.  Thus, 
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the binary spatialization is made real through the performance of these discursive 
practices, combining imagined geographies of ordered and disordered territories with 
real problems and Threats that do exist but may be more complex than such binary 
interpretations suggest. 
 
All three states seek in their own ways to bring order to the disorder that they 
see on the outside.  The geopolitical codes that they have developed strongly reflect this 
ambition, but their implementation in terms of policy has, for all of them, produced 
mixed results in terms of meeting the expectations enshrined in the codes and the 
understandings of a binary world on which these are based.  The United States, Britain 
and France have all, to varying extents, been part of the military action in Afghanistan; 
in some respects it could be argued that this has made progress towards their objectives 
of introducing the kind of order that they desire in that country, and particularly 
reducing the ability of al Qaeda to operate there.  On the other hand, there is still no end 
in sight for their involvement in the country on a military as well as on a political level, 
and it still has no stable system of government.  Indeed, it may be argued that it was 
more stable under the Taliban, however objectionable they may have been in other 
ways.  Hence, to argue that order has been introduced to Afghanistan, and the Threat of 
terrorism has been significantly reduced as a result of these actions, would seem to be 
questionable.  The same could be said (possibly even more so) for American and British 
efforts in Iraq.   
 
These types of actions actually risk increasing the Threat, and the level of 
disorder as viewed through binary discourse, by increasing resentment and anger 
towards ‘Western’ states.  Alternatives to military action discussed by French, and to a 
lesser extent British, political figures are less obvious in terms of actual policy, often 
appearing to be more in the realms rhetoric and ambition.  Overall the progress towards 
the ordered world envisioned as the ideal by each of the states, and forming a central 
objective (if understood in slightly different ways) of their geopolitical codes, appears to 
have been slow in the years following September 11th, in fact there is some indication 
that the codes have been counterproductive in this regard. 
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Characterizing the Terrorist ‘Other’ 
Constructing ‘Threat(s)’ 
 As was discussed in previous chapters, the construction of an ‘Other’ is an 
essential component of the establishment of the identity of the ‘Self’ in modernist 
thought, and specifically in neorealism as regards geopolitics.  Consequently, for the 
three (neo)realist sovereign states studied here, the reproduction of an inferior ‘Other’ is 
a necessity when understood through discourse.  In order to construct a national identity 
and hold the state together the ‘Other’ must be not only inferior, but also potentially 
threatening.  For this reason, terrorism and terrorists are suitable for this role and are 
represented appropriately. 
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Some variation can be identified in the frequency of use of the Threat discourse 
in the three states, however as the graph in Figure 7.9 demonstrates it is an important 
discourse in all of them.  The United States is where the documents show the widest use 
of the discourse, and is the only country where the highest level is found before 
September 11th, when policy-makers envisage a dangerous and disordered world with 
many possible Threats.  For Britain and France, the general trend is towards an increase 
after September 11th. Over time this declines, as the attacks become more distant and 
the focus moves to responses.  For the Americans, though, the discourse returns near to 
the previous level after the initial concentration on the actual events of September 11th,
and characterizing those responsible. 
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 Figure 7.10 depicts the use of the Weapons of Mass Destruction narrative.  
Again this is common to all three states and, given its specificity, is used in a fairly 
similar way.  While all three show a frequent use of the narrative, it is less widespread 
in the French documents.  This is unsurprising as France was opposed to the Iraq War, a 
conflict for which the arguments made were heavily focused upon the Threat of WMD.  
As emerged in chapter six, although France also made connections between Iraq and 
WMD, French geopoliticians were not trying to argue for a war, and would therefore 
not find it necessary to emphasise this so much.  Nevertheless, in all the states the 
patterns of use are very similar.  Prior to September 11th, when WMD was one of a 
number of supposed Threats, it was at a higher level.  In 2002 the narrative became 
more frequent as the debate on Iraq came to the forefront, and WMD began to be 
bundled together with terrorism and, in America and Britain, Rogue States.  This second 
narrative is not clearly identifiable in France where political figures attempt to 
encourage a more collective geopolitics that would not involve unilateral actions by the 
United States against particular ‘Rogue States’.  After the Iraq War the WMD narrative 
declines again, but remains more frequent than it had originally been in Britain and 
France. 
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Figure 7.11 
Comparison Over Time of American, British and French 
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In order for the ‘Other’ to be threatening, it has to be constructed as embodying 
negative characteristics.  In all three cases this involved the regular use of a 
Positive/Negative binary discourse in their representations.  This is shown in Figure 
7.11. Once more the United States displays the greatest use of this discourse, and it also 
tends to be used more frequently with the passage of time, peaking in 2004.  Britain and 
France differ in this respect; initially the discourse appears in relatively few documents, 
increasing dramatically after September 11th, then gradually declining thereafter, more 
so in the French case. 
 
Closely associated with the Positive/Negative binary is the Good/Evil discourse.  
It too characterizes the terrorist ‘Other’ as ‘inferior’ and ‘wrong’ in contrast to the ‘Self’ 
which is ‘positive’ and ‘right’.  However, it is more specific and displays a greater 
difference in terms of frequency of use and in how it is constructed.  Figure 7.12 shows 
the use of this discourse.  It is clear from this graph that the discourse appears far more 
often in American documents than in British, or in French documents where it occurs 
least often.  Despite this, the trends are almost identical; in each case it increases from a 
lower level before September 11th as the characterization intensifies (although in 
America it already appears in over 50% of documents, while in France it did not occur 
at all until after the attacks), declines in 2002 and 2003, and then increases slightly in 
2004. 
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Figure 7.12 
Comparison Over Time of the American, British and 
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Behind these differences in use of the Good/Evil discourse and, by extension, 
Positive/Negative and Threat discourses, are the context, and related narratives that 
define each of the states’ self perceptions and worldviews.  Although they share the 
same discourses it is evident that the frequency, both relative and absolute, is not always 
the same; equally the precise construction of these discourses can vary from state to 
state.  This is most apparent in the Good/Evil discourse.  As explained in chapter four, it 
has a meaning in the United States that connects with the idea of America as superior 
and assigned a mission by God.  Thus, when someone is said to be ‘evil’ this is, when 
understood through the discourse, an assertion that they are the opposite of God and of 
America.  This very simple division comes across in this June 2002 ‘Critical 
Infrastructure’ statement by George Bush in Kansas City: 
 
And when we see evil, I know it may hurt some people’s feelings, it may 
not be what they call, diplomatically correct, but I’m calling evil for 
what it is.  Evil is evil, and we will fight it with all our might. (Bush, 
2002e) 
 
By frequently reproducing this discourse the negativity of the terrorist can be 
reinforced, and therefore the Positive/Negative discourse can be strengthened and is also 
regularly reproduced.  Combining these discourses constructs the ‘Other’ in a menacing 
way, as it is not only inferior to America, but also the opposite of everything that 
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America stands for as ‘God’s chosen people’.  As such, these discourses support the 
Threat discourse.  This is clearly apparent in the following quotation from a speech by 
Bush to the German Bundestag in May 2002: 
 
Our generation faces new and grave threats to liberty, to the safety of our 
people, and to civilization, itself.  We face an aggressive force that 
glorifies death, that targets the innocent, and seeks the means to matter – 
murder (sic) on a massive scale. (Bush, 2002d) 
 
The negative and ‘evil’ characteristics are contrasted with the positive virtues (liberty) 
that are threatened making the magnitude of the Threat seem ‘obvious’. 
 
For Britain the Threat is certainly prescient, however there is some sense in 
which it is slightly less starkly drawn.  For example, Jack Straw said the following in 
October 2002: 
 
These threats, which have emerged since the Cold War, are more 
unpredictable than the challenge we faced in the Soviet era.  They come 
from rogue regimes and terrorist organizations which despise universal 
values and which cannot be contained by classic deterrence.  We must 
face up to these threats with the same resolve and determination we 
showed in the Cold War. (Straw, 2002c)8
Entwined with the Threat discourse and reinforcing it is the Rogue State narrative; the 
Threat is claimed to come from multiple sources and is unpredictable making it more 
dangerous than the apparently clearer and simpler Cold War Threat.  Nevertheless, the 
language used to define the Threat in America is not apparent in this passage; the 
‘Other’ does ‘despise universal values’ but does not threaten ‘civilization itself’.  This 
difference is related to the variation in how the negativity of the ‘Other’ is characterized 
in the two states, and specifically the Good/Evil binary. 
 
The British Good/Evil discourse is more descriptive, lacking the divine 
connotations provided by an Exceptional narrative.  Here it is used more to support 
characterizations of the ‘Other’ as ‘wrong’ or ‘bad’, these are the inferior implications 
of the Positive/Negative binary, it is therefore very closely tied up with this.  For 
 
8 Jack Straw was speaking at the Chicago Council for Foreign Relations on the 15th of October 2002. 
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example, in his statement to the House of Commons after September 11th, Blair claimed 
that: 
 
…what happened in the United States on Tuesday was an act of 
wickedness for which there can never be justification.  Whatever the 
cause, whatever the perversion of religious feeling, whatever the 
political belief, to inflict such terror on the world; to take the lives of so 
many innocent and defenceless men, women, and children, can never 
ever be justified. (Blair, 2001b) 
 
He concentrates on the lack of ‘justification’ for the acts of the terrorists rather than 
‘evil’ as a phenomenon.  These acts are contrasted with the ‘innocence’ of the victims as 
part of the binary construction of positive and negative characteristics; the Good/Evil 
binary is a more extreme version of this, creating an ‘Other’ that is not simply negative 
but ‘wicked’ or ‘evil’.  The use of similar language to that of American politicians 
assists in the efforts of Blair to reinforce the close relationship between Britain and the 
United States without the depth of meaning that the Good/Evil discourse has in 
America.  It was an important part of British policy post-September 11th to reaffirm this 
longstanding alliance in order to be as intimately involved as possible in subsequent 
responses and continue to hold the status of America’s closest ally.  This can be 
contrasted with the French who wish to define a clear distinction and independence of 
policy from the hegemon. 
 
Drawing on the French Threat discourse, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin said: 
 
Terrorism is the enemy of mankind, but we won’t be supported for any 
length of time by everyone in the fight against terrorism if we appear to 
tolerate conflicts, injustices and frustrations, the sources of violence. 
(Jospin, 2001c)9
While there is a clear identification of a Threat from terrorism it is not attributed the 
same menace and dehumanized character as the American version or even the British 
equivalent; it is certainly an enemy and so is apart from, and opposed to, the ‘Self’, but 
there is also some reference to reasons (‘conflicts, injustices and frustrations’) behind 
the Threat more than simply an ‘evil’ character. 
 
9 This speech was made on the 21st of November 2001, to the National Assembly, and concerned the 
Afghanistan situation. 
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For French geopoliticians, Good/Evil is not a discourse that is central to their 
characterizations of terrorists.  Like Britain, the divine element is lacking and it 
becomes a vehement expression of negativity.  Chirac makes the following statement 
through this discourse: 
 
The century which has just ended had already revealed to us the 
monstrous nature of the demons which can lurk in the human soul.  We 
now have dreadful confirmation that people still exist who are capable of 
perpetrating crimes against humanity, against the universal conscience of 
mankind – quite simply against life itself. (Chirac, 2001b)10 
In contrast to the statement by Bush, ‘evil’ is not presented as a concept in itself by 
Chirac, but as something that people do or are.  This is opposed to the Humanist Values 
of France and is therefore negative and constitutes a Threat, however it remains a Threat 
embodied in certain individuals and their actions, not part of a wider contest between 
‘good’ and ‘evil’.  For this reason it is not necessary for the discourse to be so frequent 
in representations.  Neither would it seem appropriate to Chirac to use identical 
language to the Americans, whom he wants to remain apart from, while agreeing with 
the characterization of terrorism and that it poses a Threat.  For France, an alliance with 
the United States regarding terrorism and more generally is not one that demands 
France to follow the American policy as a matter of course.  France must be distinctive. 
 
Constructing the ‘Self’ in a Regional Context 
Driving these different discourses is a variation in the representation of the 
‘Self’.  While the same processes are at work, the particulars are different.  Not only do 
the European states not have the Exceptionalism narrative, they have a regional 
dimension to their geopolitical codes, and to their real experiences, that impacts upon 
the understanding of the ‘Self’.  The effect can be seen when looking at how the 
European Unity narrative and the Threat discourses come together in the words of 
British and French actors.  Firstly, Tony Blair, in his October 2001 statement on 
military action in Afghanistan, said: 
 
We know the al-Qaeda network threaten (sic) Europe, including Britain, 
and, indeed, any nation throughout the world that does not share their 
 
10 President Chirac spoke to the ‘French Community’ in Washington D.C. on the 19th of September 2001. 
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fanatical views.  So we have a direct interest in acting in our own self 
defence to protect British lives. (Blair, 2001d) 
 
The French Foreign Minister, Dominique De Villepin, constructed the relationship as 
follows: 
 
Meaning must be given to Europe.  We are heirs to the same history.  
We belong to the same continent.  Nothing that happens to one of our 
neighbours can leave us indifferent.  Defence Europe is part of this 
profound reality.  We must be capable of together assessing the threats 
hanging over our fellow citizens, of together forging the instruments of 
an effective common response. (De Villepin, 2002d)11 
In both cases there is a very obvious attempt to suggest that Europe as a whole, not just 
the relevant state, is threatened by terrorism.  No such feature can be found in the 
American material.  The second point of note is that there is some difference between 
Britain and France in this regard.  Blair focuses primarily on Britain only briefly 
locating it in the wider European context; for De Villepin, defence against the Threat 
cannot be removed from Europe, and his concern is for a ‘common response’. 
 
Yet again this reflects the more European oriented nature of French geopolitics, 
and thus French policy.  Nevertheless, the presence of these European elements in the 
representations of both states is indicative of the construction of a European ‘Self’ in 
addition to the national ‘Self’.  This is more distinct in France due to the historical and 
political background that has led it to be more enthusiastic about European integration, 
and hence to privilege collective approaches in its geopolitical codes.  European 
‘values’ are presented as being the same as French Humanist Values, so Europe can be 
thought of as an extension of France creating congruence between the French ‘Self’ and 
the European ‘Self’.  To further the French policy of European integration it is therefore 
important for De Villepin to emphasise what Europeans have in common and the need 
for acting together on security matters.  Britain continues to seek a global role on its 
own, based on its supposed historical status, Europe is only part of this and integration 
is less attractive.  In accordance with this objective, and the less favourable attitudes to 
Europe in Britain, Blair’s focus remains on Britain even when talking of Europe.  
 
11 Dominique de Villepin was speaking in a debate on Europe, in the Senate on the 12th of November 
2002. 
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The Self/Other binary is, therefore, constructed differently in each of the states.  
Britain and France still seek to identify and construct ‘Others’ to reinforce their own 
identities, but this also includes (in different ways) a European identity, although the 
states are still dominant.  For the United States, the sovereign state, and its self-image as 
a people and country chosen by God, are unchallenged.  The American binary discourse 
has clarity not so evident in the two European states.  It is a straightforward neorealist 
construction of the ‘Self’ – the American state – and the ‘Other’, which is inferior and, 
being non-American, ‘evil’.  The different defining narratives of the British and French 
‘Selves’, combined with the regional layer of governance, and their individual 
interpretations of this, make binaries such as Good/Evil and Positive/Negative slightly 
less absolute and clear.  The ‘Self’ is not necessarily singular and the ‘Other’ can also 
be constructed in a more complex way. 
 
As noted above, American efforts to bring order to the outside and so reduce the 
Threat to the self’ have had somewhat mixed results.  The evil ‘Other’ that is the 
terrorist was repeatedly established in the performance of speeches in the post-
September 11th period as embodying entirely negative characteristics.  This 
performative process brought together the imagined notion of an inferior evil ‘Other’, 
that was well rehearsed in American discourse, with the actual, events of September 
11th. In addition, the WMD connection along with Iraq, an existing enemy of America, 
gave added menace to the ‘Other’ that was constituted through these performances.  
Only in performance could such a link be made, and America’s interventionist code 
then made a military response to the Threats ‘obvious’ and ‘natural’.  While the practice 
of militarism reinforces this identity of the ‘Other’ and, through the binary discourse, 
the positive identity of the Exceptional ‘Self’, it has also undermined the geopolitical 
code by its failure to achieve all the objectives expected.  There was a failure to find the 
Weapons of Mass Destruction that had been alleged to belong to Iraq and formed the 
central component of the discursive link between that state and al Qaeda.  The idea of 
the Threat therefore has proven to be rather different from the reality.  The geopolitical 
code for which this was a crucial element was consequently driving policies of military 
action that have been damaging to America’s interests and those of its government 
when in fact the Threat was not of the nature that was supposed. 
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 In many ways the same could be said of Britain and its geopolitical codes, which 
also led it to participate in the invasion of Iraq alongside America.  Weapons of Mass 
Destruction from sources such as Iraq were part of the wider Threat from the negative 
‘Other’.  However, in Britain the difference in the discourses, and lack of an 
Exceptionalist and religious basis for the ‘Self’, made the connection more difficult to 
enact and make acceptable in public understanding.  Thus, it was also more quickly 
diminished by the failure to discover the Weapons that had been repeatedly spoken of in 
the build up to the conflict. 
 
Most notably, this was cited in the ‘dossier’ produced by the British government 
in 2002 to support the argument for action against Iraq.  Returning to the graph in 
Figure 7.10, 2002 was the year in which the WMD narrative appeared most often in 
British documents, and it continued to be so the following year when the war began and 
the assertion was still that the WMD would be found.  To continue to maintain such a 
position obviously became increasingly difficult when no weapons were uncovered.  
The British government position was further damaged by the revelations that the 
‘dossier’ may have been ‘sexed up’ and by the subsequent death of David Kelly in July 
2003.  To continue to maintain that Iraq had WMD in the light of all these events and 
revelations was extremely difficult, as the reality no longer supported the idea of the 
Threat that had previously been made real through discourse.  In 2004 the occurrence of 
the WMD narrative was much reduced, the Hutton report into the events surrounding 
David Kelly’s death having been published in January, and the weapons themselves 
being as illusive as ever.  These events, and the apparent efforts of the British 
government to manipulate the evidence to give greater justification for war, caused 
considerable damage to the government in general and the Prime Minister in particular, 
some may argue, hastening his eventual departure. 
 
This provides a demonstration of the way in which performance can make 
manifest a dangerous ‘Other’ reinforcing particular geopolitical codes and forming the 
basis for policy responses; but when the results of these actions do not conform to the 
original interpretations the imagined strands of the performances, whether they are 
speeches or documents like the ‘dossier’, are exposed damaging the political elites.  
This failure of policy points to an inability of the British geopolitical code, on this 
occasion, to fulfil its ambitions of spreading liberal values and enhancing the security of 
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the ‘Self’ by reducing Threats.  Arguably, in this case, the American Alliance did 
damage to these aspirations rather than assisting them, while relations with Europe were 
also strained as a result. 
 
France was less affected by these issues, in as much as they did not adopt the 
policy of military invasion.  However, as has been noted, they did represent Iraq as 
being a Threat in relation to WMD.  For France, though, the ultimate discovery that this 
was not the case had little impact on the reputation of the government due to its clear 
opposition to the war.  It may be said that this policy was itself damaging at the time, 
and in some ways contrary to its own geopolitical code, in that it contributed to the 
divisions in Europe and the world and diminished French influence with countries such 
as the United States, and yet in the longer term the failure of the policy for America and 
Britain was more likely to strengthen the position of France who had opposed it in the 
first place.  Therefore, paradoxically, despite adopting a similar negative 
characterization of the ‘Other’, including WMD, France and French politicians did not 
suffer the same effects when the unfolding of events undermined this connection.  It can 
be said, therefore, that the French geopolitical code promoting cooperation and less 
encouraging of militarism was ultimately relatively successful in advancing the status of 
France in respect of Iraq.  Speeches were not matched by military responses in 
constituting the WMD armed ‘Other’. 
 
Responding to Terrorism 
 By constructing a Threat from terrorism, and when understood through the 
combination of binary discourses, it becomes an ‘obvious’ or ‘common sense’ 
implication that there should be some sort of active response.  This is true of all three 
states studied here as all of them have, as has been shown, represented the Threat in a 
similar way.  However, it is the variations that become important when it comes to the 
detail of their responses.  I have already outlined in previous chapters the ways in which 
each government developed a response commensurate with the historical context, and 
the narratives reproduced within the discursive structure, through which their 
geopolitical codes were made and interpreted.  Hence, while each state has a narrative 
that underpins a challenge to the terrorists, and/or the reasons for terrorism, it is not 
identical, and contributes to the production of different policies.   
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In order to differentiate these narratives I have given each a different name: for 
the United States it is Crusade Against Terrorism, for Britain it is War Against 
Terrorism and for France Battle against Terrorism.  These names relate loosely to the 
vision of the response that they are associated with, as outlined below.  Figure 7.13 
offers a comparison of the use of these narratives over the period of the study.  The one 
feature that is common to all three is that the narrative is least frequent before 
September 11th, and suddenly increases afterwards.  This is unsurprising as it is a 
narrative of response, and so the attacks prompt a much greater use when discussing 
real events rather than theoretical Threats.  After this point, there is a clear distinction 
between the two European states and America.  Whereas in the documents from the 
United States the Crusade narrative continues to become more frequent, in Britain and 
France the frequency declines, though not returning to its previous low levels.  Again 
this can be connected to the way in which the narratives are constructed. 
Figure 7.13 
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In the United States the Crusade narrative is underpinned by Exceptionalism, 
and the Manifest Destiny that is so central to the American self-image.  If terrorism 
represents ‘evil’ and America ‘good’, then a Crusade is necessary, as it has been against 
other enemies in the past.  This also leads to another closely related narrative – 
Inevitability of Victory.  As God’s chosen people, it is ‘obvious’ that America will 
ultimately succeed in its Crusade, again as in previous conflicts.  Although a Law 
narrative was an important part of the American response to Threats like terrorism 
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before September 11th, the representation of the attacks and those responsible not only 
led to a strong emphasis on the need to act, it also privileged the role of militarism and 
placed the ‘war on terror’ in the binary of America’s historic Crusade against ‘evil’.  On 
the 16th of September 2001, at the White House, Bush drew on the Good/Evil discourse 
as he discusses the Crusade that he is planning: 
 
This is a new kind of – a new kind of evil.  And we understand.  And the 
American people are beginning to understand.  This crusade, this war on 
terrorism is going to take a while. (Bush, 2001c) 
 
There is a considerable rhetorical character to statements such as this; Bush is directing 
his assertions to a domestic audience, which he is trying to convince with dramatic 
language and consequently gain support for his Crusade.  American policy is framed 
through the clear binary of the ‘Self’ and the threatening ‘Other’.  The Crusade that is 
promoted in response to this new ‘threat’ is one that makes ‘sense’ within the American 
construction of Threat.  Burke (2005) says: 
 
‘Real and imaginary threats coalesce, and their worlds are inevitably 
drawn more starkly distinguished and opposed, so that one may be 
crushed and the other be ever fearful of being crushed as it crushes.  This 
is how the obvious threat of terrorist violence to Americans and 
Westerners posed by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates could be expanded into 
a threat to “civilization” and “freedom” itself, how anti-terrorist action 
could be expanded into a theoretically limitless “war on terror”…’ 
(p.328). 
 
Through binary discourse, America can be considered to represent Freedom and all that 
is ‘good’, if America is threatened so are the virtues that it embodies.  Thus, confronting 
terrorism can be made into a Crusade that increasingly becomes focused on bringing 
‘Freedom’ to the world and can therefore be used to support policies of intervention in 
other states such as Iraq, as these are steadily bundled into the same homogeneous ‘evil’ 
Threat.  Consequently, as the individuals involved propose this wider purpose, the 
Crusade narrative is drawn on more and more. 
 
Britain does not have the Exceptionalism narrative and the self-image that this 
generates.  However, it does have an imperial past in which militarism was one tool in 
its efforts to spread ‘liberal’ values around the world.  Closeness to the United States, as 
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implied by the American Alliance narrative, gives the country an inclination to follow 
the American lead.  In line with this, the British War on Terrorism narrative suggests 
the need for measures to eliminate terrorism, but also includes the need to spread values 
and bring ‘order’ to the ‘chaos’ of the ‘outside’.  This comes through in this statement 
by Peter Hain: 
 
The war against terrorism is unlike other wars, because we cannot wait 
until the war is over to win the peace.  Winning the peace is part of 
winning the war.  We must not only uproot and destroy the bin Laden 
network and its allies and analogues around the world.  We must also 
remove the fertile soil of disaffection and distress in which the seeds of 
terror grow. (Hain, 2001b)12 
For British policy-makers it is important to bring ‘order’ to the ‘disordered’ parts of the 
world that they perceive to be the source of terrorism.  The ambitions of Britain to be a 
Global Player, and to be close to the United States, support the development of policies 
that see the country working with the Americans.  Promoting a War on Terrorism is 
therefore not only inspired by a belief that this is a necessity in confronting a terrorist 
Threat, but also as a means of attaining the policy objectives regarding the American 
Alliance.  Simultaneously the cooperative element of British geopolitics, encapsulated 
in the Global Community narrative, leads representations, and therefore policies, away 
from the crusading unilateralism of America.  The dilemma at the centre of British 
geopolitical codes is thus apparent again 
 
For France, the divergence from America is even starker.  Although the 
construction of the ‘Other’, and of the Threat, necessitates a response, French policy is 
often different from America, and indeed Britain.  Winn (2003) comments that: ‘Europe 
will not, and cannot, always share a “common vision” with Washington.’ (p.48).  This is 
only partially true for Britain but it is more noticeable for France.  The French Battle 
Against Terrorism narrative does not exclude military action, but it focuses to a far 
greater extent on alternative measures.  Prime minister Lionel Jospin depicts a vision of 
such a ‘Battle’ when addressing the Institute of Higher Defence Studies shortly after 
September 11th:
12 This is part of a speech made at the Royal United Services Institute in London on the 30th of October 
2001. 
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This battle must be waged collectively, systematically, and over the long 
term, with the utmost determination, but without seeing everything in 
black and white, and avoiding any amalgam.  This is not a conflict 
between civilizations.  We haven’t got to conduct a “crusade”.  The 
battle we’re joining against fanaticism and terrorist violence is being 
waged in the name of respect for life, human rights and democratic 
values.  To my mind, it should also include a huge international effort to 
promote peace, development and the fight against inequality, since 
conflicts, poverty and injustice are all conducive to the development of 
terrorism. (Jospin, 2001a) 
 
He specifically dismisses the idea of a Crusade, which George Bush is arguing for, and 
instead focuses on what he believes to be the causes of terrorism.  France has a history 
of defining a separate policy from America, and also puts a strong emphasis on French 
Republican values.  Jospin’s statement suggests that France may again be trying to 
forge a separate approach lead by France as an alternative to the American hegemon, 
encapsulating a different way of tackling terrorism.  While the French do not rule out 
military action, this is not the first option.  France has interests and connections in the 
Middle East and North Africa that it wishes to maintain and thus avoids war in favour 
of social measures with the same objective of ordering the ‘disorder’ and so removing 
the ‘Threat’.  As such, the Battle Against Terrorism is not a move away from 
neorealism, but an alternative means of practicing it. 
 
Hence, France and Britain both show some tendency to seek non-military 
solutions where this aides their interests, and yet they still participated in the 
Afghanistan conflict, and the British government, notwithstanding internal differences, 
was an enthusiastic part of the Iraq War.  So when Van der Wusten (2000) claims that: 
‘Europe has become a good example of a security community, a set of states where the 
notion that military action is one of the possibilities to sort out difficulties has waned.’ 
(p.91), he is only partially correct.  Certainly within the European Union itself there is 
no resort to war, but these two states still display varying propensities to follow a 
militarist path.  Both look to project values into the ‘disordered’ spaces that they 
consider to exist outside Europe, but for France, collectivity has a greater priority as 
they seek an independent global role for the state and for Europe.  British geopolitical 
codes are driven by the American Alliance, influencing policies that are often closer to 
the militarist and unilateralist American Crusade, while at the same time displaying 
elements of the social measures that are more dominant in France. 
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 All of the states have, to an extent, found a gap existing between the vision of 
their response to terrorism in performance and the results of their actions when it comes 
to applying their policies in line with their individual geopolitical codes.  It has already 
been shown how America’s self-image has been undermined when encountering the 
reality of circumstances in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The Crusade launched by President 
Bush after September 11th was made manifest through performance in speech and in 
these military activities, the assumption being that, given America’s status, there was an 
Inevitability of Victory; in fact such victory has not come so easily, it has proven to be 
far from inevitable.  Instead, a geopolitical code that drove Americans to intervene 
globally has in reality led the state into difficult conflicts with no clear end in sight and 
no obvious definition of what victory might actually mean.  In addition, there is a 
possibility that this Crusade could have increased the Threat rather than diminishing it.  
The difference between the ideal (the virtuous nation with a manifest destiny to rescue 
the world) and the reality is therefore apparent in the enaction of America’s post-
September 11th geopolitical code. 
 
Similarly Britain has also had a less than successful experience in its ‘War on 
Terrorism’.  Here, the contradictions within the code have played an important part in 
undermining the results of policy.  Britain has been drawn into the same conflicts with 
the same problems as America.  Although these have not been inspired by a divine self-
image, the impact of the subsequent experience was significant for the government, and 
has also been damaging to British influence at the regional scale.  British military 
interventions have seemingly generated more antagonism towards the country both 
externally and internally in the British Muslim population.  This has led to greater risk 
of terrorist attacks as demonstrated, for example, by those in London in July 2005.  
Again the complex realities of terrorist networks have proven more difficult to counter 
than the more simplistic discursive practices played out by British political elites. 
 
As has been discussed, France also saw a necessity to respond to a terrorist 
Threat, and did not dismiss the military option in doing so.  In their performances 
French elites have, though, attempted to define a different vision of a solution to 
terrorism.  This forms part of the performance that discursively draws the line between 
France (and Europe) on one side, and America on the other, as separate poles in a 
Multipolar system where cooperation is essential.  Thus, France’s Battle Against 
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Terrorism, while no less focused on eliminating this supposedly threatening ‘Other’, 
does not have the same Crusading character of the American equivalent, nor does it 
need a close association with America.  Nevertheless, it is still open to question whether 
this has been any more successful in practice.  As with the other two states, the response 
has not removed the potential Threat from al Qaeda, although it might be said that by 
opposing the war in Iraq it has become less of a focus for such a Threat than Britain and 
America.  Nonetheless, the ideal of a response, a Battle Against Terrorism, that would 
successfully remove this Threat has not, so far, been matched by the reality of results, 
when played out in performance in the supposedly disordered world. 
 
The European Layer 
A Common Foreign Policy? 
Considering the possibility of common European geopolitical codes must 
include the European scale, and in particular the European Union and its embryonic 
foreign and defence policy structures, in addition to the analysis of the sample European 
states.  At the same time as the European communities were being formulated there was 
also a move towards cooperation on defence and, by implication, foreign policy.  The 
European Defence Community (EDC) was proposed by the French government in 1950, 
but was finally abandoned in 1954 when the French parliament rejected it (McCormick, 
2005, p.210).  Such features of integration conform to the underlying aims of European 
integration in the early days.  The restraining of Germany to stop it being able to 
threaten further wars was a concern for France, hence its central role in integration.  At 
the same time this level of shared sovereignty is at odds with neorealist notions of the 
primacy of the state, it has therefore been difficult to construct common policies in these 
areas, but integration in economic and other policy matters has created a continued 
pressure for cooperation on wider foreign policy. 
 
An intergovernmental mechanism for foreign policy cooperation, European 
Political Cooperation (EPC), was first adopted in 1970.  This, though, operated 
separately from the Commission through the Council of Ministers, taking decisions 
unanimously (McCormick, 2005, p.210).  Possibly the most significant development 
occurred after the end of the Cold War as the ‘West’ became more divided in the 
absence of the Soviet ‘Other’.  The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 created the Common 
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Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) replacing the EPC.  This formed the second of 
three pillars of the new European Union (EU) and created a link for the first time with 
the Western European Union (WEU)13. The pillar system allowed decision making to 
remain separate from the Commission.   
 
Smith (2003) draws out five objectives that she considers to underpin the EU’s 
foreign policy, these are: 
 
1. The encouragement of regional cooperation and integration; 
2. The promotion of human rights; 
3. The promotion of democracy and good governance; 
4. The prevention of violent conflicts; 
5. The fight against international crime. 
(p.2) 
 
They are objectives that are compatible with the outlook of all states.  Essentially, these 
principles reflect not only a shared vision of European integration, but also values that it 
can promote in the wider world.  By doing so, the interests of the Union, and by 
extension the member states, can be advanced, while being general enough not to 
restrict the states themselves. 
 
The CFSP was enhanced further in the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1999.  These 
reforms tightened the link with the WEU as the ‘operational arm’, the Council could 
establish policy and members agreed to participate when necessary in military action 
(Van Oudenarem, 2005, p.304), this would allow them to fulfil the requirements of the 
Petersberg Tasks14. Additionally a new post of High Representative for the CFSP was 
created, although this individual still had to work alongside the foreign minister from 
the rotating presidency and the EU commissioner for external policy (Van Oudenarem, 
2005, p.305).  Again, while on one hand steps were being taken towards a more 
integrated Europe with a foreign policy and defence capability of its own, on the other 
 
13 The Western European Union is a defence association founded in 1948, but largely sidelined by 
developments in NATO (Van Oudenaren, 2005, p.296).  It did not include all EU members (p.301), and 
still has only 10, with various other associates and observers. 
14 The Petersberg Tasks are: ‘humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping, and other crisis management jobs 
(including peacemaking).’ (McCormick, 2005, p.217). 
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this vision clashed with the neorealist view that these areas should be reserved for 
sovereign states. 
 
It is arguably this conflict between the (neo)realist concept of the sovereign state 
and the transfer of powers from the state to the regional layer that has made the CFSP a 
more difficult and contested policy sphere/structure to create and put into practice than 
many of the other competencies adopted or encroached on by the European Union.  As 
such: ‘The conclusion that the CFSP is a myth is consistent with realist assumptions.’ 
(Peterson and Sjursen, 1998, p.177).   
 
Consequently, the early stages of the CFSP have been marked by limited success 
in achieving a common foreign policy, with security policy proving to be even more 
difficult to detach from the state.  Burghardt (1997) reflects: 
 
‘Although CFSP can build on the major achievements of the European 
communities’ external relations and those – admittedly less significant 
because largely declaratory – of EPC, foreign policy has not become 
more unified and security policy has not even entered its embryonic 
stage…’ (p.326). 
 
It is, Burghardt argues, the bigger more powerful states in the Union that present the 
greatest obstacles to the CFSP: ‘The larger states are not prepared to trust the EU to 
represent and implement their foreign policies, hence they create ad hoc coalitions – 
which, in turn, makes it more difficult to achieve EU visibility, responsibility, and 
coherence.’ (p.326).  It is these larger states that have the most to lose in terms of their 
power and influence, and their sovereignty when understood through neorealism.  Their 
reluctance highlights the difficulties in bringing a collection of (neo)realist sovereign 
states together to cooperate in foreign and security policy.  These policy domains are 
perceived by (neo)realists to represent the essence of state sovereignty and so 
integration is resisted more here than on any other matter. 
 
However, the limited progress made so far, and the barriers posed by the 
sovereign state, do not necessarily mean that the CFSP is irrelevant or has been a 
complete failure.  Peterson and Sjursen (1998) comment: 
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‘…the lack of a single, “common” EU foreign policy is hardly 
unexpected given the old dilemmas and the new challenges the Union 
and its member states face in a post-Cold War world.  But the 
inadequacies of EU foreign policy coordination, and the limitations of 
traditional theories, do not render the CFSP a myth.’ (p.170). 
 
Indeed, there is evidence that the CFSP has impacted on the process of foreign 
policy making in Europe.  Smith (2004) says: 
 
‘…a closer examination of both the treaty-based provisions of the CFSP 
and its early performance suggests that European foreign policy has in 
fact reached a new level of institutionalization.  In particular, we can 
describe this evolution as moves toward a system of governance, broadly 
defined for the moment as the authority to make, implement, and enforce 
rules in a specified policy domain.’ (p.176). 
 
Through the introduction of the institutions of foreign policy making, this ‘system of 
governance’ has come into existence.   
 
It is, of course, not a European government controlling foreign policy, but 
governance in the sense that the regional layer and its structures have an input into 
foreign policy.  In this regard, Peterson and Sjursen (1998) claim that: ‘The point is that 
the CFSP constitutes a pivotal dimension in all EU states’ foreign policies.’ (p.178).  
Thus, while a common foreign policy constructed and applied at the regional scale may 
not be a reality, the CFSP does play a role in how European states form their own 
individual foreign policies; there is a European dimension to their foreign policy-
making.  Nevertheless, the state remains the primary scale at which foreign and security 
policy is formulated in Europe. 
 
Constructing a ‘Threat’ 
 With foreign and defence policy still centred primarily on the state, the 
European Union, as an organisation distinct from the member states, cannot formulate 
policies and worldviews that are contradictory to, or incompatible with, those 
constructed by the governments of the member states.  Furthermore, since each state has 
its own policies and geopolitical codes, the ability of the Union to define a set of 
policies, and perhaps geopolitical codes, that are acceptable to all is restricted. 
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Europe does not have the historical interests in the Middle East that the states 
have, and it does not have a military capacity separate from the states (particularly 
Britain and France).  This has implications for the construction of responses to 
terrorism; the states were moulding their responses in relation to a bundled Threat 
involving terrorism, WMD, and perhaps Rogue States; for the EU the construction of 
Threat depended upon a compromise that would be acceptable to all member states.  
Therefore, the EU is not independent of state worldviews.  Representations of the 
‘Other’, the Threat this allegedly poses, and the response, are dependent on the 
positions taken by member states.  It is these actors that retain the power in geopolitics, 
and that still have considerable control over the Union – it is not a completely 
independent regional actor. 
 
Inevitably, therefore, the discourses that were apparent in the representations of 
the states are also used in the representations of the key figures in European Union 
foreign policy.  Figure 7.14 presents the percentage of documents from the EU sample 
that each of the discourses appears in.  It reveals that again Inside/Outside and 
Order/Disorder are both prominent discourses, and are found in more than a third of 
documents.  Hence, the same spatialization of terrorism is repeated at the regional scale, 
with East/West also present, all be it at a lower level.  Once again it is a collection of 
Threats that is assumed to come from the outside.  For example Javier Solana, the High 
Representative for the CFSP, commented to the Danish Institute of International Affairs 
in May 2002: 
 
The scourges of our age – terrorism, drug trafficking, the exploitation of 
women and children, environmental challenges, and the proliferation of 
weapons – show little respect for national frontiers.  And can only be 
addressed through transnational, global efforts. (Solana, 2002a) 
 
New Threats are characterized as having an ability to cross the state borders given the 
greater fluidity produced by the processes of globalization.  This is not unique to the EU 
representations, but is perhaps a feature that attracts greater focus for actors at this scale, 
where they are not framing their discussions in a national context.  At the same time, it 
is not alien to, nor undermining of, the representations of the member states. 
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Figure 7.14 
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As in the other three cases, Threat is one of the most frequently used discourses 
in the EU documents (Figure 7.14).  It is reinforced by the binary discourses that 
characterize a dangerous ‘Other’ threatening the ‘Self’.  Once more the 
Positive/Negative discourse features strongly, as shown in the graph.  The 
representations of September 11th are, therefore, very similar to those of Britain, France, 
and even the United States.  This commonality is demonstrated by the fact that all 
governments in the EU, and representatives of the EU’s institutions, could agree a 
shared statement three days after September 11th. They said: 
 
This assault on humanity struck at the heart of a close friend, a country 
with which the European Union is striving to build a better world.  But 
these terrible terrorist attacks were also directed against us all, against 
open, democratic, multicultural and tolerant societies.  We call on all 
countries that share these universal ideals and values to join together in 
the battle against terrorist acts perpetrated by faceless killers who claim 
the lives of innocent victims.  Nothing can justify the utter disregard for 
ethical values and human rights.  Global solidarity is at stake.  Together, 
irrespective of our origins, race or religion, we must work tirelessly to 
find solutions to the conflicts that all too often serve as a pretext for 
savagery. (Heads of State and Government of the EU et al, 2001) 
 
IO – Inside/Outside    OD – Order/Disorder        PN – Positive/Negative 
 SO – Self/Other          EW – East/West 
 GE – Good/Evil          TH – Threat            
 
Comparing Europe and America: the Regional Experience as a Context for Distinctive Sovereign States 
327
On the surface this is a repetition of the sort of language used in the United States itself, 
but the notable difference here is that positive values of the ‘Self’ are emphasised as 
universal and that solidarity is needed in response to the Threat.  The Good/Evil 
discourse is used to support the Positive/Negative binary.  However, while 
Positive/Negative is the most frequent discourse, appearing in over 45% of documents, 
Good/Evil only occurs in just over 10%.  As in Britain and France, for European policy-
makers, dangerous terrorists present a practical problem; there is no Crusade on behalf 
of God.  This derives from the requirement to balance the needs of all member states; a 
representation at regional level that was at odds with those of a state would be 
unsustainable.   
 
One crucial difference between European Union constructions of the Threat and 
those of Britain and France is the limited use of the Weapons of Mass Destruction 
narrative (Figure 7.15 shows that it appears in around 15% of documents).  Where 
WMD does appear it is in terms of the selection of Threats rather than, for example, 
Iraq.  In addition, there is no Rogue State narrative.  This was also absent from French 
representations, and so could not be used regionally.  For Europe as a whole, it was not 
possible to take a position on Iraq given the deep divisions on this matter.  This is a 
likely reason for Iraq itself being barely mentioned in the EU documents.   
Figure 7.15 
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Responding to the ‘Threat’ 
 The European response narrative is one that privileges the non-military aspects 
identified in the British and French narratives.  As before, I have given it a different 
name – Fight Against Terrorism – to emphasise the variation in its construction.  The 
narrative is the second most commonly occurring (Figure 7.14).  Due to the 
construction of Threat, it can make ‘sense’, as it does from the perspective of the state 
actors.  There is a concentration on ‘political’, ‘diplomatic’ and ‘social’ measures.  This 
is a central part of the Union’s response; a conviction that terrorism can be best tackled 
by working together, particularly in these non-military areas.  The then Commissioner 
for External Relations, Chris Patten expands on this when speaking to the European 
Parliament in October 2002: 
 
To prosecute the campaign against terrorism will require international 
cooperation of unprecedented breadth and depth: political cooperation, 
economic cooperation and security cooperation.  The European Union 
must play its part in those efforts – vigorously, generously and creatively 
– a key partner, I hope, in a well-planned and resolutely pursued 
campaign of multilateral engagement. (Patten, 2002) 
 
This ‘multilateral’ campaign is one that uses cooperation at the global scale in the 
political and economic spheres, as well as in security, but this is not necessarily 
manifested in military action.  The primarily non-military responses underpinned by 
Fight Against Terrorism is perhaps inevitable given the continued lack of a concrete 
European defence capability, this being controlled largely by the states.  The 
cooperative element is of course a familiar part of the European Union and it is now 
being applied globally with the EU as a single actor within that, according to Patten.  
Representatives of the EU bureaucracy are also liable to focus on solutions that they can 
have some influence on, and therefore attempt to promote the status of the organisation 
to which they belong. 
 
A narrative of European values dominates representations.  A parallel can be 
drawn between this and the French narrative of Humanist Values, although they are not 
identical.  Freedom on the other hand is a narrative that is used in British constructions 
of the ‘Self’.  In European representations Values are necessarily universal in nature, 
corresponding with the regionalized character of the Union.  The narrative is 
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constructed through reference to allegedly shared historical experiences.  For example 
Romano Prodi reflects: 
 
In the age of enlightenment European philosophers battled in their own 
countries against the actions of absolute monarchs, and against atrocities 
which were committed in God’s name.  They took great risks to argue 
for tolerance, in the face of the dominant thinking of the day. 
 
At the same time, the United States was proclaiming its independence in 
terms which were just as universal: “all men are created equal…with 
certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness.” 
I would call on everyone, believers and atheists alike, to spread tolerance 
and moderation in their cultural and religious lives. (Prodi, 2001) (Italics 
original)15 
By drawing on the history of the Enlightenment, policy-makers in the European layer 
can use something that all have in common, and that provides a set of Values they can 
all agree with.  They are comfortably acceptable to all member states without 
contradicting the narratives of Britain and France, for example.  According to Prodi, the 
Values that are deployed in the reproduction of a single European ‘Self’ are not only 
common to the states of Europe; they are also familiar in the United States.  The idea 
that Europe and America should be held together by these shared Values resonates to an 
extent with the argument of Huntington (1996).  Fundamentally, the importance of these 
Values is their ability to be adopted in the construction of a regional ‘Self’ as a basis for 
regional unity, a quality of interest to powerful regional figures like Prodi. 
 
Actors at the regional scale emphasize cooperative responses to terrorism.  As 
such, three narratives are important here: Coalition, Collectivity and European Unity.  
The graph in Figure 7.15 shows that Coalition is one of the least frequent narratives, but 
Collectivity is found in more than a third of documents.  It is therefore the latter that 
seems to have more importance in the representations.  The European Unity narrative is 
easily reproduced given its association with the very existence of regional cooperation.  
It is the most frequently occurring narrative, the only one present in more than half of 
the documents (Figure 7.15).  None of these narratives are at odds with the 
 
15 Romano Prodi was speaking to the European Trade Union Confederation in Brussels on the 11th of 
October 2001. 
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representations made by states, as membership of the Union requires a degree of 
acceptance of cooperation and regional unity, as demonstrated in the British and French 
examples. 
 
Through European integration and Collectivity, the Values that are supposedly 
shared by all member states can be reinforced and promoted.  The political figures 
speaking on behalf of the EU use these narratives to underpin their arguments for 
similar cooperative approaches at the global scale.  In an, October 2002, presentation 
organized by NATO at the Transatlantic Center of the German Marshall Fund of the 
United States (in Brussels), Javier Solana discussed a European role in a transatlantic 
security partnership: 
 
But it is true that for us Europeans multilateralism is our life.  We are not 
multilaterally (sic) because we are naïve, we are multilaterally (sic) 
because we had to choose between multilateralism or war.  Europe in the 
last century was at war, and when the war was over, the Second World 
War, we decided to do multilateralism with the umbrella of the United 
States, and it worked very well, and today it is impossible to imagine 
that France and Germany are going to fight, and we are going to have 
good relations with Russia because we have the European Union which 
is a fantastic example of a multilateral effort. (Solana, 2002b) 
 
What is presented in this passage is that Collectivity is appropriate to wider global 
relationships given its success at the regional scale.  The establishment of a regional 
layer of governance, with the narratives attached to this, has encouraged ambitions 
among some for a global role for the Union.  This is reflected in the gradual creation of 
a foreign and defence policy.  Hence, a narrative of Global Player is evident at the 
regional scale.  This can be found in almost 30% of documents (Figure 7.15).  It was of 
course also part of the British and French discursive structures, with varying emphasis 
on the state and region; in regional documents it refers only to Europe as a whole.  By 
drawing on this narrative, policy-makers in the European Union are perhaps following 
an agenda to gain a more powerful position for their organisation. 
 
A global cooperative system is represented through the Global Community 
narrative.  This appears to be a fairly important narrative, occurring in about a third of 
the documents (Figure 7.15).  In addition, an American Alliance is a component of 
European visions.  Again, it is a narrative that appeared in nearly a third of the 
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documents analysed (Figure 7.15).  The relationship envisaged is region-to-state rather 
than state-to-state, resulting in repeated emphasis on the need to work with the United 
States.  This vision seeks to lock states, such as the U.S. into a rule based system in 
which unilateralism becomes impossible.  In November 2003 Javier Solana, speaking in 
Berlin, set out a strategy for EU security and the Union’s role in the world.  He said: 
 
…we must help create a world both fairer and more secure.  To do so, 
we require an effective multilateral approach to international order with 
well-functioning international institutions and rules that are enforced.  
That means that the international order is based on agreed rules, and that 
we are prepared to ensure the respect of these rules when they are 
broken.  As a Union based on the rule of law we carry a particular 
responsibility to ensure a rule-based international order, the cornerstone 
of which is the United Nations Charter. 
 
He adds to this: 
 
Threats are never more dangerous than when the international 
community is divided.  For this reason in particular, the transatlantic link 
is irreplaceable.  Our security and the effectiveness of the common fight 
against threats depend on the strength and balance of that relationship. 
(Solana, 2003) 
 
A Global Community, for Europe, is therefore very similar to the visions of Britain and 
France; it is a rule-based order where multilateralism dominates over unilateralism.  
Solana makes the link with the European experience, where a Union has been 
constructed through the application of rules.  This is what European policy-makers want 
to bring to the global scale.  In the second passage he warns against a divided 
international community and emphasizes the importance of the ‘transatlantic link’.  This 
reflects the disagreements over the Iraq war, and attempts to bind the United States into 
a Global Community, (re)constructing an alliance with America.  As such, it is not 
contrary to French representations where there is no American Alliance narrative. 
 
Placing these European representations in the context of Smith’s five principles 
of European foreign policy, it becomes clear how they relate to each other.  The first 
principle, encouraging regional cooperation, echoes the emphasis on cooperative 
approaches to tackle terrorism, and the second on human rights has some parallels with 
the non-military Value based measures of the EU’s Fight Against Terrorism.  Promoting 
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democracy is aligned with the political and diplomatic solutions proposed as an 
alternative to violent conflict that the fourth principle opposes.  Finally, the fight against 
international crime can be closely associated with the Fight Against Terrorism as 
another non-state actor. 
 
Just as the principles themselves are general enough to be acceptable as a 
compromise between all member states, so too are the discourses and narratives that are 
used in European Union representations.  As the individuals that define Europe’s 
limited foreign policy are speaking on behalf of all the members of the Union, they 
cannot make policies and construct worldviews that are controversial and in opposition 
to those of any member states.  Consequently, all the discourses and narratives, and the 
representations that they underpin, are acceptable to any sovereign state.  They include 
the binaries and Threat that are ‘obvious’ for any state when discussing terrorism, and 
use collective and value based narratives that are likely to be compatible with those of 
any state that is part of a regional body like the EU. 
 
Conclusions 
 This chapter has compared the construction of the geopolitical codes of the 
United States, Britain and France, and analysed the differences and similarities that have 
emerged.  The main conclusion that might be drawn from all these combinations of 
narratives and discourses is that each state is different and this explains their different 
geopolitical codes.  From a critical realist perspective this is not surprising, each state 
has its own history, and its own political imperatives, so inevitably, although as Western 
states they will share the basic discourses that define the sovereign state, they must also 
produce their own spatially rooted discourses and narratives upon which geopolitical 
codes are built.  Furthermore, each has its own strategic concerns that underlie their 
policy decisions and relate to the geopolitical codes that are produced. 
 
The narratives that help to define the ‘Self’ are especially important in 
differentiating each of the states, and ultimately their geopolitical codes.  American 
representations reproduce the Exceptionalism narrative, which is crucial to their codes.  
This narrative, perhaps more than any other, sets the United States apart from Britain 
and France.  Freedom on the other hand, is shared with Britain, but while it is closely 
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connected to Exceptionalism for Americans, the British version relates to the liberalism 
that is supposedly part of British history.  Indeed a History narrative also helps to define 
the British ‘Self’, drawing on images of past ‘greatness’ as a global power.  As such 
Britain shares another narrative with France – Global Player.  The difference here is that 
while British policy-makers apply the narrative primarily to their own state, their French 
counterparts do so more in relation to Europe.  This is the structure through which they 
believe they can gain influence in the world and project their Humanist Values 
regionally and globally.  Humanist Values is a vital narrative in the construction of the 
French ‘Self’. 
 
The main narrative at the regional scale, for both Britain and France, is 
European Unity.  French representations are supported by the Collective Responsibility 
narrative that, when combined with France’s historically more positive approach to 
integration, produces images of a deeper Europe operating as a distinct actor in the 
world, enhancing rather than diminishing the status of France.  British representations 
are influenced by the more detached approach that has generally been adopted, and see 
it more as a cooperative organization. 
 
Finally, at the global scale, the Coalition narrative appears in the discursive 
structures of America and Britain, but is more important in the United States where it is 
the sole narrative referring to relations with other states.  In Britain this narrative is 
compatible with that of American Alliance and the image of the country as an 
independent global operator.  At the same time the Global Community narrative, that is 
also reproduced by French actors, is far more frequent and important to geopolitical 
codes.  This projects the structured cooperation familiar in Europe on to a global scale 
as a means for bringing order to the world.  French geopolitical codes are even more 
committed to this vision, given their focus on Collective Responsibility.  They use the 
narratives of Multipolarity and World Democracy to underpin this collective worldview. 
 
All three states seek to interpret the world through the basic binary discourse of 
Identity/Difference.  From this, a positive ‘Self’ is contrasted and reinforced by 
comparison with a negative ‘Other’.  They share the binary discourses that spatialize the 
‘Self’ and the ‘Other’.  Inside/Outside and Order/Disorder conform to long-term 
(neo)realist constructions of the State, and East/West is familiar from colonialism, 
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through the Cold War, to the present day.  Nevertheless, although on the surface they 
are the same, there are nuances in their use.  A European ‘inside’ is also present in 
representations by British and French policy-makers, though again this is more a feature 
of French discussions.  The simple binary distinction is therefore complicated 
somewhat, even if the emphasis remains primarily on the state. 
 
The same Self/Other, Positive/Negative and Good/Evil discourses are 
reproduced, and the negativity of the ‘Other’, in this case the terrorist, supports a 
discourse of Threat.  The Good/Evil discourse is notable for its deeper more religious 
construction in the United States than for the two European countries.  Furthermore, it 
has emerged that in France, and to a lesser extent Britain, a European ‘Self’ is defined 
alongside the state ‘Self’.  This is a complexity that does not exist in the United States.  
In addition, while French geopoliticians bundle Threats as their American and British 
counterparts do, the emphasis on Rogue States and the pressure for military action in 
Iraq is not the same. 
 
The way in which the three states have responded to terrorism gives an 
important insight into how the construction of their codes differs.  In each case it has 
been shown that a narrative of active response exists within the discursive structures, 
but subtle differences can be identified between them.  American policy-makers 
envision a divinely inspired Crusade that promotes militarism as the principal means of 
accomplishing the aims.  In Britain, this is only one way of achieving success, with 
some acknowledgement that more social solutions are necessary.  For France these are 
even more prominent in representations, without dismissing military action completely.  
However, the solutions promoted in representations by each state are in fact a function 
of variations that run through all the discourses and narratives that underpin these. 
 
It has been shown here that the discourses and narratives at the regional level do 
not present a particularly distinct position from any of the states.  Haseler (2004) argues 
that a superstate is developing in Europe, and therefore: ‘In the long run, though, a 
European superpower, in order to act in the world, needs more than just cooperation 
from its component nationalities.  It needs, no matter how weakly held, a common, 
integrated identity, that “sixth sense” of being European, and of belonging.’ (p.118).  
Although there is evidence that a European ‘Self’ is constructed alongside or as part of 
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the national ‘Selves’ in Britain and France, it is the nation-states that continue to 
dominate in this regard.  Furthermore, it is these state’s founding mythologies and 
historical contexts that dominate in the reproduction of narratives and the determination 
of policies.  Indeed, the fact that foreign policy continues to be dominated by state 
governments gives little flexibility and freedom for the actors at Union level.  Allen 
(2002) reflects that: ‘No leadership, individual or collective, has yet emerged which can 
lay credible claim to be the spokesperson of Europe.’ (p.38).  The representations, and 
the policies adopted by EU officials, cannot conflict with those of any member states, 
and therefore tend to be limited to constructions that are acceptable to all.  Although 
they may attempt to privilege the role of the Union in these representations, this is still 
restricted by the extent to which the state governments allow them to act as a separate 
entity.  The result is that the Union can speak and act only where all member states 
agree, and cannot define clear geopolitical codes of its own.  Hence, it can be concluded 
that there is not (at the moment at least) a separate European layer of governance 
developed enough to produce recognizably distinct geopolitical codes. 
 
Nevertheless, for neorealists like Kagan (2003) there is a divergence between 
Europe and America that is centred on relative power, and results in alternative 
strategies for coping with threats.  He says: ‘One of the things that most clearly divides 
Europeans and Americans today is a philosophical, even metaphysical disagreement 
over where exactly mankind stands on the continuum between the laws of the jungle 
and the laws of reason.’ (p.91), and he claims that: ‘Europeans have stepped out of the 
Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of perpetual peace.’ (p.57).  
However, this over simplifies the differences between Europe and America, and indeed 
suggests that a single European approach exists.  To group European states together as a 
single entity comparable to the United States ignores the distinctiveness of each state’s 
geopolitical codes that derives from the contexts in which they are constructed.  Elazar 
(2001) explains that: ‘The difference between partnership American – style and EU 
community is that the former is based upon a common sense of single nationhood, while 
the latter is based on the idea that separate countries have many elements in common.’ 
(p.39).  When comparing the states it is clear that Britain and France do not take an 
identical approach and the search for power and influence is still a vital part of their 
geopolitical codes. 
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Regionalization has an impact on the fundamentals of the sovereign state.  The 
pooling of sovereignty and the construction of a new layer of governance above the 
state leads to more complex borders and territoriality.  As Ruggie (1998) pointed out, 
changes in the domains of social life can produce changes in territoriality.  Particularly 
relevant here are what he terms ‘social epistemes’ which includes spatial constructs 
(p.193).  He contends that territoriality is being ‘unbundled’ by global change, and that 
overlapping territorialities are replacing the single territoriality of the realist state 
system.  Consequently, he considers that: ‘…the EU may constitute the first 
“multiperspectival polity” to emerge since the advent of the modern era.’ (p.195).  Thus, 
the construction of Europe, both in real terms through institutions, and in discursive 
terms at state and regional scales, leads to a transformation in territoriality.   
 
Regionalization, and for that matter globalization, do lead to changes in outlook 
for the European states studied here.  These changes do not amount to a fundamental 
shift away from the sovereign state as the most important unit of global politics, rather 
the Global Community narrative of Britain and France is in line with ‘global reform’, in 
that it seeks to use existing institutions to gain greater influence for non-hegemonic 
states at the global scale.  Hence, this conforms to transformationalism, and the layered 
governance that it involves.  The European states are more accepting of such 
governance in their worldviews, as they are part of a regional layer and envision some 
degree of global cooperation in a way that the United States does not. 
 
Thus, the regional context alters the way in which these states operate in global 
politics.  Experience of regionalization, and the effect this has on discourse, underpins 
policies that see close, structured cooperation as facilitating not only better solutions, 
but also acting as a vehicle for power and influence, attributes that in their own ways, 
Britain and France have both long sought.  As has been shown, in contrast to the United 
States, they tend towards social solutions to terrorism: ‘Where actual violent terrorist 
threats could clearly be identified, Europeans tended to rely on economic social and 
diplomatic solutions as well as military ones.’ (Haseler, 2004, p.147).  Again, France is 
more inclined to this approach.  Nevertheless, militarism is far from alien to Europeans, 
where policy-makers deem this to be in their interests, both as a tool for security and, 
arguably, in their pursuit of power. 
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 It can, therefore, be concluded that while Europe as a whole may not have 
common geopolitical codes, and European states have not abandoned neorealism and 
militarism, the existence of layered governance in Europe, or the experience of 
cooperation and interaction as far as it has gone, has had an impact on the construction 
of geopolitical codes in the member states.  This is part of the context for those states, 
and is therefore an experience that is shared by Britain and France.  The way in which 
this acts on the discursive structures, and then the geopolitical codes, is a product of the 
interaction with the other contextual factors, and of course the agency of the 
geopoliticians who are constructing the representations and making policy.  Britain and 
France are thus set apart from the United States by the European/regional strand in their 
geopolitical codes, while retaining their own individual codes as sovereign states. 
 
At the same time, there is a distinctiveness in the codes of each of the three 
states, a difference that highlights the continuing relevance of neorealism and state 
sovereignty in the construction of representations, and of geopolitical codes, even for 
Britain and France where a European dimension has a far greater importance than for 
the United States.  Therefore, the strategic concerns of each of these sovereign states 
also plays a role, interpreted through discourse, in the formulation of policy and the 
construction of their geopolitical codes.  Equally, within each state the individuals who 
influence policy have agency, and use rhetoric that they hope will appeal to a particular 
audience or audiences, whether inside the state or beyond.  These individuals and the 
strategies that they pursue on behalf of their states are consequently as relevant to the 
differentiation of states from each other as the discursive structures through which they 
interpret the reality of the world. 
 
Hence, this interaction of discourse, agency and strategy defines an American 
hegemon that acts unilaterally, with militarism the main form of response to perceived 
Threats.  The British state attempts to make use of alliances and organizations like the 
EU to further its interests but is inclined to follow the lead of the United States in the 
hope of retaining influence with the hegemon ahead of any other states.  For Britain, the 
EU is a mechanism for influence as part of a larger organization, but must not threaten 
British independence or its relationship with America.  France is arguably more distinct.  
French strategy is focused on the necessity to be independent from America and the 
need to protect French interests abroad and cohesion at home.  Thus, European 
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integration and greater structures and rules at the global scale are promoted, and an 
alternative vision of the world in contrast to American hegemonic dominance is 
portrayed. 
 
The success of the American, British and French geopolitical codes has been 
mixed in the years following September 11th. This points to the gap that exists between 
the ideals of performance where the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ are defined, and the material 
complexities that belie these simplistic binaries.  America’s code, implying a need to 
intervene in foreign disordered spaces, if Freedom and Order are to be delivered and 
manifest destiny fulfilled, depends upon the self-image of Exceptionalism.  Responding 
to a terrorist ‘Other’ provokes a code familiar from the Cold War and earlier, America 
must fight and destroy ‘evil’.  This is based upon an ideal view of America; an imagined 
geography of the ‘ordered’ and ‘free’ ‘inside’, and the ‘disordered’ ‘ungodly’ ‘outside’ 
where Freedom is absent, ignores the complexities of the world in which America 
intervenes, and the terrorist networks (non-state actors) which they attempt to destroy; 
hence the unexpected difficulties in applying these policies.  Although there may have 
been some military successes in the ‘war on terror’, the subsequent circumstances in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have not been favourable towards America and damage has been 
done to the reputation of the state and its government.  In this respect the geopolitical 
code has not been successful so far. 
 
Likewise, British efforts to fight terrorism have met the problem of reality 
contrasting with idealism.  In addition, Britain’s contradictory codes have proven to be 
impossible to reconcile when attempting to be a European operator and simultaneously 
sustain a close alliance with a crusading America.  By trying to keep multiple 
relationships going at once, both in a structured post-realist way and in a traditional 
realist Coalition, relations with Europe have ended up damaged.  Like America, Britain 
has tried to deliver order and reduce the Threat of terrorism by military intervention, 
and encountered the same difficulties and antagonisms as a result of this simplistic 
policy.  The idea of Britain as a Global Player, with good relations around the world and 
at different scales, has not been a plausible one when met by events; the ability to be a 
bridge between Europe and America is impossible when the gap becomes too wide and 
when British policy moves too close to one side.  Essentially, the performances in 
speeches and in political practice that constitute this unique role for Britain rely on 
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idealistic visions of the country and real relationships forged in different ways over 
time, but when a controversial issue is at stake such a role is revealed as the product of 
performance, the repetition of which has damaged Britain’s reputation, influence, and 
these very prized relationships.  The result is a geopolitical code that has not yet 
achieved a significant reduction in terrorism, and possibly put the country more at risk 
from this. 
 
France too has a geopolitical code that was based upon binary representations of 
the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’, and as such required the confronting of terrorism and 
ordering of the world through the spread of Humanist Values.  However, the French 
vision of a Europe and a world built upon Collective Responsibility, Multipolar in 
character and structured so as to establish and reinforce the status and influence of 
France, regionally and globally, has been somewhat exposed as little more than an ideal 
in the post-September 11th context.  Again, through a process of peformativity, this idea 
of France as a vital and influential component in European and global affairs can be 
made real, and a geopolitical code aimed at the furtherance of such a situation as a 
means for tackling the Threat of terrorism could be forged.  In reality, the world has 
proven to be more uni-polar than Multipolar with America adopting the policies it 
chooses, irrespective of the views of France or any other state.  This has left the French 
ideal looking far more difficult to achieve, and the state less influential than its self-
image might imply.  The geopolitical code, in this respect, appears to have been less 
successful than might have been imagined when understood through French discourse 
as performed by the country’s political elites. 
 
The three states have therefore all encountered a gap between the expectations of 
their geopolitical codes and the reality when policies are enacted.  They display 
considerable differences in strategy and policy, as they do in their construction of 
discourses and narratives, and yet each suffers the same consequences of simplistic 
idealistic interpretations/assumptions.  All, are however, Western sovereign states, and 
share many features that contribute to their geopolitical codes, not least the experience 
of international terrorism as a global actor and, for Britain and France, the layer of 
regional governance that provides a more complex contextual factor influencing, if not 
driving, the construction of their codes. 
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Chapter 8
. . . . . . .
Reinventing Geopolitical Codes: The 
Changing Nature of the Westphalian State 
. . . . . . . .
Introduction 
 When the Westphalian Treaty was signed in 1648 it began, or perhaps reflected, 
a transition, driven by modernist Enlightenment thought, to a geopolitics dominated by 
the sovereign state.  Elazar (2001) explains how: ‘Statism became the accepted world 
standard for political organization – that is, the standard in Western Europe – through 
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, as part of the arrangement that ended the Thirty 
Years’ War.’ (p.33).  State sovereignty as initially enshrined in the Westphalian treaty 
implied, in theory at least, an exclusive state authority over a given territory defined by 
clear borders. 
 
‘It was exclusive in so far as no ruler had the right to intervene in the 
sovereign affairs of other nations; unqualified in that within their 
territories rulers had complete authority over their subjects; and supreme 
in that there was no legal or political authority beyond the state.’ 
(McGrew, 2005, p.30). 
 
This territorial resolution has therefore been crucial to the state system, and as a 
result the (neo)realist geopolitics that has accompanied it.  ‘This Westphalian world was 
juridically structured through the agency of such foundational norms of international 
law as the equality of states, sovereign immunity, and the doctrine of non-intervention.’ 
(Falk, 2004, p.5).  Non-state actors offer a potential challenge to the hegemony of the 
state, or even the very existence of the state.  In this respect the international terrorist is 
a notable example of an actor that displays an alternative territoriality, crossing state 
Reinventing Geopolitical Codes: The Changing Nature of the Westphalian State 
341
borders and yet not always entirely removed from states.  Existing as a function of 
globalizing forces, it challenges the fundamental norms of the Westphalian world.  
Similarly, regionalizing forces have also brought into question state territoriality, 
particularly in Europe.  Through the introduction of possible layered governance the 
singular nature of the territoriality as described in the Westphalian Treaty may be given 
added complexity. 
 
The Westphalian Treaty, though, did not create the modern state overnight.  It 
was not intended as a definition of the sovereign state; rather it was an important 
moment in the development of the state as a product of modernist thought. 
 
‘The state, in its contemporary realization, is understood as a territorial 
entity, even though it has a history of emergence, having gradually or 
rapidly, as the case may be, expanded its political, legal, and 
administrative control by monopolizing violence and incorporating – by 
statute, by force, and/or by other means – various subunits into a legal 
and administrative entity with definitive boundaries.’ (Shapiro, 2003, 
p.278). 
 
Likewise September 11th, nor even the end of the Cold War itself, should necessarily be 
thought of as a defining moment that brings to an end the sovereign state.  The post-
Cold War period, and more specifically the post-September 11th period, do nonetheless 
present an opportunity to consider whether there is once again a process of change 
acting upon the sovereign state, one that might significantly alter the spatial resolution 
through which geopolitics is practiced.  In this regard, this chapter aims to examine 
whether new structures are superseding the state and/or if there is a process of reform of 
the state.  The possible emergence of ‘postmodern’ states in response to the processes 
acting upon them is one way in which such reform might be conceptualized. 
 
As such, the chapter returns to the literature, re-evaluating the issues raised in 
chapter two in the light of the analysis of the empirical material.  First of all, the 
reproduction of the state in the representations discussed in this thesis will be placed in 
the long-term context of evolving neorealist discourse.  Proceeding from here, the 
characterization of post-Cold War and post-September 11th geopolitics is discussed 
again, focusing on the construction of the terrorist ‘Other’ and how this exists within 
neorealist discourse.  The next section examines global and regional processes and 
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actors and the implications these, and the processes underpinning them, have for states 
and their geopolitical codes.  Finally, the critical geopolitics perspective that the thesis 
has offered to the study of post-Cold War and post-September 11th geopolitics is 
discussed.  Geopolitical codes are problematized, and the sovereign Westphalian state is 
re-assessed in the context of new actors, and the globalizing and regionalizing forces 
driving them. 
 
Reproduction of the State 
 When discourse is understood as the textual context through which reality is 
engaged while simultaneously being responsive to that reality, it suggests that 
discourses can undergo change through evolution rather than abrupt metamorphosis.  
September 11th, like all real events, could only be understood through discourse, and the 
existing discursive structure was deployed in the interpretation of a very different 
reality.  Fortin (1989) says: 
 
‘The text silences in one stroke not only any possible alternative 
approaches to understanding politics, but also any awareness that the 
nature of politics is in the nature of the qualities and understandings, 
culturally and historically situated as they always are, that participants 
bring to it.’ (p.193). 
 
Interpretations of September 11th were therefore restricted and guided by the discursive 
structures through which they were read in each state.  However, the reality of the 
events necessarily produces an evolution of discourse given the incompatibility of 
neorealist state-centric interpretation for non-state terrorist actors.  This period of 
evolution therefore constitutes a time lag following the real event to which discourse is 
forced to respond.  The examples in this thesis offer a demonstration of the way in 
which discourse and discursive structures cannot be removed from the long term 
context in which they have developed; they go through a temporal transition moulded 
by events and by the agency of the individuals who continually (re)produce them.  
Hence, post-September 11th discourses and narratives draw on their earlier incarnations, 
and on past events, when representations are made regarding international terrorism. 
 
Invoking past experiences, and in particular past enemies, is a notable feature in 
the process of drawing a new ‘Threat’ into the discursive structure and, in so doing, 
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reconciling this existing structure with a new ‘Other’.  This was evident, for example, in 
France where terrorists were compared to Hitler, a figure that has come to represent the 
very opposite of what the ‘Self’ supposedly stands for.  Discourses through which 
terrorism was represented following September 11th had already been established, most 
recently in relation to the Cold War, but also over a far longer period.  These are 
generally binaries, and as such construct the identity of the ‘Self’ as the corollary of the 
negative ‘Other’.  As Ashley (1989) explains: 
 
‘Given an undecidable diversity of contesting interpretive possibilities, a 
logocentric discourse is inclined to impose closure by resorting to one or 
another fixed standard of interpretation that is itself accorded the status 
of a pure and identical presence – a standpoint and standard supposedly 
occupying a place outside of history and beyond politics from which it is 
possible to give voice to a singular interpretation of the historical and 
political differences perceived.’ (p.262). 
 
The logocentic discourses, and the narratives deployed in constructing the ‘Self’ and the 
‘Other’, make intertextual links to the past and continue the reproduction of these 
discourses and narratives in the new context.  Reproducing such discourse assumes an 
unchanging, ever-present, ‘inferior’, threatening ‘Other’ and a contrasting ‘virtuous’ 
‘Self’. 
 
Thus, the terrorists can be constructed in an Orientalist fashion – a Threat 
emanating from the ‘inferior’ East.  This correlates with colonial constructions in 
Britain and France, as well as those of the Cold War where the Soviet Union was 
represented as a negative and inferior Eastern ‘Other’ posing a Threat to the West, this 
binary being most stark for the United States.  When discussing Orientalism, Said 
(1978) says: 
 
‘Objective structure (designation of Orient) and subjective restructure 
(representation of Orient by Orientalist) become interchangeable.  The 
Orient is overlaid with the Orientalist’s rationality; its principles become 
his.  From being distant, it becomes available; from being unsustainable 
on its own, it becomes pedagogically useful; from being lost, it is found, 
even if its missing parts have been made to drop away from it in the 
process.’ (p.129). 
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The construction of the terrorist draws on such representations and simplifications of 
the Orient.  Where previously the ‘Other’ may have been Native Americans or less 
enlightened Europeans, colonized Eastern peoples, Germany or the Soviet Union, 
depending which state the representations are made in, it is now international, and most 
significantly Islamic, terrorists.  The fact that they are identified as ‘Islamic’ is crucial in 
locking them more easily into the discourses, as this allows them to be portrayed as 
Eastern.  Just as in Cold War discourse, the ‘easternness’ of the terrorists makes them 
‘irrational’ and ‘unpredictable’ enhancing the Threat.  Consequently, when the new 
terrorist enemy is represented through the existing discursive structure it is wrapped into 
these wider understandings of the state, the ‘Self’ and the ‘obvious’ Threat posed by the 
‘Other’.  Thus, despite the fact that, unlike the Soviet Union, international terrorism is 
not another state, it can be brought into this discursive structure on the negative side as 
an ‘Other’. 
 
Post-September 11th Geopolitics 
 The post-September 11th period has therefore been characterized by the 
(re)construction of terrorism and the terrorist as the principal ‘Other’ in the discursive 
structures of the states that have been examined here.  It has become the focus of 
geopolitics, the ‘war on terrorism’ being used to justify various actions, most notably 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, although each state maintains its own position on any 
individual engagement. 
 
However, as far as causing terror is concerned, this emotion could be provoked 
by the actions of any person or organization, including states.  It is worth repeating the 
definition of Ettlinger and Bosco (2004) for whom terrorism is: ‘…violence to invoke 
fear that can be performed by networks such as Al-Qaeda as much as by urban gangs, 
and by nation states such as Iraq as much as by the United States.’ (p.252).  Thinking of 
terrorism in this way is very different from how it is generally represented by states, 
questioning the concept of a homogenous terrorist body or character that can be clearly 
differentiated and ‘othered’ from the state.  In addition, according to Booth and Dunne 
(2002): ‘Terrorism is an act not an ideology.’ (p.8).  If terrorism is an activity that any 
person or group can participate in, and if it is recognized as an action more than the 
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definition of a group or type of person, then the clear binary constructed in state 
discourses is disrupted and the assumptions made through this are undermined. 
 
The process of becoming the ‘Other’ is dependent on the construction of the 
terrorist as ‘other’ than or to the state.  It has become assumed to be the opposite of 
what the state represents.  ‘It is important for the state to insist that no question of 
justification can be raised: terrorist acts, though politically motivated are to be regarded 
as never politically justified because they are merely criminal.’ (Gilbert, 1994, p.49).  
As such, the state appears to be justified in what actions it takes, whereas the actions of 
the terrorist are wrong. 
 
Groups or networks such as al-Qaeda are described as terrorists not only because 
they create terror, as this could be said of most or even all states at some time, they are 
ascribed this status because they are not states, they do not fit into the discourse of the 
state and conform to the state system, their structures and practices are alien to those of 
the Westphalian state with its singular bounded territoriality.  Giddens (1985) notes ‘the 
legitimate monopoly of control of the means of violence’ (p.18) as an attribute of the 
state.  This principle is undermined by the ‘terrorist’.  Such a fundamental contradiction 
makes them more threatening to a state than a state enemy, but equally that very 
incomprehensible character, through state discourse, makes such groups effective 
‘Others’, slotting into the established binary discourse and reinforcing the state by the 
Threat to its principles of operation, and therefore to its very existence, that they are 
said to constitute.  Its more amorphous nature, as a practice rather than a identifiable 
organization, makes it more threatening and also more malleable as the basis for 
responses. 
 
In the American representations this is most starkly defined through the 
Good/Evil discourse and its religious overtones rooted in the founding mythology of the 
state.  Gregory (2004) notes: ‘Faced with the sudden irruption of jihad in the heart of 
America – “the homeland” – America declared its own holy war.  This is no 
exaggeration.  The sanctuary, even the sanctity of the Republic had been breached by 
the terrorist attacks.’ (p.47).  Interpreting and constructing terrorism through such 
discourse can derive ‘common sense’ responses such as a Crusade Against Terrorism 
and the militarism that follows from this. 
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 Perhaps not surprisingly, each of the states in this study has constructed the 
‘terrorist’ in a very similar way, as has already been discussed.  Despite the fact that all 
three states are as capable of causing terror as any other, terrorism becomes the 
exclusive practice of the ‘terrorist’.  In so doing the ‘terrorist’ is created as a non-state 
actor not simply because of the actions that they take, which may well be wrong, but 
because those actions are not sanctioned by any state, or at least not directly. 
 
Although France, and to a lesser extent Britain, have shown a greater, if limited, 
tendency to look for alternative solutions to the terrorist problem, these are still based 
upon the assumption that there is a binary division between the state and the terrorist.  
Political actors in these states seek positions that will enhance their influence and status 
in the world, and sustain the unity and fabric of their states.  Notwithstanding the 
regional dimension, and the limited common policies that may be adopted here, 
solutions that the states advocate are, therefore, still primarily constructed and 
understood through the neorealist discourse of the state.  The constraint that this 
discourse imposes on the responses of the state is consequently one that limits the space 
for alternatives to be discussed and put into practice.  Kiss (2002) claims that: 
 
‘In the traditional sense there is no single territorially or geographically 
locatable enemy in this war and it is waged on several internal and 
external fronts simultaneously.  Actions against global terrorism require 
“globalization” of foreign policy exceeding the frameworks of 
traditional allied systems.’ (p.50). 
 
As the state is continually being reproduced through discourse it is not possible to fully 
understand non-state actors like al-Qaeda outside this structure, rather they are always 
placed within the discursive structure that underpins each state’s worldview.  Thus, 
while the state acknowledges the existence of non-state actors, understandings are 
limited by their being filtered through the discourse of the state; they are always 
considered as part of a single and continuing inferior ‘Other’. 
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Global and Regional Processes: Geopolitical Codes in the Post-
September 11th World 
Global Actors: Representations and Implications 
Terrorist Networks 
 Terrorism is therefore now represented as one of the primary Threats to the 
states that have been studied here; enhancing this threatening nature is the belief that it 
is now global or international terrorism.  Whereas previously groups that were ascribed 
the term ‘terrorist’ were usually localised within a state or limited region, this new 
construction of terrorism is globalized making it more troubling for the state and giving 
it an appearance of being more powerful and dangerous.  Of course, there is also a 
globalized reality that impinges on ‘terrorist’ groups.  Der Derian (2002) says: ‘From 
the start, it was apparent that 9/11 was and would continue to be a war of networks.’ 
(p.106).  Globalizing forces drive the networks linking places, crossing state borders, 
and contradicting the logic of the state.  ‘Terrorist targets – even if they may be 
connected to a particular country – can be found scattered practically all over the world 
in any country (see attacks against American and Israeli Embassies or other facilities).’ 
(Rostoványi, 2002, p.74).  Terrorist networks are therefore enabled and underpinned by 
these forces giving them a global, or at least an international, character in reality as well 
as in representation. 
 
However, these representations give a singularity and a unity to the terrorist 
‘Other’ that is not necessarily the reality.  The groups and individuals involved are often 
disparate and loosely connected.  There are, nevertheless, links between groups, and 
they do cross borders clandestinely, but the complexities are simplified when 
understood through the neorealist discourse of the state.  Hence, the reality is one of 
complex and often ill-defined networks. 
 
These ‘terrorist networks’ with their roots in reality, have been shown to be 
crucial to the construction of the terrorist ‘Other’, and its Threat to the ‘Self’, in all the 
states in the study.  Rudolph (2005) notes that: ‘Borders, together with the institution of 
citizenship, designate both inclusion and exclusion and define the socio-political 
community both in terms of “who we are” as well as “who we are not”.’ (p.14).  For the 
United States this is of particular relevance when placed in the context of the 
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construction of the ‘Self’ as a country chosen by God, and with a history of isolation 
and relative safety from Threats emerging from the less virtuous outside.  For a Threat 
to be able to pass, apparently easily, through the state’s borders and attack Americans 
inside America makes it all the more real and dangerous; as such it is effective in 
reproducing the binary discourse that defines the ‘Self’ and the idea of the state.  Paasi 
(2003) says: ‘Nationalist discourses introduced expressions like “homeland,” fatherland, 
and motherland that included a distinct territorial dimension between “us” and “the 
Other”.’ (p.116).  The protection of the ‘homeland’ has therefore become central to 
American representations of terrorism and the rhetoric surrounding this. 
 
America has a history of relative isolation from Threats, and the reality of the 
porosity of borders, and challenge to territoriality that the September 11th attacks 
represented, was consequently more traumatic there.  The response of the elites was to 
use this shock in the construction of the ‘Other’ and the related Threat, re-emphasising 
the binary of the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’, of ‘order’ and ‘disorder’, and of ‘East’ and 
‘West’.  Paasi (2003) explains that: ‘Hegemonic groups may use space, boundaries, and 
various definitions of membership (or citizenship) effectively to maintain their position 
and to control others inside the territory.’ (p.116).  By spatially differentiating the 
source of the Threat from the God-given territory of the American ‘Self’ they could 
(re)define the boundaries of that territory and strengthen the territoriality of the state, the 
Threat giving them justification for responses of militarism externally and legal 
confirmations of power internally. 
 
For the European states, the national space and the borders that define this are 
less divinely inspired, and yet the Threat of sudden attacks within the state’s borders is 
still an effective basis for construction of the terrorist ‘Other’.  O’Dowd (2002) 
comments: ‘While borders are expressions of identity, they also limit the 
acknowledgement of shared identities beyond borders.’ (p.32).  Through the 
representation of a wider regional space, and reproducing narratives of unity within 
Europe, British and French policy-makers also suggest that this wider ‘Self’ is under 
Threat, that its borders too can be penetrated.  It is this idea that supports arguments for 
cooperation regionally in the face of the terrorist Threat. 
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Interdependence 
 The interdependence created by global networks is a context that produces 
constraints on the activities of sovereign states.  Starr (1997) asserts that: ‘The 
“Westphalian trade-off” stressed independence and autonomy; interdependence stresses 
collective problems and solutions.’ (p.19).  Issues pertaining to one part of the world 
can, through interdependence, pose a problem for a state in another part of the world, 
diminishing the extent to which a state can act in a truly autonomous way.  France, for 
example, is ‘constrained’ not only by its economic interests in the Middle East but also 
by its large Muslim population of North African origin, when considering what policies 
to adopt in Iraq and in response to terrorism.  It might be argued that interdependence 
constrains weaker states like Britain and France, who struggle to maintain influence 
globally, more than it does the United States as the hegemonic power, but even this state 
cannot ignore the outside world, September 11th being a dramatic example of this. 
 
While some states cope with interdependency and globalizing processes by 
seeking new ways of acting globally through deeper cooperation others, most notably 
the United States, are more inclined to continue to follow a unilateralist path.  Beeson 
and Bellamy (2003) state: 
 
‘Neo-realist logic is also sceptical about the benefits of international 
cooperation and multilateralism, a perspective that has directly 
influenced the approach of the Bush administration on a number of 
issues.  Because states only ever pursue a narrowly conceived notion of 
self-interest, cooperation is possible only in the short term and in 
relation to particular issues, neorealism implies.’ (p.350). 
 
American representations of Coalitions conform to this pattern.  Nevertheless, the 
evidence from this study still shows that whichever of these approaches a state adopts it 
is still envisaged through the lens of the state; the interests of the state and its elites 
remain paramount even if the individual contexts might point to cooperation as more 
effective in gaining influence and furthering these interests. 
 
Organizations such as the UN or the World Trade Organization have been 
formed by states, and are promoted to varying extents to cope with the more globalized 
world.  The invasion of Iraq without UN agreement is an example of how states, 
particularly powerful states like America, will act without the authority of such 
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institutions where they deem it to be in their interests.  Yet authority was sought before 
these actions, indicating that such institutions do have some place in the thinking and 
worldviews of states.  Of course how states role play in global institutions varies.  For 
example, the United States represents itself most clearly as a state acting alone.  Britain 
has competing geopolitical codes, one more cooperative and one true to neorealism and 
in alliance with the United States.  While the latter drove the entry into the Iraq War it 
was the former that demanded an attempt first of all to gain UN authorisation.  France 
stood apart on this issue, its code requiring cooperation to diffuse its Values globally, 
and its self-interest promoting a policy separating it from America as an alternative to 
uni-polar hegemonic power, and protecting its influence in the Middle East and 
domestic stability. 
 
Layered Governance 
Mansbach (2003) speaks of: ‘…a complex world of overlapping local, regional, 
and global authority structures that sometimes cooperate, sometimes coexist, and 
sometimes clash.’ (p.19), while Held (2002) describes ‘effective power’ being ‘shared, 
bartered and struggled over by diverse forces and agencies at national, regional and 
international levels.’ (p.97).  This vision of layered governance does not entirely 
correspond with the present structures and representations as uncovered in this research.  
There are regional and global strands of governance, and the terrorist non-state actor has 
become a central feature of state representations; the state though has proven to be the 
actor and the scale at which most power, authority and control of geopolitical discourse 
resides. 
 
Indeed, Archibugi (1995) reflecting on ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ says: ‘The 
perspective of cosmopolitan democracy requires us, in the first instance, to recognize 
the state as the central figure in international relations.’ (p.128).  It can also be 
concluded from the current research that the uneven and complex character of the layers 
prompts variable responses from the states in terms of how they imagine their roles and 
in their reproduction of the ‘Self’.  The discursive structures through which a state’s 
identity is reproduced are changed by the multi-layered realities, and these discursive 
structures themselves allow such realties to be (re)constructed and accepted. 
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The repeated emphasis in both European states on a Global Community, 
enshrining an increased level of cooperation at the global scale, is a response to the 
globalizing processes that bring problems and new non-state actors to challenge the 
place of the state.  Although a Global Community may have a certain idealistic veneer, 
the repetition of this narrative in Britain and France is not necessarily a move away 
from neorealism and militarism to a world of political and cooperative solutions.  
Axtmann (2002) contends that: ‘…it is inconceivable that the rich states of the North 
are willing to submit to any political will that is counter to their core political interests.’ 
(p.105).  Attempts to find more cooperative means of governance at the global scale for 
Britain and France must therefore be considered in the context of their pasts as ‘great 
powers’ and the desire to continue to have influence.  A Global Community, whether in 
British or French terms, is as much a strategy for building and sustaining influence in 
the world as it is of an alternative or new form of governance.  The state is still the main 
component.  For the more powerful United States this is not such an imperative and so 
cooperation is less important and is only used when convenient to do so. 
 
However, the presence of non-state actors such as terrorist networks cannot be 
ignored, neither can the range of multi-state organizations, whether at regional or global 
scales, that have varying degrees of influence on geopolitics.  These actors are those that 
McGrew’s (2000) transformationalism places in a complex system operating unevenly 
at different scales.  At the same time, the state continues to be the location of greatest 
power, and it is the hegemonic discursive context through which the world continues to 
be understood.  Global governance is thus encapsulated in transformationalism to the 
extent that a variety of governmental and independent actors are now operating within, 
and influencing, geopolitics, but it is the state that is at the centre of this stratification. 
 
Regional Governance 
At the regional scale governance has also been regrouped around new 
institutions, nowhere is this more apparent than in Europe.  European integration 
inevitably questions the continuing role and status of the state, and it is a phenomenon 
that the two examples here – Britain and France – have responded to in different ways 
in accordance with their historical and political contexts, and the discourses and 
narratives that define their respective ‘selves’.  Nonetheless, while there are differences 
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there are also similarities that were shown in the previous chapter to set these states 
apart from the United States in their discursive structures, and their construction of 
geopolitical codes.  The shared experience of regionalization is also a shared contextual 
element and a shared reality that influences the reproduction of discourses and 
narratives, as it in turn shapes that reality from a sovereign state perspective. 
 
Despite the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy as a result of the 
Maastricht Treaty, foreign policy and defence policy are still primarily controlled by 
member states.  O’Dowd (2002) explains that: 
 
‘The founders of the EEC had emphasized political and security 
objectives while adopting market integration as the means to these ends.  
However, from the early 1980s, and more especially after the Maastricht 
Treaty (1992), economic integration appeared to become the overriding 
objective of European integration, in the form of the Single Market and 
European Monetary Union.’ (p.19). 
 
This contrast between economic integration and the political and security spheres 
reflects the complexity of European integration, and the uneven application and effects 
of the regionalization process.  Foreign and defence policy are essential parts of 
Westphalian state sovereignty, ultimately encapsulating protection of the borders and 
territory that define a state, and enshrining the relationship between the ‘inside’ and the 
‘outside’. 
 
However, through their construction of a European ‘Self’, policy-makers in 
Britain and France create an additional regional border enclosing the European space.  
Anderson (2002) says: ‘“networked space” is becoming more important but it is perhaps 
overemphasised and co-exists with territorial identities and national units; bounded 
spaces still abound; and the EU is itself a bounded space – a case of re- rather than de-
territorialisation.’ (p.227).  Where Europe should extend to, and what states it should 
ultimately encompass, are though contested and depend upon what idea of Europe 
prevails.1 Each governmental organization or function of Europe can include different 
 
1 While the borders of the EU are fixed at any given time according to the borders of the member states 
there is some debate over where ‘Europe’ extends to and what its borders might be.  This is relevant to the 
future expansion of the EU and which countries might be eligible for membership.  Britain and France 
tend to take a different view on this, with Turkey a prospective member over which debate has been 
intense.  Park (2005) says: ‘Many in Europe remain opposed to Turkish entry on “civilisational” as well 
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states resulting in multiple borders.  This applies even within the European Union where 
the Schengen agreement, for example, does not cover every member state, a fact that 
has a very direct impact upon borders given that it involves the removal of border 
controls and free movement of people between member states. To argue that there is a 
single European border, and a set of internal borders of identical type, is therefore 
erroneous. 
 
The complex pattern of borders points to an equally complex territoriality.  
Increased freedom of movement for trade and for individuals, added to variable 
authority over different policy competencies for the European layer of governance, 
diminishes the exclusive authority over a defined territory of the member states.  Of 
course, freedom of movement is variable depending on whether a person originates 
within or outside the Union.  Furthermore, it is still the states that control the borders.  
Authority over European territory is still very much concentrated in the state rather than 
the region.  In the representations, European territory is far less important, even in 
France where integration is a more acceptable, and indeed desirable, process.  European 
territoriality is not therefore displacing state territoriality; rather it is more a process of 
adding layers of territory.  Primary authority remains with the state; it is the state that 
joins regional organizations and has direct control over the space within its boundaries, 
and yet there is an element of power at regional level acting through the states.  This is 
acknowledged in the representations of state policy-makers through their narratives of 
European Unity and suggestions of Threats to Europe and the need to cooperate against 
these.  Through their representations of a European ‘Self’ above that of the states, 
British and French elites effectively construct a form of European territory, a European 
‘inside’ threatened from the ‘outside’ by the terrorist ‘Other’.  However, since the 
boundaries of Europe are multiple, at times rather vague, and disputed, the territory is 
equally so.  The question of membership, and the idea of where Europe extends to, is 
 
as economic, political, and security grounds.’ (p.135).  France understands Europe to be based on shared 
values and culture, conforming to those of France.  Deeper integration is an objective, with French 
leadership, providing a tool for French influence in the wider world.  Therefore, a larger membership with 
more diverse states threatens to dilute this French idea of Europe, and so Turkey’s membership is treated 
with scepticism.  In the British idea of Europe the EU should be an organization of states through which 
influence can be gained with out sacrificing other alliances, and so Turkey appears to be a possible 
member as there are no obvious limits.  Nevertheless, both states do have a ‘European imagination’ 
informing their representations. 
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entangled with perceptions of what Europe is and what it represents, a concept for 
which a clear division exists between Britain and France. 
 
Regional government is a structure that is perhaps unachievable in these 
circumstances; the evidence suggests that there is indeed a ‘situation of governance’ 
(Van der Wusten, 2000, p.88) rather than a government.  Discourses and narratives 
reproduced by representatives of the Union can largely be identified as conforming to 
those that are also common to both states studied here.  While the rhetoric of these 
individuals is of a united Europe and the benefits this will bring, including in the field of 
security, their freedom to construct a European ‘Self’ and to define regional policies that 
collectively represent member states, and expressed in geopolitical terms, is severely 
limited.  Only where representations, and the policies that these underpin, are 
uncontroversial as regards the sensibilities of the states can these representatives 
establish a position for the Union on a given issue.  At the same time, there are 
structures in place for a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and in many other 
competencies there is far deeper cooperation and greater power for Union institutions.  
Regional governance is therefore a reality in Europe. 
 
Such regional governance, and the extent to which the states are tied up with it, 
means they cannot ignore it even if they still retain a dominance in foreign and defence 
policy.  ‘States have been obliged to share authority with other actors, and their ability 
to command the exclusive loyalty of their citizens in some areas has diminished.’ 
(Gamble, 2001, p.30).  Given the presence of a regional actor in Europe it is 
unsurprising that a narrative of European Unity was present in both British and French 
representations (and of course those of EU representatives), the differences between 
these were explored in chapter seven, but the fact they both draw on such a narrative is 
an indication of the importance that European Unity and the regional scale have in the 
worldviews and geopolitical codes of these countries, even if the visions are distinctive.  
For Britain to imagine Europe in this way, even to a limited extent, given its reluctance 
for the European project, is testament to the way in which regional governance impinges 
upon the sovereign state. 
 
It may be no coincidence that these representations of a European ‘Self’ come in 
a period in which terrorism is being constructed as the new ‘Other’ and Threat to the 
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‘Self’.  It is a Threat to each state and also, in the representations of the two European 
states, a Threat to Europe.  When terrorism is understood through the discourse as a 
network that can penetrate state borders (and yet can be located in certain Eastern states) 
the cross border cooperation of the EU might appear to be an effective vehicle for 
combating a non-state actor that does not conform to the rules of the state system.  
Indeed, this is an indication of how states like Britain and France can, in their own 
ways, envisage a regional layer of governance as a tool for protecting their own 
interests, and their very existence, in a world in which globalization is impinging upon 
them.  Terrorism is just one product of the global processes, but by engaging in regional 
cooperation they can, as is emphasised by the political actors of both countries, 
strengthen their own influence globally. 
 
Hence, it can be said that there is neither a transition to a European regional 
actor that can construct its own geopolitical codes distinct from, and even contrary to, 
those of the member states, nor a neorealist scenario where states are the only relevant 
actors with no significant regional dimension.  Instead, this research suggests that 
regional forces in Europe are bringing about a greater complexity that cannot be 
described in binary terms of state or region.  In this sense the binary of inside/outside 
that is central to the sovereign state and its discourses of security is no longer so 
simplistic (Hyndman, 2003).  For states like Britain and France responses to terrorism 
are produced at the state level but also at the regional level, a threatened ‘Self’ being 
imagined for both scales but never entirely separated from one another.  The existence 
of Common Foreign and Security Policy structures in the EU allows for regional 
responses to be formulated that complement and support those of the states, while 
control over these competencies is principally exercised by state authorities.  Despite 
the distinctive visions of Europe and its role promoted by Britain and France both 
represent Europe as an essential component of their worldviews; the regional dimension 
is vital to the representations of the world, and of the terrorist Threat, that policy-makers 
in these countries create, and it is a central component of the geopolitical codes that are 
constructed in each state.  Thus, while the states forge their own codes these cannot be 
separated from the participation in a shared regional experience and the, arguably, 
increasing European response to security issues such as international terrorism. 
 
Reinventing Geopolitical Codes: The Changing Nature of the Westphalian State 
356
Postmodern States? 
For Cooper (2003) European states are ‘postmodern states’ in contrast to 
‘modern states’ like America: ‘The postmodern system does not rely on balance; nor 
does it emphasize sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs.’ (p.27).  
He explains: 
 
‘Among themselves, the postmodern states operate on the basis of laws 
and open co-operative security.  But when dealing with more old-
fashioned kinds of state outside the postmodern limits, Europeans need 
to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive 
attack, deception, whatever is necessary for those who still live in the 
nineteenth-century world of every state for itself.’ (p.61). 
 
This definition of a ‘postmodern’ state has some parallels with the British and French 
examples in this thesis, and yet to suggest that a state can be simultaneously ‘modern’ 
and ‘postmodern’ implies that it is not a fundamental change in the nature of the state 
from the neorealist sovereignty that might be found in a ‘modern’ state.  In other words 
it is a definition of behaviour rather than character.  What this research has shown is that 
there is some evidence of a deeper change to states in Europe when compared to the 
United States that might be termed ‘postmodern’, this may be related to the behaviour 
that Cooper describes, but is more than a surface feature.  In contrast the ‘modern’ 
United States represents a singular vision of the ‘Self’, a state acting alone in a world of 
states.  For American policy-makers there are no regional or global layers of governance 
of great consequence, there are no regional ‘selves’, territoriality remains singular. 
 
Differences in policy cannot, of course, be explained by this contrast alone.  
Kagan (2003) comments that: ‘Because they are relatively weak, Europeans have a deep 
interest in devaluing and eventually eradicating the brutal laws of an anarchic 
Hobbesian world where power is the ultimate determinant of national security and 
success.’ (p.37).  Each state does indeed seek to preserve and further its own interests, 
to that extent they act in a neorealist fashion.  The discourse of the state still dominates 
their representations, and the construction of the terrorist ‘Other’ is used in the 
reproduction of these binaries.  Policies of cooperation either at regional or global scales 
can be, or appear to be, effective in achieving the policy aims of European states when 
they lack the power to act in other ways like the United States.  The contrast here is 
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perhaps most distinctive when looking at France; it seeks an independent course for 
itself and by extension for Europe, it is also more inclined to press for cooperation at the 
global scale and for deeper regional integration.  Thus: ‘Realism is a necessary 
component in a coherent analysis of world politics because its focus on power, interests, 
and rationality is crucial to any understanding of the subject.’ (Keohane, 1986, p.159).  
National interests and the quest for influence are therefore an important component in 
the development of geopolitical codes, and the rhetoric and policy development of state 
elites; neorealism persists in ‘postmodern’ European states just as in the ‘modern’ 
United States. 
 
Reassessing the State and its Geopolitical Codes 
 Thus, a confused picture is emerging of states sharing space and geopolitical 
influence with other actors, some of which derive their existence from state membership 
(like the EU) and others emerging outside and opposed to the state (such as terrorist 
groups/networks like al Qaeda).  Whether these really constitute a threat to the very 
existence of the state as the dominant spacio-political form, representing a shift away 
from the Westphalian order, is another matter.  Walker (1993) reflected on the end of 
the Cold War, saying: ‘An old order may be giving way to the new but, it might be said, 
we are likely to see the emergence of a new order that looks suspiciously like the old.’ 
(p.2).  Following the Cold War, and particularly after September 11th, the temptation to 
conclude that the world had changed, that the state was being critically undermined was 
great.  There is little doubt that changes are occurring; globalizing and regionalizing 
processes are impinging upon the state; the events of September 11th and the rise of 
regional structures like the European Union are manifestations of this, but analysis of 
geopolitical codes and how they are constructed suggests that writing the obituary of the 
sovereign state may be premature. 
 
This thesis has examined the issue from a critical realist perspective and as such 
differs from neorealist and critical geopolitics equivalents, and it is irreducible from the 
understanding of the relationship between discourse and reality on which the research is 
based.  As explained in chapter two, reality in terms of structures and events is 
considered to exist, but it can only be interpreted and understood through discourse.  
For individuals making decisions this implies that discourse impacts upon their 
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decisions as it is through discourse that they see the world and the events occurring 
within it.  However, decisions are not governed by discourse, agency is also relevant.  
Simultaneously discourse is also shaped by reality; events like the end of the Cold War 
or September 11th prompt changes in the discourses that have been reproduced in 
accordance with the previous conditions.  This takes time as people try to understand 
events through the established discourses, and in so doing adapt these discourses to 
encompass the changed reality.  By understanding discourse and reality to have a two-
way relationship of this kind a critical realist philosophy of geopolitics appears 
appropriate. 
 
Critical realism accounts for the reality of the state as the main structure around 
which world politics is practiced, and therefore upon which the study of geopolitics 
should primarily be based.  Equally, by examining geopolitics critically it is possible to 
account for the role of discourse, both in the construction and reproduction of the state 
as the main actor in geopolitics and also in the (re)construction of individual states.  In 
so doing, this research has offered an alternative understanding of the way in which 
states have responded to the events of September 11th, and in particular the non-state 
global actors that were involved in these events. 
 
Furthermore, by selecting the United States, Britain and France as the states on 
which the study was focused, a comparison between the construction of responses in 
these states has allowed the wider implications of global and regional forces in the post-
Cold War period to be considered.  Global and regional actors can be assessed as 
relevant to geopolitics in a critical realist study where the potential for change is 
acknowledged, without assuming that the state is no longer the main actor.  The 
comparison, and the possibility for change, has given this study an opportunity to 
determine spatial variations between Europe and America, and between each of the 
three states individually, in terms of how they are responding and reacting to global and 
regional forces as manifested in international terrorism and European integration 
respectively.  Only by taking this critical realist approach, and understanding reality and 
discourse in this way, is it possible to accomplish this state centred study inclusive of 
new actors, and the ability of states to change through their encounters/relationships 
with these. 
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 The findings of this research suggest that, although the state is still at the centre 
of representations, the regional dimension for Britain and France does contribute to their 
representations, and to the geopolitical codes that they construct, in a way that is not 
apparent in the hegemonic United States.  The shared experience of regional 
governance, and especially the moves towards Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
provide a contextual component for these two states that America does not share.  While 
there are limitations in comparing a relatively small number of states, the contrasting 
historical and political factors of Britain and France, particularly in their attitudes 
towards Europe, make these states indicators of the extent to which regionalization is 
impacting upon representations and geopolitical codes in relation to international 
terrorism.  By demonstrating a tendency to include a shared regional response to 
terrorism, notwithstanding the distinct visions of Europe that each state holds, the 
analysis of Britain, France and the EU points to changes in the way in which these 
states, and the elites representing them, view the world and practice geopolitics. 
 
This does not mean that they do not still act as states or are subservient to the 
regional organization of which they are members, but that their membership and 
participation is a regional reality that acts to adapt the discourses and narratives through 
which geopoliticians understand the world.  Thus, they develop policies and construct 
geopolitical codes that are accepting of that regional dimension.  However, this brings 
into question the very concept of the geopolitical code upon which this thesis has been 
based.  Geopolitical codes are a phenomenon that is closely linked to the neorealist idea 
of the state as the principal actor in geopolitics, states forming codes that guide their 
geopolitical practice.  If it were the case that a European regional actor was forming its 
own codes separate from the states this would conform to a similar definition of a 
geopolitical code as constructed by a distinct actor.  Instead, the research indicates that 
such a scenario is unlikely, but that regionalization is relevant for geopolitical codes 
where common responses are being developed, without displacing the state as the main 
location and actor through which geopolitics is practiced.  The geopolitical code, 
however, can perhaps no longer be taken as entirely the property of an individual state.  
In a world of multiple actors and layers of governance the notion is problematized by 
the complexity of territoriality and entanglements between these actors. 
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 Nevertheless, the need to rethink what a geopolitical code is and how it is 
formed does not equate to a move away from geopolitical codes altogether, any more 
than a regional layer of governance in Europe should mean the end of the sovereign 
state.  It is more an openness to the possibilities for change that regional and indeed 
global forces bring for the state and the way in which states operate in the world.  In so 
doing, it is necessary to accept the possible variations that might exist in the nature of 
states and in how their geopolitical codes are characterized, in addition to the neorealist 
understandings of differences in state codes and policies. 
 
The contrast between the ‘modern’ United States and the more ‘postmodern’ 
European states is perhaps an effective example of these variations in the nature of 
states.  All remain sovereign states, but in Europe regionalization has a major influence 
on worldviews and geopolitical codes.  However, the United States experiences the 
impact of global forces as September 11th demonstrated, just as much as Europe does, 
and any consideration of the geopolitical code and of the state more generally cannot 
ignore the implications this has.  In this regard, critical realist analysis is suited to this 
more complex world, it allows for the possibility that non-state actors not only exist but 
also impact upon the assumptions that are made about the nature of the state and 
geopolitics, without ignoring the reality of the state’s position and status. 
 
To conclude that the end of the Cold War or the dramatic events of September 
11th mark the end of the Westphalian sovereign state is therefore overly simplistic, but 
neither can it be said, as a (neo)realist may do, that the state is permanent, unchanging 
and constitutes the perfect and exclusive structure for the spatial organization of the 
world, and through which geopolitics can be properly practiced.  Falk (2004) claims 
that: ‘What endures to give world order its Westphalian shape over the centuries is the 
primacy of the territorial state as political actor on a global level, the centrality of 
international warfare, the autonomy of the sovereign state to govern affairs within 
recognized international boundaries, the generalized tolerance of “human wrongs” 
committed within the scope of sovereign authority, the special leadership role in 
geopolitics claimed by and assigned to leading state(s), the weakness of the rule of law, 
and the absence of strong institutions of regional and global governance.’ (p.12).  Each 
of these features can still be identified in the post-September 11th world.  Nevertheless, 
globalization and regionalization have also been shown to impinge upon the states and 
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their Westphalian character.  However, this is neither equal nor even.  Each state 
responds to the processes acting upon it according to its own contextual factors and the 
idea of the ‘Self’ that is continually reproduced through discourse, and each experiences 
the effects of regionalizing and globalizing forces differently. 
 
Thus, while new actors are real and important elements in geopolitics, states 
remain pre-eminent but not unchanged.  Through their encounters with other actors, and 
the processes underpinning these, the nature of the state as described by Falk cannot 
endure unaltered.  Borders are shown to be more porous, diminishing the exclusive 
control of territory, while in some places new boundaries are emerging.  As a 
consequence territoriality is made complex.  The transition from ‘modern’ to 
‘postmodern’ states is therefore not a process that can be explained by variations in 
power alone, nor by the eclipse of the state as the principal geopolitical actor, it is rather 
an indication of how states are evolving to meet the circumstances of the more 
globalized post-Cold War world.  When the Treaty of Westphalia was signed in 1648 it 
was not intended to herald the ascendance of the sovereign state, but in retrospect it did 
encapsulate the principles that would be enshrined in this new spatial resolution; the 
reformed state of today is thus not necessarily an end point as neorealists would argue, 
but the significance of the end of the Cold War and September 11th for the state may 
only become apparent when considered in the future as part of its long-term evolution. 
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Appendix A 
Discourse Analysis: Process and Examples 
. . . . . . . .
As was discussed in chapter three, the discourse analysis was applied to a 
sample of documents from the United States, Britain, France and the European Union.  
Following a discussion of the process applied to the samples, and to each individual 
document, one sample from each is presented here.  Firstly there is a testimony to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee from Colin Powell (The United States); secondly a 
speech to the House of Commons by Tony Blair (The United Kingdom); thirdly a letter 
to the Brazilian Minister for External Affairs from Dominique De Villepin (France); and 
finally an article by Javier Solana (EU).  This offers an impression of how the analysis 
was carried out in practice on different types of document. 
 
When carrying out the discourse analysis, the process was one of reading and 
coding.  Beginning with the oldest documents, progress was made to the end of the 
sample.  This revealed how patterns developed over time in relation to different events.  
The discourses identified in the pilot study were now given appropriate codes.  When 
analysing each document, words, phrases and passages were identified that seemed to 
draw upon/contribute to the construction of, or are representative of, particular 
discourses or narratives.  Brackets1 were used to mark these, the relevant code being 
 
1 First of all square brackets were used to identify the complete word/phrase/passage of interest, and then 
if there was a further word/phrase/passage of particular interest within this, curved brackets were used.  
Thus, in the American example, the first passage to be bracketed identifies the Crusade Against Terrorism 
discourse, it has square brackets, however within it the phrase ‘go after’ is used and this has curved 
brackets. 
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noted in the margin.2 Each of the samples here displays a variety of these codes in the 
left margin.  In addition, any particularly important point with relevance to the way in 
which interpretations or representations were being made, was also noted in the margin 
(none of the four sample documents contained such notes).  While coding, it was also 
possible that a new discourse or narrative that had not come to light in the pilot study 
would suddenly appear relevant and be added to the list.  This of course requires some 
repeated reading of earlier documents to determine if any instances of it have been 
missed.   
 
Given that only a limited number of quotes would ultimately be able to be 
included in the thesis, it was important to identify good examples at an early stage from 
which to build later analyses and explanations.  Mason (2002) describes the process of 
‘deriving data’: ‘This may mean taking, or copying, whole documents or images for 
subsequent analysis, but it may also mean that you will select elements of them, record 
specific things about them (for example, this might be literal quotations from a 
document, or it might be written or visual notes about form, style and structure in visual 
images).’ (p.116-117).  Hence, during the process of reading and coding, those passages 
that would be useful in this way were highlighted for future use.  The British example 
contains three such passages.  It would be pointless to do this for all the bracketed 
passages because they do not all demonstrate the use of discourses as clearly as each 
other.  It is necessary to code all discourses and narratives, but when seeking limited 
examples the choice must be made more carefully. 
 
The four sample documents are not all of similar length, but this reflects the 
range that were analysed.  Some have more discourses and narratives identified within 
them than others.  Again this is representative of the wider samples where some had no 
relevant discourses or narratives at all.  Nevertheless, the following four samples are 
intended to offer an impression of how the discourse analysis was actually undertaken. 
 
2 In some cases a word/phrase/passage may contribute to the reproduction of more than one discourse or 
narrative, and so all the relevant codes were added to the margin.  There are examples of this in all but the 
French sample document. 
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The Campaign Against Terrorism 
 
Secretary Colin L. Powell 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Washington, DC 
October 25, 2001 
2:30 P.M. EDT 
As Delivered 
SECRETARY POWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for welcoming me back to appear 
before the Committee. And let me also say that I happened to read the same newspaper articles that 
Senator Helms did this morning, and when I saw the glaring headline, I said whoa, wait a minute, this can't 
be right. So I immediately asked my staff to get the transcript of what you had said. And I saw that it was 
not right, that it was clear that you were speaking in a stereotypical, what other people think. And then, at 
the tail end of that sentence that was taken out of context, your final words were, "And that's not right." 
And so I was much relieved, because I knew that couldn't have been your view, and appreciative, as I 
have been, for these past weeks, and since I became Secretary, of the support, Mr. Chairman, that you 
have provided to the Department, that you have provided to me on a personal basis. And I express to you, 
and to Chairman Helms and to the other members of the Committee the same sentiment: thank you for 
your support, and especially, thank you for the solid bipartisan support that the Administration has enjoyed 
from the Committee during this crisis that began on the 11th of September. It means a lot to us, it shows a 
lot to the world about what kind of a nation we are, what kind of a people we are. And in the midst of all the 
anthrax scares and other things that are going on, we are here on Capitol Hill to conduct the people's 
business. We will not be frightened, we will not be scared. We will get on with the people's business, and I 
am pleased to be here today to participate in that solid, historic, democratic process that we enjoy and that 
we believe in to the depth of our hearts. 
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your comment and your confidence. I appreciate it. 
SECRETARY POWELL: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I'd like to provide a written testimony for the record, and 
I'd like to summarize it very briefly. 
THE CHAIRMAN: Let it be placed in the record. 
SECRETARY POWELL: Mr. Chairman, we will always remember the 11th of September, where we all 
happened to be on that day, it's seared into our individual memories, it's seared into our individual souls. I 
was in Lima, Peru at breakfast with the President of Peru, President Toledo, when the notes were handed 
to me, two notes in a quick row, making it clear that it wasn't an accident, but my country had been hit by 
the worst terrorist act that we had seen in our history. 
And it was a long day for me, as I got in my plane and flew all the way back from Peru, unable to 
communicate with anybody in Washington until I arrived and joined the President in the White House with 
the other national security advisors to the President. 
And when I walked into the Situation Room and joined the President, I found a President who was seized 
with the mission that had been handed him that day, a President who had already seen that a challenge 
had been presented to him that would change the entire nature of his presidency and his administration. 
And a President who took up that challenge, I think, in a bold way, a way that history will long remember. 
[He knew right away that he not only had to (go after) the perpetrators of these terrible attacks against 
us; he knew also that we had to (go after) terrorism.] It wouldn't be enough just to deal with these 
perpetrators, who were soon identified as the al-Qaida network and Usama bin Laden. But in order to be 
the kind of leader that he is, in order to show leadership to the world, [we had to undertake (a campaign)
that goes after terrorism in all of its many forms around the world. ] 
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And it's a campaign that has many dimensions to it. It's a campaign that some days involves financial 
attacks, other days law enforcement attacks, intelligence attacks, and sometimes, as we see now in 
Afghanistan, military attacks. [ We have to secure our borders. ] We have to do a better job of talking to 
other nations about who travels across our borders. We have to make sure we go after the financial 
networks that support terrorist activity. 
And to do that, [we built a broad coalition, a coalition of nations that came together to respond to this 
attack, not just against America, but against civilization. ] Hundreds and hundreds of people who were not 
Americans died in the World Trade Center. Five hundred Muslims died in the World Trade Center. Usama 
bin Laden and al-Qaida killed Muslims on the 11th of September 2001 in New York City, as well as men 
and women representing every race, color and creed on the face of the earth, and a large number of 
American citizens.  
Are we're going after them with this broad coalition to make sure that they are brought to justice or justice 
is brought to them. It was an attack against civilization; civilization must respond.  
People have said, well, you know, it was an attack against America, really not civilization. No, it wasn't. [It 
was the action of (an evil man), and it was an (evil act). There is no connection or relationship to any 
faith; there is no faith on the face of the earth that would sanction such (an evil strike) against (innocent 
people). And we cannot let Usama bin Laden pretend that he is doing it in the name of helping the Iraqi 
people or the Palestinian people. ] He doesn't care one whit about them. He has never given a dollar 
toward them. He has never spoken out for them. [He has used them as a cover for his (evil, criminal, 
murderous, terrorist acts). ] And he has to be seen in that light. 
We have put together a [grand coalition], and people have said, well, coalitions sometimes come with 
problems. When you bring all these people together, don't you have to take into account all of their 
interests, and don't these kinds of coalitions sometimes hamstring the President and his ability to do what 
he thinks he has to do. 
The answer to the question is: the President has not given up any of his authority. There are no 
arrangements within this coalition which in any way, shape, fashion or form constrain the President and the 
exercise of his constitutional responsibilities to defend the United States of America and to defend the 
people of the United States. So that should not be a concern in anyone's mind. 
At the same time, without this coalition, the President couldn't do what needs to be done. [Without this 
(coalition), we couldn't be cooperating with 100 nations around the world on going after financial networks 
of terrorist organizations. Without this (coalition), we wouldn't have countries that were supporting us in 
the prosecution of our military campaign, giving us over-flight, giving us basing rights and contributing 
military forces to fight alongside American forces. ] 
So this is a coalition that is of enormous value, and what is unique about this coalition that makes it 
different than any other coalition anyone has ever put together is that, except for about three or four 
countries, every other country on the face of the Earth has signed up. They have signed up in many ways, 
whether it was NATO, 19 nations invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the NATO Treaty, for the 
first time in history, saying that an attack on one is an attack on all, and that attack in New York City and 
Washington and Pennsylvania was an attack on one and was an attack on all of us, and NATO has 
responded. 
The United Nations Security Council, the United Nations General Assembly, the OAS, the Rio Treaty was 
invoked, the ANZUS Treaty was invoked. The Organization of Islamic Conference had a meeting earlier 
this month, and 56 Muslim nations came forward and said this was a dastardly attack which does not 
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represent Islam; it's a disgrace; the United States is right to see it as an attack on civilization and an attack 
on America.  
One more point I would make about the coalition is that, whether we wanted it or not, it showed up. Within 
24 hours, NATO acted. Before I could really get on the phone and ask them, they were there. The UN 
showed up within 48 hours. A lot of people pat me on the back and said, "Good job with the coalition." I 
have to sort of drop my head slightly. They all showed up. Our friends showed up when we needed them. 
People have also said, "Well, this coalition will start to come apart after a while. They won't stick together." 
Well, they've stuck together. It's now six weeks. The President just returned from an important meeting in 
Shanghai, the APEC conference, where 21 Asian and Pacific nations all came together to talk about 
economic issues, to talk about the world trading system, to talk about breaking down barriers to trade. But 
the first thing they talked about was terrorism, and all 21 of these nations reaffirmed their support for what 
we are doing. 
As my colleague Don Rumsfeld often says, "It's not just a single coalition. It's a shifting set of coalitions, 
really, that come together." And members will do different things at different times in the life of this 
coalition. Some member-nations have said, look, all we can do really is give you political and diplomacy 
support. We don't have the wherewithal, or because of our political situation, we can't do much more than 
that. Others have said we'll participate fully on intelligence-sharing and financial digging-up of terrorist 
organizations, and we'll provide military assets as well.  
We have said let each contribute according to your ability to contribute, your willingness to contribute, and 
the situation you face within your country. And so far, [after six weeks, this coalition is gaining strength, 
not getting weaker. ] 
Our attention now is focused on the military campaign in Afghanistan. I am so proud of the men and 
women in uniform that I used to be so closely associated with, as they once again go in harm's way in 
such a professional manner to serve the American people, and in this case to serve the cause of 
civilization. They are doing a fine job. But, as the Chairman noted, it is going to be a tough campaign. It's a 
tough campaign, tough in the air and even tougher on the ground, as we use not American forces directly, 
but other forces who are like-minded in recognizing that the Taliban must be removed. It's quite difficult to 
coordinate them, but we are working on that very hard, and with each passing day the coordination links 
between the air campaign and what is happening on the ground become tighter, become more direct, and 
are moving in the right direction. 
Our work in Afghanistan, though, is not just of a military nature. We recognize that when the al-Qaida 
organization has been destroyed in Afghanistan and as we continue to try to destroy it in all the nations in 
which it exists around the world, and when the Taliban regime has gone to its final reward, we need to put 
in place a new government in Afghanistan, one that represents all the people of Afghanistan and one that 
is not dominated by any single powerful neighbor, but instead is dominated by the will of the people of 
Afghanistan.  
We are working hard at that. Ambassador Richard Haass, the Director of Policy Planning at the State 
Department, is my personal representative, working with the United Nations, Ambassador Brahimi, the 
King and others to try to help Afghan leaders around the world find the proper model for the future 
Afghanistan.  
But we have got to do more than that. We also have to make sure that when the Taliban regime is gone, 
we remain committed to helping Afghanistan finally find a place in the world, by helping its people build a 
better life for themselves, by making sure they get the food aid and other aid they will need to start building 
decent lives for themselves and for their children. 
And while we are going through this conflict period now and thinking about the future, we also have to 
make sure that we are pumping as much humanitarian aid into the country now as winter approaches so 
that we don't leave anybody at risk of starvation. There are lots of reports about that, but I can say that the 
reports I have this morning suggest that we have got quite a bit of food going in, blankets going in. It is still 
a tenuous situation, but the situation has improved in recent days, and I think it will improve in the days 
ahead. 
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We are giving it the highest priority, working with our friends in Pakistan and Uzbekistan, and I was 
pleased to see the Foreign Minister of Uzbekistan in the hearing room today, and it gives me the 
opportunity to thank him and his government for the terrific support that they have provided to us. 
The Chairman mentioned that new strategic opportunities may come out of this crisis. I think that is 
absolutely right. We have seen Russia do things in the last six weeks that would have been unthought-of 
five or six years ago even, long after the Soviet Union was gone. We are working with the Russians to take 
advantage of these new opportunities.  
At the APEC meeting in China, Mr. Chairman, you would be pleased to know that while we were talking 
about trade and economic development with the People's Republic, we made sure that they understood 
that even though we want to move in that direction, we are not forgetting about human rights, we are not 
forgetting about religious freedom. The President talked about the Dalai Lama. He talked about relations 
with the Vatican. And we have seen improvement already with respect to dialogue between the Vatican 
and Beijing, just within the last 24 hours. 
We talked about proliferation. We told them what we don't like about what they do with respect [to rogue 
nations]. So Senator Helms, I can assure you and assure all the other members of the Committee that we 
are clear-eyed about this coalition building. We are clear-eyed about the campaign we have embarked 
upon. We understand the nature of some of the regimes that we are having some opening discussions 
with. And they are not going to get in on the cheap. "We are against the Taliban, but you've got to tolerate 
our actions with respect to other terrorist organizations that we like" -- it won't work. The President says 
you've got to choose now to move into a new world, where you no longer support those kinds of activities if 
you want a better shot at good relations with the United States of America. 
[And so I think we are off on a (noble cause). I think it is (a cause that is just). It is a cause that we (will 
prevail) in, because we are doing the (right thing). ]
Let me close by once again thanking the Committee for the support that they have provided to us. I know 
how much it means to the President for you all to visit with him every week or so. And let me once again 
express my admiration for the men and women in uniform who are doing such a great job. And let me also 
express my admiration for the men and women of the State Department, and the other civilian agencies of 
the United States Government, who are serving in missions all around the world, sometimes in great 
danger, sometimes at the risk of their lives. They are doing a terrific job, and I know that you share my 
admiration and pride in the men and women of our diplomatic service. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  
(2:45 p.m. EDT) 
 
[End] 
Released on October 25, 2001 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/5751.htm 
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Prime Minister's statement to 
the House of Commons 
following the September 11 
attacks 
14 September 2001 
Mr Speaker, I am grateful that you agreed to the recall of Parliament to debate [the (hideous)
and (foul) events in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania] that took place on Tuesday 11 
September. 
I thought it particularly important in view of the fact that [these attacks were not just attacks 
upon people and buildings; nor even merely upon the USA; these were (attacks on the basic 
democratic values) in which we all believe so passionately and on the (civilised world). ] It is 
therefore right that Parliament, the fount of our own democracy, makes its democratic voice 
heard. 
There will be different shades of opinion heard today. That again is as it should be. 
But let us unite in agreeing this: [what happened in the United States on Tuesday was (an act of 
wickedness) for which there can never be justification. Whatever the cause, whatever (the 
perversion) of religious feeling, whatever the political belief, to inflict such terror on the world; to 
take the lives of so many (innocent and defenceless men, women, and children), can never ever 
be justified. ] 
Let us unite too, with the vast majority of decent people throughout the world, in sending our 
condolences to the government and the people of America. They are our friends and allies. We the 
British are a people that stand by our friends in time of need, trial and tragedy, and we do so 
without hesitation now. 
The events are now sickeningly familiar to us. Starting at 08.45 US time, two hijacked planes were 
flown straight into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York. Shortly afterwards at 
09.43, another hijacked plane was flown into the Pentagon in Washington. 
At 10.05 the first tower collapsed; at 10.28 the second; later another building at the World Trade 
Center. The heart of New York's financial district was devastated, carnage, death and injury 
everywhere. 
Around 10.30 we heard reports that a fourth hijacked aircraft had crashed south of Pittsburgh. 
I would like on behalf of the British people to express our admiration for the selfless bravery of the 
New York and American emergency services, many of whom lost their lives. 
As we speak, the total death toll is still unclear, but it amounts to several thousands. 
Because the World Trade Center was the home of many big financial firms, and because many of 
their employees are British, whoever committed these acts of terrorism will have murdered at 
least a hundred British citizens, maybe many more. Murder of British people in New York is no 
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different in nature from their murder in the heart of Britain itself. In the most direct sense, 
therefore, we have not just an interest but an obligation to bring those responsible to account. 
To underline the scale of the loss we are talking about we can think back to some of the appalling 
tragedies this House has spoken of in the recent past. We can recall the grief aroused by the 
tragedy at Lockerbie, in which 270 people were killed, 44 of them British. In Omagh, the last 
terrorist incident to lead to a recall of Parliament, 29 people lost their lives. Each life lost a 
tragedy. Each one of these events a nightmare for our country. But the death toll we are 
confronting here is of a different order. 
In the Falklands War 255 British Service men perished. During the Gulf War we lost 47. 
In this case, we are talking here about a tragedy of epoch making proportions. 
And as the scale of this calamity becomes clearer, I fear that there will be many a community in 
our country where heart-broken families are grieving the loss of a loved one. I have asked the 
Secretary of State to ensure that everything they need by way of practical support for them is 
being done. 
Here in Britain, we have instituted certain precautionary measures of security. We have tightened 
security measures at all British airports, and ensured that no plane can take off unless their 
security is assured. We have temporarily redirected air traffic so that planes do not fly over central 
London. City Airport is reopening this morning. 
We have also been conscious of the possibility of economic disruption. Some sectors like the 
airlines and insurance industry will be badly affected. But financial markets have quickly stabilised. 
The oil producers have helped keep the oil price steady. Business is proceeding as far as possible, 
as normal. 
There are three things we must now take forward urgently. 
First, we must bring to justice those responsible. Rightly, President Bush and the US Government 
have proceeded with care. They did not lash out. They did not strike first and think afterwards. 
Their very deliberation is a measure of the seriousness of their intent. 
They, together with allies, will want to identify, with care, those responsible. This is a judgement 
that must and will be based on hard evidence. 
Once that judgement is made, the appropriate action can be taken. It will be determined, it will 
take time, [it will continue over time until (this menace) is properly dealt with and its machinery 
of terror destroyed. ] 
But one thing should be very clear. By their acts, these terrorists and those behind them have 
made themselves the [enemies of the civilised world. ] 
The objective will be to bring to account [those who have organised, aided, abetted and incited 
this (act of infamy); and those that harbour or help them have a choice: either to cease their 
protection of (our enemies); or be treated as an enemy themselves. ] 
Secondly, this is a moment when every difference between nations, every divergence of interest, 
every irritant in our relations, are put to one side in one common endeavour. [The world should 
stand together against this outrage. ] 
NATO has already, for the first time since it was founded in 1949, invoked Article 5 and 
determined that this attack in America will be considered as an attack against the Alliance as a 
whole. 
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The UN Security Council on Wednesday passed a resolution which set out its readiness to take all 
necessary steps to combat terrorism. 
From Russia, China, the EU, from Arab states, from Asia and the Americas, from every continent 
of the world has come united condemnation. This solidarity should be maintained and translated 
into support for action. 
[We do not yet know the exact origin of (this evil). ] But, if, as appears likely, it is so-called 
Islamic fundamentalists, we know they do not speak or act for the vast majority of decent law-
abiding Muslims throughout the world. I say to our Arab and Muslim friends: neither you nor Islam 
is responsible for this; on the contrary, we know you share our shock at this terrorism; and we ask 
you as friends to make common cause with us in [defeating (this barbarism) that is (totally 
foreign) to the true spirit and teachings of Islam. ] 
And I would add that, now more than ever, we have reason not to let the Middle East Peace 
Process slip still further but if at all possible to reinvigorate it and move it forward. 
Thirdly, whatever the nature of the immediate response to these terrible events in 
America, we need to re-think dramatically the scale and nature of the action the world takes to 
combat terrorism. 
We know a good deal about many of these terror groups. But as a world we have not been 
effective at dealing with them. 
And of course it is difficult. We are democratic. They are not. We have respect for human life. 
They do not. We hold essentially liberal values. They do not. As we look into these issues it is 
important that we never lose sight of our basic values. [But we have to understand the nature of 
(the enemy) and act accordingly. ] 
Civil liberties are a vital part of our country, and of our world. But the most basic liberty of all is 
the right of the ordinary citizen to go about their business free from fear or terror. That liberty has 
been denied, in the cruellest way imaginable, to the passengers aboard the hijacked planes, to 
those who perished in the trade towers and the Pentagon, to the hundreds of rescue workers killed 
as they tried to help. 
[So we need to look once more: (nationally and internationally) at (extradition laws), and the 
mechanisms for international justice; ] at how these terrorist groups are financed and their 
money laundered: and the links between terror and crime and we need to frame a response that 
will work, and hold internationally. 
[For this form of terror knows (no mercy); (no pity), and it (knows no boundaries). ]
And let us make this reflection. A week ago, anyone suggesting terrorists would kill thousands of 
innocent people in downtown New York would have been dismissed as alarmist. It happened. [We 
know that these groups are (fanatics), (capable of killing without discrimination). The limits on 
the numbers they kill and their methods of killing are (not governed by morality). The limits are 
only practical or technical. We know, that they would, if they could, go further and (use chemical 
or biological or even nuclear weapons of mass destruction). We know, also, that there are groups 
or people, occasionally states, who trade the technology and capability for such weapons. ] 
It is time this trade was exposed, disrupted, and stamped out. We have been warned by the 
events of 11 September. We should act on the warning. 
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So there is a great deal to do and many details to be filled in, much careful work to be undertaken 
over the coming days, weeks and months. 
We need to mourn the dead; and then act to protect the living. 
[Terrorism has taken on a new and frightening aspect. ] 
The people perpetrating it wear the ultimate badge of the fanatic: they are prepared to commit 
suicide in pursuit of their beliefs. 
[Our beliefs are the very (opposite of the fanatics). We believe in (reason), (democracy) and 
(tolerance).
These beliefs are (the foundation of our civilised world). They are enduring, they have (served 
us well and as history has shown we have been prepared to fight), when necessary to defend 
them. But the (fanatics) should know: we hold these beliefs every bit as strongly as they hold 
theirs. ] 
Now is the time to show it. 
http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1598.asp
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TERRORIST ATTACK UN BAGHDAD 
MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE 
FROM M. DOMINIQUE DE VILLEPIN, 
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
TO M. CELSO AMORIM, 
BRAZILIAN MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS 
(Paris, 20 August 2003) 
Minister, 
The tragic death of that great Brazilian, Sergio Vieira de Mello, is a terrible loss for the 
[international community] and for all those who, across the world, are working together 
to [ensure the triumph of (peace), (justice) and (respect for human rights).]
In a succession of posts and on every continent, he put his incomparable talents, his 
courage, his intelligence and the power of his conviction at the service of those 
fundamental values. He was the embodiment of what was most noble in the work of the 
United Nations and was a credit to his country of origin, to which he remained deeply 
attached. 
Today, in these painful circumstances, the United Nations and the [whole international 
community] stand side by side with Brazil and share her grief. 
In this time of cruel trial, I want to express to you my profound sorrow, my deepest 
sympathy, and the entire solidarity of the French authorities. 
(complimentary close)./. 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actual/declarations/bulletins/20030821.gb.html 
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"Three ways for Europe to prevail against the terrorists" 
by JAVIER SOLANA 
 
The Madrid attacks have reminded us of [the (potency) of the terrorist (threat)
to Europe.] How can we as policymakers and as citizens respond? Today the 
European Council will consider this issue. I see three sets of responses. 
 
First, we must make European counter-terrorism more effective. Governments 
have improved coordination since the September 11 2001 attacks on the US. 
Useful initiatives have been launched, [transatlantic co-operation] has been 
bolstered and some excellent police and intelligence work has been done. We 
must build on this. 
 
Europe lacks neither the will nor the capabilities - judicial, financial and in 
intelligence and police work - [to fight terrorism]. The immediate focus is not to 
create new capabilities but to make better use of those already available. 
Improving coherence and co-ordination must not become a bureaucratic 
exercise. That is why the European Council focused on producing practical 
results. 
 
One priority is better intelligence-sharing. More information must be exchanged 
more quickly. I suggested before Madrid that we reinforce the capacity we have 
in the Council to analyse intelligence in the field of terrorism, and I welcome 
member states' agreement to this. I do not believe we need a European CIA, 
but I will be reporting to the next European Council in June 2004 on the sharing 
of operational intelligence. If we were to go down this road, we would have to 
show that it would enhance already extensive co-operation while guaranteeing 
speed and security. 
 
In addition, we must implement fully and without delay legislative measures 
such as the European arrest warrant. These are vital tools in the [fight against 
terror]. We must accelerate the [strengthening of (border controls) and 
document security]. And we must look again at our existing curbs on the 
financing of terrorism. To make our actions as coherent and comprehensive as 
possible I have appointed a counter-terrorism co-ordinator: Mr Gijs de Vries, he 
will be in charge of coordinating the work currently being done in the European 
Union in this field.. 
 
[Outside Europe] we need to look again at how we can work with other 
countries. Where we can help our partners in bolstering their counter-terrorist 
capacities, we should do so. If they are unwilling to help, this will call into 
question the basis for our partnership. 
 
Second, we must maintain our determination to understand and tackle the 
factors behind terrorism. No cause justifies terrorism, but nothing justifies 
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ignoring the causes of terrorism. Clearly, there is a [fanatical fringe] who are 
beyond political discourse. But it is nourished by a pool of disaffection and 
grievance. Where these grievances are legitimate they must be addressed, not 
just because this is a matter of justice but also because ["draining the swamp"]
depends on it. 
 
Terrorism will not - and should not - advance the legitimate aspirations of the 
Palestinian people. But a determined effort by [the international community] to 
address such aspirations with those Palestinians who reject violence would deal 
a heavy blow to terrorism. That is why the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the 
wider sense of despair in parts of the [(Arab world) cannot be deferred until the 
(fight against terrorism) is won. At the same time, we must fight for (regional 
stability), good governance and the rule of law.]
Third, all of us, as European citizens, can and must defend our democracies by 
exercising and defending the rights that we hold dear. A climate of fear and 
repression is what the terrorists seek. Faith in democracy is the best weapon in 
our defence. 
 
Those who detect a new climate of appeasement in Europe towards terrorism 
are wrong. I marched together with more than 2million others in the streets of 
Madrid the day after the bombings. The mood was not one of fear. It was of 
quiet resolve - to honour the dead, [to (prevail) in the face of terrorism], to 
defend the democracy that Spaniards hold so dear. 
 
In Spain, as throughout Europe, people are united in their determination to 
[fight terror]. At the same time, there is also a legitimate political debate about 
how best to proceed in that fight. To suspend that debate would be a betrayal of 
democracy. 
 
Europeans know the [fight against terrorism] will not be easily won. There will 
be many silent successes but there will also be setbacks. Our successes must 
not breed complacency, just as our setbacks must not provoke despair. We 
must harness all our energies to fight for the rule of law, within the rule of law. 
[Terrorism attacks (the values) on which the European Union is founded. It will 
be overcome by adherence to those (same values). ]
The writer is the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy 
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Appendix B 
Document Cover Sheet: Sample and Explanation 
. . . . . . . .
The annotated cover sheet on the following page demonstrates what information 
was gathered and recorded for each document.  This sample is the cover sheet for the 
French documents but is almost identical to those used for the other countries.  The top 
section records general information about the document such as the title and the date; 
below this is the section for data resulting from the discourse analysis; at the bottom of 
the sheet is a section for additional comments. 
 
The discourse/narrative section was completed as follows.  After coding each 
document an assessment of the relative frequency of the discourses and narratives was 
made.  This was achieved firstly by considering general impressions of what discourses 
had been more dominant in the document; the number of times each code appeared in 
the margins was then counted.  Counting alone is insufficient as some codes may be 
attached to a single word while others may be next to a lengthy passage that is central to 
the whole text.  It is therefore by combining the count with an impression of the 
significance of the discourses and narratives to the whole document that a decision of 
whether a discourse was frequent, medium or occasional was reached, and the relevant 
box ticked next to each discourse or narrative in the table on the cover sheet.  
Nonetheless, this technique is rather unreliable and can only be used as a guide of what 
is important in a particular document. 
 
Having produced initial graphs for some of the countries discourses and 
narratives based upon these three categories, their effectiveness for analysis was 
reassessed.  When reflecting on how this original assessment had been made it was 
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decided that to process it quantitatively in this way gave the results a certainty that they 
could not possess.  These variable frequencies were therefore abandoned at this point.  
This left figures and graphs for the basic numbers (for which percentages were 
calculated) of documents in which particular discourses/narratives appeared.  These 
were determined by counting a document as containing a discourse or narrative no 
matter which of the three categories was ticked on the cover sheet.  This can be treated 
quantitatively as a document either contains a discourse/narrative or it does not. 
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Title Code 
Year Date Period 
Author Status 
Document Type Audience 
Discourses Frequent Medium Occasional 
 
Narratives 
 
Frequent 
 
Medium 
 
Occasional 
 
IO    BT    
SO    IV    
GE    CL    
OD    OG    
EW    WD    
TH    RS    
PN    FR    
GH    
GP    
EU  
GC  
HV  
MP  
CR  
WY  
Comments 
The Author is the individual(s) to whom the 
document has been attributed authorship.  
Therefore the speaker of a speech is 
considered the author rather than an 
anonymous speechwriter.  In some cases no 
author is identifiable and a U is entered in the 
box denoting unknown author.  This was most 
often the case for press releases that are issued 
on behalf of a government or department 
rather than an individual.
The Document Type is recorded as 
follows: S for a speech, I for an 
interview, L for a letter, T for a 
testimony, P for a publication, A for an 
article, and R for a release. 
The Audience is recorded as 
follows: I for international, D for 
domestic, UN for United Nations, 
and OD for official domestic 
(where the intended audience is 
not really the general public). 
The status attempts to identify the 
importance of the author within the 
state bureaucracy and is defined by 
one of three codes: H for high status 
such as Presidents, L for low status 
when it is not a senior minister, and 
U for unknown.  In practice most of 
my authors were high status as it is 
these people that the research was 
concentrating on.
This was usually completed with  an 
entry like ‘pre-9/11’ or ‘post-9/11’ , 
although on occasions it was more 
specific, such as identifying a 
particular American Presidency.  
However, while it seemed a useful 
addition at the beginning later on the 
exact dates were more convenient for 
working with.
The code is in the form 
of a letter to denote the 
country, two digits to 
represent the year, two 
digits for the order 
number of the document 
and a letter also to 
individually identify it 
and allow for extra 
documents to be inserted 
later on.  Thus, the code 
F0214C represents a 
French document from 
2002, which is the 16th of 
that year (14+2).  These 
codes are extremely 
useful when trying to 
keep track of references 
for quotes, and also give 
an immediate indication 
of what year the quote 
has come from.
In this box the date of 
publication of a document, or of 
a speech being made, is entered.
This box contains the title of the document.  In many cases the document 
does not have a particular title, particularly speeches.  In such cases the 
title may be a description of the speaker and the occasion or audience. 
This is the year 
of publication 
of the 
document.
The comments section is available for any additional 
information.  This may draw on the points noted in the 
margins of the document, or may be notes of general 
impressions.  If a document appears to be very important in 
terms of the overall themes then this could also be added here.  
All of this information could be of use in later analysis. 
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Appendix C 
Biographies of the Authors of Primary Documents 
. . . . . . . .
The following is a list of those authors of primary documents who are quoted in the text.  
It does not include all the authors of documents that were analysed.  The biographies are 
short.  They concentrate on the positions that the individuals held at the time the quoted 
material was produced, rather than an exhaustive description of their lives.  However, 
where a person has previously or subsequently held an important post this has often 
been noted.  In addition, a brief summary of the role(s) occupied at the relevant time has 
often been included in the biographies where this is not immediately obvious from the 
title. 
 
Tony Blair 
 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 2nd May 1997.  The Prime Minister is head 
of the British government. 
 
George W. Bush 
 
Republican President of the United States of America from 20th January 2001.  The 
President is the Head of State and of Government. 
 
Jacques Chirac 
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President of the Republic (France) since 17th May 1995, having previously held a 
variety of political positions including Prime Minister.  The President is the Head of 
State but also leads the government alongside the Prime Minister.  The Prime Minister 
and government are appointed by the President who presides over meetings of the 
Council of Ministers or Cabinet (The Office of the French President, 2007). 
 
William (Bill) Jefferson Clinton 
 
Democrat President of the United States of America from 21st January 1993 – 20th 
January 2001.  The President is the Head of State and of Government. 
 
William S. Cohen 
 
Secretary of Defence of the United States from 24th January 1997 until January 2001. 
Cohen served in both the House of Representatives and the Senate as a Republican 
before becoming Secretary of Defence in a Democrat administration. 
 
Dominique De Villepin 
 
Served as Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and the French-speaking Countries 
from May 2002 until March 2004.  De Villepin became Minister for the Interior, 
Internal Security and Local Freedoms in March 2004 and then Prime Minister in May 
2005. 
 
Peter Hain 
 
Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 1999 until 24th January 
2001, then at the Department for Trade and Industry.  He took up the post of Minister 
for Europe at the FCO from 11th June 2001 until 24th October 2002.  Since then he has 
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been Leader of the House of Commons, the Secretary of State for Wales and for 
Northern Ireland. 
 
Heads of State, Governments and EU Officials 
 
This encompasses the heads of state and government of the European Union member 
states, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European 
Commission, and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. 
 
Richard C. Holbrooke 
 
A U.S. Assistant Secretary of State twice; for East Asian and Pacific affairs from 1977 – 
1981, and for European and Canadian affairs from 1994 – 1996.  He then served as the 
Permanent United States Representative to the United Nations from 5th August 1999 
until 19th January 2001. 
 
Patrick M. Hughs 
 
Lieutenant General in the U.S Army until retiring in October 1999.  He was the Director 
of the Defense Intelligence Agency from February 1996 – July 1999, an organization 
that claims to: ‘Provide timely, objective, and cogent military intelligence to 
warfighters, defense planners, and defense and national security policymakers.’ 
(Defense Intelligence Agency, 2007).  The Director advises the Secretary of Defense 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
 
Edmund J. Hull 
 
The Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U.S Department of State, from 
1999 until 2001. 
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Lionel Jospin 
 
Prime Minister of France from June 1997 until May 2002.  The Prime Minister is 
responsible for government policy, working with the President. 
 
Pierre Moscouici 
 
Following a spell as an MEP he was Minister for European Affairs from 1997 until 
2002.  In 2004 he returned to the European Parliament. 
 
Chris Patten 
 
A former British Conservative politician and Cabinet Minister and also Governor of 
Hong Kong, Patten was European Commissioner for External Relations from 1999 until 
2004.  The Commissioner for External Relations is responsible for: ‘relations with all 
countries except those covered by Development and Enlargemment directorate-
generals; relations with international organizations; Commissions participation in the 
CFSP; administration of delegations in third countries’ (Smith, 2003, p.37).  In 2005 he 
was given a peerage. 
 
William J. Perry 
 
Deputy Secretary of Defense 1993 – 1994, then Secretary of Defense from 3rd February 
1994 until January 23rd 1997. 
 
Colin Powell 
 
Secretary of State from 20th January 2001 until 23rd January 2005.  Previously a General 
in the U.S. Army and also National Security Advisor and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. 
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Romano Prodi 
 
Prime Minister of Italy from 1996 until 1998, Prodi became President of the European 
Commision in 1999 continuing until 2004.  ‘The President must try to provide forward 
movement for the European Union and to give a sense of direction both to his fellow 
Commissioners and, more broadly, to the Commission as a whole... …He calls and 
chairs meetings of the Members of the Commission, and can assign responsibility for 
specific activities to them or set up working groups. Lastly, he represents the 
Commission.’ (European Commission, 2007).  Prodi returned as Italian Prime Minister 
in 2006. 
 
Jean-Pierre Raffarin 
 
Prime Minister of France from 6th May 2002 until 31st May 2005.  The Prime Minister 
is responsible for government policy, working with the President. 
 
Donald H. Rumsfeld 
 
Secretary of Defense in the United States from 20th January 2001 until 18th December 
2006.  He had held the same position between 1975 and 1977. 
 
Javier Solana 
 
A Minister in the Spanish Cabinet between 1982 and 1995, latterly as Minister for 
Foreign Affairs.  He was Secretary General of NATO from 1995 until 1999, when on 
the 18th of October he took up the positions of Secretary General of the Council of the 
European Union and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
on the 25th of November 1999 he added the post of Secretary General of the Western 
European Union.  The WEU is a defence association that constitutes the defence 
component of the CFSP.  ‘Mr Solana assists the Council in foreign policy matters, 
through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of European 
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policy decisions. He acts on behalf of the Council in conducting political dialogue with 
third parties.’ (The Council of the European Union, 2007).  In addition the High 
Representative ‘assists the Council Presidency in representing the European Union 
externally.’ (Pinder, 2001, p.184). 
 
Jack Straw 
 
Following a spell as Home Secretary, Straw was the Secretary of State at the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office from 8th June 2001 until 8th May 2006.  Since 2006 he has 
been the Leader of the House of Commons. 
 
The National Commission on Terrorism 
 
This Commission was established by the U.S. Congress in 1999 and reported in 2000.  
‘Congress gave the Commission six months to review the laws, regulations, directives, 
policies and practices for preventing and punishing international terrorism directed 
against the United States, assess their effectiveness, and recommend changes.’ (The 
National Commission on Terrorism, 2000).  It was composed of 10 commissioners 
selected by the party leaders in the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
 
Hubert Vedrine 
 
Served as Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and the French-speaking Countries 
from May 1997 until May 2002. 
 
Phillip C. Wilcox 
 
A diplomat who served as Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the U.S. Department of 
State between 1994 and 1997.  ‘The primary mission of the Office of the Coordinator 
for Counterterrorism (S/CT) is to forge partnerships with non-state actors, multilateral 
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organizations, and foreign governments to advance the counterterrorism objectives and 
national security of the United States.’ (Department of State, 2007). 
 
Paul Wolfowitz 
 
Deputy Secretary of Defense in the United States from 2001 until 2005.  He had 
previously held a variety of government appointments, and was President of the World 
Bank from 2005 until 2007. 
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